The London School of Economics and Political Science

Cultivating Hierarchy: The Reproduction of Structural Advantage in Sierra Leone's Cannabis Economy

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated it is the work of others (in which case the extent of my work carried out jointly by me and any others is clearly identified in it).

I declare that my thesis consists of 102,184 words.

Abstract

Violence is often treated as an organisational compliment to illicit drug production and exchange in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis challenges this view in light of the "chain work" undertaken by cannabis cultivators in Sierra Leone, and examines its complex web of labour, exchange, and extra-legal relations. Research reveals that an apprenticeship system during the early 1800s slavery abolition period continued to organise labour in Western Area's small-scale agriculture. Meanwhile, the migration of cultivators from Jamaica during the economic crises and War on Drugs of the late-1980s coincided with the spread of Rastafari culture and a post-war Neo-Evangelist discourse that established apprenticeship as a legitimate means for learning how to cultivate under the guidance of those known as "shareholders". These shareholders were gatekeepers in accessing land, exchange partners and extra-legal relations. They secured greater returns without organised violence. This is explained by examining the shortcomings of current conceptual approaches and turning to Pierre Bourdieu's relational sociology. It employs a mixed methodology of objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. The analysis relates the qualitative experience of cultivators and dealers to the particular position they occupied within the economic field of cultivation and exchange and the juridical field of law enforcement. Despite being motivated by strong economic incentives, apprentices and journeymen were subject to the uncertainties of limited contracting arrangements and illegality, which exposed them to exploitation. However, by adopting particular ways of acting, reasoning and valuing that qualified their status as "youth men", they continued to invest in and reproduce this institution. I examine how emic practices of "*sababu*", "*grade*" and "*haju*" acted as covert principles that limited the possibility for newcomers to secure higher value exchange partners, greater returns and police inaction. The thesis concludes that apprenticeship was the site at which structural advantages favouring the established shareholders were reproduced.

Acknowledgments

"Yu mɔs bia am" [you must deal with it] is a common rhetorical reply spoken by those that empathise with the burdens carried by others. I am indebted to my colleagues in the Department of Geography & Environment who have provided me with immense intellectual and emotional support in the study room and in the George IV pub. Harry, Jordana, Jayraj, Matt, Meredith, Taneesha and Tucker – thank you. My supervisors, Gareth Jones and Murray Low, have been exceptional in providing me with the freedom to explore academic ideas that, while time consuming, have allowed me over the past seven years in their company at the London School of Economics to take a more eclectic approach to the social sciences. Thank you also to other academic staff – especially Claire, Ryan and Sylvia – who perhaps unknowingly engaged in productive conversations that have helped immensely during the PhD process, and some of whom were vital in securing funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. My interest to embark on this project was shaped in large part by my secondary school geography teacher, Nick Ashbee – I wouldn't be writing this without your fantastic lessons and encouragement to study the discipline at university – thanks! To my family and friends: Julie Suckling, Mike Suckling, Tom Suckling, Katie Griffin, Nathan Brown, Aloke, Dave, Inder, Jon, James, Sam, Michael, Spaden, and Leela – and many others over the years – I couldn't have completed this without your empathy, humour and support. And most importantly, to my research assistant and friends in Sierra Leone who took me in and were vital in supporting my project, I hope this thesis does you justice: *Wi mɔs bia am*.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Introductory Vignette: "Going inside the game"

While sitting on a bench outside *Pablo Base* in Hastings; a *panbɔdi* [tin hut] where young men congregate to smoke *diamba* [cannabis], drink *pɔyo* [palm wine], and discuss politics, relationships and sex, Turkish told me how he used to run illicit drugs from one of Lumley Street's ghetto houses following a *coup d'état* led by Johnny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that removed elected-President Tejan Kabbah from power in May 1997. Turkish worked as a lookout for what he referred to as a cartel colloquially named "After Twelve", operated by affiliates of the AFRC and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that had infiltrated Freetown and its environs prior to a brutal and devastating offensive. Taking his time to smoke one "*sling*" [cigarette of cannabis], Turkish outlined how during the early 1990s he moved from his place of birth in Hastings and attended secondary school in Eastern Freetown while living with his uncle. When his uncle passed away and with "finance not there" he found a job through his father – a Local Unit Commander in the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) – as a warehouse worker for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMIL). With the "*sababu*"[1] of his father to support him, Turkish claimed he ran illicit drugs for After Twelve, including cannabis herb and cocaine, under the cover of the UNMIL distribution warehouse. At night he smuggled compressed cannabis herb to Guinea-Conakry in the engine parts of second hand cars, a practice colloquially referred to as "change oil". He claimed that the "fast money" of this trade allowed him to relieve the financial burden indicative of what he described as "the load in his head".

Numerous scholars have argued that social practice for youth in sub-Saharan Africa plays out in a context of uncertainty and unpredictability, and have explored the various ways in which those at the margins have sought to regain some control (Jackson 1998; Simone 2004, 2006; Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005; Christiansen et al 2006; Vigh 2006, 2009; Cooper and Pratten 2015). Uncertainty is encountered when youth participate in the *illegal* production and exchange of goods, given a lack of trust, asymmetries in available information, and the ever-present apprehension of being detected by law-

[1] A widely spoken Krio term that probably originates from Mandingo and the Arabic 'sabab' to mean good fortune from an influential person, usually within a system of patronage.

enforcement (Beckert and Wehninger 2013).[2] The weakness of formal institutions such as the education system, factory and courts is argued to have resulted in fields of activity that no longer seem to make sense when using extant conceptual approaches that emphasise well-institutionalised norms and rules (Ralph 2008; Vigh 2009). The "load" in Turkish's head was analogous to what critics of mainstream economics refer to as 'fundamental uncertainty': probabilities could not be assigned to events that could not be knowable *ex ante*: 'the future is yet to be created' (Dequech 2008; see also Dequech 2000: 44-50; Hanappi 2011: 795-6). When trying to plot a course and relieve the load in his head, Turkish claimed he did not know what the future held (Gerrard 1994; Beckert 1996; Graeber 2012: 25-7; Lainé 2014).[3]

Turkish leaned his head back against the corrugated zinc walls of Pablo Base and started to "meditate" [smoke *diamba*]. Unwilling to further risk his life while hemmed into a line of work that seemed to offer no further opportunities, he suggested in a low whisper that his dependency on those "big men" within the cartel meant his life was on the precipice of turning "*bɔmboshɔro*":

> "A disturbance in life […] when all goodness has gone, when you are cast away […] *bɔmboshɔro* is not good for us, it is awful […] I pray I can overcome any situation in life. I want to overcome my debt."[4]

Turkish lamented his social stasis by referencing a common contrast between the socio-economic mobility afforded to "playing the game" with the "stiffness", fixity and stasis of "the system". The system connoted waged labour, the school, government jobs and the diaspora; those whose economic, geographic and social mobility was assured by

[2] Illegality represents the official position of the state and cannot be conflated with the actions of agents of the state, such as the police. Economic activities are therefore illegal if the good exchanged and mode of transaction are illegal (Beckert and Wehinger 2013). This distinguishes illegality from informality, which generally involves the illegal exchange of legal goods (Portes and Haller 2005: 425).

[3] The application of neoclassical economics to illegal drug economies has been widely critiqued (see Dwyre and Moore 2012; Sandberg 2012: 1134-6 for overviews). Discrepancies in the popular 'risks and prices' model (Reuter and Kleiman 1986) are usually explained with reference to 'failures of judgement' on the part of participants, rather than empirical weaknesses stemming from a narrow model of rational action (Caulkins and MacCoun 2003: 438, 456). Recent studies of cannabis markets have challenged neoclassical tendencies to separate the roles of buyer and seller (Caulkins and Pacula 2006; Coomber and Turnbull 2007) that are often undertaken simultaneously (Sandberg 2012: 1138-40). Such economic analyses have, however, been confined to cases of wholesale import and retail distribution in North America and Europe.

[4] Interlocutors claimed "*bɔmboshɔro*", written here phonetically in Krio, referred to a "fracas", meaning a break or rupture in life. It was perceived to be an emasculating status and associated with a loss of manhood.

bureaucratic processes and technologies - ID cards, passports and drivers licenses – that benefited only those sat behind silver-tinted windows in the air conditioned offices of Siaka Stevens Street (cf. Jackson 2008: 65). As Mats Utas (2014: 175, 2015) has argued, the system closely resembles the sociological concept of 'structure' and of youth trapped in a condition of urban marginality. Turkish and his peers continue to occupy a liminal position, characterised as 'risks yet at risk' (Vigh 2006a), as breakers yet makers (Honwana and de Boeck 2005) and vandals yet vanguards (Abbink and van Kessel 2005).

Unable to recount the painful experiences he and his peers had been subject to during the RUF's advance, Turkish said that by the end of the war in 2001 he had moved back to his place of birth in Hastings. While congregating with other young men in search of employment in one of Back Street's *panbɔdi*'s, Turkish explained how he met a "shareholder" called Harold from whom he rented a plot of land for one "*scale*" [kilogram] of cannabis a season in an area of bush known as "*Obɔnoki*". By escaping Freetown and moving back to Hastings, Turkish reasoned he could now embark on "finding his own lane in life". To do so required him to quite literally "go *inside* the game" in order to learn from Harold how to "*sabi*" [know, understand in phonetic Krio vernacular] cannabis cultivation and dealing.[5] In doing so, these young cultivators invested in an ascetic commitment to the "strain" of hard work and the patience required to be recognised as a productive and "righteous somebody".

[5] "The game" appears to be analogous with a 'moral economy' (E.P. Thompson 1971, 1993; James Scott 1971; Austen 1993; Newell 2009: 180-1). Earlier work has used the moral economy concept to explain the legitimation of notions of justice and rights against the self-interests of unfettered markets and state over-centralisation, indicative of working class and student protest in Sierra Leone's wharves and university campuses (Bolten 2009; Harris 2014: 33-46). Moral economies are formed according to conscious consent with shared norms perceived to be in an agent's best interest. Despite James Scott's (1976: 4) more complex approach to the psychology of moral economy claiming to 'deal with the nature of exploitation', moral economy lacks a fully worked out theory of domination and it is unclear how a moral rhetoric is, subjectively-speaking, rendered compatible with objectively exploitative labour relations. Scott recognises this shortcoming when suggesting that 'such theories [of moral economy] rarely provide a conceptual link between an *a priori* notion of exploitation and the subjective feeling of the exploited […] Such an approach must start phenomenologically at the bottom' (*ibid*: 159-60). Scott (1985: 307, 323-4) discusses Bourdieu in later work claiming that 'appropriation must take place through a socially recognized form of domination', but reduces Bourdieu's treatment of domination to 'mystification', applicable only in 'very rare and special circumstances'. Ironically, Scott argues that hegemony works 'to define what is realistic and what is not realistic and to drive certain goals and aspirations' (*ibid*: 326). This mirrors precisely Bourdieu's concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence as I discuss in Chapter Two and as deployed in the following analysis.

So you left the cartel?

"Yes, I worked, worked, worked, but I didn't see any other way [out] except that [cannabis cultivation]. That's why I came back to my home land [place of birth], where I am from, so I could start to develop and make progress on my *own*."[6]

In the next secton I examine the ethnographic and theoretical literature on youth, particularly in West Africa, in order to situate youth as a specific kind of social construction in the context of apprenticeship in Sierra Leone.

1.2. Youth and apprenticeship

Research on youth in West Africa has been marked by a post-structuralist ambivalence that makes the concept of youth difficult to pin down (Honwana and de Boeck 2005: 3). As Deborah Durham (2000: 116) argues in a review of the anthropological literature, youth in everyday practice is a 'social shifter', one that represents 'a very shifty category that seems to fit many people at the same time but no one consistently'. A more recent critique of the literature has concluded that there remains a 'fuzziness of the idea of youth [that provides] no conceptual clarity of how their choices, situations and motivations can be understood' (Van Djik et al 2011: 5; also see Philipps 2014). Yet, in the quote above, Turkish's decision to move back to Hastings was guided by a specific telos, one that obligated him to "start to develop" and to "make progress on my own". Rather than associated with government-mandated numerical age brackets[7] or socio-biological stages of development, I interpret "youth" as a socially constructed, generational category that invokes different emic meanings and status-claims embedded in particular relations of power. This conception of youth suggests a transition from childhood to adulthood that is neither fixed or stable, nor immanent or permanent (Durham 2004; Christiansen et al 2006). As Langevang (2008) remarks of youth 'managing' towards adulthood in Ghana:

'Adulthood is not an endpoint at which people arrive but rather encompasses composite positions that are achieved, a process of becoming that is continuous'.

[6] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[7] Sierra Leone's National Youth Policy 2003 defines youth as aged between 15 and 35 years, which is indicative of how this socio-generational category is much wider than compared with the Global North.

I follow Christiansen et al (2006: 11) in their interpretation of youth in West Africa as being premised on two states, those of *becoming* adult and those of *being* youth. Becoming adult corresponds with culturally, historically, and socially specific processes that generate broad generational categories within a society. Being youth, however, is more specific to the individual and depends on how those considered to be "youth" position themselves and are positioned by this generational category.

From the perspective of their elders, the passage from youth to adulthood in Sierra Leone 'crucially' depends on 'ritual and social obligations' to gain 'economic independence', which is perceived necessary for marriage, handling parental responsibilities and providing for the community (Peters 2011a; Boersch-Supan 2012: 27, 31). For instance, parents, teachers and government officials would frequently caution "the youth" that "an idle mind is the devil's workshop". This early 1800s English proverb inherited the colonial maxim that education is a prerequisite for social mobility; such that "youth" are defined by their being productive and as using their labour and faculties to fulfil social obligations to communal and national development (Langevang 2008; Manning 2009; Boersch-Supan 2012). As Bolten (2012: 499) argues, 'Sierra Leonean sociality emphasized the importance of relationships to individual survival', such that a young man's "bigness" corresponds to 'whether they nurture those who initially invested in them' (also see Jackson 2011). Otherwise, a young person is relegated to a "*bobo*"; a Krio term for a "small boy" who is dependent, lacks direction and does not possess the labour and skills necessary to provide for his family or wider community.

These social obligations stem from a history of struggle over patrimonial authority and the need to extract cheap labour, control access to resources and ensure social control. Under the British colonial policy of indirect rule in Sierra Leone's interior during the late 1800s to early 1900s, paramount chiefs were granted powers to elicit labour from their subjects: an arrangement 'that was little distinguishable in some aspects from domestic slavery' (Peters 2011b: 39). The result was an 'ossification of patrimonial authority' whereby a two-tiered society organised around a demographic cleavage divided the families of chiefs who had access to education, labour and land, from those whose labour was extracted by chiefs for the ostensible benefit of their chiefdoms (Fanthorpe 2001: 379-384). The post-independence period, as Reno (1995) has argued, was also marked by the emergence of a 'shadow state' that controlled access to mining through a parallel network of political patronage. As a result of these twin developments, Sierra Leonean

politics and society has been based on what Peters (2011b: 42) describes as 'patrimonial principles'. These principles mean that 'national resources' are distributed through a system of 'personal favours to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the leader represents' (Richards 1996: 34).

Those deemed to comprise "the youth" are usually still the patrons of elders. This division of labour is relatively uncontested and premised on the 'well-established norm to provide (unpaid) labour in the name of community and development' (Boersch-Supan 2012: 46). Youths' obligations to, and dependency on, their elders is indicative of what Boersch-Supan (2012: 27) calls a 'generational contract'. The generational contract ties 'several generations vertically and horizontally to each other through material and non-material exchanges taking place over the life course'. Such arrangements do, however, more often result in exploitation. Peters (2012b: 47) notes, for instance, that there are 'striking' similarities between slavery and the way elders 'manipulate the labour' of young people today, such that the 'expression of a cultural legacy [still] persists' (also see Fanthorpe 2001). Consequently, young men in contemporary Sierra Leone have frequently bemoaned the "slave work" of agriculture in the rural provinces that, being organised by customary authorities, is deemed labour intensive, paternalistic and as requiring 'too much work for far too little yield' (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082-3).

The growing political and social marginalisation of young people and resulting instability of this generational contract was, of course, made apparent with devastating effect during Sierra Leone's civil conflict in the 1990s. Most researchers argue that those who comprised the insurgent Revolutionary United Front were largely young, rural men who were seeking to challenge, by violent means, the gerentocratic control paramount chiefs had over their 'productive and reproductive' rights (Peters 2011b: 34; Richards 1996; Humphrey and Weinstein 2004; Richards 2005). Rural settlements in which the village was the 'primary social matrix' were characterised by the 'extreme localization of criteria of identity and belonging', including ancestral rights to land and chiefly family's exclusive access to formal education. As rapid demographic change exacerbated the exclusivity of these patrimonial relations, those marginalised by this system had little recourse to other forms of moral community. Young persons could not undergo the same rites of passage or associate through the same social relations, rendering them neither 'citizens' nor 'subjects' (Fanthorpe 2001: 372, 375).

In the aftermath of this inter-generational conflict, Bolten (2012: 497) argues that donor-funded reconstruction programmes focused on the "sensitisation of youth", which re-established the gerentocratic order albeit with a more accommodating character. While there is disagreement as to the legitimacy young people ascribe to the continuation of patrimonial authority in rural affairs (Fanthorpe 2005; Sawyer 2008), the generational contract is now largely characterised by 'qualitative' rather than 'quantitative' challenges to authority in young peoples' relations with their elders (Boersch-Supan 2012: 31). This has been demonstrated by a number of scholars in relation to the creation of youth associations and their use of human rights discourse to carve out a space in civil society to challenge the perceived uncivil customary practices of elders (Boersch-Supan 2012; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2012; Tom 2014). Therefore, a young person's pursuit of self-enterprise in Sierra Leone is negotiated through a potentially exploitative generational contract. Yet it is one that offers opportunities for capital accumulation. The contract remains necessary to gain the social status of adulthood which, as a process of becoming, is qualified by being able to marry, raise children and provide for elders (Bolten 2012: 498).

Economic autonomy is, however, difficult to achieve in a context where socio-generational categories are primarily determined by gerontocratic control over wealth, land, status and even women. This is especially the case when young people are afforded limited educational opportunities and are subject to widespread unemployment, resulting in a ceaseless search for "job facility", usually in small-scale agriculture or the informal sector (Peters 2011a; Boersch-Supan 2012: 27). Like elsewhere in West Africa, the skills training provided by a traditional apprenticeship represents an 'intermediate position' towards self-employment (Nordman and Pasquier-Doumner 2014). Furthermore, the qualitative shift in the character of Sierra Leone's patrimonialism has meant that:

> 'An important part of youth's 'maturing' lies not only in learning by doing and gaining more formal responsibilities but, more importantly, by 'being close' to elders, 'listening', 'watching' and 'taking advice' […] learning is seen by elders as a one-way process flowing from elders to youth.' (Boersch-Supan 2012: 31-2)

This thesis is concerned with how the institution of apprenticeship organised youth's labour in cannabis farming. Similar to what Meagher (2010: 64-6) refers to as 'apprenticeship networks', young men trained under the guidance of those they called

"shareholders" who provided a 'gateway to entry' to economic and social capital and the potential for obtaining self-sufficiency and social worth. As I examine in Chapter Four, Sierra Leone's apprenticing system was utilised under British colonialism in the late-1700s during Christian missionary efforts to challenge slavery by transforming recaptured slaves from unproductive and idle to productive wage labourers. After independence, apprenticeship continued to represent an important means for the under-educated to receive training and access employment in a range of informal enterprises, such as baking, blacksmithing, carpentry and tailoring (Chuta and Liedholm 1976). I argue that, in relation to small-scale agriculture, a system of 'apprentice provisioning' represented an institutional adaptation to control labour in the service of capital accumulation.

However, the informal apprenticeships involved in farming cannabis were not governed by contracting arrangements or independent referees, such as the state, paramount chiefs or parents. This meant an apprentice was subject to uncertainty, exploitation and the danger of perceiving their labour as "slave work". I therefore also argue that, much like the qualitative shift in patrimonial relations described above; the social construction of "youth man" represented an institutional accommodation of young people's agency to suit the needs of a hierarchically organised activity. This was necessary because the expectations of young men needed to be congruent with their expectation that, by undertaking cannabis farming, they too could achieve adulthood.

Having left the cartel, Turkish was apprenticed to his shareholder Harold, a relationship he described as follows:

> "Harold is a big man, because he is a caretaker and he sponsors me for the farming […] financially you need support, so they call you […] you get it from Harold."
>
> *So you said he is your 'shorty'?*
> "A shorty is a person who likes you. Any instance, you know, he is your boss. Like you have your boss in college. So it is like a shorty […] He will help you, he will *guard* you. He guards you from the police."
>
> […]

> "Those that have started a business are called *shareholders*. We are the small boys; we have our head who is the overseer. So we are the sm- small boys. *So I believe we have to build like them, we have to assist them*."[8]

I argue that youth represents what Durham (2000) refers to as a 'social effect of power'. Youth assumed a differentiated status rooted in an organisational need.

Furthermore, apprenticeship has been studied by scholars concerned with the linguistic and non-linguistic transmission of embodied knowledge, skills and techniques, in cases ranging from artisans to boxers (Coy 1989; Ingold 2000; Wacquant 2004a; Bloch 2012: 19, 150-1; Dalidowicz 2015). Common across these studies is that, when undertaking apprenticeship:

> 'Skill is not a 'thing', nor is it a mental representation, to be acquired, fixed, and secured, but *it is a transformation of our being in the world*.' (Dalidowicz 2015: 839-40, emphasis added)

Many apprentices and journeymen working on Western Area's cannabis farms were treated by their peers as "youth men". This represented a strategic intermediate social category. By possessing agricultural skills and committing their able-bodies to labour in the service of the community, they were recognised in emic terms as "youth". Many were also numerically older and had children to provide for, but remained dependent on their shareholders for access to the economic and social resources that would secure their autonomy and self-sufficiency. Given the informal nature of apprenticeship, it was, furthermore, unclear when and whether they too would become shareholders. Hence, being youth-yet-men indicated a transitory state towards becoming socially adult that was expected but not yet fulfilled. For instance, Vigh (2006b: 32) describes how the "*blufo*" in Bissau-Guinean society is a 'betwixt and between category described by the discrepancy between chronological and social age […] being symbolically stuck in the position of youth without possibilities of gaining the authority and status of adulthood'. Youth man was also a between category, but one in which apprentices and journeymen professed not to be stuck and without possibilities. Instead, it was common to reason that cannabis farming was a sure means to "find your own lane in life".

[8]Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. "Shorty" is a colloquial term derived from late 1980s East Coast hip-hop culture before growing in popularity during the 1990s (prounced as "shawty") in the songs of Public Enemy and Tribe Called Quest. The term originally meant a "thug" or "wannabe" new to gang life, but more broadly refers to someone who sells drugs.

This apparent contradiction of chances and expectations requires an examination of how being a "youth man" is experienced, and how their expectations of masculine authority informed on-going social practice. I therefore also understand youth as a state of *being* in the world, of positioning within positions, that is negotiated in different contexts and situations according to a broader process of *becoming* socially adult. As Christiansen et al (2006: 11) go on to explain, it is necessary to:

> 'Look at the ways youth are positioned in society and the ways they seek to position themselves in society to illuminate the ways the category of youth is socially constructed, as well as the ways young people construct counter-positions and definitions.'

I therefore develop a relational sociological approach that is sensitive to the positioning of youth within broader socio-generational categories, precisely because it treats the social and experiential as 'inseparable' (*ibid*). In doing so, it is possible to understand how, despite youths' expectations of reaching adulthood being highly uncertain in the absence of apprentice contracting, their qualification as "youth men" accommodated struggles over the economic, social and symbolic capital required to claim masculine authority. In other words, the ethics constituting what I term the 'apprentice habitus' (Chapter Five) informed youths' practice when undertaking cannabis farming for the shareholders. It was experienced as a sense of requiredness and validation for what was necessary to be recognised as a youth man. However, these ethics conflicted with a youth culture shaped by rural-to-urban migrants during the 1980s. The globalisation of Western fashion, media and music provided youth with an avenue to escape from economic hardship by fantasising about an elsewhere, thought reachable through the "fast money" attributed to informal employment and social connections disembedded from kinship in the city of Freetown.[9]

[9] This tension is also reflected in, for instance, the lives of young men in Abidjan, Côte D'Ivoire for whom fantasy was 'glorified through not productive but consumption-oriented identities'. This fantasy defied 'production as a means to an end – a secure livelihood with the opportunity to [move from] the status of social junior to social senior – consumption becomes means and end for defining manhood at the periphery' (Matlon 2015: 147, 152). The need to accommodate these expectations is further evidenced by Waage (2006: 61), who concludes with regard to Cameroonian youth negotiating access to the unpredictability of informal employment, that 'These young peoples' main challenge for succeeding in their personal project is to find ways to act out new knowledge and new roles in ways that are acceptable within the framework of local ideals for respectable identities.'

I therefore examine how youth's expectations of social adulthood were accommodated, while a hierarchy of cannabis production and marketing networks retained the basic institutional character of apprenticeship. Apprenticeship enabled a tier of proprietors known as "shareholders" to dominate production and marketing. This was primarily because they claimed first rights to land ownership. However, they also obtained first-mover advantages following the arrival of several cultivators from Kingston, Jamaica, in the mid-1980s that were displaced by the ruling Jamaican Labour Party's crackdown on cannabis cultivation amid the US-led War on Drugs. Already connected to Freetown through a Rastafari diaspora that was shaping youth culture during the 1980s, the established shareholders in Hastings – what youth referred to as "Ganja HQ" – planted a new seed variety (cannabis *sativa*), utilised new cultivation techniques, and secured access to high value cross-border buyers (Chapter Four).

Map One: Location of field sites in Sierra Leone.
Source: Open Street Map and Contributors, 2016.



During fieldwork at these sites in 2013 (Map One), I identified several clusters of cannabis production colloquially referred to as: *Loko Fakay*, *Obɔnoki*, *Sugar Loaf*, *Wanpala*, and *You Must Grumble*.[10]

Apprentices were not afforded contracting arrangements governing the obligations of their shareholders, such as in wages, skills training and settlement upon graduation. Given cannabis cultivation was officially suppressed by the state, these youth also had little recourse to other authorities within the community to mediate disputes. Their participation could not, therefore, be based solely on the veneer of a promise to be granted one or two *lagati* [bundles] of cannabis herb each season. I argue instead that apprenticeship reproduced what I term *structural advantages* favouring shareholders. This was because apprentices and journeymen engaged in a one-sided valuation of what was necessary to succeed, which was defined by a particular ethics of economic and social conduct regarding what was required to reach adulthood. Resisting translation into the conceptual framework of 'Big Man networks' (Utas 2012) a close analysis of relations between shareholders, journeymen and apprentices during field work indicated that apprenticeship operated according to more covert forms of power and violence (see Chapters Two and Four). In the absence of contracting arrangements, then, apprenticeship provided an empirical site at which to examine the reproduction of a hierarchically organised field of activity in a context that has otherwise been treated as more volatile and prone to criminal breakdown (e.g. see Newell 2006; Lindell and Utas 2012).

1.3. Conceptualising *chain work*

With state over-centralisation and the cronyism of indirect rule under President Siaka Stevens' and then Joseph Momoh's one-party state posited as the underlying causes of rural grievances that precipitated Sierra Leone's civil war (Peters and Richards 2008; Richards et al 2011), the expansion of illicit economies throughout the 1990s and 2000s was presented as being facilitated by the parasitic, rent-seeking activities of elites occupying a 'shadow state' (Reno 1995; Hibou 1999; Keen 2005: 107; Reno 2009: 68; see Meagher's 2003: 58-9 critique). The weakening of official state structures is argued to have allowed extra-legal networks to exert downwards pressure on cross-border trading arrangements assumed to be increasingly involved in criminal activities (Duffield 1999; Chouvy and Laniel 2007: 139-40) and provided a context for the

[10] Pseudonyms are used to conceal the specific locations of these farms.

emergence of violent modes of accumulation and exchange (Roitman 2005; Kunkeler and Peters 2011; Mirella 2014). It is common to assume that 'there is a real possibility of Freetown turning into another Sao Paulo or Bogotá, with youth-cum-drug gangs becoming part of the urban landscape' (Kunkeler and Peters 2011: 282).[11]

These geopolitical representations have tended to conflate different kinds of informal and illicit activities and further differentiation of goods and practices therein, despite limited empirical analysis of the actors involved in facilitating the expanding production and trade of such economically and politically distinct goods. For instance, Value Chain Analysis (VCA) originating in the work of Porter (1980) is widely utilised in the study of drug markets in Europe and North America and small-scale agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. However, rarely are the full range of activities and stages of value addition involved in cannabis supply chains in the Global South examined, while those studies that do focus largely on the organisation of production (see e.g. Bloomer 2009). There is also scant consideration for the institutional histories from which these supply chains have emerged and the social norms by and through which they are operating (Meagher 2003: 62-4, 2009: 505-517; 2014). Consequently, the conceptual approaches deployed to examine illicit activities are primarily derived from North American, European and Latin America experience. In doing so, illicit economies in sub-Saharan Africa have been left 'essentially' without a history (Klantschnig et al 2014).

Cannabis cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo does not fit into a neat conceptualisation of illicit drug economies that privileges organised violence, state criminalisation, or as a contributor to the onset and duration of violent conflict. Cultivators at each site would instead lock their index fingers together and claim they were undertaking "chain work":

> "Myself now, I am the grower. We have the pedlars [dealers] and we have the main sellers and buyers – that is chain work. I am the grower, I have a middleman who I have linked with; the man who buys and sells by slings [cigarettes of cannabis], and he comes with the money for me – you see? So that is the chain work."[12]

Chain work was not confined to production and supply activities occurring at the firm-level of apprenticeship. Neither was it reducible to direct sales undertaken by

[11] As Turkish earned a living in Eastern Freetown's ghettos, Robert Kaplan (1994) denied that such 'loose mollecules' as Turkish could participate in anything like an organised field of activity, let alone a coordinated 'economy'.
[12] Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.

shareholders to already well-known dealers close to farms in Hastings' and Waterloo's ghettos. Rather, chain work related to a complex series of exchange relationships and social practices involved in the supply chain. Cannabis herb was, for example, sold by farmers to intermediaries in bulk who then separated the product into smaller quantities called "*kwants*" [1/4 kilogram] or "*slings*" [one cigarette] for onward sale in Freetown. The emic term is also not interchangeable with the better known concept of value chains, eventhough a process of value addition did occur after cannabis was sold to cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia, and also when middlemen separated cannabis into smaller quantities for sale in the domestic market.

Chain work was instead a byword for the social interactions that held together a complex network reaching beyond buyers in close proximity and that linked together producers, buyers in the domestic and cross-border markets, and consumers. Crucially, the term also connoted a moral distinction from activities organised in a similar way, but what participants considered as being illegitimate enterprises, such as cigarette smuggling, cocaine and heroin trafficking, and the fencing of stolen goods. As one cultivator remarked when explaining chain work, "we bind around *this*, but not around *that*". In order to conceptualise chain work, in the next section I provide a critical reading of the research on criminal enterprise. I argue that shortcomings associated with this research motivate the use of a relational sociology.

1.3.1. Contested models of organised crime

Understandings of organised crime stem from different theoretical histories, largely of North American and European import, that have responded to the changing empirical realities of crime since the 1950s (Von Lampe 2006; Hall 2008; Kleemans 2014: 32). Of particular concern has been to analyse the internal, economic characteristics of criminal organisations in order to establish how co-operation is ensured among illegal actors in support of recurrent criminal activities (Haller 1990). In particular, North American scholars beginning with Dwight Smith (1994) have drawn on transaction cost economics to argue that, in an illegal context characterised by uncertainty and the potential for opportunistic self-interest, some level of organisation is necessary aside from market-based mechanisms (Von Lampe 2006: 82).

To this end, organised crime has drawn from a number of disciplines in order to shift the analytical focus between the "who" and "what" of organised criminality, across

different levels of analysis from individual to collective. Von Lampe (2006: 84) suggests this represents a bifurcation of the literature between concerns with 'structures of association' and 'structures of activities'; the latter taking its starting point as criminal enterprise rather than organised criminality. There seems to be some agreement, however, that analysis is left with an 'ambiguous conflated concept, produced by a stratification of different meanings' (Paoli 2002: 52; see also Smith 1991; Moselli 2005: 10-11; Von Lampe 2006: 80). Organised crime continues to encompass a broad empirical foci, for it simultaneously seeks to characterise both the provision of criminal goods and services (as 'organised crime') and the forms of social organisation (as 'Organised Crime') that coordinate these economic activities (Hagan 2006: 134; Paoli 2002; Hall 2008: 369). Common to this literature, however, is a concern with the degree to which the "who" and "what" of criminality is actually organised, which depends foremost on whether criminality is being 'driven by a structural logic of organization and unified purpose' (Abraham and Schendel 2005: 4; also see Hall 2008: 374).

Organised criminal enterprises involved in the distribution and marketing of illegal drugs are often shown to be short-lived and small, depending on who is involved in them and according to what specific criminal enterprises they are engaged in (Reuter 1983; Van Duyne and Levi 2005). Natarajan (2006) concludes, for instance, that heroin distribution networks are organised by 'small groups of loosely linked entrepreneurs rather than large, highly structured criminal syndicates'. Such observations result in what Paoli (2002) describes as the 'paradox' of organised crime, which requires an explanation for why particular organised crime groups grow and survive while others remain small and fleeting. This begets a more critical view on the minimal definition of organised crime, whereby the provision of illegal goods and services is separated from the study of 'criminal organization[s], understood as a large-scale collectivity primarily engaged in illegal activities with a well-defined collective identity and subdivision of work among its members' (Paoli 2002: 52). The degree to which criminality can be said to be organised therefore depends on: the maintenance of a formalised structure based on personal, ethnic, or kinship ties that utilises force or violence; their unified sense of collective identity; the degree to which this structure monopolises the production and/or distribution of illegal goods or services across legal and illegal divides, and their resilience and ability to expand over time (Papachristos and Zhao 2015: 2938; Ellis and Shaw 2015: 509).

Most empirical research in this vein originates in taking bureaucracy as the archetypal model of organised crime (Papachristos and Zhao 2015), as demonstrated by studies of Italian and Sicilian Mafias, such as the Cosa Nostra (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001).[13] This conception of the Mafia has more recently been stretched to encompass 'gangs, clans and insurgencies' that are argued to provide alternative forms of governance in the context of weak states (Shortland and Varese 2016). These are understood to be private and hierarchically organised groups that behave relatively autonomously and work against the state. When communities are disorganised and states are unable or unwilling to enforce and protect property rights, Mafia groups respond by fulfilling a demand for private protection over a range of illegal and legal economic activities (Kleemans 2014: 36-8; Smith and Papachristos 2014). These groups of strongmen are bound by non-economic ties of obligation, loyalty and trust; enabling them to function as *de facto* rulers who commercialise the sale of protection, which is enforced primarily through the use and credible threat of inter-personal violence (Gambetta 1996; Paoli 2002). The resulting protection economy works to undermine the capacity of the state to deliver public goods and services such as security, which, mirroring Charles Tilly's (1985) theory of state formation, results in the Mafia group selling protection by means of extortion rather than legitimately through taxation in the legal sphere (Shortland and Varese 2016: 811-2). It is therefore the 'fact of being protected [that] acts as a singular lubricant for economic transactions' (Dewey 2012: 686; also see Leander 2004).

However, as Smith and Papachristos (2014: 662) argue, in practice the members of organised crime groups must integrate with 'noncriminal society'. They occupy a more ambiguous position in relation to the state than the strict functionalist opposition implied by bureaucratic Mafia models. For instance, having recognised the role local notions of legitimacy play alongside state legal codes in social encounters between law-breakers and law-enforcers in the context of weak states; some scholars have drawn a distinction between juridical principles of state-mandated legality and local notions of licitness that inform everyday social interaction (van Schendel and Abraham 2005: 17). This analytical complexity is, however, often reduced to corruption, with criminal agents understood as motivated by a desire to subvert the appropriate roles of public office by breaking legal codes solely in pursuit of private gain. The notion that corruption threatens state authority is typically based on an ideal-typical model of the Weberian

[13] Von Lampe (2007: 110) suggests this is primarily the legacy of Cressey's (1969) research that concluded organised crime in the United States is synonymous with Mafias, particularly the Cosa Nostra, such that they operate as 'both a business organization and a government'.

state, as a rational and neutral bureaucracy that serves the public interest (Gupta 2005: 8). However, what counts as corruption is more situational and subject to the context-specific sensitivities of what constitutes localised perceptions of the 'public interest' (Heidenheimer 1989: 7-10).

The resulting difficulties in identifying a boundary between legal and illegal, and public and private interest, in the everyday activities undertaken by these groups has provided a window for critical scholarship addressing the theoretical utility of organised crime models (Hall 2008: 372). For instance, in the social anthropology literature criminal activity in the Global South is more readily understood as occurring in social contexts that are not governed the same way as those involving the legal system. This results in a degree of 'ontological uncertainty' when utilising models of organised crime owing to the plurality of different public authorities that criminal groups work with and exploit in these contexts (Dewey 2012: 683; also see Zaitch 2005; Hall 2008: 373; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Aguiar 2011; Auyero et al 2014: 104-5).

This observation is not new. As Keith Hart (1973: 74-6) acknowledged in his study of self-employment in Accra, something is amiss when participants' perceptions of illegal activity are made to conform with conceptual schemes embedded in moral and legal principles enacted by the state; such as the right to property, obligation to repay debts, and rectitude of public office (Robertson 2006: 9). State-mandated illegality is an important resource when multiple different kinds of public authority; such as "Big men", town chiefs, the police, secret societies and youth associations, are staking particular claims and negotiating particular classifications of what is licit and permissible and what is illicit and impermissible (Heyman 2013: 304; for Sierra Leone see Baker 2008; Albrecht 2015). It is analytically prudent, therefore, not to treat 'the state' as a unitary actor, and instead to glean the actions and interpretations of law-enforcers during their social encounters with law-breakers. The state represents, as Raeymaekers et al (2008: 8) argue, only one source of public authority among other 'specific modes in which different social forces in society strive for political control and domination'.[14]

This is well illustrated by the market for stolen vehicles in Buenos Aires. According to Dewey (2012), the local police force engaged in the sale of illegal protection to criminal

[14] Eschewing a model of the Weberian state, the concept of 'hybrid political orders' is, for example, now widely discussed among policy makers for these reasons (see Boege et al 2009; OECD 2010).

enterprises, while also protecting the public from crime. The sale of protection was a 'largely non-violent relationship' based on the 'temporary non-application of the law as a commodity' (*ibid*: 681-2). Hence, an *a priori* distinction between public and private interest precludes the ways in which law-breakers and law-enforcers are interlocked for long-established institutional reasons. More broadly, criminal groups have increasingly been argued to operate in an 'extra-legal' fashion that cuts across a clean-cut distinction between legal and illegal (Nordstrom 2010). As Galemba (2012: 9; also see Titeca and Flynn 2014) has argued in her examination of cross-border smuggling, attention to the overlaps between the legal and illegal might hold the 'key to the functioning of many socioeconomic systems'. And yet the variability of law enforcement has only recently been acknowledged as a 'pertinent sociological research topic' within the organised crime literature (Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 7).

Given that cannabis production and marketing in the Global South usually occurs in the context of weak states or spaces characterised by partial or ungovernance, it is readily assumed these activities are organised by small and closed groups that accumulate and protect returns. Despite a paucity of empirical evidence, the commercialisation of small-scale cannabis farming is said to be achieved by 'recourse to Mafia activities', which facilitates collusive agreements based on the non-economic ties of loyalty, obligation and/or trust found in clan, kinship and ethnic bonds (OGD 1998: 10; Labrousse and Laniel 2006: 35, 343, 256-7, 259-61; also see Paoli 2002: 88). These organisations often resemble an internal patron-client structure, whereby commands are dictated from the top to the bottom of a hierarchy, based on a relationship of dependency in which the patron has exclusive access to valuable economic and social capital, and can offer the client continued protection (Papachristos and Smith 2013). These dependency relationships also ensure market information is protected from detection and disruption by law-enforcement, both externally through the 'clientelisation' of exchange relationships and internally by way of collusion and secrecy (Geertz 1978; Baker and Faulkner 1993; Kollock 1994; Smith and Papachristos 2014: 648). A 'common culture' binds recurrent exchange and contractual arrangements that are deemed necessary for adjudicating increasingly complex transactions (Dick 1996).

Following this thread, retail-level drug 'gangs' are demonstrated to 'embrace common goals, engage in common enterprise, [and] regulate the revenue generating activities of their members' (see Benson and Decker 2010: 131; also Decker et al 2008). Given the barriers to growth presented by illegality, these groups are usually 'dense' and 'small' to

ensure internal member and external customer loyalty, thereby minimising or maximising risk in line with the presence of law-enforcement (Smith and Papachristos 2014: 662; also see Reuter and Haaga 1989; Adler 1993; Hagedorn 1994; Eck and Gersh 2000: 265; Desroches 2005; Paoli et al 2009). For instance, Bouchard (2008) demonstrates that cannabis cultivation in Quebec comprised groups of 3.7 farmers on average at each production site.[15] The tendency for crime groups to monopolise illegal markets is therefore the Mafia's 'exception rather than rule' (Von Lampe 2004: 84), such that limitations on group size are supported by the credible and strategic use of force to prevent interference by law-enforcement and limit the entry of challengers. This results in many small-scale producers competing to claim a patchwork of monopoly rents (Reuter 1983; Reuter and Kleiman 1986: 301-2; Ayres 1987; Gambetta 1988, 1993; Fiorentini and Peltzman 1997; Heyman and Smart 1999: 4; Zaluar 2000; Coomber and Maher 2006: 741; Antonopoulos 2008: 281)[16] and stands in contrast to 'overarching power structures', such as Mafias, that monopolise violence over a range of individuals and groups that may conduct a variety of different illegal and legal enterprises (Shortland and Varese 2016: 812). The latter provides a non-violent means for managing the succession of strongmen and ensuring discipline among members.[17]

Despite this organisational logic, recent reviews of the organised crime literature have conceded that 'we know very little' empirically about organised criminal groups outside the context of Europe and North America (Papachristos and Zhao 2015). Ellis and Shaw (2015: 509) are more dismissive, suggesting that in the context of sub-Saharan Africa it would be unwise to begin with definitions of 'organised crime' imported from studies of Europe and North America. Instead, the primary characteristic of organised criminality in Africa is the presence of markets for protection organised through 'private arrangements' in collusion with agents of the state such as police forces, customs

[15] As Paoli (2002: 88) concludes, contrary to popular depcitions, that 'Mafia consortia hardly ever operate as a single unit', because different economic enterprises are left to single members.
[16] Empirical analysis in the context of Western Europe and North America broadly agrees that cannabis exchange markets, rather than firm-level organisations involved in cannabis production; usually do not share the violent characteristics of markets for other illicit goods (Curtis 1998: 1250; Curtis and Wendell 2000: 141-4; Reuter 2009: 376).
[17] Separately, violence may also be utilised externally under conditions of competition between organisations in order to ensure the protection of economic transactions, or in gaining territorial control over new areas in which to sell drugs. Although cannabis markets are generally not observed to experience 'systemic violence' in competition between competing producers and marketers (Reuter 2009), it continues to be the case that, for the internal organisation of small-scale cannabis production and marketing: 'violent enforcement and organizational hierarchy are [treated as] compliments' (Rogers and Leeson 2012: 97; see also Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 15-7).

officials and politicians. This protection economy cannot be reduced to the 'criminal capture' of state institutions or an alternative Mafia-like governance arrangement in which protection is offered in opposition to the state's unwillingness or incapability to enforce property rights. Rather, organised criminality is characterised by the:

> 'Reformulation of politics and crime into *networks* that transcend the state/non-state boundary in ways that are hardly subsumed in standard concepts of organized crime.' (*ibid*: 505, emphasis added)

A number of shortcomings undermine the utility of organised crime for examining cannabis production and marketing in the context of Sierra Leone. First, the emphasis placed on internally homogenous social ties based on clan, ethnicity or kinship precludes an explanation for self-enforcing arrangements among heterogeneous groups (Leeson 2008: 162-3). This is especially the case in Sierra Leone where participants are diverse owing to colonial history, rapid rural-to-urban migration and displacement following civil conflict. By extension, violence is privileged as a blunt device that cuts across difference to ensure co-ordination, especially in contexts that are unfamiliar (Bunt et al 2014: 334). This also presents opportunities for particular cultural traits and identities to be essentialised as more or less amenable to overcoming the uncertainties presented by illegality; as suggested by a renewed focus on ethnic-bonding models of drug trafficking. Organised crime scholars have, therefore, begun to recognise the need for a closer examination of how trust and social capital facilitate cooperative criminality, rather than beginning with extant organisational structures (Von Lampe 2006: 88-9). Second, there is often a lack of clarity regarding the object of study, which obscures attention to how individuals are specialised in different tasks, such as the production of goods as opposed to their distribution and exchange (Shortland and Varese 2016: 811-2). Meanwhile what constitutes the boundaries of an organised criminal group is not readily specified. This weakens the reliability of theoretical conclusions drawn from empirical case comparisons, especially when these are largely based on evidence from Europe and North America (Bouchard and Morselli 2014: 294). Finally, *members of* criminal organisations and *agents o*f the state are often intertwined for functional reasons when undertaking criminal activity. This begets a more relational state-society framework that is attentive to context-specific modes of extra-legal regulation that take place outside of, but not necessarily in opposition to, weak states.

1.3.2. Towards a Relational Sociology: Criminal Networks and Institutions

Formalised models of criminal organisation lack utility when analysing criminal enterprise in West Africa. In contrast to North American and European cases, studies demonstrate the involvement of non-permanent and flexible organisations, including 'adhocracies' and 'syndicates', whose participants are often diverse, allocated resources according to task specialisations, engage closely with agents of the state, and use their flexibility as a resource to avoid detection and interference by law-enforcement (Shaw 2003; Simone 2004: 417; Ellis 2009: 185-90; Klein 2009; Ellis and Shaw 2015; Paolo 2016). Over the last two decades, the network concept has been methodologically and theoretically formalised into a widely adopted bottom-up, exploratory approach to studying organisational forms such as these, which are often based on 'short-term relationships and shifting coalitions' rather than comparable to formalised organisational structures synonymous with bureaucracy or patrimonialism (Bouchard and Morselli 2014: 296; see e.g. Morselli 2005, 2010, 2014; Von Lampe 2006: 82-3, 2009; Bunt et al 2014; Carrington 2014; Kleemans 2014; Papachristos 2011, 2014; Smith and Papachristos 2016).

Drawing on earlier conceptions of organised crime as rooted in inter-related and overlapping social relationships, a network approach examines the processes involved in *organising* criminality, be it in an illegal market or an overarching governance structure (Bouchard and Morselli 2014: 11). This differs in focus to the broader criminological literature, which considers non-recurrent exchange – burglary, car-jacking and theft – and concludes that participants are confined to small groups that do not organise effectively (Benson and Decker 2010: 131). Instead, it is the 'embeddedness' of criminal agents in pre-existing social relations, such as ethnicity, friendship and kin that shapes more durable organisational strategies. In essence, embeddedness purports that economic behaviour cannot be separated out from social and cultural context. Rather than beginning with organisational hierarchy then, networks exist on a spectrum from the more fleeting to durable, and from the more open and expansive to asymmetric and closed (Morselli 2005: 10-11). As Bunt et al (2014: 322) conclude, 'social embeddedness means that existing relations and structures are not the only breeding ground for criminal activities, but also determine what form these activities can take'.

Embeddedness is, however, 'quite a broad church' (Kleemans 2014: 40) and one that has been applied 'haphazardly' in the African context (Meagher 2005: 220-2). For criminal organisation, the concept is largely imported from the New Economic Sociology popularised by Mark Granovetter (1983, 1985, also see Fligstein and Dauter 2007). Economic sociology scholars take a structural-functionalist approach to networks, agreeing they are crucial for explaining how cooperation and co-ordination are ensured in the conduct of criminal enterprise (Morselli 2005: 20, 34; Aspers 2011: 175-6; Papachristos 2011, 2014; Beckert and Wehinger 2013; Papachristos and Smith 2013; Smith and Papachristos 2016: 645-6).[18] The concept is analogous to what Beckert (1996: 827-9) refers to as a 'restrictive social device', because it reduces the uncertainty stemming from product illegality and mutual distrust by regulating economic action through existing social relations. These are said to prevent opportunism and provide a shared framework for cooperative action.

The prevailing view of embeddeness is demonstrated by Morselli's (2005, 2014) commonly cited work on 'criminal networks'. Here, embeddeness represents a constraint on freedom for action and choice, based on levels of dependency with others in the network that fluctuates between determinist and indeterminist effects of network structure on social action. Networks can, for instance, be agency-centred when entrepreneurial agents are able to exploit 'structural holes' by investing time and energy in developing new business contacts, rather than remaining 'closed and cliquish' (*ibid*: 24). At the same time, agents can also be excluded from opportunities for brokering due to gatekeepers that control access to economic and social resources. The productive view of networks is associated with the formation of what Granovetter (1983, 1985) terms 'weak ties' that bridge difference and form new bonds, resulting in a more symmetric network structure. By contrast, 'strong ties' are asymmetric and produce closed social groups that are inwardly bound by relations of loyalty and obligation. Strong ties aid in the internal organisation of illicit activities by ensuring that 'fraudulent actions will be penalised by exclusion of the violator from key social networks and future transactions' (Portes 2010: 137). These ties are often chacaterised by 'homophily', which has positive effects on peer influence; because ties are based on the familiarity and sameness of characteristics such as age, place of residence and criminal experience (Carrington 2014). The resulting closed and asymmetric networks are a

[18] Beckert and Wehinger (2013) provide the first schematic approach to criminal enterprise in the sub-discipline of the sociology of markets. Here, the 'economic coordination' of illegal activity is the unifying theme and is discussed through the typology of value, competition and cooperation.

function of the imperative to facilitate trust through recurrent interaction inwards; utilise concealment to avoid detection; ensure intra-network monitoring of participants, and to pool scarce resources in the production of illicit goods. Weak ties, by contrast, enable the expansion of illicit transactions by facilitating the generation of trust outwards through on-going interactions with prospective exchange partners. This ability to bridge across networks is often said to be the product of agents exploiting structural holes and gaining access to useful information.

Smith and Papachristos (2016: 645-7) conclude, however, that weak ties are rare in criminal enterprise. Instead, expansive criminal networks are 'multiplex', in terms of the content and role of social ties. Given criminal enterprise requires resource pooling, task specialisation, and access to information (especially from law-enforcement authorities), multiplexity signals how agents come to 'stack' different social relationships on top of each other as they exploit different roles when co-ordinating action. In this sense, 'multiplexity adds depth to social relationships by building on pre-existing ties […] provid[ing] a foundation for trust that can reduce risk and mobilize action'. Smith and Papachristos (2016: 662) conclude, therefore, that criminal networks are typically asymmetric, 'dense, small, and highly multiplex'; characteristics that are increasingly marked by economic, social and power inequalities the longer they remain durable (Hess 1998: 82-3). These networks are also the building blocks for governance approaches that suggest networks 'minimize the need for state regulation' (Meagher 2007: 221). Von Lampe (2006: 86-7) similarly concludes that, rather than clusters of weak ties, criminal enterprsise are organised through closed 'chains'. Network asymmetry, closure and density are, in sum, treated as functional to the need for internal monitoring and sanction, particularly when evading detection by law-enforcement.

Despite providing better specification of the organisational elements required to maintain criminal enterprises, the criminal network approach has remained largely exploratory and descriptive (Carrington 2014), with few attempts to theorise agency, culture and power beyond a functional-structuralist interpretation that views networks in terms of what agents can purposively use social relations for in 'self-directed' action. This shortcoming is reflected in the recent notion of 'relational positioning' (Morselli 2005: 37, 2014). Here, power is reduced to a 'capacity to control resources' in terms of nodal proximity to gatekeepers and the relations of dependency that are formed by consequence. By thinking in terms of function and structure, embeddedness abstracts

out a single aspect of social life (ethnicity, exchange, friendship, kin, sex and so forth), which is then analysed in terms of how structural characteristics are amenable to illicit coordination. Such weaknesses are echoed in a review of criminal networks by Smith and Papachristos (2014: 662), who conclude that 'culture, agency, and context' tend to be abstracted in network analyses of criminal enterprise, rather than problematised as core themes when explaining the relationship between criminal action and social structure (also see Meagher 2009). What result are stylised analyses whereby violence and trust are viewed, respectively, as functional equivalents to symmetric and asymmetric network structures. Furthermore, by treating culture in terms of its utility or tendency to facilitate certain kinds of action and network structure, the criminal network literature is often culturally essentialist and prone to stereotype. This is problematic when conceptualising the emic practice of "chain work", given the presence of 'too much embeddedness', particularly in the context of West Africa, readily justifies a pathological analysis 'associated with parochialism, fragmentation, and communal violence' (Meagher 2005: 219, 221-2; also 2010: 22).

Recent scholarship has argued, by contrast, that these shortcomings necessitate a fine-grained analysis of the institutional content of networks (Meagher 2005: 224). An institutional approach is sensitive to the historical legacies of networks and how they have been reshaped into contemporary forms of non-state governance, particularly in contexts 'characterised by state neglect and chaos' (Meagher 2005: 226-230; Meagher 2009; Meagher 2010: 25-6). As Krippner (2001: 777) has suggested, this approach was lost due to the displacement by the new economic sociology of earlier notions of embeddedness that underscored the importance of 'studying institutions as concrete, multiply-determined objects that could contain various social processes simultaneously'.

Much like networks, institutions are conceptually broad and account for a wide array of economic and social phenomena that cut across the formal, informal and illegal divides, albeit making it challenging to pin down precisely what 'an' institution is. The baseline definition for informal institutions is a subset of patterns of regularised conduct, or 'rules of the game', which unlike formal institutions are 'created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels' (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 725). Informal institutions typically represent 'patterns of behaviour deriving from pre-existing forms of public authority' that continue to be shaped by struggles over power and resources and that may compete for legitimacy with formalised state institutions

(Meagher 2007: 408-9). Such institutions include, for instance, the British colonial system of indirect rule used to extend commercial and political control into Sierra Leone's protectorate during the 1800s, where paramount chiefs continue to exercise authority through post-war policies of governance decentralisation. Given the presence of multiple sources of authority in West Africa, a 'legal pluralist' approach has typically been utilised to study non-state modes of regulation and their attendant political implications.

Legal pluralism is subject to confusing specification and disagreement over what constitutes the core concept of 'law' (Tamanaha 2000: 297; 2011: 2). Broadly-speaking, the literature recognises that, beyond the nation-state, more than one body of 'law' exists and that these are systematised through social norms and processes that, for example, are involved in the mediation of local disputes and acquisition and enforcement of land rights (Griffiths 1986; Santos 1987; Merry 1988). As Benda-Beckmannn and Benda-Beckmannn (2006: 12) have argued, the concept of law is broadened beyond the state to become 'the summary indication of those objectified cognitive and normative conceptions for which validity for a certain social formation is authoritatively asserted'. Here, a system of law outside the regulatory framework of the state is said to encompass a broad range of social processes that maintain order and motivate legitimate conduct, but that are ultimately reducible to the concepts of institution, norms and rules that, coupled with the threat of force, represent a kind of 'institutionalised norm enforcement' (Tamanaha 2011: 3-5; 2000: 297; Benda-Beckmannn and Benda-Beckmann 2006: 22, fn, 22). Legal pluralism also implies a sense of identification with and obligation to non-state authority, such that the institutional basis of law acts as an 'enabling and constraining context for social interaction in all arenas' (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2006: 23). Apprenticeship could be characterised in these terms, given the institution lacks codified contracting arrangements and referees for managing relations between apprentices and their masters, despite the former recognising his obligations to the latter.

However, as the Benda-Beckmannns in a review of the legal pluralism literature admit, very few studies consider how informal institutions are reproduced by examining the social processes involved in their reproduction, while little theoretical work has, in turn, been undertaken to achieve this empirical aim (*ibid*: 22, fn. 22; also see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1413). This is crucial when observing that 'not all forms of social control are law', particularly in cases where agents fail to obey rules and where a high degree of

uncertainty in the absence of contracting arrangements or enforceable property rights is hastily equated with pathological assessments. The latter typically emphasises the instrumentalisation of law by elite interests or emergence of violent social organisations prone to closure or criminal breakdown (Tamanaha 2000: 298; Martin 2011: 330-2). This results because institutional analyses have a tendency to concentrate on the "what" of social action and co-ordination in terms of patterns of social behaviour, rather than the "why" of how these regularities are intuited and reproduced by agents (Martin 2011; Tamanaha 2011: 5). This forecloses attention to how non-state forms of regulation are reproduced and altered through the on-going actions and interpretations of the individuals that constitute them. As Meagher (2009: 25) has similarly concluded: 'it is not enough to 'rediscover' the role of the social; we must 'problematize the social' as a 'regulatory force'.

Tamanaha (2000: 206) argues, however, that these 'myriad' phenomena do share the common characteristic of involving 'rules', such that informal institutions might be more accurately described as a 'rule system'.[19] Rules are either 'regulative' or 'constitutive' (Martin 2011: 295-6). Regulative rules determine how agents should act in a given social formation, while constitutive rules determine what agents are acting towards in terms of the stakes and goals that motivate their actions. Institutions typically focus on the former rather than the latter by relating rules to agents exogenously. Regulative rules are the observed products of patterns of regularised conduct. Institutions are, at root, 'simply one particular subset of a more general, and non-problematic, process of intuiting patterns' (Martin 2011: 303). Yet these patterns must be 'inter-subjectively valid' to agents, meaning they must be constitutive of their action, if they are to be willingly adhered to and reproduced in the absence of sanction and violence. Hence, the current literature often fails to relate rules to agents *endogenously*, which begets a focus on the point of view of the agents responsible for "doing" the action that is regularised and intuited as an inter-subjectively valid patterning of rules.

I therefore follow Martin's (2011: 303) approach to the explanation of social action and agree that a rule is better understood as 'the alignment of particular action imperatives with position'. The positons, in this instance, are marked by social categories such as "youth man" and "shareholder" that, in turn, are rooted in unequal distributions of economic and social capital. The alignment of an agent's on-going action and

[19] For instance, Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (2006: 18) describe a 'legal system' as foremost being a 'body of legal rules and regulations conceived of as a totality'.

interpretation with these positions is secured according to phenomenologically valid experiences of, for instance, appropriateness and requiredness, the character of which stems from broader cultural values and social influences. Tamanaha (2000: 314, emphasis added) similarly argues that in order to ensure greater conceptual specificity in the legal pluralism literature, institutions can be understood as a bundle of inter-related practices, where each practice represents 'an activity that constrains aspects of *both meaning and behaviour*, linked together by a loosely shared body of (often internally heterogeneous) norms and activities'. This is particularly necessary given recent research on cannabis production and exchange has concluded that the connection between drugs and violence 'varies depending on the type of drug and the nature of the surrounding culture', and yet there exists a paucity of studies that engage with a phenomenological mode of enquiry to ascertain how the motivations and views of drug users and producers relate to and reproduce resulting organisational structures and strategies (Copes et al 2015: 32; see also Sandberg 2012).[20] Furthermore, I suggest it is also analytically prudent to start with individuals, rather than with a pre-defined group or pre-existing network of social relations, in order to focus upon the transactional relationships between individual members in an activity that may or may not adhere to positions within a clearly demarcated and regulated organisational structure (Von Lampe 2006: 81, 87-8; also see Levit and Venkatesh 2000).

A focus on the phenomenological alignment of action with position therefore provides an alternative entry point for examining how institutions, like apprenticeship, remain durable and stable despite the absence of contracting arrangements, certainty over how masters will settle, or what the likely returns after being apprenticed might be. By understanding that these inter-subjectively valid alignments function as restrictions on interaction, it is possible to grasp the emergence of 'vertical social differentiation among persons' (Martin 2011: 293). The alignment of expectations with chances from the point of view, for instance, of the apprentice in relation to his shareholder, is a core theme of Pierre Bourdieu's relational sociology. Bourdieu suggests that this is because his underlying aim is to discover how it is possible for 'behaviours [to] be regulated without being the product of rules' (Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986: 114). What emerges in his early sociology is a notion of 'strategy' defined in opposition to the rules that constitute

[20] The importance of relating a phenomenological mode of inquiry to an examination of social structure is not new. For instance, in his seminal study of crack dealers in East Harlem, Philippe Bourgois (1995: 3) argues that a mastery of street culture was necessary to navigate 'a complex and conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, values and ideologies that have emerged in the opposition to exclusion from mainstream society'.

institutions. A strategy is the product of a particular social game that represents a 'set of regularities in action and interpretation'. According to the game metaphor, there is room for improvisation as agents face new circumstances, but that 'cannot be achieved by mechanical obedience to explicit, codified rules'. This is because an agent can play according to the rules in agreement with their own interest but also treat the rules "as if" they were the case. Consequently:

> 'One can speak of a game in order to say that a group of people participate in a regulated activity, an activity which, without necessarily being the product of obedience to rules obeys certain regularities.' (*ibid*: 112-3)

Important when studying the social organisation of illicit production and exchange under conditions of uncertainty then, is the examination of an agent's sense of requiredness and validation, particularly as these also relate to the broader socio-generational categories of youth discussed earlier, which motivate and co-ordinate regularised action that is endogenous to an institution. By starting with the relation between an individual agent's experience and their objective position within an institution, it is possible to avoid essentialist or pathological analyses that emphasise criminalisation, organised violence and exploitative patrimony (Shammas and Sandberg 2016). I turn to outline this relational sociology in Chapter Two and how it aids an analysis of what I term *structural advantages*. I suggest this requires bridging objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. In doing so, a relational sociology provides a window on how the institution of apprenticeship is reproduced and rendered stable despite uncertainties owing to illegality and a lack of self-enforced contracting arrangements between apprentices and shareholders.

1.4. *Cultivating Hierarchy*: Research Question, Outline and Main Argument

The research question guiding this thesis motivates a sociological analysis focused on examining the particular forms of acting, reasoning and thinking that youth acquired and practiced as they undertook apprenticeships:

> **How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to organised violence?**

The degree of contestability in illegal markets is an important parameter in the question, because, from what I term an objectivist-structuralist viewpoint (see Chapter Two), it is the most significant factor determining how and according to what social mechanisms producers are organised (see Venkatesh and Levitt 2000; Leeson and Rogers 2012: 92). Contestability is determined by the particular entry and exit barriers that prospective participants in an illegal market may face on the supply-side. In illegal markets, these barriers usually result from the deliberate strategies of dominant players to stifle competition, but also include sunk costs, availability and access to appropriate skills and technology, and the strength of loyalties between existing buyers and sellers. Cannabis markets are assumed to comprise relatively autonomous small-scale agriculturalists engaged in near perfect competition because cannabis farming is considered to be a highly contestable activity. This is, however, a more specific characteristic of domestic cannabis markets in which there is oversupply, a susceptibility to 'hit-and-run' tactics, and resulting high price competition. On this view, cannabis seeds are easily accessible and can be grown in a variety of soils according to rudimentary skills that result in negligible differences in quality. These localised markets are also relatively illiquid; resulting in a higher proportion of credit-based transactions that undermine the accumulation of greater returns to a smaller pool of players.

Although these conditions characterise cannabis farming in Sierra Leone's rural provinces, in Western Area a small number of cannabis producers monopolised transactions with cross-border exchange partners, while claiming rights of first ownership to plots of land. These specific endowments provided a comparative advantage, because their greater accumulated returns over time were re-invested to enable the expansion of production and incentivised new entrants to join their

particular apprenticeship networks. Such developments were unusual in a context where agriculture typically suffered from low yields that undermined labour productivity, which in turn motivated the continuation of more coercive labour arrangements, such as customary authorities, to reduce the ratio of costs to yields and extract a profit (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1083-4). The resulting market in Western Area was, however, not organised through overtly coercive labour relations, yet remained characterised by oligopolistic competition, in which only a small number of players accrued the greatest returns. Given that the use of violence can be costly towards achieving this end, Reuter and Kleiman (1986: 310) argue that cannabis is typically farmed in accordance with a 'mercenary strategy' during times of price depression in otherwise higher value legal cash crops. Entry barriers are assumed to be low, allowing cannabis production to be utilised as a fall back livelihood strategy. It is, for instance, common to argue in this context that criminal firms are not capable of growing in size, with only some mature markets capable of comprising multiple mini-monopolies (Bouchard et al 2009).

These dominant firms are also understood to have succeeded by having behaved strategically. Strongmen lead in developing a hierarchical organisation that enables the use of credible threats of inter-personal violence against rivals who might otherwise, for example, capture cross-border exchange partners, invade more productive farms or engage in corruption by colluding with state-mandated enforcers of violence directed against competitors. However, the privileging of strategic behaviour misses how, in other contexts, prospective rivals are already the dependents of incumbent firms, rather than independent actors making relatively autonomous decisions with regards to entry strategy and pricing behaviour. In the case of Western Area, the founding farmers of the 1980s and 1990s took on young men to work as apprentices, some of which transitioned to become *de facto* journeymen renting plots of land on the same farm as their former master. This resulted in the emergence of a number of firm-like social groupings, in which an upper tier referred to as "shareholders" presided over a lower tier of workers who were, initially, apprentices following their commands. Threats of violence or deliberate collusion were not overt features of this arrangement, contrary to the assumptions of two-tiered hierarchical models of criminal actors that were shown to be prevalent in the organised crime literature (Rogers and Leeson 2012: 90-91).

Although Western Area comprised a small number of dominant farmers who ostensibly exercised control over the market, I take the threat of price competition posed by

potential rivals as being independent of an incumbent's strategic decisions to raise entry and exit barriers. This also involves holding equal "innocent" barriers to entry based on the existing endowments of incumbents that do not comprise an explicit strategy for denying entry. At root, the theoretical motivation of the research question is to discard with rational choice models underpinning the economics of organised crime, in favour of a practice-based theory of action based on social learning. This is detailed in Chapter Three.

Having framed the research question in this way, the analysis can proceed by focusing on how endogenous factors determine market structure. Endogenous factors relate to the institutional context of cannabis production and marketing, such as the social relations between bosses and apprentices, informal rules governing access to land, and the schemes of valuation enacted by participants. These factors are taken as being primarily responsible for *reproducing* an oligopolistic market structure in the absence of organised violence or collusion with a unitary and corrupt police force. For instance, the time required undertaking an apprenticeship can be translated as an incurred sunk cost that prevents the quick exit necessary for a hit-and-run or mercenary strategy to be successful. As such, the research question begins with the view that market incumbent's fear of competition, and prospective responses to deal with this fear, are already largely discounted by rivals perceiving that they must participate in apprenticeships.

It is, therefore, the motivation of the research question to understand how apprenticeship is taken to be an agreeable and meaningful course of action, and how it shapes the on-going practices of those participating in them. This avenue of enquiry is used to determine the structural effect apprenticeship has on cannabis production and marketing, and why a hierarchical structure continues to be reproduced. It is therefore in accordance with the structural effects on youth's participation in apprenticeship, in terms of the particular forms of acting, reasoning, and valuing they acquire and reproduce through on-going practice, that I use the term *structural advantage*. Moving forward, the research question is tackled by identifying *boss-apprentice relations* as a case of what I refer to as the *reproduction of structural advantage* in the *economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange* and the *juridical field of law-enforcement*.

In ***Chapter Two: Cultivating Hierarchy: The Conceptual Approach*** I turn to discuss Pierre Bourdieu's relational sociology. The concept of economic field is derived from Bourdieu's late theoretical work on economic sociology, in which he privileges a

'structural vision' of economic activity and organisation against dominant economic models based on methodological individualism. In addition, I elaborate on what he refers to as 'open concepts' in order to reconceptualise violence as endogenous to the institution of apprenticeship, rather than violence being treated as an overt strategy. Furthermore, rather than being guided by an interactionist vision that embeds on-going action in inter-personal relations, Bourdieu's structural vision suggests that "relations" are instead found between different positions within organised fields of activity. These fields are organised in terms of how encounters between shareholders, their apprentices and law-enforcers are foreshadowed, perceived and valued. Bourdieu's open concepts, especially *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence, are fleshed out to guide analysis during the empirical chapters and examine what I refer to as the *reproduction of structural advantage*. The shareholders secured a structural advantage as gatekeepers to economic capital in cash-money, land and labour. Structural advantages needed to be reproduced. By entering into apprenticeships that were recognised by youth as legitimate competence, I argue that shareholders were able to affirm a sleight of hand that these advantages were rooted in.

In ***Chapter Three: Going inside the game***, I outline how apprenticeship was identified as a site for the reproduction of structural advantages and the process by which I entered the field, paying attention to ethics, positionality, reflexivity and the politics of how illicit drug economies are represented when writing about them. Having sought to bridge sociological and anthropological methodologies, I detail a number of objectivist and subjectivist techniques of data collection used during field research in the peninsula towns of Hastings and Waterloo from December 2012 to December 2013. Rather than following the conceptual shortcomings of the objectivist-structuralist approach, and taking care to protect against a more naïve representation of social reality offered by the subjectivist-constructivist approach, I build on Bourdieu's sociology to develop a methodological avenue I refer to as *social aesthetics*: the examination of qualitative experience tied to a particular point of view in the overlapping economic and juridical fields. By coordinating the particular forms of acting, reasoning and valuing of cultivators and dealers in structurally unequal positions, what I refer to as 'practices', social aesthetics provides a window onto the reproduction of structural advantage, without recourse to direct intervention by a higher authority.

In ***Chapter Four: Chain Work***, I examine the historical origins and contemporary characteristics of apprenticeship as a means of organising labour, in addition to chain

work as an inter-related complex arrangement of production and marketing networks. Sierra Leone's apprenticing system was utilised under British colonialism during late-1700s Evangelical Christian efforts to challenge slavery by transforming young recaptured slaves from unproductive and idle to productive wage labourers. After independence, apprenticeship continued to represent an important means for the under-educated to receive training and access employment in a range of informal enterprises. I argue that, in relation to small-scale agriculture, a system of 'apprentice provisioning' represented an institutional adaptation to control labour in the service of capital accumulation. Furthermore, having been displaced by the US-led War on Drugs in the 1970s and 1980s, I discuss how Jamaican cultivators migrated to Sierra Leone and introduced higher yielding seed varieties and new growing techniques that provided the more established shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo with a competitive advantage over newer cultivators. I argue that apprenticeship provided youth with strong economic incentives. However, the absence of contracting arrangements and referees meant apprentices were subject to uncertainty and exposed to attempts by shareholders to exploit them for cheap labour. Meanwhile, journeymen remained trapped in low-margin domestic markets with limited opportunities for land ownership.

The chapter then shifts to an objectivist mode of analysis to map out the topography of advantages in production and exchange relations enjoyed by these more established cultivators. By examining the characteristics of price competition between cultivators within and across several clusters of production, in addition to the production hierarchies through which labour was organised, I demonstrate that the shareholders benefited from structural advantages as gatekeepers in access to economic and social capital. The chapter concludes by introducing Bourdieu's (2005) concept of economic field to explain how shareholders secured their more dominant position without recourse to organised violence, motivating a closer, subjectivist examination of apprenticeship through which structural advantages were being *reproduced* in the linking of economic field and apprentice habitus.

In ***Chapter Five: The Game***, I begin to link field and habitus to argue that youths' subjective expectations to, as they put it, "find their own lane in life" were realigned by their respective shareholders to the more reasonable goals of owning land, building a house and providing for the household against a stylised Western modernity. The chapter draws on life histories to examine the emergence of a folk cosmology comprising Rastafari and Neo-Evangelist values that differentiated cannabis cultivation

as a righteous pursuit requiring hard labour. The readjustment of expectations rested on the shareholders' ability to deceive and conceal their cynicism that the future was more uncertain. Apprentice cultivators *mis*recognised certain characteristics for what was required to succeed and claim masculine authority. Unlike the narrow concept of economic interest, I utilise what Bourdieu refers to as the '*illusio*', and argue that cannabis cultivation had psychological as well as economic payoffs found in the intermediary social category of "youth man". This commitment to righteous labour motivated what practices were possible.

In ***Chapter Six: Apprenticeship***, I focus on apprenticeship in the relations between shareholders, apprentices and journeymen as the site at which structural advantages in access to cultural, economic and social capital were reproduced. By organising labour in this way, apprenticeships facilitated collective "learning by doing". Apprentice cultivators learned how to cultivate, how to establish new exchange partners, and how to value cannabis in ways that came to be taken as legitimate competence. The chapter examines the emic practices of "*sababu*" [obtaining the support of an influential person] and "*grade*" [evaluating the quality of cannabis herb] that resulted from these apprenticeships. *Sababu* represented the imperative in a context of scarcity to establish relationships with a person of influence who could provide new opportunities. Despite having functional importance for facilitating recurrent exchange, the chapter argues that apprentices and journeymen perceived and valued social relations in a one-sided way that ensured the shareholders retained more-or-less exclusive access to the highest value cross-border exchange partners. This was indexed by unequal positions within the economic field. When cultivators negotiated the quality of cannabis for sale their valuation related more to expectation based on social position. *Sababu* worked through a moral rhetoric by which apprentices and journeymen reasoned that hard work, honesty and an ascetic commitment to the "strain" of hard labour were the characteristics most likely to obtain new opportunities and become a successful cultivator. The chapter thereby concludes that apprenticeship and resulting commitment to "*sabi* the game" ensured these emic practices operated as principles that regulated the possibility of converting social into economic capital, thereby limiting chances of succeeding.

The final part of the research question entails an examination of how cultivators and dealers established extra-legal relations with law enforcement such that the 'official' rule of law was enacted in relation to some participants in the cannabis economy but not

others. In ***Chapter Seven: Raiding***, I focus on encounters between law-breakers and enforcers and argue that those occupying structurally disadvantaged positions within the economic field were subject to criminalised categories and targeted by the police who disrupted their activities. Turning to Bourdieu's concept of the juridical field, as outlined in Chapter Three (2.5), law-enforcers drew on the seeming autonomy of the state and enforced the law selectively based on local distinctions regarding what counted as permissible and impermissible activity. Apprentices and journeymen reasoned that by being righteous labourers, and not idle or unproductive, that they would not be subject to this criminalising discourse.

I argue that the dynamics of law enforcement began to change following the introduction of TOCU. The hardening of distinctions between law enforcers and breakers placed these extra-legal relations under stress and cultivators increasingly relied on more formalised arrangements of what they referred to as "*haju*": giving a little something for something in return.[21] This secured police protection but its efficacy depended on economic capital rather than personal character. As another covert principle of convertibility, this practice relied on the commoditisation of not-so-secret information. I explain how cannabis cultivation and dealing was synonymous with public secrecy: knowing the facts but not being able to articulate them as such. Rather than secrecy being related to the privacy of closed groups attempting to conceal their activities from law enforcement, public secrecy mattered for how certain knowledge was interpreted and how secrecy foreshadowed encounters between law enforcers and breakers in terms of what could and could not be said with efficacy. The chapter argues that public secrecy created scarcity in information concerning illegal activity that was widely known. The market for this information worked as an additional principle of convertibility that secured the structural advantages enjoyed by shareholders.

In everyday encounters with shareholders and law-enforcers, the emic practices of *sababu*, *grade* and *haju* formed a triptych regulating opportunities to access economic capital that otherwise had been secured by a sleight of hand. By participating in apprenticeships that rendered particular ways of acting, reasoning and valuing as correct and legitimate, and that in doing so garnered social value as a righteous

[21] "Haju" is a Krio term; probably a phonetic contraction of the English (1600s to 1800s) phrase "pay dues" or "pay your dues", meaning an obligation (i.e. to owe somebody) to make payment that is fitting or rightful. The phrase was used, for instance, in the payment of "dues" for transporting cargo on merchant ships and the payment required of early 1800s apprentices to rent land on plantation estates in the Americas and West Indies. It can therefore be understood as the need "to do something that you do not enjoy in order to have something that you want".

somebody, apprentices and journeymen clung to the expectation that they could claim masculine authority in a context of scarcity in opportunities for gaining a stable income. By recognising themselves to be working as righteous somebodies, these young men also *mis*recognised that they reproduced the structural advantages enjoyed by their respective shareholders. In turn, journeymen attempting to become shareholders privately held a more cynical view of their efforts and as such needed to "*bluff bluff*" [deceive, fool] relations with their new apprentices. This resulted in the regulation of the cannabis economy through symbolic violence rather than recourse to direct intervention against challengers and protection of transactions through the organised and credible threat of violence.

The conclusion of this thesis, ***Chapter Eight: Reproducing Structural Advantage*** outlines empirical contributions and raises theoretical implications for the study of youths' participation in illicit economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Namely, it discusses how Bourdieu's open concepts, particularly *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence, in addition to recent developments in field theory towards a social aesthetics, provide new tools for examining domination. I argue that the concept of structural advantage is useful for examining the durability and reproduction of institutions in contexts characterised by uncertainty. By using a mixed methodology and elaborating on Bourdieu's conceptual tools, I argue it is possible to understand how social order can be established and maintained in contexts that have otherwise been characterised as more uncertain and volatile.

Chapter Two: Cultivating Hierarchy: The Conceptual Approach

2.1. Introduction: Turning to Bourdieu's open concepts

Pierre Bourdieu's scholarly work has ranged from anthropological studies of the Algerian *Kabyle* to the sociological study of class reproduction in French society. Tracing the development of Bourdieu's conceptual toolbox there is a productive iteration between anthropology, a discipline that tends to emphasise conceptual eclecticism and a subjectivist approach drawing cases from the context of the Global South, in contrast to the conceptual parsimony of sociology that draws primarily from the Global North (Calhoun 2006; Burawoy and von Holdt 2012: 1-2). With this in mind, Bourdieu's project is fundamentally concerned with bridging what he recognised as a false meta-theoretical and methodological dichotomy in the social sciences between 'objectivist-structuralist' and 'subjectivist-constructivist' approaches (Bourdieu 2003: 285, 2006: 72-8; Bourdieu 1986: 14-5; see also Brubaker 1985: 746-7, 749-753).

Objectivist-structuralist approaches, synonymous with 'models', 'rules' and 'structures' operate from a position outside an agent's experience, exemplified by structuralism, in addition to the behaviourism and functionalism of networks and institutions in economic sociology. These conceptual approaches privilege the material conditions of social life as autonomous from and working on the agent in an overly determinist fashion. The approach typically relies on mechanistic models of causality comprising externally determined 'self'-interests, which, in more sophisticated approaches, are held to be constrained by institutions and norms (Beckert 1996: 827-9; Bourdieu 2006: 73). Such approaches fail to establish how on-going action is rendered meaningful and why, even when courses of action appear to contradict a 'rational' means-ends relationship, agents come to invest in their activity and reproduce their otherwise disadvantaged position. The 'reality' of the model is, in short, located outside the head of the agent, providing 'second-best' explanations that 'slip from the model of reality to the reality of the model' (Bourdieu 2006: 30).

Subjectivist-constructivist approaches, including phenomenology, privilege beliefs and conceptions from the point of view of experience in the world and argue that action is dependent on mind and agent, and adherence to a 'creative free will [… that] reduce[s] the objective intentions and constituted significations of actions and works to conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors' (*ibid*). Social reality is reduced to the

representations agents have of it and implies a certain view of social 'reality' is shared by agents (Bourdieu 1989: 14-5). Agents in the subjectivist view act reasonably rather than causally in the stricter sense of the objectivist-structuralist approaches. In doing so, this approach struggles to explain how any apparent breakdown in rationality comes to be reasonable to an agent during their on-going experience of that reality. Youth are afforded a higher degree of agency in 'navigating' their social environment and bridging social difference, despite their social world being represented as somewhat more uncertain and volatile given an absence of attention to social structures that are arguably less visible, more complex and highly differentiated (cf. Simone 2004; Johnson-Hanks 2005; Vigh 2006, 2009). As Bourdieu (1990b: 42) remarks, 'the world of action is [treated as] nothing more than [an] imaginary universe of interchanging possibles'. Bourdieu also claims that when privileging the individual and their interpretation of reality there lacks a conceptual approach for examining how extra-discursive, symbolic relations of power shape how agents act, reason and perceive in ways that are meaningful even if these practices are in the service of those who dominate them. It is often the case, therefore, that the subjectivist-constructivist approach 'excludes[s] the question of the conditions of its own possibility' (Bourdieu 2006: 3).

To bridge this gap Bourdieu developed a relational sociological approach that he characterised as 'constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism' (1989: 14). This project has sought to move beyond the impasse between objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches, which he held to be 'dialectically linked' (*ibid*: 15). Bourdieu's sociology entails a conceptual shift to the *relations* between the individual agent and the social structure in which they are positioned (Wacquant 1987: 74-5). This avoids remaining trapped in the 'interactionist vision' of 'relations' (Bourdieu 2005: 76; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 9-10) whereby the criminal network literature conceptualise 'relational ties' as inter-personal and formed 'among interacting units' (McIlwaine 1999: 305). As Martin (2009: 14) argues, there is no philosophically sound reason to lend conceptual primacy to social relations or 'ties' in the interactionist sense at the expense of the individual agent.

A structuralist-constructivism has two theoretical pillars. First, social structures are taken to be objective from the point-of-view of the agent and lie in the distribution of different forms of capital within a field of organised activity. Second, social structures are inter-subjective in the lived experience of agents, indicative of symbolic systems that advance particular modes of classification, appreciation and valuation that agents rely

upon to make sense of what is happening in everyday life. These two pillars refer to Bourdieu's concern with the 'intrinsically double nature of social life' (Brubaker 1985: 750). The linking of each pillar is motivated by the need to understand how social structure is internalised in the mind of the agent with the recognition that action is 'shaped as much by unconscious, habitual, taken-for-granted dispositions as by conscious intentions and world views' (Jackson 1998: 9). Through this process of internalisation, referred to as the 'habitus', agents reproduce particular forms of action, appreciation and judgement, which in turn produce regularities that the researcher-as-observer objectively identifies as a regularised and patterned field of activity. Bourdieu also argues against a tendency to abstract market exchange and 'embed' it in on-going social relations. Instead, the concept of economy equates more closely to an 'economy of practices' (Bourdieu 1990b: 123, 124-8; Lebaron 2004: 552). The methodological avenue of this alternative conceptual approach requires examining what agents do, as well as what they say, in order to grasp why, not just how, the practices agents invest in through their on-going activity come to be reproduced. Agents do not blindly follow rules or norms, nor do they automatically engage in the kind of rational calculation advanced by economic formalists. Action is instead based on a practical sense of how to operate within a field of activity such that fields are relatively autonomous with each entailing its own set of practices or "common-sense" way of going about things.

By drawing on this relational sociology I piece together a conceptual approach that examines the establishment of hierarchy through what I refer to as the *reproduction of structural advantage*.[22] The subjectivist approach, synonymous with ethnography, is to be rooted in fields of activity that, having been structured and re-structured according to unequal distributions of capital, provide some agents with an advantage over others. Structural advantages relate to objective inequalities in access to economic capital (land, labour and high value exchange partners) and as a social construction in terms, for example, of distinctions between "youth", "youth man" and "shareholder". The experience of participating in apprenticeship corresponds with a social aesthetics: qualitative experience from the point of view of an individual who assumes a particular position-*taking* within an organised field of activity (Martin 2011: 314-5). Given that youths' subjective expectations were, from the point of view of the researcher, usually incongruent with the objective chances they had of succeeding in the cannabis economy,

[22] The importance played by the notion of 'hierarchy' in Bourdieu's sociology is most obvious in his discussion of economic organisation outside the legal framework of the state (Bourdieu 1977: 183-197, see *Modes of Domination*).

social aesthetics provides an approach for examining how action corresponded with the position apprentice cultivators assumed at the bottom of their respective production hierarchies. In doing so, the chapter provides a conceptual approach for examining how structural advantages enjoyed by shareholders were reproduced through the on-going action of the dominated, without their direction intervention. Relational sociology provides a conceptual toolbox to examine the reproduction of structural advantage in both economic and social terms, while paying attention to more covert, extra-discursive processes that are attuned to how the unequal chances of participants came to be congruent with their more optimistic expectations. This chapter now turns to discuss 'open concepts'.

2.2. Open concepts

The conceptual approach for examining the reproduction of structural advantage makes use of a mode of theoretical enquiry that Bourdieu terms 'open concepts'. Open concepts provide a perspective from which the researcher views and interprets social reality. It provides a set of conceptual lenses that are used to interpret an agent's experience of reality in relation to their objective social position, and reflexively, to be aware of the researcher's own position in making this interpretation and in representing the reality of agents (Abend 2008). This enables a relational analysis attuned to covert forms of domination and violence from the perspective of the agent, without falling into a false dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 96-7). Open concepts are used to examine the reproduction of structural advantages from the position of those who are disadvantaged (Leander 2008: 15). Leander (2008) argues these represent 'thinking tools' to be taken into the field and operationalised in order to attune the researcher to domination and violence, helping to grapple with how agents conform to hierarchy and thereby reproduce it, albeit not in terms of their explicit acquiescence. Being 'armed' with these thinking tools requires challenging the perceptions of researcher and researched by moving reflexively between an agent's representation of reality, their position within a field, and the researcher's representation of this relation (Wacquant 2014b: 119).

This iterative process is complex and time-consuming for as Bourdieu argues, domination works most effectively when research subjects are somewhat disinterested or articulate common place understandings of their situation. Thinking tools provide a conceptual starting point from which to interrogate why those 'losing' from the point of

view of an objective model continue none-the-less to pursue a particular course of action and engage in practices they perceive to be meaningful. Consequently, I treat the concepts of field, habitus, practices and symbolic violence as inseparable and operating within the same theoretical system: 'put[ting it] to work empirically in systematic fashion' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 96).[23] Open concepts guide empirical analysis and necessitate the reconstruction of Bourdieu's sociology (Abend 2008: 182). Although Bourdieu's studies of the Algerian peasantry represent an exception that I draw on in what follows, critique of these concepts is necessary because they have often been interpreted in relation to Bourdieu's engagement with well-established and striated fields – such as French class society – that has restricted attention to the more plural relationships between concepts in his wider tool box.

2.3. Fields, Games, and Capital

Much like youths' claim that they were "going inside the game" to undertake apprenticeships, Bourdieu has argued that fields are analogous to games (Bourdieu 1990: 64; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 98-100). Fields comprise a social space of structured and objective positions assumed by concrete agents who share a common stake – or 'common commitment' (Wacquant 1987: 72) – to participate and play the game according to an uneven distribution of economic, social and cultural capital. Fields of organised activity are relatively autonomous from each other and the positions marked out within them are the products of particular social and historical processes that endow each field with a particular logic. There are as many fields as there are reasons for agents to participate in them. Fields are structured according to the relations between the different positions that agents occupy. They are not composites of interpersonal relations of interaction and cooperation between agents (Bourdieu 1986: 16; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 6). This important distinction between the position of concrete individuals, and the positions to-be-taken and reproduced, requires thinking not in empiricist terms of observable social interactions, but instead in terms of how agents come to 'take', claim and reason from a particular position, and play the game in such a way that reproduces inequalities within the field.

[23] Reflecting on Bourdieu's early studies of the Kabyle in Algeria, Wacquant (2014b: 123-4) suggests, however, that habitus can be deployed independently in empirical analysis, especially where their lacks a well-organised field of activity.

Each position-taking corresponds with the unevenly distributed resources that agents have accumulated; what Bourdieu refers to as 'species of capital'. Capital is deployed in an on-going struggle over the principles that construct and reproduce the field, usually in favour of the dominant (Bourdieu 1998a: 3). Fields are not simply shorthand for 'social context' (Wacquant 2014b: 125). Neither does the field concept substitute for a network of inter-dependencies and the visible interactions and conflicts between them. Rather, the field offers the image of a social space comprising positions *to-be-taken*, each marked by the unequal accumulation and resulting distribution of capital, which is perceived and valued in ways corresponding to unequal 'objective' positions. When competing with each other, agents seek to accumulate and use capital in defence of their position and during attempts to challenge the position of others.

Three types of capital: economic, cultural and social, are perceived and valued according to the distribution of a fourth distinct kind, symbolic capital, which regulates the recognition of each species of capital as socially valuable and convertible into different forms (Brubaker 1985: 755). The convertibility, or 'fungibility', of different types of capital is generative of strategies used by the dominant to accumulate and utilise that capital. In doing so, this reproduces their position within the field. Symbolic capital accounts for how these different forms of capital are liable to be misrecognised and objectified in line with the dominant that 'try to conserve a particular distribution and form of capital, while the dominated attempt to subvert this order' (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 11). The appreciation and perception of capital corresponds to an agent's position-taking, which may also be used as a resource to challenge the dominant.

Economic capital represents accumulated human labour and access to it (money, credit, land, institutionalised property rights etc.) provides dominant players with a 'structural advantage' (Bourdieu 1986). Economic capital is convertible into other forms of capital, and vice versa, according to particular principles of convertibility that are specific to the culture and history of the field, such that capital is objectified and socially recognised as useful and valuable in particular ways. When structural advantages in access to economic capital are secured by the dominant, the dominated are less likely to challenge the organisation of the field and the on-going accumulation of and convertibility between capitals according to which these positions are being reproduced.

Cultural capital relates to socially recognised and/or institutionalised expertise and skill. It is convertible into economic capital according to particular principles of

convertibility. Bourdieu claims that cultural capital exists in three states: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Embodied capital refers to an agent's mastery of how to act and interact in ways recognised as being socially valuable, and is closely related to the concepts of habitus and practices (Sandberg 2008: 156). The objectified state is cultural capital congealed in objects, such as cannabis product, the value of which is adjudicated according to an agent's position within the field in relation to others. Finally, the institutionalised state – synonymous with "the system" – underpins the embodied and objectified states, indicating rules and technologies used to reproduce the utility of some forms of cultural capital over others, such as the utility of certain academic disciplines within the education system or predominance of a particular kind of economic theory within the financial sector. In his later work, cultural capital is treated as a sub-type of informational capital but also as a substitute in response to criticism of his allegedly narrow focus on high culture (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 19).

Bourdieu (1986) provides a specific definition and interpretation of what the wider sociological literature refers to as social capital: the 'possession of a more or less durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition'. Who you know matters and depends on the recognition of certain social relationships as more 'useful' than others. These relations are socially constructed and require a high degree of sociability, time and effort, in addition to investments of cultural and economic capital, to establish new relationships and ensure they remain durable. While more dominant agents are liable to perceive and use social capital instrumentally, self-interest is not taken-for-granted as an analytical starting point. Social capital provides access to resources possessed by others. The nature of the social relationship determines the value of the resources being accessed (Portes 1998: 4). By accumulating social capital agents gain access to, for instance, new markets and lending arrangements (economic capital), to advice and expertise (embodied cultural capital) that, because of repeated interaction and various modes of officialisation can be institutionalised. Social capital therefore secures and re-secures the position of dominant players according to their past accumulation of social capital and the schemes of recognition on the part of the dominated that have emerged to correspond with the dominant's vision of how relationships should be broached and adjudicated. Social capital is, therefore, inherently exclusionary, opposed to phenomenological approaches that emphasise inter-subjective agreement and the productive capacity of social relationships to enhance social mobility and establish connections across difference.

The distribution of capital within a field corresponds to the unequal positions of agents within it, that, in turn, determine who has the *potential* to continually reproduce their more dominant position, and importantly, to (re)produce the position of those less dominant. The potential to succeed in a field depends on the volume and composition of capital that agents are endowed with, in addition to how capital is adjudicated according to an agent's position within it. The 'accumulated labour' of the dominant in trying to conserve a particular distribution and interpretation of capital limits the possibilities open to the dominated to subvert the organisation of the field (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 11).

Capital is something you not only possess but also do. It is accumulated in both its objectified, material form and in an 'embodied' or incorporated form that relates to how agents perceive and value the different kinds of capital they are trying to accumulate. Rather than interpreting capital as a resource that is 'held' or 'possessed', its utility lies in how other agents come to recognise its status, value and worth, which limits the accumulation of and convertibility into other kinds of capital necessary to challenge the dominant. While all kinds of capital are liable to be accumulated self-interestedly, Bourdieu is not formalist. Rather, *particular* fields are reproduced according to *particular* interests depending on the history of contestation and struggle that has resulted in the formation of that field. Empirical work is therefore necessary to examine how capital is objectively distributed and how the adjudication and valuation of these different species of capital corresponds with their degree of convertibility into other forms. Vice versa, an unequal distribution of capital can work to limit subversion of the social constructions and principles of differentiation that structure the field. To grasp the reproduction of structural advantage requires both objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis that are attentive to the particular history and cultural logic of a field, and how this logic has come to regulate participation in it.

2.4. The juridical field and the post-colonial state

Bourdieu has produced a theoretical account of the state (see Bourdieu 1998a: 35-63; Bourdieu 2014), but it is not utilised in full here, instead I draw selectively on the open concepts of juridical field and capital. This is because Bourdieu's analysis was primarily concerned with the French state and a tight relationship between class structure and habitus. The state is defined as:

> 'An X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population (Bourdieu 1998a: 40)'.

Relying on Bourdieu's extension of Weber's conceptualisation of the bureaucratic state is unsuitable in the context of the Sierra Leonean post-colonial state given primacy is attributed to a legitimate monopoly over physical and symbolic violence.[24] Bureaucratic power results in a monopoly over the accumulation of 'informational capital' by, for example, utilising surveys, taxation and cartography (Bourdieu 1994: 7-8). This monopoly is, however, incomplete in the context of Sierra Leone, which is characterised by the 'hybrid governance' of a range of non-state actors such as customary authorities, secret societies and youth organisations that have largely been understood in relation to the concepts of legal pluralism and informal institutions (see Chapter One, 1.3.2). These non- and extra-state organisations provide security (Meagher 2012; Albrecht 2015: 613-4) and often benefit from the hybrid legitimacy of 'public' rather than solely state authority without recourse to the use of sanctions (Logan 2013; also see Lund 2006, 2007), both in cooperation with and in opposition to the state with important political and economic implications. As argued previously, these approaches focus on regulative rather than constitutive rules, such that it is unclear how rule systems are reproduced from the point of view of agents, especially in contexts characterised by uncertainty. It is, furthermore, necessary to conduct a micro-sociology attuned to the relative autonomy of *agents of* the state, such as the police, during their encounters with law-breakers without conflating these agents with the state itself. To examine the reproduction of structural advantages I consider the relationship between the economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange and the state by starting with Bourdieu's (2006: 183-197) discussion of 'modes of domination'. This concept emerged from Bourdieu's field studies concerning the reproduction of social order where the state,

[24] I address symbolic violence in section 2.8.2.

including the educational system and judiciary, have been weak or absent. In this sense, the field of cannabis cultivation and exchange is relatively autonomous but overlaps with the juridical field of law enforcement.

Recent micro-sociological studies of law-enforcement in West Africa have examined how the police enforce the 'official' law in some situations but not others by purposefully negotiating the boundary between 'state' and 'society' during their encounters with law breakers (Beek 2012: 554).[25] Eschewing a distinction between legal formalism, whereby the law is held as autonomous from the social world, and legal instrumentalism, whereby the law remains in the service of dominant groups, Bourdieu (1987) introduces the concept of juridical field. In practice, the juridical field is somewhat autonomous from society and functions according to 'specific power relations which give it its structure and which order the competitive struggles' within it, in addition to an 'internal logic' that foreshadows and structures encounters between law-enforcers and breakers when participating in that field. As American legal realists and legal pluralist scholars have similarly argued, the law is closely tied to and produced by other fields and practices, albeit operating in a seemingly autonomous and impersonal fashion. Bourdieu argues that participants in the juridical field, such as the police, benefit from its performative logic (*ibid*: 838). By harnessing 'juridical capital' law enforcers use their officialdom to impress a particular vision of order onto fields that the juridical field of law enforcement overlaps (Bourdieu 1989: 22). The law's 'deceptive appearance of autonomy' (Bourdieu 1987: 808) results from its impersonality and neutrality by which:

> 'Substantive – as opposed to procedural – decisions publicly formulated by authorized agents acting on behalf of the collectivity, are magical acts which succeed because they have the power to make themselves universally recognized. They thus succeed in creating a situation in which no one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.' (*ibid*: 838)

Juridical capital represents a tool used by agents of the state to intervene in and regulate other fields by criminalising and delegitimising particular social categories and practices

[25] This point of departure does not necessitate the blurring of a *conceptual* distinction between informal and illegal modes of regulation (e.g. see Meagher 2010). Rather, I begin with 'boundary work' as one of few approaches addressing policing in West Africa that considers the *experience* of law enforcement during encounters between law breakers and enforcers. As I argue in Chapter Seven, institutional changes to law enforcement in Sierra Leone hardened the distinction between law enforcers and breakers. This suggested the ability to 'blur' distinctions between legal and illegal was a privileged resource for those cultivators and dealers, such as the original 'shareholders' of the mid-1980s, who were more dominant.

(*ibid*: 839). Given juridical capital is unequally accumulated, an objectivist analysis of the resulting juridical field – by, for example, using the tools of network analysis (Chapter Seven, 7.5) – informs a subjectivist analysis of how law-enforcers and breakers deemed who was criminal and who was not during their encounters. In doing so it is possible to link the juridical field to the economic field and examine the rationales that determine the degree of blurring between law enforcers and law breakers, in addition to the practices through which access to juridical capital was regulated. The concepts of juridical field and capital are therefore necessary in order to further examine the reproduction of structural advantage.

2.5. Symbolic Capital

Symbolic capital is a central concept in Bourdieu's toolbox. It determines the degree to which different species of capital endow agents with the power to improve their position in the on-going struggle over principles of social construction that have produced and work to reproduce the field. This concept relates the objective positions taken by agents with the degree to which they recognise particular forms of capital as useful and valuable, and that correspond with a particular 'vision' regarding how capital is to be accumulated, utilised and converted into other kinds. More concretely, symbolic capital is, for example, analogous to a sense of esteem, identity status and worth towards achieving a better life. In Bourdieu's sociology symbols do not filter reality or act as a 'screen' blocking its true nature. Rather, symbolic action works to actively construct social reality as agents internalise their unequal structural position and reproduce it through on-going practices (Bourdieu 2000: 172; Leander 2008: 14). Symbolic capital renders some avenues of action and forms of interpretation possible without reference to explicit rules or norms of conduct in the first instance. Agents come to know and recognise the specific logic of a field 'through the categories of perception that it imposes' (Bourdieu 1989: 21), which are reproduced through the practices of dominated agents that are often taken-for-granted and treated as somewhat matter-of-fact and banal (Bourdieu 1986: 18). As Bourdieu (1998: 85) explains, symbolic capital is 'a principle of differentiation that permits them [i.e. the dominated] to recognize all these differences and to give them value'. The resulting symbolic order is most stable when it is 'objectively in agreement with the objective structures of the social world' (*ibid*: 55).

Challenges against the dominant levied in the accumulation, convertibility and use of cultural, economic and social capital play out according to a struggle over the 'monopoly of the power to consecrate' that reproduces shared beliefs in the value of certain goods and relationships but not others. Linking the aforementioned types of capital with symbolic capital then, it can be argued that the authority of the dominant is indicative of a 'credit-based value, which only exists in the relationship with the field of production as a whole […] 'authority' is nothing other than 'credit' with a set of agents who constitute 'connections' whose value is disproportionate to the credit they themselves command' (Bourdieu and Nice 1980: 264-5). Symbolic capital regulates the convertibility of other species of capital, particularly economic capital, into different forms, and is generative of how particular positions are reproduced within a field, which corresponds to the strategies employed by the dominant to retain their position (Wacquant 1987: 69). Bourdieu concludes, however, that in the final analysis fields are 'engendered by the objective structures, that is [...] by the *economic basis* of the social formation in question' (Bourdieu 2006: 83, emphasis added). Symbolic capital accounts for the one-sided perceptions of agents who, when making reference to rules, customary codes, ethical norms or moral frames as guiding their actions 'conceals, even from their own eyes, the true nature of their own practical mastery' and the 'objective truth' of how the field they are 'implicated' in was produced and is being reproduced by virtue of their on-going investments of energy, labour and time (Bourdieu 2000: 19). Symbolic capital is therefore understood during the empirical analysis as a covert, somewhat extra-discursive principle that regulates the accumulation, convertibility and use of cultural, economic, juridical and social capital in favour of the dominant shareholders. The concept of symbolic capital is examined in more ethnographic terms as a principle responsible for reproducing structural advantages through the on-going practices of apprentices and journeymen.

2.6. Competent Practices

Practices break with a false dichotomy between objectivist-structuralist approaches that privilege rules and norms and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that privilege inter-subjectivity. Practices result from patterns of recurrent activity, interpretation and reasoning, a 'process of doing something' that is meaningful, embodied and experienced as competent by the agents implicated in these practices (Bourdieu 2000 [1977]: 16-22; Schatzki 2001; Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). Practices are distinct from behaviour and

action. The concept is not analogous to behaviour with meaning or 'practice' in the singular. Instead, practices correspond to a third level of action characterised by:

> 'Patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts [such as apprenticeship] and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training.' (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 5)

Practices take on a particular form that conceptually-speaking represents a 'block' of 'bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge' (Reckwitz 2002: 249). Rather than beginning with norms or rules of the game, practices represent 'those non-linguistic conditions for an activity that are *learned*' and are generative of patterned sets of action that we come to recognise as objective social structures at the level of the field (Turner 2001: 120). The simpler the learning process required to produce like practices, as organised through the institution of apprenticeship, then the longer the 'chain of links' that can be extended between agents to reiterate the same kinds of tacit knowledge (*ibid*: 124). This chain of links expands and incorporates more participants in an organised and structured way. By learning how to grow cannabis, and being recognised as productive and skilled cultivators, I argue in Chapter Six that youth were recognised to have gained an 'embodied competence' (Bourdieu 2006: 81) such that those outside of the field treated their practices as socially meaningful and valuable (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). The practices – particular ways of acting, reasoning and thinking – acquired through apprenticeship related to the "correct" or "right" way to go about things. The stability of a field therefore depends on whether practices continue to be recognised as legitimate by dominant and dominated players and thereby reproduced (Bourdieu 2000: 184). A methodological approach to practices requires an examination of the various routinised ways in which cultivators and dealers perceived, reasoned, valued and acted (Reckwitz 2002: 250). In doing so, Chapter Three discusses the methodological avenue of *social aesthetics* by which practices are examined both from the point of view of the agent and their experience of them (subjectivist mode of analysis), and according to how these practices materialise into the objective social structures – i.e. the economic and juridical fields – observed by the researcher (objectivist mode of analysis).

But how are practices shared between a wider collective of agents engaged in the same activity? Recent critique has tended to reduce practices to habit and claimed that the

learning of practices alone is not a sufficient causal mechanism for establishing how practices are 'shared' and 'iterated' (Turner 2001). Two weaknesses arise from this critique. First, practices indicate practical activity with an audience, such that practices are directed towards and garner recognition as legitimate – i.e. as 'correct' – by others participating in the same field. The conjunction of *social* practices would therefore be an oxymoron. Consequently, practices can be deemed as right or wrong by the dominant in accordance with the particular vision of order established within a field. For practices to be legitimate is indicative of agreement regarding what particular patterns of acting, reasoning and thinking are perceived to be required of a field and are validated by others in that field. Unlike action, practices are meaningful both in the mind of the agent and for those in the wider field who give recognition to practices, hence the pluralisation of this concept.

Practices must also be congruent with an agent's background knowledge as indicated by the emphasis placed on learning and the social qualification of what I refer to as 'competence'. Bourdieu (1990) refers to this requisite knowledge as the 'skill' or practical knowledge embodied by the agent. Hence, capital is a resource and something to be used in line with an agent's competence. However, as indicated by the generative concept of symbolic capital, capital (economic, cultural and social) can only be accumulated, converted and utilised if practices are 'legitimate' and align with a dominant conception of how the field is to be reproduced. The pluralisation of practices is indicative of meaningful action that is socially recognised as the legitimate way to act and interpret in relation to others, which is congruent with the competencies acquired by the agent – in this case through apprenticeship. Hence, in what follows, I refer to the 'legitimate competence' of practices to signal both of these dimensions.

Second, in my reading, practices entail a closeness of fit between the bodily means and mental ends of action (Reckwitz 2002: 251-2). Patterns of action are organised in a field in the sense that they are worth 'striving for' towards a reasonably held expectation that is invested in and taken as meaningful but not necessarily as normative (Martin 2011: 248-54). The ends must appear reasonably achievable from the point-of-view of the agent, which in turn acts as a motivator for an inter-linked set of practical actions that form a block directed towards the achievable end goal or aspiration. Laurent Thévenot (2001) has developed this argument further to claim that practices are geared towards a shared 'conception of the good that governs human activity' and establishes modes of coordination between agents. Practices are therefore not simply actions with meaning

because they are continually reiterated and organised according to the closeness of fit between means (the agent's competence), which are attuned to reasonably achievable ends that differ according to an agent's social position within a field. Ways of thinking, interpreting and acting are therefore closely related to individually unique expectations, which being more-or-less congruent with the objective chances of succeeding in a field, form a coherent block of practices that are inter-subjectively valid to agents despite occupying structurally different positions. Practices do not correspond to neat schemes of rationality. Instead, they are more vague in the social reality of the agent, needing only to appear "worth it" to the agent who reiterates those practices accordingly.

2.6.1. Practices and the wider tool box

To summarise in relation to Bourdieu's wider toolbox, practices are the product of: i) how a field is structured and the symbolic relations of power that generate it, and ii) the habitus, or set of dispositions, an agent brings into the field. Practices cannot, therefore, be entirely reduced to an agent's history and the dispositions they carry with them (i.e. subjectivism). Neither can practices be reduced to observations of recurrent activity at the level of the field (i.e. objectivism). This avenue returns to the false dichotomy between subjectivist-constructivism and objectivist-structuralism. Instead, practices shift the methodological focus towards explicating what people do in addition to the discourses and representations present in what they say. This is the case because Bourdieu (2006: 79) places emphasis on the notion that:

> 'Subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they do has more meaning than they know.'

How an agent represents their particular view of reality through interview and in everyday discussions matters more in terms of where they 'speak from' in terms of their (dis)advantageous objective position within a field, which allows those in structurally advantageous positions to 'produce the material realities they purport to represent' (Leander 2008: 14). Practices result in the 'objective regularities' experienced by agents that lend to the durability of unequal social positions the researcher observes as the materialised field. Youth participating in the field of cannabis cultivation and exchange interpret these practices and the 'objective' positions from which they are practiced as common knowledge. This process of 'incorporating' objective structures into the cognitive and bodily practices of the agent is what Bourdieu refers to as 'embodied'

knowledge or a 'practical sense' that is elucidated in relation to the concept of habitus. The efficacy of practices is indicated by the verb form, 'position-*taking*', which references the active construction of a field from a particular point of view attuned to an agent's habitus (Bourdieu 2000: 183).

Building on habitus, which is addressed below, practices entail a degree of disinterestedness and "matter-of-factness" in agents' interpretations of what they are doing. Practices are not, however, entirely pre-reflexive and inaccessible to conscious articulation and elaboration (Chapter Three, 3.5). Rather, practices are congruent with some reasonable aim-in-view and an agent's sense of place in the social field. A common sense or 'practical know-how', what Bourdieu (2006: 19) has simultaneously referred to as 'legitimate competence' and 'learned ignorance' (Bourdieu 2000: 184), is shared by agents from similar position-takings within a field even if practices maybe somewhat more diverse at first glance. Analogous to what Bourdieu refers to as a 'feel for the game'; practices provide agents with a sense of direction and meaning that is not wholly reducible to consciously-planned and purposive action. Practices provide agents with an immanent sense of their place in an organised field of activity and a shared sense of the direction that field is taking in terms of their *prospective* future position within it (i.e. their expectations). Crucially, these prospective positions are circumscribed by a 'sense of limits' such that current practices are reasonably anchored in a future that appears achievable rather than flexible or multivalent (*ibid*: 185; Reckwitz 2002: 245-6).

2.7. Habitus: Motivating Participation and Coordinating Practices

An agent's propensity to assume a position within a field and reproduce the practices that objectify it is motivated by the acquisition of durable dispositions, which, from a phenomenological point of view shape how an agent thinks, feels and conducts social life. Methodologically-speaking, habitus does not provide an explanation for action in isolation but is instead an 'invitation to investigate the *social constitution of the agent*' in terms of the courses of action that are taken to be reasonable, achievable and investable in (Wacquant 2014a: 6). The dispositions that shape social reality are structured according to an agent's habitus. Habitus is a concept that signals to the researcher how dispositions come to be acquired. In circumstances where social positions are congruent, it explains how these dispositions are shared between agents subject to

similar economic, political and social conditions throughout history.[26] Habitus requires departing from the empirical individual as defined by roles or scripts; indicative of the conceptual shorthand of 'actor' associated with the ahistorical rationality of 'embeddedness' as critiqued in Chapter One (also see Hanappi 2011: 788). Instead, habitus begins with the epistemic individual, an *agent* with a history that has acquired particular dispositions that guide and motivate their current practices. Habitus suggests that participation in the cannabis economy is motivated by dispositions shaped by prior social and economic experience that coordinates on-going practices and in doing so organise the 'ways in which the world appears to members of society and the ways in which each could imagine himself and improvise action' (Calhoun 2006: 1405).

Rather than reproducing the field in circular fashion, the concept of habitus is indicative of a 'tendency, not a compulsory order' such that an agent's reasonable expectations closely fit the objective potentialities observed by the researcher in the wider field (Lainé 2014). While the probability function of a group of like-individuals aggregated actions reveals some objective potentialities at the level of the field; this same probability function breaks down when applied to the individual at the level of the habitus. The coordination of practices within the field is facilitated by the adaptive capacity of habitus to maintain expectations in line with the more limited positions of a given field that reproduce and maintain it (Hanappi 2011: 761-3).

The term 'acquisition' indicates habitus is the culmination of transposable and learned dispositions (Wacquant 2014b: 126, 129). More generic dispositions are first acquired, often imperceptibly and gradually through shared experiences of deprivation, familial relations and schooling that are sources of what Bourdieu in his studies of education terms primary dispositions and what Wacquant (2014a) appropriating Bourdieu's distinction refers to as the 'primary habitus'. Primary habitus represents a certain 'baseline social personality'. It acts as both a limit and a motivational resource that can be attuned to more imminent social relations, institutions and economic circumstances an agent is confronted with. The secondary habitus derives from the primary habitus but is shaped by more immediate and specific situations, groups and institutions. As

[26] Wacquant (2011, 2014a) refers to habitus as a 'signal concept' to be used as a guide during empirical research, and furthermore distinguishes between habitus as a 'topic', identifying something to be investigated empirically (i.e. *what* makes a competent boxer), and as a 'tool', a particular method of inquiry during empirical research (i.e. *how* a boxer acquires certain dispositions and bodily knowledge).

such it may entail multiple different dispositions depending on the field at play (Wacquant 2014a: 7).

In this vein, Wacquant focuses on pedagogical forms of labour and training or 'apprenticeships' – most notable in his auto-ethnographic study of the pugilist in *Body and Soul* (2004) – as the site at which certain skills and bodily competencies are learned through a combination of observation and interaction with others engaged in the same activity. These learning processes are geared towards gaining a practical mastery such that 'desires are aroused and channelled towards their proper objects in repeated interaction with other participants'. The greater the distance between the primary habitus and its subsequent iterations in particular groups and activities (i.e. secondary habitus), the less likely an agent is to be meaningfully anchored in a field. Therefore, 'the more difficult the traineeship, and the greater the gaps and frictions between the successive layers of schemata, the less integrated the resulting dispositional formation is likely to be.' (Wacquant 2014a: 8).

2.7.1 Habitus: cognitive, conative and affective

Habitus is opposed to rational calculation, which specifies an 'actor' with no history that fulfills goals posited by an external model. According to this view of rationality, there is limited appreciation of the agent's particular social or economic experience (Hanappi 2011: 791). By contrast, habitus points to how on-going action is attuned to *reasonable* rather than rational expectations. The reasonableness of action is supported by both bodily and cognitive factors, although recent critique suggests Bourdieu fails to clearly distinguish between these two characteristics (Martin 2011: 255).

To respond to this critique and flesh out the theoretical specification of habitus, Wacquant (2014a: 8-9) has identified three analytic components: cognitive, conative and affective. The *cognitive* component of habitus endows agents with perceptual categories through which they assign meaning and distinguish the value of activities, people and things. From the point of view of the agent these social categories and distinctions relate to what Bourdieu refers to as 'principles of vision and division'. Cognitive dispositions represent relatively durable ways of valuing and perceiving, but these are more malleable when confronted with the emergence of a secondary habitus. The cognitive component of habitus is analogous to principles of 'hierarchicization', 'division' and 'vision' that guide judgement and action in different fields (Wacquant

1987: 79). These principles mobilise dispositions regarding what is good and bad, vulgar or beautiful, valuable or surplus to requirements. The resulting expectations exhibit a close fit between secondary habitus and positions taken within a field (Bourdieu 2010) – hence the term position-*taking* in Bourdieu's work. These dispositions work to shape the social 'distances, that are predictive of encounters, affinities, sympathisers or even desires' (Bourdieu 1998a: 10). They produce the practical segmentation of those at the top from those at the bottom: an 'organizing principle for action' (Bourdieu 2006: 18).

Conative habitus is carnal. It relates to the bodily competencies and skills acquired through the secondary habitus, facilitating practices that reproduce particular positions based on the recognition that certain competencies and skills are valuable. Taken together, the cognitive and carnal components of habitus signal how agents are able to interpret and act in the social world, whereas the *affective* component of habitus signals why agents, in the first instance, desire to invest their energy and time in a given course of action in terms of what they are continually motivated and inspired to do. The affective dimension of habitus corresponds to a sense of what should be valued in the 'objective future' that is designated by a 'shared modal understanding [and] evaluation of certain expectations and aspirations as reasonable and of others as unreasonable (Brubaker 1985: 759). The affective component of habitus thereby facilitates a certain 'love [for] the inevitable' (Bourdieu 2006: 77).

Taking cognitive, conative and affective components together allows, as Bourdieu (2006: 20) argues, for habitus to depart from rational or norm-guided action. The habitus corresponds with the agent's learned feel for cannabis cultivation and exchange, and a 'practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given situation [that] brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical precepts'. Habitus mobilises dispositions and embodied knowledge that are brought into the moment of interaction between agents in a field. These dispositions are reinforced by the objective structures of the field (e.g. apprenticeship). The secondary habitus, in turn, shapes participation in the field and a reasonable understanding of the agent's position in relation to others. Habitus acts as the motor of action in Bourdieu's sociology because it defines the 'generative principle of distinct and distinctive practices' rather than reducing agents to subjects of free will or causally-determined automatons (Bourdieu 1998a: 8). It instigates a 'practical logic, that of vagueness, of the

more-or-less, which defines one's ordinary relation to the world' (Bourdieu 2006: 78) and shapes what agents reason, do, and say in different contexts and situations.

2.7.2. Habitus as a dispositional theory of action

The underlying theoretical thrust of habitus is that, even in our most conscious thoughts, we struggle not to take some aspects of reality for granted. Habitus is attentive to taken-for-granted and common sense experiences that endow practices with certain conditions of possibility and render particular courses of action and types of activity as reasonable rather than rational (Bourdieu 1998a: 33-4; Collet 2009: 424). Or, in other words, habitus coordinates a 'practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given situation' (Bourdieu 2006: 77). Wacquant (2014b) summarises this theoretical statement as Bourdieu's 'dispositional theory of action' rather than as a fully worked out explanation for action. It is important, however, to bear in mind that Bourdieu does not deny the possibility of conscious reflection and that agents do form prior intentions to act. Rather, habitus signals how agents act *as if* they were rational (Hanappi 2014: 166; Lainé 2014: 78).

Positions within a field are actively constructed by agents (the field comprises position-*takings*) in relation to the interaction between their primary and secondary habitus, such that there is an affinity between an agent's subjective capacity to reason, think and act (i.e. dispositions & habitus), in addition to their objective chances relating to the distribution of cultural, economic and social capital. Wacquant (2014a: 5) summarises the relationship between subjective capacity and objective possibility as the 'conjunction between disposition and position'. This is theoretical shorthand for the internalisation of particular dispositions and forms of bodily knowledge, which, by way of recurrent practices and principles of vision and division produce the 'objective' field of organised activity observed by the researcher. The closer the congruence between an agent's objective position and their habitus – e.g. between the objective distribution of capital and their position-taking – the more likely a field is to form, the more taken-for-granted its positions and motives become, and the more durable that social order is likely to be. Habitus, in sum, guides and motivates relatively stable patterns of reasoning and acting (i.e. practices) that result in the topography of the field. This iterative relationship between habitus and field is what Bourdieu commonly refers to as a 'structuring structure'. Wacquant (1987: 75), in appropriating Bourdieu's theory, refers to this as a 'structured dispositions'.

2.7.3. Hysteresis

Fields often emerge outside of well-entrenched class structures. Subjective expectations do, however, tend to fit poorly the objective chances circumscribed by such fields: such is the case when corporate managers use the phrase "managing expectations". To examine empirical cases defined by a mismatch of field and habitus, Bourdieu has employed the concept of 'hysteresis' (Wacquant 2004b: 391-2 for an overview). Hysteresis is a time lag between when habitus is constituted and when it is activated to motivate and coordinate stable patterns of behaviour, reasoning, thinking and valuing that materialise into the positions of a more-or-less stable field that is recognised as *the* objective reality. Hysteresis is not simply a mismatch between an agent's habitus and their recognition of the stakes and positions of others within a field such that somebody 'feels out of place' (Wacquant 2014b: 126). Rather, this additional concept accounts for situations in which habitus is not internally coherent, integrated or tending towards congruence with the structure of a given field (Wacquant 2012a: 5-6). Bourdieu (2000: 161) is at pains to emphasise that:

> 'Habitus change constantly as a function of new experiences. Dispositions are subject to a sort of permanent revision, but one that is never radical, given that it operates on the basis of premises instituted in the previous state.'

Hysteresis therefore also accommodates fields that are *yet-to-come*. The concept reminds us that a field must first be produced before it is *re*produced. For example, Wacquant (2014b) argues that contrary to locating habitus in the individual, it is a multi-scalar concept that can be applied to different aggregations of social activity, including individuals, groups (e.g. class, gender, demography) and institutions (e.g. academia, art) depending on the empirical context and the research question at hand.[27]

[27] It is worth noting that in Bourdieu's canonical texts, such as *Outline of a Theory of Practice* and *Pascalian Meditations*, 'habitus' is used in both the singular and plural sense, which has often led to confusion.

2.7.4. Habitus and the wider toolbox

Habitus represents a useful conceptual point of departure in cases of illicit economies that lack a well demarcated field. It is also crucial at the theoretical level to relate habitus to other concepts in Bourdieu's wider toolbox. First, habitus shifts primacy to the individual and takes their on-going practices as the unit of analysis. Agents actively construct relations between positions within the field (as these positions are perceived and adjudicated) rather than beginning with pre-existing inter-personal relations – or network 'ties' – that then take primacy over the individual and shape interaction into asymmetric and symmetric structures (Martin 2011: 13-14, fn. 18). Second, habitus acts as a bridge between the false dichotomy of objective and subjective approaches. It allows for an examination of how apprenticeship was reproduced through their on-going participation.

Furthermore, habitus is a window onto the inconsistencies, weaknesses and successes of Bourdieu's attempt to develop a constructivist structuralism. Habitus is made to do a great deal of theoretical work in these regards (Brubaker 1985: 760) and has accordingly been critiqued by sociologists concerned with conceptual parsimony and a neo-positivist methodological bias that relegates habitus to a 'black box' (Martin 2011: 255-6; Burawoy 2012: 204). However, it is more appropriately understood as an open or signal concept designed to guide empirical analysis and be reconstructed by it in iterative fashion. Habitus draws attention to the dispositions, bodily competencies and practical knowledges that are acquired and shared by agents that motivate participation and coordinate practices. Rather than a purely 'theoretical operator' (Wacquant 2014b: 119) habitus requires further specification during empirical research. In the empirical chapters, I work to link the economic field with the primary habitus of the established shareholders and the secondary habitus of apprentice cultivators. The concept of habitus is necessary to examine how the subjective expectations of youth were brought into alignment with their more limited chances and how this alignment in turn dealt with the uncertainty arising from illegality and lack of enforceable contracting arrangements with shareholders. While an ethnographic analysis demonstrates that the dispositions of youth entering apprenticeships were often idiosyncratic and multivalent, expressing a range of different ambitions, their resulting practices tended towards conformity and the patterning of action at the level of the field (Collet 2009: 420).[28]

[28] From a methodological point of view, Collet (2009: 419-20) suggests habitus 'is an invitation to understand what influences the view that agents have of their own actions without reducing

Methodologically-speaking, then, habitus highlights the productivity of researcher-as-*observer* (of the field), researcher-as-*participant* (in practices) and researcher-as-*interpreter* (of the habitus) who, armed with open concepts must 'swim in the stream of action and filter out its composition, rather than scope it from the bank' (Wacquant 2012b: 123).

2.8. Reproducing structural advantage: linking field and habitus

Having established that habitus: i) motivates and shapes participation in a field, and ii) coordinates practices within a field; the chapter now turns to elaborate a theoretical link between field and habitus to guide an analysis of how the hierarchical organisation of Sierra Leone's cannabis economy is reproduced through the on-going practices of participants. I therefore use the terms reproduc*ing* structural advantage and cultivat*ing* hierarchy in verb form. In what follows I critique the utility of structural violence towards an explanation for how agents incorporate a habitus that actively reproduces the hierarchical organisation of economic and juridical fields. I argue that agents misrecognise their subjection to structural violence associated with the state bureaucracy, political corruption and economic inequality – what youth in Hastings and Waterloo referred to as "the system" – as shared with shareholders who they perceived to "play the game against the system". I proceed by turning to the concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence to provide a conceptual approach for examining how domination was actively reproduced. In doing so I advance a theoretical explanation for why rationality from the point of view of the researcher appears to breakdown despite the continued investment of youth in their on-going activity.

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them to a model [and] agents rely on their previous experience and their current and previous social positions as a tool to respond to a crisis'.

2.8.1 Structural violence of "the system"

I now turn to establish a conceptual approach for examining how violence is experienced as compatible with reasonable expectations to achieve a better and dignified life, without recourse to violence as overt and working visibly on the agent. Both legal and illegal markets are argued to be organised through the credible threat of violence, such as that which upholds state sanctioned laws, or the inter-personal violence of a gang leader's baseball bat or a Mafia boss's fists. It is open to empirical debate whether 'systemic violence' during exchange and the enforcement of contracts plays a significant role in regulating the economies of illicit drug *production* in the Global North as well as the Global South (Goldstein 1985; Brownstein and Goldstein 1990). An empiricist or behaviouralist approach to violence entails what Lukes (2005: 109) in a comprehensive critique of power terms the 'exercise fallacy' or 'power-to'. Violence in this view is used to allow one party to alter the interests of another and ensure they align with their own.

Three shortcomings arise. First, the role of violence in altering another's interests constitutes a conscious act; they know their best interest but knowingly acquiesce against it due to the threat of violence. Second, violence is physical, inter-personal and exercised from the top down. By taking these conceptions of violence together a behavioural and empiricist methodology treats violence as overt and the resulting structure of power relations as something to be 'accessed' and discovered during research that works towards those at the top where authority is expected to be exercised over those at the bottom. This conception of violence was shown to be prevalent in the organised crime and economic sociology literatures and conforms to an 'interactionist vision' (Bourdieu 1986: 16). The analytical focus is on visible outcomes of overt violence that are fully contained within the moment of interaction between agents, taken as both inter-personal and as resulting from demonstrating credible threats to deploy violence (Lukes 2005: 16-9).

An analytical blind spot emerges when power is treated as the outcome of overt rather than covert forms of violence (Bourgois 2009: 24).[29] The researcher is afforded an

[29] Bourgois (2009) suggests symbolic violence sits in-between structural and 'normalised' violence. Normalised violence refers to the 'commonsensical' discourses that come to 'render systematic patterns of brutality invisible' and entails a process of objectification through which agent's invest in particular identities and roles to make sense of the world, but which are ostensibly a product of conditions of structural violence (*ibid*: 20). Symbolic violence for

ability to 'reach out and touch' the objective relations of violence, even while this method of enquiry foregoes an explanation for why agents often do not comprehend 'the [objective] structures that are realized in them' (Bourdieu 1986 16; Fourcade 2007: 1022; cf. Venkatesh and Levitt 2000). The subjectivist-constructivist approach, meanwhile, privileges inter-subjective agreement rather than considering how such agreement conforms to a one-sided conception of social relations that is perceived to be matter-of-fact and even inevitable (Wacquant 1987).

Structural violence begins to account for more covert and implicit forms of violence. Violence has an indirect effect whereas inter-personal violence has both a physical and psychological direct effect. Structural violence originates from the institutionalisation of economic inequality and social injustice in the lives of those less dominant. It works to restrict agency while rendering the source of these constraints ambiguous, vague and/or incomprehensible (Galtung 1969, 1985; Farmer 1996; Bourgois 2009: 17). For Farmer (2004), structural violence is material and the product of an unequal distribution of resources throughout history. It is the dominant that, even if unintentionally, continually work to reproduce structural violence by maintaining inequalities in access to opportunities, such as in education, the labour market, healthcare and economic production.

Structural violence is analogous to Lukes' second dimension of power given the concept focuses on the 'rules of the game' that govern social life and set economic agendas. It is a game in which the interests of agents consciously enter but according to an agenda that is shaped in such a way that the resulting decisions favour the dominant. Youth recognise that particular issues are organised out of the agenda. Yet they are not in a position to organise them back in given this agenda is by-and-large inaccessible to them. Power, in this sense, is taken as 'power over' someone dependent on somebody else, or some other group, who dominate in two ways. First, in relation to power as generically about establishing control over a decision-making process, and second, in relation to power as the credible threat of sanctions that prevent the contravention of a dominant authority. Structural violence does, however, fall short of examining how youth continued to participate as apprentices in the cannabis economy towards expectations aligned with their reasonable rather than rational interests. Furthermore, "the system"

Bourgois refers to how agents 'blame themselves' for their position such that their domination becomes somewhat naturalised. As I argue in what follows, normalised violence overlaps significantly with symbolic violence, and Bourgois arguably presents a somewhat reductive reading of Bourdieu's symbolic violence.

was a widely articulated emic concept that was explicitly recognised as a shared source of structural violence and that apprentices and journeymen perceived their shareholders were equally subject to, despite remaining hemmed into structurally disadvantage positions characterised by an objectively high degree of uncertainty regarding future opportunity and success. Youth openly resented the system and held it responsible for limiting their life chances.

Following Lukes (2005: 21), the power-to and power-over dimensions of violence have tended to overlap. It is analytically prudent to sub-categorise overt violence as theoretically analogous to coercion. More broadly, power operates to secure alignment with dominant interests in different ways: when the dominant actively or otherwise threaten to deprive a more dependent agent (coercion); when agents act without consciously altering the interests of others (influence); when a command is understood to be legitimate (authority); and finally, when an agent adopts a course of action but cannot determine the source of the interest that motivated it (manipulation). It is to the roles of influence, authority and manipulation, in terms of how youth were unaware that their interests had been altered (influence) but continued to pursue these altered interests as 'correct' (authority & manipulation) that need to be addressed if the continual reproduction of structural advantages through youths' on-going participation as apprentices is to be explained fully. To move beyond structural violence I turn to consider what participants in the cannabis economy referred to as "the game", and examine how by playing this game apprentices and journeymen were subject to symbolic violence.

2.8.2 Symbolic violence in "the game"

Recent criminological research has highlighted the significance of 'symbolic boundaries' around the use of violence that are aligned with the 'acculturated meanings' of offenders (Copes et al 2015: 33). Illicit drug markets often operate in very different cultural contexts that legitimise and permit varying degrees of violence (Sandberg 2012). The key shortcoming of structural violence was that it could not account for how violence can be 'productive, transformative, authoritative and [yet] *compatible with dignity*' (Lukes 2005: 109, emphasis added; cf. Bourgois 1995). A conceptual problem arises when trying to explain on-going participation in structurally disadvantageous activities that are viewed by agents to be legitimate in the sense of being believable and investable in. Bourdieu refers to this as a 'committed stake' in the field. "Playing the game"

represented a meaningful alternative to the structural violence of "the system". I proceed by adopting a relational approach to violence that is not reducible to inter-personal relations and 'interdependencies' between agents (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997; Lukes 2005: 112). A relational approach utilises conceptual tools that examine how youth come 'to accept their role in the existing order of things [i.e. the game], either because they can see no alternative to it [i.e. the system], or because they see it as natural and unchangeable' (Lukes 2005: 28).

To do this I turn to Bourdieu's open concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence that are found in his analysis of 'modes of domination' in non- and extra-state regulated fields (Wacquant 1987: 66). Bourdieu argues that the on-going practices of those in structurally disadvantaged positions are motivated by specific socially constructed interests (*illusio*) and entail a degree of misrecognition in terms of miscomprehending that a particular one-sided course of action is the best means of achieving certain expectations posited by an agent's *illusio*. Bourdieu (1998a: 72-84) argues that the *illusio* entails immediate, economic incentives that encourage participation in particular fields in addition to the reproduction of practices affording particular psychological payoffs. These psychological payoffs result from the perception of inclusion and opportunity within "the game" of cannabis cultivation and exchange in contrast to exclusion from "the system", and recognition by others within the same field that the practices they undertake (forms of action, reasoning, and valuing) are respected and socially valuable. The *illusio* is double-edged because it motivates on-going participation in structurally disadvantaged activities, albeit based on recognition of the economic and socio-psychological rewards that are *expected* to result. *Illusio* signposts the 'fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing the game is "worth the candle" or, more simply, that playing the game is worth the effort' (Bourdieu 1998a: 76-7). By playing the game against the system apprentices and journeymen exhibit a:

> 'Confused awareness of the profound complicity between the adversaries [i.e. their shareholders] interested in the same field: they disagree with one another but at least they agree about the object of disagreement.' (*ibid*: 78)

Illusio therefore entails a degree of misrecognition in the on-going practices of youth that is analogous to 'illusory ideas of what is natural [and] induce[s] or encourage[s]

failures of rationality' (Lukes 2005: 115).[30] Bourdieu's claim is that psychological payoffs construe participation in highly unequal fields as economically *disinterested* from the point of view of the agent who is motivated by *reasonable* interests, rather than participation being explained away as a breakdown in rationality. Arriving at this understanding of misrecognition requires two theoretical manoeuvres.

First, it is necessary to break with a phenomenological approach to lived experience said to reveal the 'true' nature of domination, such that a more objective account of violence in this view would require the researcher to shift from outsider to insider. Second, misrecognition entails a break with the supposedly more objective truth of the researcher-as-insider who examines how social structures have been incorporated through the lived experience of agents, and how in doing so, the agent actively reproduces their domination (Bourdieu 1998: 40; Bourdieu 2000: 202-5; Burawoy 2012: 187-8). This double break provides the conceptual starting points for examining how youth invested so much time and effort while apprenticed despite the uncertainties of opportunity and success in the absence of enforceable contracting arrangements. Misrecognition suggests that youth often did not recognise apprenticeship as being responsible for reproducing their structural disadvantage because participation afforded them reasonable economic and psychological payoffs that were not otherwise available. Consequently, youth rarely challenged the structures of domination responsible for keeping them hemmed in.[31]

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[30] The original French term for misrecognition in Bourdieu's texts, '*méconnaisance'*, is not directly translatable into English. It can, however, be understood as a 'confused awareness' (Bourdieu 1998a: 78) or 'mis-conception', or more directly as 'mis-knowledge'. Recognition translates to '*réconnaisance*', meaning to 'know again', such that *re*cognition signposts the alignment of practices (action, reasoning, and valuing) to those that support the dominant, and as such *misre*cognition is a failure to perceive this realignment. Practices are cognised according to particular dispositions that have meaning only in relation to particular fields of activity and their specific culture and history.

[31] Burawoy (2012: 192-3) argues it is important to distinguish between 'mystification' or 'ideology' generated in the gap between an agent's experience and the social relations that they have entered into, opposed to misrecognition, which accounts for how the dispositions of agents are shaped by a deep-seated habitus that is congruent with unequal social relationships. Burawoy concludes that domination can result from both and is conditional on neither simultaneously (*ibid*: 198-9). Rather than abandoning habitus as Burawoy argues (*ibid*: 200), I emphasise that the concept provides an analytically useful starting point for how secondary dispositions are attuned to unequal social relations that agents are implicated in, but also deeper-seated primary dispositions, established in the bodily dispositions of the unconscious, which result from a particular personal history and process of socialisation. Burawoy ostensibly reduces habitus to primary dispositions and misses the secondary habitus as a potential empirical site for grasping the reproduction of domination. Manual labour on the factory floor was, for Burawoy, construed as a game shared by workers and motivated for 'good psychological reasons' that resulted in the naturalisation of domination. Treating work as a game with objective stakes helped to deal with mundane, routinised tasks, while exit from this game

Symbolic violence is the outcome of misrecognition in the lives of youth such that the objective structures of an unequal field gain a degree of stability. The concept necessitates a conceptual shift from the macro level of centralised 'power over' or 'power to', to focus instead on the individual and their subjective dispositions and the concrete mechanisms through which these are brought into congruence (Bourdieu 1998a: 40).[32] Violence operates according to relations of symbolic power between dominant and dominated, a 'tacit complicity' that legitimises one-sided interpretations and valuations of the world (Bourdieu 1989: 20). From this, I take symbolic power to mean:

> 'The capacity to impose and inculcate means of understanding and structuring the world, or symbolic systems, that contribute to the reproduction of the social order by representing economic and political power in disguised forms that endow them with legitimacy and/or taken-for-grantedness.' (Wacquant 1987: 66)

Methodologically, symbolic violence is approached from the position of the dominated habitus, both primary and secondary, which are responsible for reproducing their domination. Such an approach does not solely require a topographic view to identify those who 'possess' power and observations of how those 'wielding' this power make others acquiesce to their own interest. By linking field (objectivist analysis) with habitus (subjectivist analysis) it is possible to examine how shareholder-apprentice relations were 'recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved […but] that, if presented another way, would be unacceptable' (Bourdieu 1990: 85). The reproduction of structural advantages results from both the objective mal-distribution of economic, social, juridical and cultural capital within an organised field of activity, and in terms of how these species of capital were misrecognised as 'socially accepted or socially concealed uses of other

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entailed a degree of ostracisation. At the same time, it was a game that could not be taken seriously if its conditions of existence were intellectualised, questioned and objectified by those participating in it. It is this 'subjective truth' that makes work bearable for agents who are unlikely to wilfully reflect on their disadvantageous social position in view of the psychological violence this otherwise entails. While mystification provides a 'rational, cognitive basis for consent' – what Burawoy associates with the Gramscian view of hegemony – it lacks tools for grasping the second theoretical break. First, in terms of how the conditions and sources of domination are re-concealed and dissimulated (*ibid*: 194-5). Second, for how fields already subjected to the structural violence of more exclusionary fields (i.e. the game *in* the system) produces domination in relation to that field but internal to its own relations.

[32] During the methodology (Chapter Three) I identify apprenticeship as the mechanism through which symbolic violence is reproduced.

types of capital' (Wacquant 1987: 69). As Bourdieu (1998: 40) concludes, symbolic violence:

> 'Incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought.'

Symbolic violence is central to Bourdieu's conceptual toolbox. It accounts for how any objective distribution of capital (the field) exerts a 'structural effect' according to how different species of capital are perceived and valued, and in terms of how particular practices are accepted as competent and permissible. The concept is therefore closely related to symbolic capital because it is generative of covert principles that govern the accumulation, convertibility and use of various kinds of capital (cultural, economic and social) into other forms. It also accounts for ways of interpreting and perceiving how to most effectively accumulate, convert and utilise this capital. More concretely, symbolic violence is the product of, for example, misrecognising hard work, honesty and sacrifice as the means by which to play the game against the system. Symbolic violence results in a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' that reproduces structural advantages through on-going activity perceived to be compatible with dignity and worth striving for (Wacquant 1987: 69, 74; Bourdieu 1998a: 40-1). This is examined in relational terms: of relations between position-takings in the field according to which one-sided practices were adjudicated, and finally the relations between this economic field and the juridical field of law enforcement.

When beginning with symbolic violence I am not suggesting that youth lack a capacity to act (i.e. agency) or that their actions are restricted by particular social rules. Instead, by using the phrases '*reproducing* structural advantages' and '*cultivating* hierarchy' I am emphasising how youth actively engage in captivating and meaningful activities that reproduce their domination by symbolically denying their dependency on those more dominant. (Mis)recognition is at once conscious and explicit (and unconscious and implicit) but requires specification in terms of the concrete mechanisms and relations through which it is reproduced.

2.9. Conclusion: Conceptual tools for examining the reproduction of structural advantage

The conceptual approach outlined in this chapter was motivated by bridging objectivist-structuralist (institutions, networks and structures) and subjectivist-constructivist (phenomenology) approaches. This followed from the identification of a number of conceptual shortcomings in the economic sociology, network theory and organised crime literatures (Chapter One). When dealing with the uncertainties of product illegality, lack of enforceable property rights, and threat of interference by law-enforcement, direct intervention by a higher authority using overt violence was privileged as the principle means for ensuring the organisation and survival of criminal enterprise. Rather than reaching out and trying to 'touch' these power relations in a behaviourist or empiricist sense, I turned to what Bourdieu refers to as open concepts. These conceptual tools were deployed during field research in order to attune the analysis to more covert and less empirically graspable forms of violence. Having taken "the system" and "the game" as heuristic devices with which to organise this line of critique, I discussed a number of shortcomings that resulted in a conceptual shift to structural violence: when historically instituted rules of the game are weighted in favour of the dominant but which the dominated cannot readily establish the source of. While this represented one avenue for examining youths' motivation to undertake apprenticeships, it did not fully explain continued participation in contravention of their 'best' interest. This was because they explicitly recognised that the system was *the* source of structural violence, which in turn motivated their desire to "play the game against the system".

It was therefore necessary to consider how participation in cannabis production and marketing networks reproduced what I termed *structural advantages* as shareholders regulated their apprentices' and journeymen's access to economic and social capital. To do this, I outlined Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence. The concept linked an objectivist examination of the unequal accumulation of economic, social and cultural capital, with a subjectivist analysis focused on symbolic capital that was generative of the one-sided interpretations of how these species of capital were accumulated, converted and utilised. The historical accumulation of symbolic capital by the shareholders ensures other kinds of capital and ways of accumulating them are recognised as legitimate competence by the dominated. Practices were treated as plural in the sense of having an audience within a field that corroborated their viability.

The concept of habitus is opposed to purely rational action and instead emphasises that action is reasonable and entails particular cognitive (reasoning, thinking), carnal (bodily) and affective (emotions, feeling) schemes of appreciation, perception and valuation that guide action, but do not overly determine action as such. Habitus is related to particular dispositions formed in relation to particular histories and more imminent institutions and social structures, such as boss-apprentice relations, through which social reality is interpreted and acted in relation to. I therefore concluded that habitus represented a dispositional theory of action that was useful in terms of understanding what motivates participation in a given field and how the practices responsible for reproducing that field come to be coordinated. I divided the concept of habitus into primary and secondary dimensions, which relate to the habitus of the shareholders and the habitus of apprentices and journeymen respectively. The concept of habitus was necessary to examine how the subjective expectations of agents in terms of their aspirations and hopes were made congruent with the objective chances they had of getting by in an organised field of activity; especially in terms of recognising hard work, sacrifice and honesty as the means by which to succeed. I referred to incongruences between habitus and field as hysteresis. It was therefore deemed necessary to engage in both objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis to link field and habitus and examine how structural advantages are reproduced.

The reproduction of structural advantage could only be fully examined in relation to Bourdieu's concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence. These conceptual tools suggested those in structurally disadvantageous positions misrecognise their 'objective' reality as somewhat matter-of-fact, banal and even inevitable, and are useful for examining how practices conform to the organisation of the economic and juridical fields. In the next chapter I locate apprenticeship as the empirical site at which to examine the reproduction of structural advantage and operationalise a methodological avenue for utilising the open concepts discussed in this chapter during field research. More specifically, I discuss how to examine the extra-discursive dimensions of symbolic violence during field research, especially in relation to issues of positionality, reflexivity and ethics that arose as I went "inside the game".

Chapter Three: Going inside the game

3.1. Introduction: Research question and methodological avenues

The methodological rationale of this thesis is motivated by the discussion in Chapters One and Two that bridged a long-standing division between objectivist-constructivist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that has underpinned research on illicit drug economies. More specifically, the turn to Bourdieu's open concepts resulted from having engaged with a number of other conceptual approaches, such as economic sociology, network theory, and an iterative engagement with social anthropology, which raised the issue of disciplinary silos but also the opportunity to develop an alternative methodological avenue. To do this, the research process begins with an objectivist research question that is answered by incorporating the subjectivity of cannabis farmers:

> **How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to organised violence?**

The research question is prompted by an initial analysis of the economic field of cannabis cultivation in Chapter Four. There I examine the characteristics and structure of the cannabis economy (production and exchange) and determine that the shareholders from the 1980s and 1990s "controlled" larger farms, employed more apprentices, monopolised relationships with higher value exchange partners, and therefore obtained greater returns than newer farmers. The concept of *structural advantage* points to these objective relations of power particularly in terms of control over access to land and labour. Yet by following Bourdieu, I also examine an inter-related subjective dimension of (dis)advantage. In doing so, a subjectivist mode of analysis is incorporated into the research question and requires the linking during field research of three concepts: field, habitus and practices. I do so, first by examining how youth conformed to apprenticeship rather than setting up farms independently and directly challenging the shareholders. And second, by examining how youths' on-going practices – acting, reasoning and valuing – were shaped through their on-going participation in apprenticeship. Consequently, the subjectivist analysis is concerned with: i) ascertaining the motivations that secure the participation of newcomers through apprenticeship; and with: ii) identifying the emic practices that secured indirect

competition in the economic and juridical fields. In doing so the research question is prompted by the observation that the shareholders did not retain their dominant position by taking recourse to direct intervention through organised violence. Instead I aim to explain the *reproduction of structural advantage* in the economic and juridical fields by virtue of youths' on-going participation in *boss-apprentice relations*.

The research question is tackled via three methodological steps that are related to Bourdieu's open concepts:

1. Identification of an appropriate field site(s) at which cases of structural advantage can be examined in objectivist terms. *To examine the* ***economic field****.*

2. Utilisation of a subjectivist approach that examines the historical and social conditions responsible for securing participation. *To examine th*e *primary and secondary* ***habitus*****.**

3. Identification of the concrete mechanisms responsible for linking field (via objectivist analysis) and habitus (via subjectivist analysis) in such a way that reproduces the disadvantaged positions of youth through their on-going participation in the economic and juridical fields. *By examining the reproduction of particular* ***practices****.*

To link the concepts of field, habitus and practices, and examine the reproduction of structural advantage, I deploy Bourdieu's (2003) preferred methodological approach of 'participant objectivation' (also see Wacquant 2004b: 395-9). The aim is to turn 'objectivist tools' such as network analysis and statistics onto the 'private person' in order to situate their interests, motivations and the particular representation they have of their social reality within a wider field of organised activity. It is the case that our research subjects 'do not stand before their action […] in the posture of an observer'; for they are invested in practices and are unlikely to work as professional philosophers that consciously stand outside of experience and continually intellectualise it (*ibid*: 288). Asking "why" somebody undertakes cannabis farming is, therefore, to assume that the whole truth of the practice is in their head and that the researcher only needs to extract this 'truth'. Caution is especially reserved where participants in illicit activities are subject to domination and the varying degrees of misrecognition this entails.

As I argued in the previous chapter, relational sociology claims that agents practice as irreversible what the researcher seeks to reconstruct as reversible. In other words, there is a degree to which practices cannot be consciously articulated by those who are 'implicated' in them. The researcher must therefore exercise a degree of detachment (see Candea et al 2015 for an overview) rather than solely pursuing objectivity by way of increasing immersion into the world of the agent through participant observation, for 'how can one be both subject and object' simultaneously (*ibid*: 281)? The ramifications of collapsing a distinction between object and subject were especially apparent late on into field work. During the introductory vignette in Chapter One, I discussed with Turkish, a cannabis cultivator in Hastings, the hardship he experienced while participating as a runner in one of Lumley Street's cartels:

> "I do not want *bɔmboshɔro*, a disturbance in life […] when all goodness has gone, when you are cast away […] *bɔmboshɔro* is not good for us, it is awful […] I pray I can overcome any situation in life. I want to overcome my debt. That is why they [the shareholders] call me Turkish. It is why they gave me this name."[33]

"*Bɔmboshɔro*" is a Krio colloquialism synonymous with "*fracas*": a break or a rupture. While it is of course possible to empathise with loss or hardship, it would arguably be naïve to claim that I was 'immersed' in Turkish's sense of emotion and urgency so as to claim that I could fully comprehend (and rationalise) his social reality and the whole trace of his past that shaped his perception of being on the brink of *bɔmboshɔro*. This is not to argue that the researcher should not be aware of the discourses through which youth articulate their lives, as Utas (2002: 49-51) carefully unpacks in his discussion of 'victimcy modes' of representation during research with Liberian youth who participated in conflict. This is precisely what the reflexive dimension of Bourdieu's methodology calls for and which I discuss in 3.5. Rather, it is to dispense with a view of objectivity that calls for ever greater intimacy with our research subjects. The notion that researchers are 'with' their research subjects is a 'stereotype', which as Venkatesh (2002: 108) somewhat hypocritically argues, 'has to be driven finally into its grave'.

Participant observation would furthermore presuppose the learning processes by which youth have come to understand the world and therefore presuppose identification of the concrete relations through, and the histories according to which, certain dispositions and practices have come to be invested with meaning. This does not mean embarking on

[33] Field notes, with Turkish in Hastings, 30/08/2013.

two independent research avenues, by separating out emic from etic, even if this is necessary for structural purposes when writing. Rather, the linking of objectivist and subjectivist analysis considers the inter-relation between emic and etic that is necessary for examining the 'social conditions of possibility' that give rise to certain experiences and practices. In doing so, these provide a critical vantage onto a 'necessarily fictitious immersion in a foreign milieu' (Bourdieu 2003: 282).

To achieve this aim, the methodology begins with an objectivist analysis that maps out cannabis production and marketing networks. First, I examine the characteristics of competition and struggles that played out according to unequal positions occupied by cultivators and dealers within their respective production hierarchies. Data was collected using a survey of cultivators that snowballed throughout field research from December 2012 to December 2013. This survey was conducted after purposively identifying those categorised as shareholders, journeymen and apprentices, in terms of their level of autonomy in decision-making and access to economic and social resources, which were grouped into several production hierarchies around shareholders that had claimed first rights to land ownership (Chapter Four). Snowball sampling is often used for accessing 'hard-to-reach' or 'hidden' populations such as drug users, in contexts such as cannabis production and marketing where a more representative probability sample is challenging to implement due to the lack of a reliable sampling framework. In this instance, my informants were also aware of the study's purpose and actively searched for farmers at each site of production, albeit only in cases where I was present with them to verify their claims.

Selection bias can arise from attempts by gatekeepers to conceal the identities of close associates or when the researcher follows initial social networks and potentially misses less connected and more socially distant farmers. Cannabis farmers were, however, often difficult to locate, especially through referral when beginning with farmers of lower social status. Therefore, initial cultivators usually idenfitied sites of production which were then mapped out. These physical sites of production were then visited and each cultivator validated by cross-checking claims to land-ownership with other cultivators and members of the community. The initial six months were dedicated to this labour intensive strategy so as to identify the entire population of cannabis farms and accompanying farmers within the limits of Western Area. Given the unit of analysis was individuals; the methodology did not use Participatory Rural Appraisal to conduct small-scale surveys (Chambers 1983). As Malleson et al (2008: 2) argue in an evaluation

of small-scale livelihood surveys in West Africa, the PRA takes rural households as the unit of analysis and, while cost- and time-effective, is limited in understanding 'broader socio-economic, political and historical processes' that impact agriculturalists. Therefore, in line with recent African small-scale agricultural studies (Munyua and Stilwell 2009), a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology involving participant observation, one-on-one interviews and surveys is undertaken periodically throughout field research to triangulate the validity of data collected from farmers (Creswell 2003).

In terms of the qualitative research, this also involved a purposive snowball sample that began with an apprentice in Hastings and a shareholder in Waterloo. This worked to reduce the degree of gatekeeper bias and triangulated differences in interpretation, motivations and values from less to more dominant positions. This is in line with the methodological approach of social aesthetics outlined in the next section (3.1.1). Given each cluster of farmers was relatively small; I was able to conduct a baseline survey of the total population of apprentices, journeymen and shareholders at each site between December 2012 and December 2013. Data were gathered on seasonal variation in advertised and transaction prices, the volume of inputs (fertiliser, chicken dung and fish skin) used to grow cannabis, the types of exchange relationships used to sell cannabis (open market and closed, cross-border exchange partners), the duration of apprenticeships, and the total time spent cultivating cannabis.[34] Data collected during this time period was generalisable to the *illegal* context of what Maconachie et al (2012) refers to as urban and peri-urban agriculture (UPA) in Western Area. Maconachie et al conclude that 62% of legal UPA farmers were under the age of 35, and benefited from Western Area's unique system of informal land regulation, and marketing and production networks. These factors are distinct from the rural provinces and allowed young men in Western Area to improve their access to economic capital and social standing. For this reason, the sampling strategy selected only cannabis farming sites in Western Area, given their unique context and greater commercial viability. By cross-checking between first-person interviews, informal discussions and observations of everyday activity, I validated and mapped out the production hierarchies that linked apprentices to their respective shareholders and the extra-legal relations cultivators utilised with law-enforcers to access information regarding raids against their farms (see Chapter Seven).

[34] See Appendix One for tabulated data from the survey. Also see Appendices for English and Krio translations of the initial topic guide, including survey questions.

To map and analyse these economic and extra-legal topographies I drew on objectivist techniques such as: network mapping using software tool *Gephi*,[35] regression analysis using the *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)*, and kernel density analysis using the *R* statistical software package. Kernel density calculates a smoothed-out histogram amenable to identifying nuances in the price distributions for agricultural goods, enabling the identification of seasonal variations that I control for using regression analysis to estimate price variations owing to factors including product quality, social capital in access to open and closed market exchange partners, and the degree of incumbency within apprenticeship. These tools were complimentary in analysing price competition and formation, in addition to the topology of relations that comprised production hierarchies and extra-legal relations with law-enforcers. I discuss these methods and their theoretical implications in more detail as they are drawn on throughout the empirical chapters. This is despite such tools 'usually [being] excluded from the arsenal of anthropological weapons' (Bourdieu 2003: 284). I refer to the topographies produced by these methods as the *economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange* (Chapter Four) and the *juridical field of law enforcement* (Chapter Seven). The latter also entailed observations of how law enforcement interacted with youth and the extra-legal encounters and relations that protected dominant players despite 'official' suppression of cannabis cultivation and dealing by the state. In doing so, I argue that the economic and juridical fields were inter-related to ensure the reproduction of structural advantage.

Meagher (2009) has argued that the use of networks as a *theoretical* approach to examine non-state regulation encounters a number of analytical drawbacks. A focus on topological structure privileges the patterning of ties over their content. Agency-centred approaches assume a flat ontology that results in the solving of collective action problems on the basis of mutual interests. The analytical focus of each is the 'form' of the network and therefore its structure in a more limited topographical sense, rather than efforts focusing on unpacking the content of ties in terms of the mechanisms of agency, culture and power responsible for the regulation of networks. This aim, as Meagher suggests, is important if studies of non-state regulation are to move beyond the economic to consider their political implications.

[35] I have used the *Gephi* software package both for analysis of network centrality and betweenness, and the weighting of nodes, in addition to presenting the resulting network diagrams. These are discussed in more detail as utilised during the empirical chapters.

In my reading, preference for the institutional conception of networks outlined in Chapter One (1.3.2) converges with an interactionist vision. I acknowledge that this approach is decidedly important for it adds much needed empirical specificity, especially given that recent studies of illicit networks (e.g. Nordstrom 2004) are often based on 'a highly speculative departure from available evidence' and have a tendency, as previously argued, to treat illicit networks as 'highly centralized rather than fragmented' (*ibid*: 17). Rather, the issue here lies with conceptual approaches that privilege inter-personal relations, and 'mechanisms' in the sense of empirically observable face-to-face interaction, as the site at which agency, culture and power play out. This conceptualisation of illicit organisation is at odds with the concept of field I outlined in Chapter Two. I argued that 'relations' lie between positions taken by cultivators and dealers within a field and the associated dispositions that are *brought into the moment of interaction between agents* that guides their action and interpretation. Furthermore, the norms and rules that comprise institutions tend to lie outside the head of the agent, congruent with what Beckert (1996: 827-9) refers to as restrictive social devices that are held to be responsible for regulating social action.

For example, youth regularly commented that they needed to obtain "*sababu*": a person of influence who could provide access to new opportunities. This could be understood as the emic counterpart of social capital. While this had functional importance for facilitating recurrent exchange, the objectivist vantage misses how *sababu* was perceived and valued in different ways, in terms of respect and trustworthiness, and depended more on the status youth brought *into* an encounter with a potential *sababu* than was it negotiated in the immediacy *of* the encounter (Chapter Six, 6.3). Given that sociologists have begun to highlight the ways in which learned dispositions foreshadow interaction (Torche and Valenzuela 2011) and considering that there is arguably no philosophically sound reason to privilege relations over individuals (Martin 2011), the interactionist vision precludes a fuller explanation of illicit practices. Pushed further, where continual interaction results in establishing the norms posited by an institutional approach, or when such norms are more difficult to pin down, we rely on a conception of power that takes recourse to direct intervention in illicit economies or alternatively one that advances 'mutual' interests through a shared moral rhetoric.

3.1.1. 'Social aesthetics' and analytical tasks

I follow recent developments in field theory that argue for linking the objective position of the agent and their subjective reality to provide a fuller explanation of social phenomena. This approach to social scientific explanation is referred to as 'social aesthetics' (Martin 2011: 236-244; Fligstein and McAdam 2012): the experience of an individual is *qualitative* because it is oriented from a particular objective point of view within an organised field of economic and social activity. The objective positions within a field can be examined using tools such as statistics and network analysis, while qualitative tools such as interviews and participant observation are also required to examine the interpretations and perceptions of agents. By tying these two modes of analysis together it is possible to grasp the qualitative experience of the agent in terms of 'what [they] actually feel in the environment, a push to do or be something' (Martin 2011: 244). This mode of explanation draws on Bourdieu's theoretical argument that dispositions are shaped by particular cultural, economic and social conditions (resulting in the primary habitus) set against more immediate 'objective' power relations (resulting in the secondary habitus). Habitus therefore shapes action and interpretation, but is tied to a particular position within a field as it has emerged historically. Social explanation is therefore not complete without an understanding of the conditions that give rise to action and the particular positions within a field from which and towards which action is oriented. I referred to this theoretical position in Chapter Three as a *Dispositional Theory of Action* (see 2.7.2). This alternative approach to social scientific explanation requires a methodological rationale that accounts for: the cultural, economic and social conditions that give rise to particular dispositions motivating particular kinds of action; how these motivations confront the objective relations that structure a particular field (i.e. boss-apprentice relations), such that particular actions, expectations and interpretations are tied to an agent's historical position within the field they are participating in.

Social aesthetics enables a close approximation of how the expectations of the agent (as identified by a subjectivist analysis) relate to their chances of succeeding in the field (as identified by an objectivist analysis). It provides a methodological avenue to examine non-state regulation without privileging institutions as directly intervening to restrict action or the interactionist vision that privileges inter-personal mechanisms of trust and violence. In doing so it has been important to recognise that while a top-down view of the field suggests certain regularities and tendencies, e.g. of price competition or

patterns of network ties, these regularities tend to breakdown when confronted with the more idiosyncratic interests and motivations of the agent. While a probability function can be drawn over the field, it cannot be drawn over the individual (Lainé 2014). As such, habitus is emphatically not about claiming that all agents "conform" to particular schemes of action and interpretation or that they articulate the same interests and representations of social reality in line with some dominant conception. Rather, it is to acknowledge that practices are invested with different kinds of meaning even though the researcher-as-observer recognises that practices take on a regular pattern that structures durable positions within the field – what Bourdieu refers to as the pattern*ing* of social action. With this in mind, the research process maps out the economic and juridical fields using network and statistical techniques, while Bourdieu's open concepts remain attentive to the dispositions and practices of agents during their encounters by means other than interaction and/or the shaping of interaction through certain institutional norms and rules, or the credible threat of organised violence.

A further methodological issue when examining structural advantage is that much of our lived experienced is grounded in structures and processes that often cannot be consciously accessed. This is a particular shortcoming for the subjectivist approach that reduces analysis to the representation agents have of their particular reality. To link the economic and juridical fields with the habitus of youth participating in them, it is necessary to identify more concretely the mechanisms responsible for *reproducing* structural advantage. To do this, and having established the methodological avenues that need to be undertaken, the research question can be broken down into five analytical tasks:

1. Undertaking a historical analysis to determine how the economic and juridical fields of cannabis cultivation and law enforcement have come to be structured.

2. Establishing the positions of dominant and disadvantaged players within this field and the objective characteristics of competition and struggle that are indicative of these position-takings.

3. Establishing the social conditions that have given rise to particular dispositions motivating participation in the cannabis economy.

4. Identifying the concrete relations and mechanisms through which youth misrecognise structural advantages as an 'objective' social reality, and come to be invested in the economic and juridical fields that they work to reproduce.

5. Examining how the juridical field of law enforcement interacts with the economic field in 'failing' to enforce the official rules that would otherwise challenge positions of dominance.

The accomplishment of these tasks requires identification of the mechanisms and processes – the *cases* – through which structural advantages are reproduced. In the next section I elaborate on the role played by theory (i.e. open concepts) during a subjectivist enquiry that seeks to identify and examine these modes of domination.

3.2. The role of theory in identifying and examining cases of structural advantage

This section examines how theory can be related to evidence so as to 'operationalise' Bourdieu's open concepts (Leander 2008). Rather than identifying and examining cases of structural advantage according to a hypothetico-deductive model of research enquiry that tests hypotheses based on extant theoretical propositions (Flyvbjerg 2001; Gerring 2004), the research process begins with a set of open concepts that were motivated by the identification of short-comings arising from the objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches. Open concepts provide theoretical sensitivity without being straight-jacketed by a theoretical 'framework'. This does not, however, necessitate a more open-ended exploratory approach that treats cases as found objects that later come to be of theoretical interest. All ethnographic enquiries are at bottom theoretical because the researcher selects and deselects certain aspects of empirical reality and ascribes certain actions, claims and representations as "evidence" of a particular case over others. Rather than simply reportage, theoretically-informed ethnographic research is also driven by an ethical impulse because it entails a degree of transparency when identifying conceptual biases brought into the field, withstanding the 'epistemological fairy tale' of inductive Grounded Theory (Wacquant 2002: 1481).[36] Given its central aim of discovering theory through bottom-up emic concepts and practices (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978), Grounded Theory arguably struggles

[36] Wacquant (2004: 1481, fn. 19) is unapologetic in his accusation that this 'I-began-to-get-ideas-from-the-things-I-was-seeing-and-hearing-on-the-street approach to field-based inquiry [… does] not discover the hidden mechanisms that produce' the practices observed by the researcher. Wacquant cautions (again unapologetically) that a grounded theory approach is always open to ideological bias during analysis and representation.

to locate the mechanisms responsible for reproducing domination that are often covert and non-obvious, and as such evade the search for 'theoretical clues' from a given *ethnos* (Tavory and Timmermans 2009). Following this line of critique, I take theory and evidence as mutually constitutive in the construction of evidence when examining the reproduction of structural advantage.[37]

To this end, Bourdieu and especially Wacquant (2004a), are explicit in their argument that primary habitus is shaped by an agent's early social environment, such as experiences of education, family and religious practice, which is subsequently re-adjusted (producing a secondary habitus) in confrontation with immediate relations of power and social institutions. The identification of cases demonstrative of the reproduction of structural advantage is therefore theoretically informed rather than theory-generating or purely inductive (Wacquant 2002). The research process involved continuous and time-consuming iteration between gathering evidence in the field and theoretical reflection that, in turn, shaped what was to be considered 'evidence' towards answering the research question and further elaborating upon how the resulting conceptual approach was to be specified.

To accommodate this productive iteration between theory-at-the-desk and evidence gathered in the field, field research from December 2012 to December 2013 was divided into two halves. The first half identified the research issue and question, and invested patience and trust in building relationships with a small number of interlocutors that provided incremental access to other cannabis cultivators and dealers in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. During desk research in June 2013 it was possible to step-back and examine the initial material, reframe the research question, and establish the

[37] Burawoy's (1991, 1998) Extended Case Method was considered as an alternative methodological avenue for examining cases of structural advantage in the field. ECM integrates a phenomenological approach within a broader political economy framework in order to 'extract the general from the unique' and develop the macro-foundations of a micro-sociology on the basis of pre-existing theory. ECM works out from a case to reconstruct theory. Manoeuvring away from a positivist model of social science, ECM applies of a 'reflexive model of science' to participant-observation. This has affinities with Bourdieu's method of participant-objectivation by trying not to separate subject and object (folk and academic theory) in the pursuit of objectivity in terms of four goals: reactivity, reliability, replicability and representativeness. In doing so ECM 'extends' from individual to larger structures that shape their practices and dispositions. However, with a view of the relation between 'the game' and 'the system', I did not pursue this methodological avenue beause ECM's focus on theoretical extension goes too far, pointing outwards to 'macro structures' synonymous with structural violence, rather than keeping the methodological focus on the more discrete forms of domination that have emerged in opposition to them. Burawoy (2012) has since engaged with Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence (Burawoy 2012), suggesting a logic of enquiry through ECM that is in line with that elaborated here.

conceptual tools required to guide a more intensive period of field research and empirical analysis from July to December 2013. This later period of research focused on boss-apprentice relations (i.e. apprenticeships) and encounters with law enforcement as specific cases of how structural advantage was being reproduced. Having closely read Bourdieu, the resulting conceptual approach outlined in Chapter Two motivated the use of mixed qualitative and quantitative methods despite having originally embarked on a purely 'ethnographic' or qualitative approach. During this first phase of field research I identified apprenticeship as the case indicative of how structural advantages were being reproduced.

3.2.1. Locating the Case: apprenticeship

After negotiating access to cannabis farms in order to survey their financials and map out the organisation of production, I noticed that cultivators had arranged their farming plots into several clusters that were each referred to by a colloquial nickname: *Loko Fakay, Obɔnoki*, *Sugar Loaf, Wanpala* and *You Must Grumble*, among others located in the outlying towns of Macdonald and Four Mile. While cultivation was prevalent throughout Sierra Leone's provinces, cultivators claimed that these clusters of farming collectively comprised "Ganja HQ". Indeed, they closely allied the findings of archival research as the historically most well-established sites of cultivation for commercial export (see Akyeampong 2005).

Although chain work is indicative of a flat form of organisation synonymous with social bridging usually facilitated by 'weak ties' (Granovetter 1985), youth described how they were 'drawn' into such work by already established cultivators and dealers referred to as 'shareholders'. One youths' explanation was indicative of this:

> "In the bush we have leaders. When you first meet them they control you."[38]

Unemployed youth who congregated in *panbɔdis* [tin huts] awaiting income-generating opportunities were drawn into these arrangements selectively, with their prospective shareholders claiming they had to ensure they had the "intention" and "the mind to do it". After gaining access to farms and interviewing both newer and more established cultivators it was apparent that these labour relations were hierarchically organised.

[38] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.

Apprenticeship was a reasonable means by which to obtain economic capital (cash-money, credit and land) and so young men trained under shareholders who claimed to "control" them. What I term *boss-apprentice relations* allowed shareholders to explicitly instruct youth how to cultivate cannabis, how to monetarily value the product of their labour, and acted as gatekeepers when new comers tried to establish relationships with higher value exchange partners. Consequently, the boss-apprentice relation functioned as a gatekeeping mechanism that regulated youths' access to economic and social capital.

I subsequently turned to examine whether direct intervention by the shareholders, in the form of organised violence and/or corruption through a unitary police force, was responsible for raising barriers to entry as claimed by the objectivist-structuralist approach. Contrary to the organised crime and network literatures that privileged asymmetric and centralised organisational structures, apprentices and their respective shareholders claimed that they could not "take the advantage" amid disputes or when preventing challenges by rival cultivators. By refraining from the use of inter-personal violence, refrains from taking the advantage assumed an equal playing field from which an advantage could be gained, despite the topography of cultivation revealing more hierarchical tendencies. These initial findings indicated that more covert forms of power were at play and required a conceptual shift that resulted in the turn towards Bourdieu's relational sociology during desk research in June 2013. Following Bourdieu's focus on the peasantry and long standing interest in 'Modes of Domination', as discussed in the later chapters of *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, I focused on apprenticeship as the site at which youth came to adopt particular practices – patterns of acting, reasoning and thinking – that, in turn, reproduced their disadvantaged position without their shareholders' need for direct intervention.

A period of desk research in June 2013 also revealed that apprenticeship had been identified elsewhere as the most promising empirical site at which to serve clarity on Bourdieu's less well-specified open concepts, such as embodiment, habitus and practices (Bloch 2012: 192-3); and has been central to the later defence and elaboration of Bourdieu's conceptual and methodological approach (see Wacquant 2004b, 2011). Furthermore, both Bourdieu (2000: 136) and Wacquant (2014b: 129) have argued that the concept of misrecognition is open-ended and requires empirical illustration in order to add theoretical specificity. I therefore took apprenticeship as the *site at which structural advantage is reproduced* in the on-going participation of youth in the cannabis

economy. Apprenticeship was the central 'case' for examining how misrecognition was secured and re-secured through the on-going activity of apprentices. Consequently, field research between July and December 2013 focused explicitly on examining apprenticeship.

3.3. The field as an arbitrary location

Having identified apprenticeship as a case for examining the reproduction of structural advantage, it was necessary to locate and map out the field site in which these relations were situated. I understood the historically most well-established sites of cannabis cultivation and exchange in Hastings and Waterloo as an 'arbitrary location' (Candea 2007). The advent of multi-sited ethnography first advocated by Marcus (1995) has deconstructed the field site to the point where it is the research subjects who define the boundaries and limits of the field, a process that the researcher follows as the researched constructs the object of inquiry (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). However, this doing away of the 'bounded field' (*ibid*: 38) is at odds with Bourdieu's concept of field as constituting relatively autonomous but organised economic and social activities that engender certain limits on action and interpretation for their participants. The multi-sited field is also at odds with what Wacquant (2004b: 389) refers to as the 'living laboratories' of Bourdieu's field research. Each site of research, from Béarn to Algeria, represented an arena in which to reconstruct theory that spoke to broader practices and tendencies across difference. Rather than a much earlier precursor to what is now recognised as multi-sited field work, these were bounded sites used specifically for re-examining his open concepts (*ibid*: 396).

When explaining the tasks involved in undertaking chain work, cultivators bound their index fingers together and placed emphasis on the fact that cultivation "*de na di grawnd*" [it is in the ground here]. The cultivation of cannabis comprised situated hierarchies of labour relations and social encounters through which its product was exchanged. The case was chain work and its site was Hastings and Waterloo. The field was therefore not so much *un*bounded, multi-sited and awaiting discovery, but rather, the bounding of the field stemmed from an analytical decision that it was necessary to establish the positions and relations of participants within a given organised field of activity – and indeed to deal with the time constraints required of a 'deeper' subjectivist enquiry into youths' domination. Given the importance of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence to the conceptual approach, I was cautious not to rely solely on my research

subjects to construct the object of enquiry without first considering the objective position they occupied from my more detached position of researcher-as-observer, in relation to the particular representation of social reality that they were providing from my position of researcher-as-participant. A more 'open-ended' field enquiry, as Candea (2004: 172-3) claims, would be to invoke an 'imaginary freedom'.[39] Rather than directing efforts at 'following' objects, relations and agents, then, I instead paid heed to the boundedness of reasoning and thinking – as well as of geographic mobility – that were often imperceptible to apprentice cultivators and therefore absent from the representation they had of their social reality, which afforded them the perception of more "movement" within it.[40]

To expend effort on leaving the bounds of the field site in favour of mapping all social ties within a wider network would have been to depart from a bottom-up view of hierarchy in favour of an illusion of ideographic closure. Instead, it was necessary to begin with those I had identified within a field of organised activity (chain work), and to examine how their qualitative experience and partial knowledge was tied to this particular position (the game), to grasp the reproduction of structural advantage. The field site is thereby treated as an arbitrary location:

> 'The actually existing instance [of an empirical case], whose messiness, contingency, and lack of an overarching coherence or meaning serve as a 'control' for a broader abstract object of study [that allows the researcher to] reflect on and rethink conceptual entities [i.e. open concepts], to challenge their coherence and their totalizing aspirations [...] The *decision* to bound off a site for the study of 'something else', with all the blind-spots and limitations which this implies, is a productive form of methodological asceticism.' (Candea 2006: 180)

Having argued that the bounding of the field site was an analytical decision necessary to examine the reproduction of structural advantage through Bourdieu's open concepts, in what follows I outline issues that emerged with a subjectivist analysis during my time in the field. In doing so I elaborate on my entry into the field – what youth claimed to be a

[39] During the first stage of research it was often the anxieties of 'not knowing enough' that lent itself to breadth, rather than focusing on a productive iteration between concept and evidence towards knowing what to know.

[40] As I examine in Chapter Six (6.4), it was precisely youths' false perception that their open-ended movement was a source of agency, which suggested that a multi-sited ethnography could provide evidence of social exclusion and economic disadvantage.

matter of "going inside the game" – and confront issues of positionality, reflexivity and ethics.

3.4. Entering the field

Entry into any field is entangled with its own unique idiosyncrasies that rarely conform to established academic norms involved in preparing oneself to be a 'professional stranger' (Agar 1996). As a field work novice my own entry was shaped by the legacy of a plethora of research contacts that were being used to study various conflict and 'post'-conflict topics relating to Sierra Leone's civil conflict from 1991 to 2002. In certain respects this was a hindrance. Many of my interlocutors and especially their younger followers had, as they put it, been "sensitised" to the "exploitation" of being unpaid research subjects and utilised reasonably well-defined networks stretching into the provinces to ensure academic researchers got what they needed. Initial encounters with youth in *attaya* [green tea] bases and *panbɔdis* [tin huts], during which I practiced Krio – and grappled with its contextual interpretations, colloquialisms and metaphors – were framed by the obligation of needing "protection" from ostensibly dangerous outsiders.

After at least two months spent "hanging out" a picture emerged of an eclectic youth culture that shifted between Rastafari dictates of "*livity*" [living positively], Neo-Evangelist virtues of righteous labour, and ascetic Islamic commitments to moral virtuosity. This complex and highly differentiated value system often confronted a stylised Western modernity that promised there was more to be gained outside the corrugated zinc walls of the *panbɔdi*. Unlike media portrayals to the contrary, these youth were rarely ex-combatants and many had instead been displaced by the civil conflict during the late 1990s (Peters 2010). These youth retold oblique and euphemism-laden stories of the RUF's advance into the outlying peninsula towns of Hastings and Waterloo. Uncommon, then, was a 'victimcy mode' of dialogue through which youth presented themselves as powerless individuals during their re-telling of the past (Utas 2003: 49-51). Rather, I encountered multiple ways in which youth established a veneer of agency by aspiring to a number of different identities and roles related to the benefits they perceived could be sought from what they continually referred to as my "project".

Most frequent was what I termed in my field diary "Mr NGO". Youth bases were presented as proto-youth organisations with names such as "Youth, Empowerment, and

Development". Youth often assumed I was an NGO worker and deployed a vernacular of NGO-speak and references to loose affiliations with "*links*" [contacts] in the NGO sector in the expectation of arranging a host of "programmes" to "sensitise the youth". Such discourses took an immeasurable amount of patience to pierce beneath, even if they were indicative of a reality that had been shaped by the saturation of international donors and aid organisations in their daily lives. When first learning Krio at Fourah Bay College, my tutor claimed that there were many different kinds of youth: "those that swing briefcases, the *raray* [rootless] boys, those in the bush", and so forth. Analogous to the "*drɛg*" [hustle] of a previous generation defined by geographic movement, youth greeted each other with the phrase "*Aw di tɔnin*" [How is it turning?]. 'To turn' was to make a profit. Yet the phrase also referred to an ability to literally turn into different roles, be it a mechanic, youth coordinator or cannabis cultivator.[41] Youth earned incomes through a variety of licit activities including the 'buy and sell' of second hand clothes bundles in Eastern Freetown, as apprentices responsible for *poda poda* [minivan taxi] fares and, for those with more economic capital (and a generator), a range of street vending activities from barber shops to mobile phone charging stations.

Movement around Eastern Freetown required dealing with territorial divisions claimed by *kliks* [gangs] including the *Red Flag Movement* ('*RFM*'), *Black Leo* and *Cens Coast Hood* ('*CCC*'). Sporting red, black and blue bandanas respectively a number of youth claimed that in early 2012 *Black Leo* and the *CCC* had joined "in combination" against the RFM. The RFM was taken as a conduit for President Ernest Bai Koroma's ruling APC party and, growing rapidly in numbers, had betrayed itself to "the system". Petty theft and fuel siphoning were organised through these *kliks*, albeit less visibly with such activities usually conducted at night. Theft was both physically and socially dangerous for those caught were often quickly held culpable by local residents and punished with mob violence before being taken to the local police station. Such cases bypassed the informal dispute resolution of a "*shorty*"' [big man] in the *panbɔdi*. It was not, youth claimed, possible to *"bɔf*" [drop] the case. The itemised rules written onto the walls of youth bases in Freetown – "do not fight", "do not spit" – corresponded with youths' refrain to "*no advantage am*" [do not advantage him/her]. The veneer of an equal playing field

[41] Hoffman (2007a) employs Deleuze and Guatarri's concept of production in general and without distinction by which social relations and modes of labour are totally subsumed under capital ('without distinction') and there exists no 'outside' to surplus labour value in production: 'social life itself is a space for the generation of exchange value and the production of profits' (*ibid*: 404). In this view, youth constitute a floating population that, by congregating in the *panbɔdi* – what Hoffman refers to as the 'barracks' – constitute sites of readily deployable labour for any task or any role.

established commonly practiced refrains from the use of inter-personal violence or theft that would otherwise have allowed youth to gain an advantage over those who were also trying to make money. These refrains worked to protect my research subjects' personal security. As such, those more closed activities were distinguished from cannabis cultivation.

The aim of this period was to befriend more accessible low-level dealers referred to as "*pedlars*". With time I thought it would be possible to pinpoint from the fragmented jottings I was gathering in my field diary the locations and names of gatekeepers who would grant access to the historically most well-established sites of cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo that I had gleaned from previous archival research conducted by Akyeampong (2005). Venturing into less familiar [*fiba*] territory outside of Eastern Freetown, strategies of social closure for financial gain re-appeared and the anxieties of appearing to make no progress with my field research necessitated a change in strategy.

These barriers to entering the field of cannabis cultivation came into even sharper relief when, emboldened but naïve, I attempted to "hike" into the dense bush surrounding Hastings and Waterloo. Not alert to the layers of surveillance and suspicion that surrounded this illicit activity, I was on all of three attempts followed and stopped by a Forest Guard representing the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. This first encounter with an agent of the state was indicative of the multivalent discourses and practices that, in a different manner for youth seeking employment, worked to deny entry into an economy that at street-level was neither particularly 'taboo' nor exactly secret. For the Forest Guard speaking with the capitalised authority of the Sierra Leonean state, the bush was a wild and dangerous place (Hoffman 2005: 301-3, 2007b) and I needed his "*sababu*" [an influential friend] as protection from those said to wield cutlasses at the sight of "strangers". Deciding to abandon the somewhat anachronistic and heroic idea of "going it alone" in the field, I momentarily assumed the position of what my then-to-be research assistant nicknamed Lamine[42] referred to as the "academic hustler". While it would be unwise to treat the designation of ex-combatant as a social category somehow detached from its past (Jackson 2004), one such ex-combatant, a former member of the Royal Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), proved that his past was instrumental in securing both initial contacts and providing much needed information as to the landscape of cannabis cultivation that I had initially gleaned from dealers in Freetown.[43]

[42] A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of my research assistant.
[43] I would like to thank Dr Krijn Peters for his kind efforts in arranging this.

Rather than working from dealer-on-the-street to cultivation akin to a supply chain analysis, several discussions with Lamine – and his encouragement that I tackle the research head-on – gave me the confidence to again try and enter the field directly at the sites of cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo, before working outwards through its networks of labour relations, distribution and exchange. Lamine had spent time training during the early 2000s at a military barracks in Hastings. He explained to me in detail the routes taken in-and-out of the bush by cultivators when transporting their *diamba* [cannabis herb] to Freetown and beyond to Guinea. As an RSLAF private in the late 1990s, Lamine participated in an offensive against the RUF after they had pushed into Hastings and Waterloo with brutal and devastating effect. The high-tension electricity pylons he and his squad mates had followed through the bush cut across several well-stablished areas of cannabis cultivation, colloquially referred to as *Loko Fakay*, *Next World* and *Makeni*. With this knowledge also came legitimacy because RSLAF personnel were viewed by residents of Hastings and Waterloo as veritable heroes that ensured they were treated as "good" *sababu*. The flash of a military identification card was enough to reconfigure power relations and create a beachhead from which trusting relations could be piecemeal negotiated. As Hoffman and Tarawalley Jr (2014: 292) claim in their insightful take on the role of collaborators while undertaking research on violent conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the research assistant's authority 'is rooted in the way these figures straddle multiple social spheres'. While Lamine was not as central to the play of narratives and interpretations as Tarawalley Jr was to Hoffman, being recognised and respected as former military personnel proved crucial for establishing contact with two cultivators whom Lamine and I believed were trustworthy enough to "get" the project.

Since the early 1990s Musa had cultivated cannabis in his birthplace of Kambia District before joining the RSLAF later that decade. Having trained as a communications engineer he returned to Waterloo in the early 2000s and claimed first rights to land ownership that allowed him to clear a section of bush now named *Loko Fakay* after an old Krio village. Now in his early 40s, Musa claimed belonging to the social category of a "youth man" that was qualified by his being in "control" of two youth on his farm, Ayo Pack and Lamine, who were trying to understand the game while watering the crop and acting as lookouts to deter "idle thieves". Musa lived in a house with his mother and his two young children were raised by his wife in a separate, much larger compound built and owned by an extended relative now living in the United States. Cannabis cultivation

provided Musa's main personal income. He had, however, attempted to branch out and invest the capital he had earned into numerous other activities. The most ambitious attempt was in late 2013 when Musa purchased a minivan for Le4 million and converted it into a *poda poda* [minivan taxi]. Having hired one youth as a driver and another to collect fares, Musa bemoaned that they had "faked him" by failing to return the full balance on the *poda poda's* second outing. Re-selling the *poda poda*, Musa reinvested the capital in the subsequent cultivating season.

Lamine also helped me gain access to an area of Hastings known as "Back Street" that dealers in Freetown claimed to represent the hub for bulk buying cannabis herb. A collection of *panbɔdis* surrounded a large building known as "Islex Entertainment". The walls of Islex were painted with murals dedicated to Reggae artists such as Peter Tosh, Bob Marley, Bunny Wailer and Burning Spear, in addition to newer icons such as LAJ and Kao Denero, each associated with "*kliks*" [gangs] in Eastern Freetown known as the Red Flag Movement and Black Leo respectively. Next to Islex resided a cluster of houses, resident to what youth in Back Street referred to as the "shareholders of the business". I met my second primary interlocutor, nicknamed Turkish – amongst a host of other names – while spending time "binding" [hanging out] with young men as they drank *pɔyo* [palm], smoked *diamba* and discussed politics, religion and sex. Exclusively male spaces with occasional visits from girlfriends just outside its walls, the young men in Back Street vied for my *sababu* but ultimately conceded by giving me the nickname "*Balogun Tɛnda*".

Tɛnda is a phonetic rendering in a Krio accent of the English word thunder, like a "bolt of lightning out of nowhere", as well as the nickname of a former Sierra Leonean goalkeeper who could save penalties like lightning. Balogun originates as a military institution in Yorubaland during the nineteenth century, where it referred to war commanders appointed by each Yoruba state (Jimoh and Oloruntola 2016). War commanders reported to the civil authority and were primarily responsible for leading able-bodied men within the community into offensive and defensive battles against rival states. The Balogun became powerful in economic and political matters, and so the colloquial use of the term in Krio is synonymous with someone in a position of authority. *Sababu* was prized and this nickname was indicative of the concessions and cynicism that pervaded youths' hopes and refrains as they attempted to establish relationships with those perceived to assume a position of influence (the system) from which new opportunities might be granted to them. Turkish lived in a half-constructed *panbɔdi* with

his wife and three-year old son on a hillside clearing between Back Street and the winding copper-orange tracks that led to the plot of land he rented from his shareholder amid a cluster of farms colloquially known as *Obɔnoki*. While his wife sold household goods in Freetown's *Sani Abacha Street*, Turkish's main source of income was earned from cannabis cultivation.

As outlined in the introductory vignette (Chapter One, 1.1), Turkish's friendship, despite his lower position in the cannabis hierarchy, proved crucial for examining the limits and social distances within a field that Musa and my research assistant Lamine had more freedom to navigate. Getting to know Musa and Turkish was not just a matter of friendship, opportunity or access, but also an analytical decision. They represented different positions within the economic field of cannabis cultivation and juridical field of law enforcement from which I could flesh out a social aesthetics. Entry into the field of cannabis cultivation and dealing entailed a greater degree of reflexivity when encountering practices that were less visible but provided a window onto youths' misrecognition of their social reality as somewhat more matter-of-fact, banal and even inevitable.

3.5. "Going inside the game": ethics and reflexivity

> 'The most difficult thing, paradoxically, is never to forget that they are all people like me, at least as much as they do not stand before their practice.' (Bourdieu 2003: 288)

Befriending Musa and Turkish proved crucial for being able to meet with other cultivators and accessing cannabis farms in the bush where I conducted a survey of cannabis cultivators and a series of one-on-one recorded interviews from *Loko Fakay* to other clusters of cultivation such as *Sugar Loaf* (see Appendix Seven). This process was, however, fraught with suspicion and the need to manage rumour, what cultivators cautioned as resulting in "blazing the lane": preventing access to new opportunities for exchange. On my first visit into the bush with Musa and other cultivators from *Loko Fakay* in March 2013, a helicopter with radar used for conducting geological surveys attached to its underside flew over us. A BBC World Service feature aired shortly after on Musa's portable FM radio concerning the lack of protection afforded police informants in the US drugs trade.[44] Apprehensive, and feeling this turn of events conspiring against me, the cultivators claimed I was a CIA agent who had been sent to

[44] See: 'Snitches in the USA', BBC World Service, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01611vz

"spy" on them. Unfortunate as this incident was, Musa worked tirelessly to prove that far from a "*kɔngosa*"[45] I was merely a (British) student "writing a book" on cannabis farming. My rite of passage subsequently became about the veracity of this book. It was expected to provide the 'true' representation of life as a cannabis cultivator and the hope that, rather than an issue of law enforcement, cannabis cultivation would be taken as a matter of deficient agricultural policy.

As my time surveying cultivators with Musa progressed, I faced further issues trying to grasp how cannabis farming was organised. While details of prices, crop rotations and output were fairly accessible, cultivators discussed the organisation of chain work – and therefore of their respective production hierarchies – in indirect and vague terms often laden with euphemism and mixed metaphors; what Ben Penglase (2009: 57-8) has referred to as 'semantic ambiguity'. What I later refer to as public secrecy (Chapter Seven) did not, however, require someone with an insider's view of secret societies that have long functioned to organise social life in Sierra Leone (cf. Hoffman 2012a: 292; also see Ferme 2011; Albrecht and King 2015). Although Lamine had experienced initiation, and was not shy to explain it or for that matter let me undertake it, I came to understand public secrecy, of knowing the facts but not being able to articulate them as such, as a more general social practice encountered in a variety of mundane contexts (Bellman 1981: 1; Boltanski 2012). My lines of questioning could therefore not be framed in ethical terms as a matter of personal privacy.[46] Secrecy was not analogous with privacy in the sense of concealing the content of information, but instead with how information was being presented and the effects this had in terms of foregrounding discussions and encounters throughout field research. I therefore took the analytical decision to observe

[45] A Krio noun and pronoun gossip and somebody who gossips, in this context used to mean a police informant.

[46] There are six key principles that govern the Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC) Research Ethics Framework (REF). Of concern here is the third principle that, 'The confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and the anonymity of respondents must be respected.' While I have protected anonymity by obscuring nicknames and the locations of illegal activity, information was not treated by my interlocutors as 'confidential', but instead as a commodity that secured their position in the cannabis economy and, ultimately, that prevented them from having to resort to more dangerous criminal activity that would have seriously impinged on their personal security. I therefore treat confidentiality in the REF as unrelated to matters of personal privacy in order to respect the research participants' representations of their activities. See: https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/archaeology/documents/ESRCETHICS%20revised%202010.pdf, pg. 3.

how secrecy was practiced from the bottom (Turkish) and the top (Musa) during encounters cultivators had with their respective shareholders and law enforcement.[47]

Given cultivators already possessed numerous tried-and-tested means by which to obscure their activities and identities, public secrecy was less an ethical issue of confidentiality and privacy. Such not-so-secret information represented a commodity that shielded youth from law enforcement and worked to protect knowledge of cultivation practices and high value dealers that was otherwise easy to share. The secrecy entailed when "going inside the game" instead raised ethical issues concerning the politics of representation when writing about illicit lives (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 12-15). The issue was how to write in such a way that conveyed the specific cultural logic of these practices without succumbing to a mode of representation that could be appropriated by discourses of criminal breakdown or organised violence. I wanted to articulate this as a case, not of an "illegal drug economy" *per se*, but as an organised activity that for my interlocutors was meaningful and reasonably invested in, with participation being closely-related to arguably more mundane concerns of employment, masculinity and extra-state social order. Cognisant of the cultural essentialisms that pervaded the studies reviewed in Chapter One, I wanted to examine cannabis cultivation and dealing as a case of extra-state economic and social organisation free from moral prejudices found in the wider literature.

To this end I took time to read Bourgois and Schonberg's *A Righteous Dopefiend* and tackled what they refer to as 'cultural relativism'.[48] This was important because I was writing about forms of social life considered to be "righteous" that were also subject to powerful discourses that treated an otherwise productive activity as a threat to national security (see Chapter Seven). In line with the theoretical sensitives of Bourdieu's open concepts, cultural relativism is a mode of critical analysis and writing that:

[47] I agree here with Utas (2003: 79) that cultivators who had contact with the police (i.e. those that had secured *haju*) were more open in their accounts for they perceived to run a lower risk of being caught. What I add is that the degree of openness in youths' accounts aligned with a more favourable position in a tacit hierarchy.

[48] I have also drawn from Bourdieu's *The Weight of the World* (1998), a collection of upfront interview transcripts from those in precarious and marginal life circumstances across France and North America. To approach symbolic violence using a narrative mode of ethnography the contributors also provide a social and economic preface to their subject's retelling that aimed towards a 'practical and theoretical grasp of the social conditions' of which their research subjects were 'the product' (*ibid*: 613).

> 'Strategically suspends moral judgement in order to understand and appreciate the diverse logic of social and cultural practices that, at first sight, often provoke righteous responses and prevent analytical self-reflection.' (*ibid*: 7)

Consequently, my aim was to tease out the 'pragmatic rationality' of the encounters and practices I observed during field research (*ibid*: 9).

A more immediate concern was the presence of law enforcement. My apprehension was that, having been treated as the *sababu* of *particular* cultivators I might alter the rules of the game and attract undue attention, disgruntlement and even resentment. During encounters with Sierra Leone Police (SLP) officers they were often affronted and disgruntled by my failure to contact them in the first instance, and perceived my failure to be granted their "permission" as incompetent. In both Hastings and Waterloo, I therefore regularly visited the town chiefs to make them aware of my presence and gradually broached the subject matter of my research. In both cases I was eventually greeted openly. I attended a tour of the National Police Training Centre in Hastings to observe the Operational Support Division (OSD) conduct live fire drills. The town chief of Hastings organised for me to meet 'all' the cannabis cultivators in the area, which provided me with a window onto the more formalised arrangements of "*haju*" [giving a little something] that secured police inaction.[49] These authority figures were more concerned with the violent forms of criminality that might result if youth were pushed out of cannabis cultivation and as such invested in my book as a challenge to its representation by the Sierra Leonean government as a threat to national security.

Following the logic of public secrecy I was also concerned with the politics of what it meant to reveal evidence of complicity and hierarchy in the cannabis economy to both outside audiences and to my interlocutors. Often I played a dual role as the participant observer by conforming to a view from the bottom (Turkish) that often did not converge with that of their respective shareholders (Musa) who were privately cynical in recognising their complicity. Semi-structured interviews were recorded at times and places away from the oversight of shareholders to engage apprentice cultivators and other youth in lines of questioning that challenged their pre-conceived views.[50]

[49] I was, however, cognisant of research studies regarding ex-combatants that caution against approaching access through gatekeepers who often present a one-sided view of how such networks are organised (e.g. see Hoffman 2011).
[50] See Appendix 7 for examples of interview transcripts and Appendix 8 for examples of field diary transcripts.

Interviews were, however, often treated with a degree of suspicion and proved more useful for obtaining objective data regarding prices, the cultivation process, relations with other cultivators, in addition to confirming or drawing out inconsistencies with observations and details of informal discussions recorded in field notes.[51] The mechanisms responsible for misrecognition were, however, rarely articulated by youth during interview. Instead, they moved between outward signifiers congruent with the immediacy of their on-going activity. Such dialogue rarely involved introspection in the sense of 'revealing' underlying motivations and fears. During informal discussions recorded using scratch notes and written up later during the day, I was able to more flexibly move the conversation away from a line of reasoning that confirmed their representation of reality, and instead tried to pinpoint exactly *why* they continued to work under apprenticeships. While this approach proved more insightful, when speaking with my interlocutors I encountered mixed metaphors, euphemisms and ambiguity.

How is it possible, then, to empirically grasp misrecognition through interviews that are, generally-speaking, inter-subjective not extra-discursive encounters? Psychoanalytic geographers have adopted a variety of approaches to tackle similar methodological issues (see Kingsbury 2009 for an overview). While attempting to examine the nationalistic motivations of football fans amid their emotional outbursts when watching the 2006 World Cup, Proudfoot (2010) argues that he encountered the 'paradox of enjoyment [*jouissance*]'. When broaching the 'why' question 'speech itself evaporates and we are left to interpret ellipses' – it is the methodological task, therefore, to 'make the ellipses speak' (*ibid*: 511). Following Proudfoot I began to reflect on the methodological tools of 'speaking' and 'looking awry' that Slavoj Žižek (1992) has used in his analysis of nationalism and consumption practices. These modes of enquiry do not call for more intimacy and fuller immersion into the lives of research subjects. Rather, as Proudfoot argues, it requires a degree of detachment:

> 'I maintained an unproductive distance from the interviewee, acting solely as an observer rather than a participant [because] subjects are loathe to make conscious the unconscious […] To speak awry is to direct the research by situating the object in the periphery of one's questions.' (*ibid*: 514-5)

[51] Quotes from interviews and field notes are acknowledged using footnotes containing a pseudonym as used by cultivators and dealers, role (e.g. cultivator, dealer), location, and date of occurrence. A list of interviewees is available in Appendix One (real names are omitted).

This required me to strategically withhold empathy because it was precisely a more empathetic line of dialogue that would have allowed my interlocutors to circulate between self-affirming signifiers that concealed the modes of domination that I posited they were subject to. During specific moments I would feign eye contact, speak in monotone or generally appear to be uninterested. I would interject the flow of dialogue with blunt and obvious questions: "what *is* the game?", "why do you farm *here*?", "who *is* your shareholder?", "*how* did he become your *sababu*?" and so forth. Such lines of questioning were met with confrontation and exasperation – "*Balogun*, I've already told you. It is the way it is!" – but these responses provided a view of the limits around acting, reasoning and thinking when youth treated their social reality as matter-of-fact, always with close comparison to the objectivist analysis of the economic and juridical fields I was undertaking as a simultaneous observer.

I have taken care during transcription to present the views of my interlocutors in an accessible format when translating from Krio to English, by retaining the original voice and by including pauses where conversations hanged. To allow the reader to relate these moments to the objectivist analysis, I have provided snapshots of dialogue indicative of more widely shared practices, using certain interlocutors (e.g. Turkish) as devices through which to convey a more coherent narrative. Certain emic concepts indicative of practices responsible for reproducing structural advantage (e.g. *sabi*, *sababu*, *haju*) are left in the original Krio vernacular but unpacked and explained in the third person. 'These changes' were necessary in order to 'respect the integrity of human character and to retain the full contextual meaning' of those participating in the cannabis economy (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 13).

This approach did, for example, help examine how public secrecy was borne out in the act of concealing an 'objective' social reality to oneself through a subjective manoeuvre. Attention to absences during interviews and repetition of certain outward signifiers, what Bourdieu refers to as 'recognition' or 're-cognition', highlighted certain extra-economic payoffs that made life bearable for cultivators and dealers who claimed to have sought meaningful lives "inside the game". This mode of dialogue and presentation was indicative of a rhetorical refrain youth frequently used when dealing with times of hardship:

> "*Aw fɔ du*" [What can I do?]
> "*Yu mɔs bia am*" [You must bear it].

It is rarely possible to talk directly about domination in order to 'reveal' it. To disrupt embedded forms of judgement and perception by forcing the ethical imperative of confidentiality onto my research subjects and continually explaining the importance of why confidentiality "protected" them[52] would in my opinion have been to:

> 'Spotlight the role of shame, that self-defeating emotion that arises when the dominated come to perceive themselves through the eyes of the dominant, that is, [when they] are made to experience their own ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving as degraded and degrading.' (Wacquant 2004b: 393).

By moving between a subjectivist and objectivist mode of enquiry I have aimed to situate the action and interpretation of my interlocutors within their specific position-*taking*. This was a subjectivity that treated confidentiality as a practice of dissimulating hierarchy (and its psychological payoffs) rather than as a matter of personal privacy.

My exit from the field was somewhat undramatic. Given that social media provided ample opportunity for continuous contact with my research subjects after leaving the field, the idea of closure or exit appeared as something of an anthropological anachronism. Exit was defined more by my leaving "the game" and working to represent the reality of the cultivators and dealers participating in it in a way that, as discussed, was cognisant of the politics of representation that could inadvertently return to impact their lives if appropriated by a discourse that was treating cannabis cultivation and exchange as a threat to national security. My exit will be complete after providing my interlocutors with what they referred to as a "reference point". By explicating the *qualitative* experience of youths' voices from a particular point of view within a hierarchy, in my "book" I hope to provide an objective account of how structural advantages were reproduced in Sierra Leone's cannabis economy.

[52] This in any case often only serves to protect academic institutions from litigation (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009).

3.6. Conclusion: 'revealing' the cultivation of hierarchy

This chapter outlined the methodological rationale of the research and the process through which the research question will be answered. The thesis is concerned with how shareholders of the 1980s and 1990s retained their dominant position within the cannabis economy through the *reproduction of structural advantages* in access to economic capital and encounters with law enforcement. The *boss-apprentice relations* entered into by youth under their respective shareholders were identified as the empirical sites at which to study the reproduction of structural advantage through their on-going participation and activity. Rather than adopting a multi-sited study akin to a supply chain analysis I identified the chain work undertaken by cultivators as playing out in bounded sites – "we bind around this and not around that" – and as such I used these sites to operationalise Bourdieu's open concepts during field research. By adopting the approach of *participant objectivation* I have argued it is necessary to utilise both objectivist (Chapter Four) and subjectivist (Chapter Five, Six and Seven) modes of enquiry and analysis. This enables a study of the economic and social conditions that have given rise to youths' particular dispositions and practices (subjectivist) as these are tied to a specific position within the economic and juridical fields (objectivist) – indicative of an approach to social scientific explanation I referred to as *social aesthetics*. I argued that by bridging a division between objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches to the study of illicit economies prevalent that is prevalent in the literature, it was possible to arrive at a more objective answer to the research question.

The foregoing analysis draws on 55 interviews and 58 surveys of cannabis cultivator's across five clusters of production – *Loko Fakay*, *Obɔnoki, Sugar Loaf, Wanpala* and *You Must Grumble* – in Hastings and Waterloo. Network diagrams comprising relations recorded between 158 bosses, apprentices and law enforcers are also utilised. My entry into the field took consideration of positionality, reflexivity and ethics. In terms of ethics, I conformed to standard principles of consent, personal and research subject safety, but reinterpreted ethical guidelines relating to confidentiality to preserve the pragmatic rationality of meanings and practices experienced by my interlocutors, and to respect their lives with dignity. I claimed this was particularly necessitated by what I referred to as the logic of *public secrecy* (Chapter Seven). Having identified these issues the chapter discussed the politics of representation involved when conveying and writing about the experiences and practices of illicit agents that were being *re*-presented through a

discourse that presented them as a threat to national security. In closing this discussion of methodology I turn to the empirical analysis. The next chapter examines the historical political economy of cannabis cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo to situate an objectivist analysis of the organisation and regulation of what established cultivators referred to as chain work.

Chapter Four: Chain Work

4.1. Introduction

This chapter begins by examining the use of apprenticeship during the British abolition of slavery movement in the late 1700s. The colony of Freetown was organised through an English evangelist parish system in which apprenticeship supported the missionaries "civilising mission". This was seen as necessary to improve cash-crop production and undermine slave trading and labour, culminating in the 1833 Slavery Abolition Act that enforced apprenticeship elsewhere in the British Empire. I demonstrate that Sierra Leone's system of apprenticeship predates those commonly attributed to the West Indies sugar plantations that emerged from the 1833 Act. Rather than resembling British master-slave contracts, the Evangelists worked closely with abolitionists in Sierra Leone. The principles of amelioration, agriculture skills training, and religious instruction were practiced as conducive to transforming recaptive slaves into industrious workers. What resulted was an institution of 'apprentice provisioning' that has continued to organise the labour and capital involved in small-scale agricultural production in Western Area.

The chapter then examines how this basic institutional character of apprenticeship emerged again during economic structural adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. State power centralised under Presidents Siaka Stevens and then Joseph Momoh, in response to the implementation of liberal economic policies designed to address structural imbalances and reduce informal and illegal cross-border trade (Reno 1996: 10). Sierra Leone was subject to falling agricultural output and export prices, diminished diamond extraction, and the closure of iron ore and rutile mines that drove down incomes and increased unemployment. Small-scale cannabis production grew as a compensation crop in Hastings and Waterloo, which represented the first sites of commercialised cannabis production during the 1940s. I demonstrate how cannabis cultivation in Jamaica also rapidly expanded during the 1980s based on marketing networks known as "higglers" that were closely inter-related with apprenticeships on the West Indies plantations. Jamaican cultivators fled to Western Area during the US-led "War on Drugs" and transferred new seed varieties, cultivation techniques, and contacts with overseas buyers to Sierra Leone's cannabis farmers. These farms continued to be organised according to the system of apprentice provisioning and resulted in the clustering of farms around several dominant Sierra Leonean cultivators referred to as "shareholders".

This was despite a campaign by the All People's Congress (APC) government to implement new legal arrangements designed to control 'disobedient' and illicit subjects perceived to be responsible for smuggling in Freetown's wharves, alluvial diamond mines and cash crops (Keen 2005: 32-5; D'Angelo 2015a: 6, 2016).

The chapter draws on field research undertaken between December 2012 and December 2013 in Hastings and Waterloo.[53] I use this material to examine the structure of production, marketing networks, and relations between shareholders, apprentices, and journeymen. New cultivators were apprenticed by the shareholders. As one apprentice noted: "you must go under someone to learn it, until you are perfect".[54] Chain work mimicked apprentice provisioning and resulted in a two-tiered market. Journeymen who had completed their training were confined to an illiquid domestic market that operated largely on credit, while renting small plots on the shareholder's farm. Shareholders, by contrast, drew on the cheap labour of apprentices and regulated access to higher-value cross-border traders. I argue that this structural advantage was based on a "sleight of hand", such that the concept of "boss" is useful when examining the relations between shareholders and workers.

Finally, the chapter draws on Pierre Bourdieu's economic field. This enables an analysis of how the shareholders benefitted from structural advantages, without directly intervening in the market through organised violence. Structural advantages corresponded to inequalities in access to land, labour and exchange partners that, having been secured according to non-economic competition, limited possibilities available to access these more exclusive markets without first having to work as a shareholder's apprentice. The chapter concludes by arguing that the stability of the apprenticeship institution in the absence of written contracts and a central authority requires turning to a subjectivist-constructivist mode of analysis that takes the subjectivities of youth seriously. This is necessary in order to understand how the structural advantages enjoyed by dominant cultivators were reproduced through youth's on-going participation in cannabis farming.

[53] Evidence is drawn from a combination of 55 interviews with cultivators and dealers, a network analysis of labour relations in production (n = 154), in addition to financial accounts and price data collected during a survey of cultivators (n = 58) during both the dry (December to April) and rainy seasons (May to November).
[54] Interview with Cannabis Cultivator, Alie Kamara, Waterloo, 11/11/2013.

4.2. Abolition, Evangelism and Apprentice Provisioning

Apprenticeship was utilised in Sierra Leone under British colonialism and continued to structure the labour and marketing networks involved in the small-scale production of cannabis along the post-independence peninsula. A nearly sixty-year old colonial policy legitimised the practice of apprenticing recaptured slaves from the late 1700s, until at least 1865, after being officially abolished in April 1848. Evangelical Protestants implemented an apprenticeship system to train liberated slaves that were resettling in Freetown, a settlement originally established by Granville Sharp in 1787. During this period, Freetown and the villages of Hastings, Sussex, Waterloo and York, comprised a growing mix of black Africans from London, Jamaican Maroon's from the British colony of Nova Scotia, Black Loyalists who fought during the American Revolution, as well as Nigerian Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa liberated from Spanish and Portugese slavers.

Freetown was originally administered by the Sierra Leone Company (SLC), established in 1791 by members of the evangelical Clapham Sect such as William Wilberfoce, Lieutenant John Clarkson, and later administered by Zachary Macaulay and William Dawes (Tomkins 2010: 92-100; Thomas 2011). Wilberforce and Clarkson led the abolition of slavery movement in Britain and the SLC embarked on a threefold task to abolish the slave trade, "civilise" recaptives through Christianity, and spread the gospel (Tomkins 2010: 92-100). Although evangelicals believed in the natural equality of moral character, this claimed universalism was lost in practice. Instead, racial, class and gender hierarchies were fixed through a 'rule of difference' similar to that experienced in colonial India. It was, therefore, expected that former slaves could only achieve redemption by becoming Christian subjects. Apprenticeship was the ideal institution through which they might become 'grateful, obedient, industrious, and domesticated' (Hall 2008: 778). To this end, Sierra Leone emerged as a test case for the abolitionists' belief that slavery could be ended by establishing the virtues of 'Civilisation, Commerce, and Christianity' in Britain's colonies (Everill 2013: 81).[55] In this sense, apprenticeship provided the assets and skills necessary to develop "legitimate commerce", which was thought necessary to undermine the cotton and sugar trade worked by slave labour on plantations in the West Indies and the Americas (Law et al 2011). However, as Tomkins (2010) and Everill (2013) argue, apprenticeship ultimately represented a compromise

[55] Sue Thomas (2011) suggests that the origins of 'the system of redemption and apprenticeship in Sierra Leone to Granville Sharp's "A short Sketch of temporary Regulations (until better shall be proposed) for the intended Settlement on the Coast of Africa."'

with powerful commercial and political interests in Britain who protested that full liberation would disrupt trade and result in growing political opposition financed by wealthy absentee plantation owners.

The Slave Trade Act 1807 had officially abolished slavery in the British Empire, resulting in the Royal Navy's West Africa squadron being deployed to patrol the Bight of Benin and Bight of Biafra, and along the West African coast to Freetown. By this time, the SLC had proven unprofitable and Sierra Leone came under the authority of the British Crown. The Clapham Sect retained its influence through successive governors and by establishing the Africa Institution in 1807. Admitting the SLC's civilising mission in support of plantation production had been a failure, Wilberforce and his associates mandated the Africa Institution to focus on raising the living standards of new settlers. Clapham Sect member Zacharu Macaulay was, for instance, a firm believer in the transformative potential of education through apprenticeship, which tied freedom together with the virtues of independence and obedience (Hall 2008: 780). Macaulay was appointed as the Africa Institution's secretary, having governed Sierra Leone under the SLC from 1974 to 1979. However, in an 1808 memoir on apprenticeship submitted to the African Institute, Macaulay cautioned that the proposed apprenticeship system would replicate the failings of slave labour and resulting protests experienced on the West Indies sugar plantations. He concluded that "the Slave Trade has proved a source of evil, that evil will be perpetuated by the proposed [apprenticeship] system [in Sierra Leone]" (Thomas 2011).

Regardless of Macaulay's protestations, the 1807 Act legally authorised the use of apprenticeship for captured slaves upon resettlement. According to the act, slaves became crown property and bounties were paid to their captors by Vice-Admiralty Courts in Freetown. If older than six years of age, apprenticeships were stipulated to last for a period of no more than fourteen years. Masters were obliged to provide food and clothing, but need not provide wages. Alternatively, recaptives were conscripted into the army or navy (Tomkins 2010: 24; Ryan 2016: 401). Gibril (2013: 5-6) demonstrates that men and children would be 'apprenticed' for twenty dollars to British colonists and settled Nova Scotian farmers in the peninsula's villages.[56] Alternatively, apprentices

[56] F. Harrison Rankin, a former employee of the Liberated Africa Department, notes in *White Man's Grave* that prospective masters "of any colour, may enter the King's Yard, select a boy or girl, and thereupon tie a string or piece of tape round the neck as a mark of appropriation. He then pays ten shillings; and the passive child becomes his property, under the name of apprentice, for three years. So little discrimination is exercised with respect to the purchaser,

were utilised by the colonial administration as labour in the construction of public buildings, such as churches, provision stores and schools. In practice, most apprentices worked as agriculture labour on small-scale farms or as domestic servants (Ryan 2016: 412). By the late 1820s, most apprentices in Sierra Leone were children under the age of fourteen working as domestic servants. Apprenticeship was therefore understood as akin to 'involuntary child domestic labour' (*ibid*: 402).

An alarming increase in abuse cases heard by the Vice-Admiralty Courts meant that the abolitionists began to view apprenticeship as a system of exploitation. Indenture documents signed between government and master were often poorly enforced or not issued, such that masters could accumulate multiple apprentices in one household. Evangelical's protested that apprentices were being sold to settlers and used to accumulate wealth, rather than fulfilling their contractual obligations to provide education (Ryan 2016: 408). Or, at minimum, receive training in crafts such as needlework (Thomas 2011). A growing trade also emerged between settlers and the government that used apprentices as free labour in rudimentary public works (Everill 2013: 85). Ryan (2016: 410) notes that some masters did meet their obligation to teach apprentices valuable trade skills. Consequently, indenture documents were introduced that officially bound apprentices to craftsmen or the government, resulting in a reduction in the duration of apprenticeship from three to seven years before termination. Apprentices were freed once indenture contracts had expired and also provided by the colonial administration with a small parcel of land on which to begin cultivation. Former apprentices then often purchased apprentices of their own, who were usually male, and undertook farming in the villages of Hastings, Waterloo and Kissy (*ibid*: 411).

Despite these nuances, the colonial authority's inability to prevent the abuse was eventually brought to the attention of the British government under Sierra Leone's Governor Thomas Perronet Thompson in 1808. Perronet, who was a close associate of Wilberforce, likened the African Institution's apprenticeship scheme to the continuation of slavery. These sentiments were echoed by Thompson's successor, Governor William Fersguson, who asserted that apprenticeship represented:

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that domestic servants are in the habit of buying them, and of employing them in the heavier drudgery of house-work."

> "A moral millstone round the necks of its people. By placing easily within their reach the means of obtaining gratuitous labour, idleness is engendered […] as, at length, to become an inveterate habit" (Ryan 2016: 406).

The colony's reliance on apprenticeship had the effect of undermining the Puritan work ethic; that the 'millstone' carried by apprentices implied a 'dragging effect, a sinking effect, a prevention of 'progress'' (*ibid*: 415). Thompson, for his part, was relinquished as governor in 1810 under pressure from Wilberforce, who, as Tomkins (2010) concludes, continued to perceive that apprenticeship was a necessary evil to ease the transition towards the complete abolition of slavery.

In response, apprenticeship in Sierra Leone was reshaped by the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) from 1810. The CMS played an important role in establishing Krio culture and identity, which largely mimicked Western-style churches, education and professional trades. The society's aims aligned with those of the Clapham Sect, having been founded in 1799 by Evangelical Protestants who had broken away from the Anglican Church. The CMS was supported by new Evangelical groups, such as the Eclectic Society, as a vehicle for spreading the Gospel overseas and establishing a network of parishes that could begin to reform the slave trade through principles of amelioration. Apprenticeship was viewed as a means of ameliorating the slave trade's ills and achieving the evangelical's aim of transforming recaptives into "useful" members of society.

Under the governship of Thompson's successor Charles McCarthy, from 1814 apprenticeships were implemented through a system of local parishes administered and financed by the African Institution. The institution enforced new regulations, albeit restricted to the territorial jurisdiction of the colony, which stipulated that recaptives were to be apprenticed for no more than seven years or until they were twenty-one (Everill 2013: 20). The CMS used apprentices to construct numerous parishes in Freetown and outlying villages. Each parish comprised a small community that was appointed a 'Superintendent' who managed the feeding, education and employment of nearly 13,000 recaptives (*ibid*: 85). The Anglican Priest Reverand Edward Bickersworth observed in 1816, for instance, that craft guilds had been established in each parish. Children also received some preparatory education and were then apprenticed as tradesmen and mechanics (Seddall 1874). Letters of correspondence also suggested that apprentices were trained by a growing number of craft associations and guilds,

including as builders, blacksmiths, and carpenters (Dixon-Fyle and Gibril 2006: 205, 274; Tomkins 2010: 218). Bickersworth concludes, for instance, that apprenticeship was "very important to mark the indications of providential learning" and represented the only successful means by which settlers may become "useful members of society".

McCarthy's parish system proved important for strengthening the Clapham Sect's calls to outlaw slavery and introduce apprenticeship across the British Empire. The group's continued advocacy culminated in parliament finalising the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833, which specified a template for instituting apprenticeship in all of Britain's colonies (Tyson et al 2005: 207). Until this point, the parish system was not directly financed by the British government and neither was apprenticeship legally enforceable elsewhere in the empire. (Holt 1992: 72) Despite this, from 1814 to 1824, McCarthy's administration supported the plan in order to placate growing opposition in parliament for abandoning the colony, which was perceived to be a drain on government resources and unable to produce significant exports for the empire, such as coffee, cotton, palm oil and sugar.[57] In turn, parliament recognised apprenticeship as a 'half-way covenant' towards abolition; one that limited disruption to commercial trade and thereby reduced the potential for political opposition from wealthy plantation owners (Holt 1992: 56).

Apprenticeship as specified by the 1833 Act was, therefore, devised to suit the interests of sugar planters in the West Indies, particularly Jamaica. The legislation sought to exact a complex system of social controls and labour discipline. It was thought that a 'well regulated system' could mould apprentices into industrious wage labourers, thereby striking a balance between labour and capital that, after freedom was granted, would maximise productivity and protect the sugar market for absentee plantation owners (Morgan 2012: 461). The institution was to be maintained by a complex system of accounting rooted in British industrialist ideas regarding how to inculcate regular working habits and a sense of 'disciplined time' (Tyson et al 2005: 205). The specific regulations regarding 'work behaviour, task-rate, and punishment levels' were left to be determined by legislatures in each colony (*ibid*: 207). This meant that in the West Indies,

[57] Apprenticeship systems were also attractive during this period as anti-slavery colonisation among the Temne and Mende in Sierra Leone's hinterland, and also in Liberia, was proving ineffectual, and held during parliamentary debates as responsible for the Royal Navy's struggle to suppress slave traders further along the West African coast in the Bight of Benin and Bight of Biafra. These failures of the anti-slavery movement were viewed by opposition factions as disruptive to commercial relations, especially when the international legality of anti-slaving activities was already being challenged by colonial interests in the Americas and the West Indies.

unlike in Sierra Leone, masters struggled to overcome a reliance on intimidation and force (Holt 1992: 131).

Apprenticeships were stipulated to last six years for field slaves ('praedial apprentices') and four years for house slaves and artisans ('non-praedial apprentices') before freedom was granted. During the period of apprenticeship, a master was to provide food and clothing, allowing the apprentice to work in his service unpaid for three quarters of the week over 40 ½ hours. The remaining quarter would be used for waged labour in order to accumulate enough savings to be self-sufficient after securing freedom. Apprentices could also use these savings to buy their freedom early according to fair valuation by an appraisement tribunal comprised of respected planters and colonial administrators. Unlike the system of accounting, appraisal was highly subjective. As Holt (1992: 133-4) suggests, appraisals were based on the 'demeanour' of the apprentice such that:

> 'Value was determined by a labourer's age, strength, skills, and general worth. Strong, accomplished, reliable apprentices, the people most likely to seek appraisement, were valued much more highly than their idle and unproductive counterparts, and the inflated valuations which planters placed on them bore no relation to the wages offered for the extra work they performed'.

In practice, few apprentices possessed the capital necessary to attempt valuation. Nor, as was especially the case in Jamaica, did planters regard their apprentices as possessing a good demeanour. This is largely because, as per the 1833 Act, master-apprentice relations were rooted in Britain's master-slave contracts, and the Jamaican Assembly's interpretation of more specific legal provisions – such as punishment – that were aligned with the interests of plantation owners who relied heavily on force and intimidation (Tyson et al 2005). Indenture documents underpinning apprenticeship were signed between government and master without reference to the apprentice, such that indentures were endowed with legal force "as if" the apprentice had voluntarily entered into the contract. In exchange, the master was obliged to treat his apprentice 'with humanity' and refrain from excessive punishment (Ryan 2016: 402-3). While abuse still existed in Sierra Leone, it was generally regarded that the parish system inherited from the early 1820s onwards was more amenable to 'dispose' slaves humanely than it was in the West Indies (Africa Institution 1807: 22-3). Unlike the 1831 and 1832 revolts in Jamaica, the transition to freedom in Sierra Leone was a relatively 'uncontested' one (Ryan 2016: 401).

Under both systems, apprentices were not legally permitted to own land titles. Instead, masters were obliged to grant a small area of land on the plantation's estate with which an apprentice could cultivate their own provisions. Given apprentices utilised their free labour for a quarter of the week, any surplus could be sold to planters or other apprentices (Morgan 2012: 461). Following Jamaica's later adoption of the 1833 Act, Morgan (2012: 470-472) suggests the cultivation and sale of provisions began to expand by 1939. Furthermore, apprentices could also do extra work for hire on other plantations using their free labour, resulting in a patchwork of low margin trading relations across the plantations (Holt 1992: 135). The CMS argued that the transition of apprentice provisioning to wage labour in Sierra Leone was a necessary 'panacea for what was considered a negative trend in the social values of the colony-born youth in Sierra Leone […] pairing the Bible and the plough tied the goal of the civilising mission to appreciate the peculiar cultural contexts of emerging non-Western churches' (Olabimtan 2011: 207).[58]

In Jamaica, provisioning was reinterpreted through specific colonial ordinances that created a two-tiered market protecting the returns of planters and their absentee owners. Planters in the West Indies linked rents with access to provisions. Each apprentice was assigned a fixed plot of land on the plantation to cultivate, according to a fee set by the master that was 'proportionate to its value'. Cultivation outside the plantation was strictly prohibited and an apprentice could not sell produce on behalf of a master. The affordance of free labour time, access to land, and a surplus of crop, resulted in the creation of an autonomous low-margin marketing system that was 'functionally, historically, [and] psychologically' wedded to small-scale agriculture (Mintz 1955: 98). Morgan (2012) concludes that by the late 1840s, provisioning had resulted in the emergence of a 'proto-peasantry' that undermined the commercial viability of the colonial sugar plantations.

Apprenticeship was officially abolished by decree on 1 August 1848, two years earlier than legally stipulated. Parliamentary debates took heed of Governor Johnson's caution that apprenticeship was a moral millstone around the empire's work ethic and outlawed

[58] The Evangelical missionary aim of advancing the civilising mission by undertaking agriculture development through apprenticeship was likely formalised by Reverend Ulrich Graf, the resident CMS Missionary in Hastings in 1845. For instance, Olabimtan (2011) demonstrates that Graf established model cotton farms in Hastings during the early 1850s that were adopted more widely by CMS missionaries, for instance, in the Yoruba mission at Abeokuta in southwestern Nigeria.

the practice. In Sierra Leone, most apprentices continued with the now well-established parish system, where they were afforded wages, greater access to land ownership, and were subject to religious instruction through schooling (Ryan 2016: 416). The continuation of provisioning under apprenticeship was crucial in creating a pattern of internal cultivation and marketing for which, at least by the 1950s in both Sierra Leone and Jamaica alike 'seems to have fundamentally remained unchanged' (Mintz 1955: 95).

Archival records examined by Akyeampong (2005) demonstrate that the cultivation of cannabis *indica* for personal use, likely undertaken through provisioning overseen by settled planters, also began in the early 1800s, following introduction by Congolese slaves who later settled in Freetown (also see Duvall 2016: 12-3).[59] By the 1940s, cannabis production began to grow on a commercial scale in Freetown and the peninsula towns of Hastings, Waterloo and York. The continuation of similar market conditions under apprentice provisioning resulted in a small minority of middlemen securing exclusive commercial relationships with overseas buyers through an educated Krio diaspora that dominated the civil service and had access to merchants using shipping routes into North America and Europe (Akyeampong 2005). As I demonstrate in what follows, the contemporary organisation of cannabis production and marketing in the service of inter-regional and domestic trading networks provided a guilded source of revenue during agricultural depression. Yet it retained the same institutional character as the parish system of apprentice provisioning.

4.3 Economic depression and the growth of cannabis production in Western Area

Cannabis farming expanded across Sierra Leone's provinces and accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s in the context of a collapse in commodity prices that depressed agricultural, mineral and cash crop exports, and left the one-party state under Siaka Stevens' ruling APC with little room for rapprochement (Reno 1996: 10; Harris 2013: 63-80). Inequalities in access to land also increased significantly during the 1980s, resulting in a greater number of small-holders producing diminished output and receiving declining real incomes. According to Weeks' (1990: 10-11) estimates in 1971, 35.2% of land owners possessed more than five acres of land, in contrast to 25.3% by 1985, precipitating greater inequality in access to land and the widening of a gap

[59] Sierra Leone's colonial governor noted, for instance, that the colony's first psychiatric hospital, Kissy Lunatic Asylum, was established in 1817 to deal with trauma experienced by returnee slaves and psychosis was attributed to the use of cannabis.

between average farm incomes with 70% of farming households falling below the 1984-5 average. The wealthiest 3% enjoyed nominal incomes 18 times greater than the average for the poorest 20% of land owners. Non-agricultural incomes also declined rapidly with deflated wages falling from Le116 per day in 1969-70 to Le32 by 1985-6.

Meanwhile, less than one third of agricultural output entered the legal monetised economy. As part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) strategy to render exports more competitive, albeit largely to ensure the government earned enough foreign exchange to repay its creditors, Stevens devalued the Leone and enacted long-lasting structural changes that have left Sierra Leone's agriculturalists exposed to global price volatility (Weeks 1990; Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 402).[60] For the legal agricultural economy, an influx of lending from international financial institutions allowed the APC to purchase subsidised rice and sell it back on the local market at an inflated price. A subsequent IMF policy 'corrective' privatised agricultural marketing boards at a time when prices for locally produced food stuffs were falling relative to the returns obtainable on export, pushing much of Sierra Leone's agricultural activity outside of formal channels of exchange and into the untaxed economy.

For Hastings and Waterloo's cannabis farmers, the 1980s to early 1990s represented a period of growth, contributed to by the introduction of new cultivating techniques and seed varieties from Jamaica that provided comparative advantages over regional peers. Farmers reported that small-scale cannabis farming was increasingly common in Sierra Leone's provinces, especially in the context of increasing demand in Freetown amid growing urbanisation, cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia; and to a lesser degree, bulk supply through international markets as recreational use increased in Europe (Leggett and Plietschmann 206: 189; Chouvy and Laniel 207: 139; UNODC 2011: 31). On the supply-side, misallocations of labour resulting from rural-to-urban migration were spurred by diminishing output, declining real incomes, and inequalities in access to land (Weeks 1990: 10-11). This shift resulted in an abundance of experienced agriculturalists migrating to Western Area that were willing to undertake

[60] Initially, the World Bank in 1981 recommended that the government take control of the price mechanism through state regulation of marketing boards and implementation of a progressive tax regime to facilitate 'equitable growth' (World Bank 1984; Weeks 1990, 1998). By 1987 this recommendation was reversed, and the World Bank advocated for reducing the Sierra Leone Rice Corporation's 'interference' in the market for agricultural goods. Weeks (1990: 7) argues in a study of agricultural deficiencies in Sierra Leone for the International Labour Organisation that the World Bank had exploited 'common sense' during the 1970s in order to improve foreign exchange earnings and the government's ability to pay back its lenders.

small-scale farming. Furthermore, government subsidised imports of agricultural foodstuffs began redistributing income away from sellers to buyers, and thereby diminished incentives for farmers to re-engage in the local production of legal agricultural goods. Meanwhile, rapid urbanisation ensured Freetown's informal economy was increasingly saturated, offering more precarious work and lower wages.[61] Separately, the growth in cross-border trade for cannabis herb exploited disparities between low domestic producer prices for licit agricultural goods (Conteh et al 2012: 468). The greater returns available for exporting cannabis encouraged smuggling of the crop into neighbouring Guinea-Conakry and Liberia, creating an exclusive cross-border market that was being monopolised by a monopoly of land-owning cultivators with the right contacts.[62] By 2012, for instance, there existed three official border crossings and 53 unofficial border crossings into Guinea, compared with eight official border crossings and six unofficial border crossings into Liberia.[63]

These early cannabis farmers claimed that, since the conclusion of civil conflict, Guinea emerged as the leading cross-border consumer market due to increasing demand; a favourable unofficial exchange rate between 2001 and 2004 that encouraged Guinean cultivators to import Sierra Leonean cannabis, and the exploitation of higher domestic prices on the parallel exchange market. Historical price data collected during a survey of cannabis farmers in 2013 indicated that the average nominal price per kilogram of cannabis increased by Le130,000 (USD31.7) from 1999 before stabilising at Le170,000 (USD42.6) by 2012.[64] While a smaller pool of farmers benefited from the higher-value cross-border market, the plateau in price reflects the growth of production in the rural provinces. This resulted in supply beginning to meet demand in the domestic market where a burgeoning number of youth in Western Area were lower value-higher frequency consumers. Consequently, stabilisation of the price in Western Area closely aligned to inflationary changes for a wider basket of domestically produced legal agricultural goods. Price stabilisation likely occurred due to the government's decision to tighten monetary policy in 2011, encouraging a year-on-year reduction in inflation. With the cost of living more bearable and stable inflation rendering producer prices for

[61] Non-agricultural real income fell from Le116 per day in 1967/70 to Le32 by 1985/6 (Weeks 1990).
[62] Interview with UNODC officials, Freetown, 06/12/2013.
[63] Data provided by United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response Geographical Information Systems Services, http://www.unmeer-im-liberia.website/unmeer-gims-web-map-app.
[64] Price data is collected from surveys with 58 cultivators during 2013 that began cultivation at or before 1999. These data were cross-checked with price data supplied by Sierra Leone's Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) and Bøås and Hatløy (2005).

agricultural goods less volatile, the need for apprentice farmers began to decline, encouraging a return to cultivating cash crops, such as coffee, cocoa and oil palm. Demand in Hastings and Waterloo's principal export market for cannabis, Guinea, had, however, also momentarily fallen under President Alpha Condé. Inflation had increased significantly in Guinea since 2006, peaking at the highest level in West Africa by 2008. Consequently, the Guinean Franc weakened against the Leone and recovered by only half in 2008. Condé responded by implementing a ban on all agricultural exports in December 2007. This encouraged the uptake of domestic cannabis production in Guinea, particularly as 30% of the rural population that relied on cash crops as their main source of income (IRIN 2008c; WFP 2008).

Falling real incomes and a decline in agricultural exports thereby increased demand for local production of cannabis in Guinea and Liberia, reducing the demand for imports from Sierra Leone and increasing competition among farmers who were able to grow more potent varieties, such as *sativa*.[65] Export markets in Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria also grew more competitive as domestic and regional demand began to increase. According to Liberia's Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), for example, Bong and Nimba counties, which are close to consumer markets in the capital Monrovia, had experienced an increase in small-scale cannabis production (VOA News 2012). Meanwhile, surplus supply remained low in Ghana and Nigeria as domestic demand continued to increase throughout the 2000s. The UN's World Drug Report (2014) estimated, for example, that by 2013 Ghana had achieved the world's highest per capita rate of cannabis consumption and that Nigeria was the largest producer of cannabis in sub-Saharan Africa with the second highest per capita consumption.

Despite stabilisation of the regional cannabis export market, cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo was disrupted by civil conflict in the late 1990s, a period during which my interlocutors claimed that "everything turned to dust".[66] Cultivation in Sierra Leone trailed expansion driven by greater inter-regional demand elsewhere in West Africa. Nigeria and Ghana represented the first and second largest producers of cannabis herb respectively by the mid-1990s (Bernstein 1999: 15). Cultivation in Ghana grew with price declines in export-oriented cash crops, such as cocoa, which encouraged

[65] Cannabis cultivation may also have reduced after the implementation of a trade embargo by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) following instalment of the AFRC in 1996, which further reduced import values, from USD181 million in 1990 to USD79 million in 1999, thereby alleviating some of the downward pressure on domestic rice prices (Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 408).

[66] Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013.

substitution away from lower margin legal crops to comparatively higher value illegal cannabis herb (*ibid*; Aykeampong 2005: 435). A Paris-based Global Drugs Observatory report (1995) cited by the UNDCP (1999: 24) notes that during the early 1990s cannabis cultivators in Côte D'Ivoire were capable of earning three hundred times more than their cocoa farming counterparts, and fifty times more than groundnut farmers in Senegal. Commenting on these findings Laniel (2006) notes that:

> 'Western Côte D'Ivoire started producing cannabis after the fall in coffee and cocoa prices in 1988/1989; [and] two-thirds [of cultivators] attribute their decision to grow cannabis to the economic and land crisis.'

This expansion in West Africa's commercial production-for-export is confirmed by Ghana's Narcotics Control Board, which estimated that 50% of cannabis herb produced in Ghana during the 1980s was destined for export markets (Akyeampong 2005: 435), while cross-border seizures across West Africa's main cannabis producers peaked in the mid-1990s (UNDCP 1999: 29).[67]

In the context of growing inter-regional demand, national law enforcement agencies in West Africa, unlike international donors and financial institutions, reported that the cross-border trading networks involved in the unofficial trade of legal and illegal goods were geographically more localised than those assumed to be involved in "trafficking" networks. This was because cannabis cultivation had already diffused throughout the region by the late 1990s, with sites of production concentrated close to areas of high demand, such that cultivators needed only to conduct intra-regional trade with close neighbours (UNDCP 1999: 33; Legget and Pietschmann 2006: 203). Cannabis cultivation and exchange during the 1970s and early 1980s was therefore increasingly decentralised in West Africa, particularly in response to the deleterious effects of uneven economic structural adjustment, albeit conflated by policy makers with the growth of informal cross-border trading networks that were initially presented as a

[67] Cross-border seizures in Senegal grew by 201,962 kilograms from 1994 to 1996, and by 238,785 kilograms in Ghana (UNDCP 1999: 29). Weak law enforcement does suggest, however, that demand for cannabis is unlikely to be highly elastic, while differences in yield efficiencies of producing regions somewhat limit the validity of such comparisons. Disclaimers relating to these methodological shortcomings are buried within several annual UNODC reports (e.g. see UNODC 2011: 175, 2014: 24, fn. 53). There isagreement, however, that seizure statistics demonstrate a reasonable fit with trends in domestic and regional demand, and as such are a useful starting point from which to make inferences on trends in illicit drug economies (e.g. see Legget and Pietschmann 2006: 194).

popular livelihood strategy opposed to the financial mismanagement of the state (see Meagher 2003).

According to the OGD there was an associated 'increase in the number of short [exchange] networks' between regional neighbours trading illicit goods during this period (1998: 10). This logic was not, however, extended to countries that had experienced a decade-long violent conflict. In these contexts, the ODG is demonstrative of wider policy discourse given its claim that illicit drug production was organised through a 'Mafia model' in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the so-called Rainbow Mafias in South Africa (ibid; also see Labrousse and Laniel 2006: 35, 243, 256-7, 259-61). For countries affected by violent conflict, cannabis cultivation was synonymous with organised violence or treated as a survival response to the combined effects of painful structural adjustment and civil conflict.

For rural communities in Sierra Leone's provinces, most notably Kambia District,[68] cannabis cultivation was, however, increasingly undertaken by numerous small-scale producers during the late 1990s. Unlike the Mafia model, cultivators mimicked the apprentice provision system by renting plots of less than one hectare from land-owners, and selling produce in the domestic market while a minority had access to middlemen able to facilitate cross-border trade into neighbouring Guinea and Liberia (also see Keen 2005: 105, fn. 28). Much like its origins as a compensation crop in other West African producer countries (Bernstein 1996; Laniel 2006), these small-scale producers suggested that by the post-war recovery of the early 2000s, cannabis *sativa* was being intercropped with traditional foodstuffs such as cassava and rice in response to stagnating production (Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 410-11). Production costs had also diminished because agricultural inputs like fertilisers were subsidised by the government or obtained at lower-than-market prices from non-governmental organisations. The increasing availability of opportunities for agricultural skills training undertaken during the immediate post-war period also reduced labour costs and provided a further economic incentive for agriculturalists and the unemployed alike to cultivate cannabis.

[68] A civil society representative and former cannabis cultivator claimed that Kambia District, and specifically the town of Madina, represented the fastest growing site of cannabis cultivation given its proximity to neighbouring Guinea (Freetown, 09/12/2013).

There is limited empirical evidence, at least outside its use as a compensation crop or used as a stimulant by factions of the anti-government Revolutionary United Front (RUF), that cannabis production expanded to meet the needs of an emerging war economy (Keen 1998; Duffield 1999; Reno 2000: 55; Humphreys and Weinstein 2003; Gberie 2005; Chouvy and Laniel 2007: 139-40; Reno 2009; Silberfein 2010). Neither was demand created during the pre- and post-war periods to meet the revenue needs of an extra-legal 'shadow state' (Reno 2009). Cross-border trade out of Sierra Leone during the late 1990s was instead confined to more parochial trafficking networks coordinated by the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Groups (ECOMOG) that had deployed an intervention force to quell the RUF's offensives against Freetown.

Chain work, by contrast, comprised a separate, two-tiered system of marketing networks, whereby those of greatest value were almost exclusively accessible to the shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo where larger-scale cannabis farming resumed following an end to the civil conflicting the early 2000s. This partitioning of the market occurred in response to changes in supply-side factors: increasing rural-to-urban migration of young unemployed youth, and improved yields and agronomy following introduction of the cannabis *sativa* variety by immigrant Jamaican cultivators in the mid-to-late 1980s.

4.4. The shared institutional history of Jamaica's '*ganja* complex'

Cannabis farming and marketing in Hastings and Waterloo emerged from a system of apprentice provisioning. Jamaican apprentices in the West Indies' plantations shared this provisioning system during the transition from slave labour to apprenticing. Following the official end of apprenticeship in Britain's colonies by 1838, provisioning resulted in former apprentices selling their produce to a network of "higglers" engaged in low-margin transactions that were organised through West African marketing institutions inherited during the slave trade. Higglers acted as middlemen responsible for smuggling agricultural exports during a period of structural adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s; particularly 'underground' goods such as cannabis (Mintz 1955). This resulted in some higglers providing access to high-value exporters, while others served the increased competition and low-margins of the domestic market. Chain work denoted these networks for cannabis farmers and dealers in Western Area; both having emerged from apprentice provisioning. Mintz (1955: 99) concludes his study of Jamaican higgler

networks by suggesting, for instance, that 'the interdependence between higglers and small-scale agriculture has never been broken and may be even stronger today than it was a century ago'.

These small-scale production and marketing networks expanded during the mid-1980s at the height of US President Ronald Reagan's War on Drugs. At this point, a number of cultivators emigrated from Jamaica and settled in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. Established cultivators suggested three figures: Carrie B, Burning Spear and Tafaray, arrived in Hastings in 1985 and introduced new cultivation techniques and the cannabis *sativa* variety. Waterloo's oldest cultivator who had owned a farm for at least 25 years suggested, for instance, that:

> "He [Carrie B] was the first man that came, [and] they brought this [cannabis *sativa*] straight to the county [...] Ganja was grown in Salone but they brought a different kind of production, because we used to grow it the local way."[69]

Another cultivator who had grown cannabis since the late 1980s outlined a similar history. He bemoaned the way in which collectivised farms under Siaka Stevens' ruling APC party benefitted only the political elite. With a photo of the Jamaican cultivators in his hand, he suggested Carrie B and Tafaray arrived in Waterloo after being "exiled" from Jamaica in the early 1980s. Carrie B resided in Ibo Town, Waterloo with two local APC politicians, Mr Iskandrie and Mohamed Jabi from 1985 to 1995 while Tafaray was resident in Fulah Town, Waterloo. These APC politicians had, cultivators claimed, close familial relations with Rastafari members of the then-ruling Jamaican Labour Party (JLP).[70]

These original shareholders reasoned their work was conducted according to non-exploitative labour relations, which amounted to "binding around this and not around that".[71] Chain work subverted the chains that had tied down slave labour on the plantations of the West Indies by utilising an apprentice provisioning system of farming that was considered more autonomous and presented the opportunity of being able to gain long-term security in land ownership. In the contemporary context, cannabis farming was regularly contrasted with the "slave work" of legal agriculture in the

[69] David Kamanda, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 12/11/2013.
[70] Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/10/2013.
[71] Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.

provinces, which was deemed to be labour intensive and paternalistic, and required 'too much work for far too little yields' (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082-3).

Cannabis farming was also shaped by the political struggles of the Jamaicans. Since the 1950s, cannabis cultivation and consumption was closely intertwined with Rastafari ideology and cultural practices that were prominent among urban youth throughout Jamaica and West Africa (Savishinsky 1994: 27-28). For Freetown's youthful populace, the Rastafari movement gained adherents because it represented an 'ideological corrective' for those who were:

> 'Trying to come to terms with urban living in a multi-ethnic, post-colonial African society, adherence to Rastafari provide[d] an alternative source of meaning and identity to a life frequently punctuated by hopelessness, alienation and despair in what [was] often perceived [to be] a hostile, corrupt and hypocritical Eurocentric environment.' (Savishinsky 1994: 19)

Following the activism of Marcus Garvey in the 1940s, Rastafari in Jamaica had grown increasingly anti-government and anti-free market. The movement was profoundly shaped by the history of the slave trade in the West Indies and adherents were motivated by a desire for returning to East Africa, referred to figuratively as "Zion" (Meeks 2002: 166; Shilliam 2012: 341).[72] According to this discourse, "Babylonians" personified corrupt government authorities under the tutelage of colonial masters who prevented the Rastafari accumulating the capital necessary to return home.[73] This discourse was shared by farmers in Hastings, for whom Babylonians were law enforcers that failed to "play the game" and were perceived responsible for obstructing their pursuit of economic autonomy.[74] As one apprentice explained:

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[72] During the early 1940s Garvey's spiritual successor Leonard Howell established the Ethiopian Salvation Society (ESS) to practice these ideals and promote a "true communalistic lifestyle", a movement that reached its apogee with the establishment of Pinnacle, a self-sufficient commune in the county of Middlesex, comprising 700 men, women and children. Price (2012: 63-4) suggests the Jamaican government's raiding of the commune in 1937 is largely responsible for the diffusion of Rastfari ideology and practices into the capital Kingston.

[73] This longing for return was somewhat satisfied in 1961 when the Jamaican government sponsored a Rastafari-led diplomatic mission to sub-Saharan Africa. The visit to Sierra Leone included meetings with President Tejan Kabbah and the Njala Agricultural Centre regarding ways of improving crop yields and rectifying labour shortages (see Minority Report of Mission to Africa, 1961).

[74] By contrast, Jamaican cannabis farmers were often regarded as having the same moral outlook as Robin Hood (Priest 1987; Shaw 2001).

> "It is a case of doing things differently […] the Faray treat all men the same, they think fast, are honest. They will own land and a house […] When you are a Faray it means that you have the common understanding, it is someone you can trust. But the Babylonian is different, they are like the police. They think slowly [*safu safu*], all they want is [to own] a car, a plane; they are selfish, they will steal from you".[75]

To own land, make independent decisions, and accumulate capital autonomously, had held a special value for the Jamaican peasantry (Mintz 1955: 101). Zion and its personification Tafaray denoted strength and permanence in Rastafari vernacular and are reserved for those deemed honest, humble and hardworking "sufferers". Zion was also shorthand for the hills along Sierra Leone's peninsula where cannabis herb is cultivated. Babylon and Zion thereby figured as opposite poles in an imagined geography that contrasted enmity and hope. Prominent Rastafari leaders in Kingston during the 1960s and 1970s, such as Raz Jayze, referred to Babylon as "the system" that obstructed a return to the diversity and equality of Zion (Price 2009: 67-70; also see Rifka 2010: 32).[76] Unlike the restricted access to land that characterises youth undertaking agriculture in the provinces, where customary law is preferred to an impersonal common law framework (Unruh and Turray 2006; Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082), undertaking cannabis farming for the shareholders appeared to satisfy expectations of economic autonomy and security for youth migrating to Western Area.

The legal status of cannabis was also an important terrain of political and economic struggle for the Rastafari.[77] Jamaica emerged as the US government's "pet project" for demonstrating the superiority of capitalist market-led development over socialist democracy (Headley 1987; Harrison 2001: 121). Following election victories in 1972 and 1976, the ruling People's National Party (PNP) responded to demand and

[75] Interview with Gbrilla Manseray, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 30/10/2013.
[76] Numerous organisations such as Reverend Claudius Henry's "Back-to-Africa" and the Brothers Solidarity of United Ethiopia, in addition to academics campaigning for civil rights such as pan-African historian William du Bois, began to petition the Jamaican government throughout the 1950s culminating in the, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, submission of an Immigration and Repatriation Plan to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1954. The longing for return was partly satisfied in 1961 when the Jamaican government sponsored a Rastafari-led diplomatic mission to Africa, which included meetings with Sierra Leonean President Tejan Kabbah and meetings with Njala Agricultural Centre and Training College regarding limited food output and labour shortages (see Minority Report of Mission to Africa, 1961).
[77] Cannabis has been legally prohibited in Jamaica since 1913. Although revised legislation (the Dangerous Drugs Act) passed in the 1960s was more punitive and removed the discretion of magistrates. Mandatory minimum sentences for cultivation, sale and possession were three years of hard labour. At least 3,000 mandatory sentences were issued between 1964 and 1972, before the legislation was abandoned amid bottlenecks within the courts and overcrowding of the prison system motivated the passing of less punitive legilsation (Chevannes 2001: 33-4).

commodity-linked price volatility by significantly increasing state equity shares in flagship industries and strengthening bilateral ties with Cuba, which the Reagan administration – weary of Soviet promotion of client states in its periphery – sought, in turn, to destabilise and undermine. The PLP also continued the Jamaican Labour Party's (JLP) democratic socialist policy of reorganising agriculture by investing in cooperative sugar production. These arrangements offered small-scale farmers the prospect of becoming owner-operators on larger-scale sugar cane properties. Government expenditure was also invested in the teaching of new cultivation techniques using 'demonstration plots', rollout of fertilisation schemes, and introduction of higher quality and yielding crops (Crichlow 1997: 83-83). However, following the opposition JLP's victory in 1980, a coalition of bauxite miners, and a middle class sympathetic to the political elite's support for free market ideals; meant the War on Drugs began in the context of painful structural adjustment and resulting depression in agriculture production (Harrison 2001: 118-121).

Consequently, much like in Sierra Leone, the 1980s witnessed a significant rise in the number of young and landless tenants for whom cannabis farming represented a suitable alternative (Crichlow 1997: 86). Contrary to the War on Drugs aim of reducing supply, cannabis emerged as the 'principal commodity in [Jamaica's] informal sector in the lean years of the 1970s and 1980s' (Chavannes 2001: 33). Prime Minister Edward Seaga reamrked, for example, that cannabis cultivation represented:

> "The only healthy segment of the Jamaican economy. The 1.1 billion dollar business has been the economic lifeline of Jamaica for years, especially after traditional segments of the economy [had] failed." (Cited in Harrison 2001: 123)

In Jamaica, cannabis was increasingly grown in crop sharing arrangements alongside other agricultural goods, while its distribution was facilitated by networks of 'higglers' [dealers] that connected rural cultivators with urban consumers (Hamid 2002: xxxix; also see Johnson-Hill 1996: 16-17). This marketing network resembled the contemporary use of middlemen undertaking chain work in Western Area's domestic and cross-border cannabis markets, which has largely resulted due to the circulation of slaves to the West Indies from West Africa (Mintz 1955). Hamid (2002: xv) notes that the interdependence between cannabis production and marketing comprised a 'ganja complex' that was already 'endemic' among the rural working classes in Jamaica since at least the 1950s. The system of apprentice provisioning established on West Indies

plantations following the 1833 Abolition Act, whereby masters provided apprentices with free labour time and a small plot of land their plantation to grow provisions, was mimicked in the late 1900s, such that the 'cultivation of marijuana was always undertaken by the single individual' (ibid: xxxix). The rapid growth of cannabis production during this period of economic downturn ensured Jamaica remained the test case for Ronald Reagan's War on Drugs. This culminated in the 1988 United Nations Drug Conventions (UNDC) and the 1990 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Each treaty significantly expanded punitive law enforcement measures to target the activities and proceeds of cannabis farming and marketing.

Although not party to the 1988 UNDC until December 1995 (INCSR 1996), the US State Department had already established a bilateral arrangement with the Government of Jamaica in 1984 and implemented that implemented a 'Marijuana Eradication Program'. Opposition PNP and ruling JLP members actively opposed the programme during the 1980s. The US had, however, introduced terms into the bilateral agreement – which were also later inserted into the 1988 UNDC – that ensured failure to comply resulted in the withdrawal of US votes towards obtaining credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The potential loss of IMF credit and US economic assistance, at a time when external borrowing had produced a USD 3.5 million debt (one of the largest per capita debts worldwide), ensured the ruling JLP were locked into cooperating despite growing dissent from poorer rural classes (Long 1986; Priest 1987; Jones 2002).

The US State Department recorded a significant spike in arrests from 2,272 in 1985 to 3,341 in 1986, indicative of an equally significant increase in the scale of crop yields from 950 Mt in 1985 to 1,755 Mt in 1986, which subsequently declined to 460 Mt in 1987 as the eradication programme began to take full effect (INCSR 1996). The deteriorating economic situation – unemployment had reached 35% by 1980 – also motivated the migration of influential higglers who controlled the export of cannabis and forwarding of proceeds to the then opposition JLP and ruling PNP.

The Jamaican cultivators that found exile in Sierra Leone taught new cultivation techniques and introduced the cannabis *sativa* variety, which became known for it's uniquely "clear high".[78] Two farmers nicknamed "*Ɔsilibu*" and "American" emerged as

[78] The Jamaican diaspora also likely initiated a transition from self-sufficient production to commercialised export in Ethiopia during the early 1990s. One Jamaican cultivator suggested,

the dominant shareholders in Hastings, having established close relations with the Jamaicans in 1985. A farmer who had worked as an apprentice under these shareholders explained the resulting hierarchy as follows:

> "*Ɔsilibu* is our Chair [i.e. our boss]. They are all chairmen inside the business. They are the ones that have set up camp here [i.e. own land]. Any year they send thousands of kilos [of cannabis]. When the December harvest comes, you will sign up with 300 kilos […] this ganja is going to Jamaica. It is going to Jamaica because they respect it, the ground here is so *rich* […] American is a shareholder alongside *Ɔsilibu*. They started the business here, inside Hastings, after coming with Mr Iskandri and Carrie B. They got a hold of the *skunk* seed, which they planted in Hastings and then in Waterloo. They are all friends together".[79]

As I explain in the next section, these shareholders controlled labour and access to higher-value markets by continuing the practice of apprentice provisioning first established under McCarthy's parish system. By allowing fully-trained apprentices to rent a small plot of land on their farms with which to grow relatively autonomously, prospective competitors were confined to the greater competition and lower margins of domestic market networks that resembled those navigated by "higglers" in Jamaica's cannabis economy. Furthermore, the Jamaicans passed on agricultural skills acquired during the 1980s collectivized farming schemes and introduced cannabis *sativa* seeds. This provided the shareholders with a comparative advantage in marketing, because cross-border buyers perceived that the Sierra Leonean climate and soil produced a more unique "taste".

Mirroring the contrast made by the Jamaican's between Babylonians and Tafaray, cannabis farmers in Hastings' who had been apprenticed by the Jamaicans also occupied a decidedly political terrain. As one of the shareholders nicknamed American explained:

> "You know, you know, most of the business belonged to Waterloo, through a man called Carrie B who lived in Ibo Town and his associate Mohammed Jabi who came and went with the *diamba* to the UK. He was blessed; not by me, but by God. Tell me, how many people has he brought work here? [...] Eventually they were pushed out of Hastings by

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'We taught them how to farm it and helped them with their problems'. Linkages between Jamaican and Ethiopian cultivators appear to have grown closer still following a decision by the Mengistu government to reduce land allocations promised to Jamaican settlers amid a resumption of eradication programmes in 1996 that destroyed 320 hectares of cannabis crop and arrested 21 farmers, all Jamaican (UNDCP 1998: 22-3).

[79] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

> [Kabbah's] SLPP [in 1996]. Everything was brushed and they stole all of his ganja […] He married a woman from Waterloo and moved back to Jamaica. We still had the links with London who used to send money back, but after the war ended they started to eat it, even the headman here uses the money now to pay off the NPA [National Power Authority] and have electricity at his house. *American abruptly stands up and in animated fashion explains to me that*. You know that we used to sing at school: 'better days are coming'? *He suddenly slumps down seated again, head between his knees*. … But it's getting worse. This is a hard, hard village, everyone is running every which way to try and find work. Freetown has the ways and means to get work, but Hastings relies on ganja. If ganja stops, the village will not stand. *I ask what the consequences might be*. Theft, too much theft, too much poverty can make you turn into a criminal; your head turns to a coconut. *American gestures to a large mango tree in his back yard and begins to speak in a low whisper*. You know what I am trying to say Balogun [the researcher]? *He gestures to the mangoes at the top of the tree, moving his hands as if passing them along between people lined up in a chain to the bottom. He carefully and quietly reaches up to grab one, before placing it slowly back down on the ground*. You see? There are plenty of tricks. Too much poverty will make you have no friends. When the lion is hungry in the jungle – you understand? There is money in this country, but we don't see any benefit. They [the government] are weak; they *chop* everything […] Only one thing will stop the system changing. Fear".[80]

One apprentice farmer claimed that "when you hear that name, 'American', it is a powerful somebody". He was correct, as the nickname implied; American was *Ɔsilibu*'s right-hand man. These shareholders reasoned in the same way as the Jamaicans that cannabis farming was productive and generated employment, and consequently was opposed to "the system" of nepotism and political elitism that had sought to destroy or capture the trade in the 1990s. By picking fruits in the shade of a tree, American was conveying a moral rhetoric shared by apprentices who were committed to the more equitable and righteous labour of cannabis farming. This was despite Western Area now hosting a small tier of shareholders who controlled the largest farms with the greatest returns.

At the same time, the transition from the locally cultivated cannabis *indica* – known as *Country Tay*, *Lobito* and *Sensimilla*[81] – to the farming of cannabis *sativa* enabled this

[80] Interview with American, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 07/11/2013.
[81] Sensimilla derives from Spanish to mean, literally, 'without seeds'. Hamid (2002: x) argues *sativa* first arrived in Jamaica with indentured Chinese and Indian labourers that replaced emancipated African slaves the early 1800s. There is little evidence indicating cannabis *sativa* was present in Sierra Leone before the onset of World War Two, despite the possibility of

exclusive tier of cannabis producers in Western Area, particularly in the peninsula towns of Hastings, Waterloo, Four Mile, Macdonald and Tombo, to gain a further comparative advantage over aspiring farmers. For instance, cannabis *indica* has featured as the common strain grown throughout West Africa, requiring a period of two months before flowering (Bernstein 1999; Hamid 2002). Although cannabis *sativa* can take up to 2 ½ months to bloom, it grows more quickly than *indica* during the vegetative stage prior to flowering. Both strains therefore have an average growing time from germination to harvest of four-to-five months. *Sativa* was, however, perceived to produce a "clearer high" than *indica*, and its association with Jamaican cultivators gave it a marketing advantage over regionally more common varieties. With a total growing time of four-to-five months, cannabis *sativa* also had a comparative advantage over other cash crops, such as palm fruit, which takes five-to-six months from pollination to maturity and can only be obtained from pre-existing palm trees not located in privately-owned land.[82] The unique "high" and comparatively higher value yields of *sativa* ensured cannabis farming became a 'formidable market', even in the face of regional competition and growing domestic supply (Leggett and Pietschmann 2006: 191). As Waterloo's longest established cultivator asserted: "things had established then, unlike before".[83]

4.5. Economic incentives to participate in the cannabis economy

Cannabis farming in Hastings and Waterloo provided young, rural-to-urban migrants who lacked capital with a reasonable opportunity to obtain a relatively secure income and to access land. Strong economic incentives permitted large numbers of unemployed youth to undertake cannabis cultivation from the early 2000s onwards. By 2013, for example, cannabis farming represented cultivator's dominant source of income, while at least 67% claimed they had previously undertaken a range of other income generating activities, including alluvial diamond and gold mining, carpentry, vehicle repair and street vending. The remaining 13% of cannabis farmers were previously engaged in self-

interaction with Arab trading groups originating from what is now Somalia and Kenya in East Africa (du Toit 1976). Colonial botanical studies suggest cannabis *indica* was cultivated in Sierra Leone from around the mid- to late-nineteenth century, originating from seeds brought to Freetown by recaptured Congolese slaves (Clarke 1851). Some established cultivators suggested *lobito* was first imported from Nigeria following refugee displacements during the Biafran war in the late 1960s.

[82] A similar trend is noted in Liberia. For instance, Liberia's Deputy Justice Minister suggested in 2008 during acceleration in the growth of small-scale cannabis firms in Bong and Numba counties that it took seven years for rubber and three years for palm oil to produce a return comparable to cannabis grown within three to four months (IRIN 2008a).

[83] Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/13.

sufficient agriculture. The average net profit across all cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo during 2013 was Le2.64 million (USD 644), or Le9,962 per day based on 265 working days. In comparison, more precarious waged labour is estimated to provide an average daily minimum wage of Le14,286 during 2013 (WFP 2014). All cannabis farmers in Hastings and Waterloo reported that cannabis farming provided their main source of personal income, and all but three cultivators had switched from inter-cropping arrangements, typical of the 1980s and 1990s, to mono-cropping. Household incomes have, however, remained diverse in other contexts, and the data collected here indicates that the growth of cannabis cultivation in Western Area is driven by rural to urban migration, labour reallocation, and inequalities in land access and ownership, rather than simply commodity substitution (also see Bloomer 2009; Laudati 2014: 168).

Cannabis *sativa* does, however, have an adaptable and resistant agronomy when grown in the peninsula hills (Duvall 2016: 13-14). Cultivation begins with the germination of *sativa* seeds, which are placed inside used water packets containing holes for water drainage, and then placed onto a growing table and covered with a tarpaulin to increase humidity and darkness. After one week, seedlings begin to form, referred to in Krio as "*nɔsri*", meaning a nursery garden. Over a period of four weeks, soil moisture is closely monitored. The shoots are then placed into a dug-out hole with direct access to sunlight and watered using plastic jerry cans until the plant begins to vegetate. Usually within two-to-three months the *sativa* plant doubles in size and begins to bloom. Cultivators then identify the plant's sex. Male buds comprising caniples[84] are removed to prevent cross-pollination with female plants. Other cultivators choose to "groom" the cross-pollinated plants after harvest to remove excess seeds. Both cleaning processes are used to remove unwanted seeds from the cannabis herb, which is a contributing factor in a buyer's determining the potency of the cannabis and skill of the respective farmer. Cultivators refer to these cleaned buds as "*sɛnsimilla*" or "*sɛnsi*" for short; a term originating from the Spanish *sin semilla*, meaning "without seeds".

The plants then grow larger over a period of up to two months. NPK fertisliser, chicken dung and fish peel are mixed into each hole, according to varying quantities, combinations and timings; depending on the available capital and farmer's preference. This process varies between farmers, but usually mimics that learned or modified from the technique of a former shareholder. Having prevented cross-pollination, the female buds begin producing trichomes containing a high ratio of canabinodiol to

[84] Caniples are ball-shaped flowers that cluster together on a bud.

tetrahydrocanniboil, typical of *sativa*'s cannabinoid composition. Canabinodiol was a sticky subtance that farmers typically cleaned off and roled between the fingers to produce a dark brown ball of sought after cannabis resin.[85]

Average yields for cannabis *sativa* in Hastings and Waterloo, which typically requires three to four months from planting to harvest, closely approximated yields estimated by the UNODC (2009: 93) for a well-tended, outdoor farm with no irrigation based in the United States. Based on an average farm size of 60.75m^2, cultivators produced a combined 26.2 kilograms annually. This finding contradicts the assumption that cannabis farming in sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by rudimentary techniques and the prevalence of cannabis *indica*, which otherwise results in the lowest yield efficiencies for cannabis production globally (UNODC 2010: 191-3; also see Duvall 2016: 12-14).[86] The introduction of cannabis *sativa* during the late 1980s afforded a clearer "high" than those of regional peers, and maintained a similar growing time as *indica* such that annual yields were comparable to Western Area's most common agricultural cash crops. This was particularly important, as explained below, due to constraints around land access and farm size. Table One demonstrates that, for farms of equivalent size, cannabis produces greater yields of higher value than rice and palm oil in Western Area. For instance, over the course of a year, one square metre of a farm producing cannabis could obtain an average return of Le57,284 in the dry season and Le69,977 in the rainy season. Given cannabis produces a greater yield per metre, cannabis farms have the potential to obtain a nine times greater return than could be obtained from palm oil over the course of a year.

[85] Bosses typically allowed their apprentices to keep the resin for personal consumption or allowed them to sell it to known buyers. This also represented a useful was to placate apprentice's impatience before receiving wages at the end of a season, and retained the connotation that profit was derived from the "strain" of hard labour.
[86] Regional variation in plot densities and yields weaken the validity of these estimates, despite attempts being made to control for plant size (e.g. see UNODC 2010: 183, 272).

Table One: Average yields and returns for cannabis herb compared with legal agricultural goods in Western Area.

Crop, year	**Annual yield (kg) per square metre**	**Advertised price (Le per kilogram)**	**Annual return per square metre**
Upland rice, 2011	0.10	2,563	244
Inland valley swamp rice, 2011	0.21	2,563	528
Oil palm, 2011	0.68	9,076	6,126
Cannabis *sativa* (dry season), 2012	0.43	132,910	57,284
Cannabis *sativa* (rainy season), 2012	0.43	162,360	69,977

Source: MAFFS (2011); Fieldwork survey data (Appendix One)

Other agricultural activities undertaken in Western Area, such as palm oil tapping, do, however, require fewer labour hours and are more amenable to livelihood diversification strategies. However, Western Area is resident to larger-scale commercial plantations on privately-owned land, resulting in a more saturated market that forecloses opportunities to access land.

The majority of agriculture undertaken in Sierra Leone's provinces is hindered by restricted access to land which is governed according to customary law enforced by patrimonial authorities (see Chauveau and Richards 2008). Arguably these institutions, first established under colonial indirect rule, were necessary for coercing labour when land was too abundant and labour too scarce to ensure the sustained productivity necessary for cash-crop export during the late-1800s (Austin 2009: 34-35). As Austin (2009) concludes, it was in the transition of coercive labour arrangements from slavery, to pawning under chiefs or apprenticing under colonists, that the commercial viability of slavery was eventually undermined. Improvements have arguably been made regarding the accountability and equality of these patrimonial institutions following the civil conflict, such that community relations are not marked by the grievances responsible for generating conflict during the late 1980s (Sawyer 2008; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). However, locals without inherited land rights, commonly referred to as "strangers", still struggled to secure long-term access to land, which hindered agricultural productivity (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082). Recent evidence shows that agricultural productivity is difficult to sustain without cultivators perceiving that they

have longer-term security over land ownership (Unruh 2005: 102-108; Peters and Richards 2011: 379, 390, 393).

Furthermore, agriculture in Sierra Leone suffers from acute labour shortages due to small yields resulting in an unfavourable ratio of costs to earnings in production. Labour accounts for an estimated 80% of production costs (Bolten 2009: 83). Rice farming, for instance, is burdened by high labour intensity, lack of specialised equipment, and limited land and labour security that prevents generating the yields necessary to sustain an extended work force (*ibid*). As Cartier and Bürge (2011: 1083) remark: 'Put simply, agriculture in Sierra Leone requires too much work for far too little yields [therefore] precluding the involvement of a more extended network of people paid in kind and through reciprocity of labour'.

Cannabis farming, by contrast, 'does not require intensive management for high-potency products' and is capable of being grown in 'marginal sites' (Duvall 2016: 14). Production also benefits from Western Area's unique system of land tenure. Unlike in the provinces, land tenure is based on the freehold system of English common law comprising state-owned land and individuated rights to privately-owned land (Renner-Thomas 2010). Cannabis farms were typically established on state-owned land during the 1980s and immediate post-conflict period of the early 2000s. During the early 2000s, for example, the Ministry of Lands issued temporary permits to internally displaced people in order to stimulate small-scale agriculture amid chronic food shortages. It was typical for cannabis farmers to claim that their plots resided on "government land" accessible to anyone. Given ownership rights have continued to be poorly enforced and regulated, an informal system of rights to first-ownership emerged that technically amounted to illegal squatting. This was particularly the case for Western Area's population, many of which were displaced by civil conflict. For instance, a cultivator who farmed cannabis in an area of bush known as Loko Fakay suggested that: "it is free land, government land; everyman can go and work there".[87] As Bloomer (2009: 50) similarly observes in a study of cannabis production in Lesotho, access to land was 'regulated but often non-codified'.

Due to the resulting legal misunderstandings around land tenure and lack of clarity otherwise served by the enforcement of written contracts, the founding cannabis farmers justified their ownership claims on the basis of hereditary rights from ancestors or extended family members. Although these claims were difficult to independently

[87] Interview with Musa Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/08/2014.

verify, it was in the continued absence of state-mandated officials that shareholders could exploit their close relationships with town chiefs in order to legitimise them. Claims to hereditary rights supported by town chiefs represented a sleight of hand necessary to dismiss challengers. For instance, to be granted access to land, which otherwise amounted to illegal squatting, apprentices still insisted that shareholders needed to, "draw you", "bell you" or "give you the green light", such that the authority to grant access to land was conferred on those who had established an original presence there (also see Machonachie et al 2012). Whether recognised as such or not, this continued exploitation of rights to first-ownership was attractive to shareholders and apprentices alike, because, unlike in the provinces, access to land was not primarily based on birth or kinship rights. Under the customary authority of chiefdoms in Sierra Leone's provinces, access to land was regulated by high bride prices and tied labour arrangements (Richards et al 2011).

Having established rights to first ownership, cannabis *sativa* was well-suited to maximising returns on these small, informally rented plots.[88] In an evaluation of Sierra Leone's land reform process, Unruh and Turray (2006: 5) note, for example, that in the context of a 'fairly fluid economic and social environment' where money or assets like a 'vehicle, shop, or even a job' could be 'finished' at any moment, land in Western Area represented a more secure asset that 'keeps on giving […] a significant aspect of a risk averse approach' to making a living. This was especially the case for apprentice farmers, as apprenticeship presented an opportunity to accumulate capital and gain land ownership through the guidance of their respective shareholders. As I examine in relation to the notion of "winning the race" in Chapter Five, for example, proceeds from cannabis farming were reinvested to secure land titles and build a house. The pressure to claim home ownership was primarily driven by high rents, particularly as the demands of urbanisation in Freetown motivated newcomers in Hastings and Waterloo to exploit legal ambiguities in privately-owned land and secure more affordable housing. Such opportunities were generally unavailable when producing legal cash crops such as palm oil and palm wine, that, at least in Western Area, were not organised through apprenticeship; occupied less secure plots of land in the absence of a shareholder; required greater labour hours and inputs, and were exposed to hit-and-run strategies that generated greater price competition at local markets and undermined savings strategies.

[88] Cannabis farms occupied an area of 60.75m^2 on average.

Farmers also reasoned that the more recent shift to mono-cropping cannabis was motivated by the lower and less predictable returns available when producing legal agricultural food stuffs, such as rice and cassava. For instance, the average price advertised to buyers for cannabis during the period of field research in 2013 varied from Le132,910 (USD32.4) per kilogram in the dry season to Le162,360 (USD39.6) per kilogram in the rainy season. These returns were 28.5 and 34.8 times greater, respectively, than the average national retail price, Le4667 per kilogram, for the same quantity of locally produced rice in 2013. Furthermore, cannabis farmers reported that reliable seasonal fluctuations in the price of cannabis enabled arbitrage and savings strategies. Farmers did this be reserving some cannabis to be sold at a higher price amid a foreseeable reduction in supply, especially from the provinces, during the rainy season.[89] For instance, the distribution of average price across farms in Figure One demonstrates a significant seasonal difference. The overlap between the seasonal distributions suggests that, in the majority of cases, this seasonal change did not only affect the domestic market. Even when excluding outliers for the two largest producing farms in Hastings, in total 1,134 kilograms were sold during the dry season compared with only 277 kilograms during the rainy season. Consequently, at the higher-end, farmers well-connected with cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia gained an additional advantage by adjusting farming cycles or saving harvested cannabis in order to gain the greatest returns during periods when supply was interrupted by the rainy seasons in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia.

[89] Kernel density estimation is analogous to a smoothed out histogram and is typically used to examine price distribution among finite populations from which inferences regarding the structure of competition would like to be made.

Figure One: Distribution of prices for cannabis sold during the dry and rainy seasons in Hastings and Waterloo in 2013.
Source: Fieldwork survey data (Appendix 1).



By contrast, the exposure of legal agricultural goods to global market conditions and 'uncertainty about future inflation' (Kovanen 2007; also see Glennester and Suri 2014: 5) resulted in more volatile price variations that prohibited farmers from engaging in these kinds of strategic sales strategies. Government officials have, for example, responded to this volatility by attempting to install price control systems for agricultural goods, albeit with limited success:

> 'Officially Sierra Leone has no price control system. Consumers are generally at the mercy of retailers, who peg prices at their whims and caprices.' (Africa Review 2011)

Cultivators could therefore take advantage of more reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply and demand for cannabis *sativa*, which allowed them to proactively plan for the future rather than engaging in more short-term, reactive tactics.

The resulting increase in the uptake of small-scale cannabis farming is demonstrated by data from the Sierra Leone's Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU). Seizures of cannabis herb increased by 2,821 kilograms in 2012, two years after the United Nations-funded unit began operations in 2010. Furthermore, following implementation of more punitive drug control measures established under the National Drugs Control Act 2008,[90] guards at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown reported that the court and prison

[90] The 2008 Act repealed the British colonial Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 1926 and compliments provisions under the Pharmacy and Drugs Act 2001. The 2008 Act serves minimum sentencing of

system had become increasingly overstretched. In response, magistrates *de facto* decriminalised cannabis cultivation, sale and possession by reverting to more lenient provisions contained within the Pharmacy and Drugs Act 2001. Furthermore, the majority of arrests for cannabis possession were often dealt with at local police stations, such that TOCU's figures represent the majority of commercially produced cannabis destined for cross-border markets in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia.

Growing domestic and regional supply since the late 2000s began to divide cannabis farmers into two camps. Those with the middlemen necessary to access cross-border markets began to produce in larger volumes and obtained greater returns that were reinvested into the hiring of apprentices, physical capital (such as fertiliser); payments in-kind to capture new buyers and bribes to the police. Meanwhile, those without these contacts faced greater competition in Western Area's domestic market and remained hemmed-in to small-scale farming. Furthermore, the transmission of cannabis *sativa* from the Jamaican's in the 1980s provided the shareholders with a marketing advantage, due to the clearer high yet comparable yields and harvesting time when compared with the more common *indica* variety. The unequal distribution of economic capital that resulted underpins the contemporary organisation of Western Area's cannabis markets and labour relations.

4.6. The economic organisation of chain work

Farmers predominantly sold cannabis in bulk quantities to pre-established middlemen in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo. Although most accounts suggest cannabis herb undergoes little processing before market (UNODC 2010: 190), cultivators "groomed" their cannabis during harvest to remove stems and seeds, which was then examined between the palms by buyers. This indicated that processing was an important step of value addition prior to selling to known buyers. These middlemen, referred to as "pushers", were regarded by farmers as the crucial "links" of chain work because their value was derived from maintaining close personal relationships in contrast to fleeting, anonymous sales that characterised the open market. These dealers varied in their ability to access different markets. The majority would separate the product into smaller

five years for possession and sale of 'hard drugs' (which includes cannabis *sativa*), and life imprisonment for 'importing, exporting, transhipping or transmitting' illicit drugs.

quantities for onwards sale in the domestic market by word of mouth.[91] As one dealer explained: "I am not a supermarket […] you meet up, sell it, and go".[92] Cannabis *sativa* remained the dominant variety of choice for buyers and relatively few farmers engaged in what was referred to as "mixed" cultivation by growing the *indica* variety as well.[93] These middlemen were also usually affiliated with a youth base. Here, "slings" [cigarettes] of cannabis were sold directly to, predominantly, young men.

Alternatively, these same middlemen provided youth, at least those who were not already undertaking apprenticeships, with larger quantities of cannabis herb referred to as a "*kwant"*, which was roughly equal to a quarter kilogram. These were sold on credit. It was typical, for example, that a middleman request a *kwant* be sold for Le40,000 to Le50,0000 in return for commission on a sliding scale that began at half the value of the sale price. Given supply from the provinces had increased throughout the 2000s and periods of oversupply were now especially experienced during the dry season; credit-based transactions reduced the risks for middlemen of selling to high frequency-low value buyers who could only afford to purchase cigarettes of cannabis. Although production in the rural provinces was not well integrated with markets in Western Area, middlemen occasionally sought to increase their margins by exploiting small time seller's lack of knowledge regarding how to assess the quality of the herb by, for instance, passing it off as having been grown in Hastings or Waterloo. This occurred largely because oversupply resulted in a lack of demand and created an illiquid market. As such, dealers selling on credit often resorted to conducting what they referred to as "auctioning" and "fast money". These sales tactics involved separating the *kwants* – also referred to as "*pɛku*" – into the smaller quantity of a cigarette in an attempt to sell as fast as possible, while still retaining some commission. These credit relations therefore increasingly tied new dealers to their respective middlemen and ensured they were dependent on their goodwill to delay or cancel debts when they failed to sell. Separate to this, those undertaking apprenticeships were also given opportunities to sell *kwants* on behalf of their bosses. These particular arrangements were, however, based more on

[91] Barter transactions are immediate, non-recurrent and involve the transaction of goods in low volume. Market exchange was synonymous with the chain work undertaken by cannabis cultivators for it resulted in recurrence and the integration of exchange networks within Hastings, Waterloo, the capital Freetown and in cross-border regions of Guinea and Liberia (see Humphrey 1985: 51-2, 66-8).
[92] Interview with Cannabis Cultivator, Musa Bangura, Waterloo, 06/08/2013.
[93] The dominance of cannabis *sativa* indicated the base level for potency, measured according to Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content, was the same for all cannabis produced. THC content typically closely correlates with increasing quantity and quality of fertiliser, and the time (usually after two months) between harvesting and consumption after which Trichomes degrades and reduces the crops potency when consumed.

testing an apprentice's trust, with the cannabis sold for a fixed fee to a buyer already known to the shareholder.

When supply was interrupted during the rainy season, middlemen benefitted from the conditions of a seller's market. This was characterised by a shortage of goods available for sale, such that a seller could afford to sell at a higher price. Furthermore, when farmers and middlemen had engaged in more frequent transactions with a known buyer over time, they were able to negotiate higher prices. Buyers gained confidence in being recurrently provided with cannabis of high quality in potentially larger quantities, thereby strengthening the seller's bargaining position as the buyer continued the relationship. By contrast, those selling outside of these exclusive networks at the ghettos and beach parties of the open market were subject to more-or-less fixed prices based on the quantities of *kwant* (Le30,000 to Le40,000) and *sling* (Le500 to Le1,000). This pegging of prices to an ordinal scale was likely necessary to ensure during transactions.

For instance, the emic terms "locked game" and "open game" were indicative of how different modes of transaction were being established to deal with the uncertainties of what economists refer to as 'information asymmetry'. A land-owning cultivator explained that in a locked game a buyer anticipated the unspoken agreement on a fixed price from which the seller should not deviate. Whereas in an open game, such as that synonymous with known middlemen – the "links" – price was ostensibly up for negotiation: "when you have friends that know about the game, then you can meet open[ly]".[94] Accordingly, most cannabis farmers (59%) without connections to well-placed middlemen or shareholders faced the disadvantages of information asymmetry and constraints on price negotiation, because they were only able to sell cannabis on open markets in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo.

However, a smaller proportion (41%) sold to well-placed middlemen or were already those shareholders selling directly based on their respective long-standing relationships with cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia, and wealthier members of Freetown's middle class. Within this more exclusive market, cannabis was only sold in multiples of '*skels*' [scales], each being roughly equivalent to one kilogram, given the expectation it would most likely be trafficked and then separated into smaller quantities for onwards sale elsewhere. Consequently, dominant cultivators that had accumulated sufficient economic capital and had access to higher-value buyers in Guinea and Liberia during the

[94] Interview with Alie Kamara, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo,11/11/2013.

1980s and 1990s were able to increase production volumes and returns due to their continued relationships with middlemen who served these same cross-border buyers. Those cannabis farmers not able to access these more exclusive markets were able to participate in a more contestable market, but as a result of greater competition, were left to adopt sales strategies in the open market that resulted in comparably lower, if only more immediate returns.

The role of shareholders as gatekeepers to exclusive markets, their pre-existing accumulation of economic capital, and claims of first ownership to land since the 1990s resulted in the geographical clustering of farms along Western Area's peninsula hills into five distinct sites. Each cluster comprised a hierarchy of production, which included apprentices, journeymen and shareholders, as discussed later (see section 4.6.1). Some clusters were more competitive than others. For instance, one cluster of farms colloquially referred to as "You Must Grumble" produced the largest quantities of cannabis each season; largely due to the shareholder's first-mover advantage in reinvesting accumulated capital and the labour secured from apprentices and journeymen during the 1980s and 1990s. You Must Grumble hosted between 10 to 15 apprentices and up to five journeymen at any one time. However, due to *Ɔsilibu's* on-going relationships with middlemen involved in cross-border trafficking, farmers at this cluster could collectively benefit from the discrimination of higher prices and expansion in production resulting from larger orders. One of *Ɔsilibu's* apprentices noted, for example, that at least two large orders to Liberia were requested each year; such that all apprentices and journeymen would pool the cannabis they produced on behalf of the shareholder, in exchange for a cut of the profits. Consequently, the You Must Grumble cluster of farms was able to gain greater returns than others, indicative of oligopolistic price competition whereby the shareholder operated as a price-setter in the more exclusive market (see Arlacchi 1998: 205). Table Two demonstrates the continuation of oligopolistic competition by comparing the annual net profit margin in 2013 for each of the five clusters of farms.

Table Two: Annual net profit and margins for cannabis farming clusters in Hastings and Waterloo.[95]

Farm	Annual net profit (Le)	Annual net profit margin (%)
Loko Fakay	1,334,000	22
Obɔnoki	1,284,444	31
Sugar Loaf	1,869,000	33
Wanpala	2,761,750	56
You Must Grumble	5,284,167	61

Source: Fieldwork data (Appendix 1)

Net profit margin adjusts for the costs of inputs, such as labour and physical capital (e.g. fertiliser), which contribute to an organisation's size and gross profit margin. You Must Grumble represented the largest and most competitive cluster, with a 5% greater profit margin than its nearest rival. Another farming area, referred to as Sugar Loaf, increased expenditure on fertiliser, chicken dung, and fish skin by Le600,000 more than You Must Grumble.[96] The average annual expenditure on these inputs across farming clusters was Le1,698,938 (USD415.5). The shareholder of Sugar Loaf reasoned his strategy would help him compete with rivals, as his farms currently obtained a below average transaction price in the dry season of Le101,667 per kilogram and Le150,000 per kilogram in the rainy reason. This strategy did not, however, translate into greater returns, instead obtaining a 27% lower net profit margin than You Must Grumble. Price competition was skewed in favour of a small tier of shareholders, which suggested economic exchange was not being played out within an equal playing field.

These inequalities confirmed that there existed strategic barriers to entry as well as natural barriers, such as labour and physical capital, that determined the cannabis market's degree of contestability. For instance, Tremblay et al (2009) conclude a statistical examination of the size and influence of criminal organisations by suggesting there are contributing factors; namely social capital and the nature of transactional relationships between leaders and followers, which determine the influence of an organisation in illegal markets other than the organisation's size, propensity to organise and use violence, and the likelihood of detection by law enforcement including the use of

[95] Net profit margin was calculated as total annual revenue less costs of inputs (fertiliser, fish skin and chicken dung), costs of informal land rent (where applicable) and payment of '*haju*' [bribes] to law enforcers.

[96] Cultivators in Sugar Loaf each spent on average a total of Le4,717,500 (USD 1,150) on inputs, whereas cultivator in You Must Grumble and *Loko Fakay* spent Le4,119,167 (USD 1,004) and Le1,066,250 (USD 260) despite the latter obtaining greater returns.

corrupt strategies (see Reuter and Kleiman 1986: 301-2). As I go on to argue, other factors also contributed to the success of some clusters over others. These included the inherited institutional context, perceived status of leaders, and at the individual level, the practices learned, enacted and reproduced by participants in each production hierarchy. These factors are important for explaining how shareholders mediated access to more exclusive markets and how apprenticeship remained stable despite not being beholden to written contractors or being enforced by independent adjudicators.

4.6.1 Apprenticeship system of cannabis production

The shareholders mimicked the apprentice provisioning system of small-scale agricultural production that emerged under McCarthy's parish system. This form of labour organisation had followed slavery and pawning modes of production prevalent in the provinces that, as Austin (2009) has argued, proved to be crucial in stimulating cash-crop production for export across West Africa. Absent of coercion, legal force or written contracts, the youth who participated in these informal apprenticeships conveyed them as being congruent with their expectation to establish small-scale farms of their own. One apprentice farmer explained, for instance, that he was first apprenticed while searching for employment after migrating to Western Area in the mid-1980s:

> "Those that first started inside the business, they are the shareholders. We are the small boys, and we have our 'head' that we call the 'overseers'. We are the small boys and we must live by them and help them. [...] My boss back then had over fifteen small boys working for him. So I have done the same thing, start to develop [in order] to rule the business. So I am doing the business now with my own *bobo* [small boy] because I have already worked under them."[97]

In order to know longer be deemed a "small boy" or "*bobo*" a twenty-three year old cultivator who had just begun to grow cannabis with four other workers "under" a shareholder in Loko Fakay, suggested that "to be somebody you need training from the big ones".[98] The apprenticeship system was crucial in maintaining the shareholders' dominance, primarily because it restricted the opportunities newcomers had to utilise what Granovetter (1985) refers to as the strength of weak ties in accessing higher value cross-border exchange partners through the "links" of their chain work.

[97] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[98] Interview with Lahay Corrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 18/11/2013.

For youth who congregated inside *panbɔdi* [tin hut] youth bases, apprenticing was highly selective. It required permission from the shareholders who adjudicated whether they could be "drawn" in and granted their close guidance. For instance, a 27 year old farmer who had cultivated cannabis for two years "under" a boss having previously worked as a carpenter and a masoner after arriving in Waterloo in 2007 suggested: "He [his shareholder] knows the good ones and the bad ones, so he put me inside the game […] he told me to come inside".[99] Prospective apprentices reasoned that this was necessary, as only some possessed the acumen necessary to learn how to cultivate, including what inputs were required, how to value the quality and taste of cannabis, and how to establish relationships with buyers. This was confirmed by the shareholder of a farm nicknamed Sugar Loaf:

> "I am the leader. I am the force for work. When I work they see the example, and I tell them that by seeing this example it is their turn to take up the work. So when they go and work I am watching them. Any one mistake, I will correct it and tell them it is not the way to work – I direct it".[100]

A former apprentice turned journeyman who had recently begun to rent his own plot of land in You Must Grumble confirmed this:

> "In the bush we have leaders. When you first meet them they control you. If they see you want to work then you can brush [i.e. clear] the bush in that place […] no one will humbug [i.e. interfere] with you there."[101]

This journeyman had arrived in Waterloo searching for work as a carpenter in 2002 following Sierra Leone's civil conflict. He subsequently worked with 10 other young men for *Ɔsilibu* who, he suggested, had "taught me how to grow it" for at least three years. After his apprenticeship, he began to informally rent a small plot of land from *Ɔsilibu* in You Must Grumble. Another cultivator who arrived in Fula Town, Waterloo in 2005 aged eighteen claimed he too was taught how to grow cannabis under the eye of *Ɔsilibu* between 2006 and 2010, and now "grows for himself" in *Loko Fakay* where he rents a plot of land from another established cultivator.[102] The most competitive cultivators, such as *Ɔsilibu* and American, were therefore more central to this history of

[99] Interview with Gbrilla Manseray, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 30/10/2013.
[100] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.
[101] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.
[102] Interview with Lamine Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/09/2013.

shareholder-apprentice relations. Another youth who had previously cultivated in You Must Grumble explained the current organisation of production as follows:

> "*Ɔsilibu* was our 'chair' we called him 'chairman'. The shareholders are all chairmen inside the business. You have seen? They are the men that first cleared the ground here and made a camp. They will take thousands of kilos when they go abroad [*oba yanda*]. Like this December, they have signed up 300 kilo [...] it is going to Jamaica, because they respect it, because the ground is so rich [...] American is also a shareholder, alongside *Ɔsilibu*. Well now they started the business, inside that town [Hastings] when they met with Mr Iskandrie who knew Carrie B. They got hold of the skunk seed and planted it in Hastings, and then they went with it to Waterloo [...] They are all friends together inside the business [...] They [the shareholders] may want to sell a thousand kilos of *diamba* [cannabis *sativa*], so they ask American to give five hundred kilos [from *Obɔnoki* farm]. Then Izato [another shareholder] will say he has five hundred kilos, or maybe two hundred kilos, so you know then that they will blend it [...] wherever *Ɔsilibu* goes they are getting fine money. Say he gets one hundred tent [10 million Leones] he will pull [take] 20 tent and give the shareholders 80 tent between them".[103]

The dominance of shareholders stemmed from the first-mover advantages they secured in access to higher-value trading partners, first rights to land ownership, and their central position within an emerging network of shareholder-apprentice relations. In turn, apprenticeships were perceived to offer the prospect of securing land ownership, sustaining an income, and being respected as a skilled agriculturalist.

There was, however, no shared convention governing the duration of apprenticeship or how it was to be settled, especially given the illegality of cannabis farming prevented the formalisation of written codes and contracts.[104] This is often also the case for 'traditional apprenticeships' that provide vocational training in the Sahel and Francophone West Africa's informal economy, which as Walther (2008: 42, 45) concludes, are usually self-regulating and based on a 'moral commitment'. Furthermore, unlike apprenticeships elsewhere in West Africa, shareholders did not enter into either a verbal or written agreement with an apprentice's parents or guardians (Boehm 1995). Neither did they request a training fee, as has been 'unique' to apprenticeships in informal manufacturing

[103] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[104] Legal contracts regulating the obligations, duration, and settlement of apprenticeships in West African informal enterprises, such as in Senegal and Nigeria, are also rare, with a 'moral contract' agreed between master and apprentice or with the apprentice's family being more common (Walther 2000: 39, 42; Meagher 2011: 65-66).

clusters across West Africa (Velenchick 1995: 458). Neither was an apprentice selected on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Middleton et al 1993). Apprentices in Western Area were, however, of comparable age, between 16 and 18, and had completed some form of secondary education.[105] This is common under formalised apprenticeship training schemes, such as in Ghana (Monk et al 2008: 32). Usually apprentices began working for a shareholder after losing financial support for schooling from family members. In no cases was there a structured route of training or a standardized pedagogy for work. Neither, or course, did there exist a standardised qualification as proof of training. Instead, each shareholder taught their own particular method of cultivation. Furthermore, apprentices relied on the status of their shareholder and word-of-mouth to qualify their expertise.[106]

According to one-on-one interviews, each apprentice spent 3.2 years on average working for a shareholder. This is in line with the duration of product- and sector-specific apprenticeships involved in informal production across West Africa, which typically last between three-to-four years depending on the craft or occupation being undertaken, and the discretion of the master or madam (Bas 1989; Boehm 1997; Fluitman 1992; Hanson 2005: 168; Frazer 2006: 259; Monks et al 2008: 32; Walther 2008; Anoyke and Afrane 2014: 136). The majority of apprentices returned to school or took up work in the informal economy, and benefitted from no appreciable increase in earnings derived from skills training; in contrast to apprentices in the Ghanaian and Nigerian informal sectors (Mabawonku 1979; Frazer 2006; Monk et al 2008). Others have, however, suggested that exploitation arises from the overstated learning potential of apprenticeship (Ninsin 1991) and the reduced earnings accruing to apprentices with lower education levels when compared to other forms of training (Monks et al 2008: 30-31). Frazer (2006) suggests, furthermore, that for apprentice mechanics in Ghana, productivity was increased under a master but not when participating in other clusters of informal production. In Western Area, the shareholders engaged in exploitation by extracting cheap labour from apprentices and foreclosing their opportunities to become journeymen.

This exploitation also stemmed from the insecurity of land tenure. As Machonachie et al (2012) note in a study of peri-urban and urban agriculture in Freetown: 'cultivators

[105] This is in line with the Child Rights Act 2007, which stipulates the minimum age before entering apprenticeship is fifteen in both the formal and informal sectors.
[106] Walther (2000: 43) reports similar observations for apprentices working in Senegal's informal automative trade.

claimed that they were vulnerable to being exploited, particularly as land tenure arrangements were informal and not guided by well-defined laws or policies'. Hence, "Big Men" were increasingly sought in order to access land for rent. These unstable contracting arrangements are noted as being especially motivated by high working capital costs (Velenchik 1995), which problematically for masters, result in reduced productivity, depressed firm-level profits, and a higher non-completion rate (Berry 1985: 142; Fluitman 1992; Donkor 2011: 32-34).

Figure Two: Morphology of apprentice-shareholder networks involved in Hastings and Waterloo cannabis farming since 1985.



To demonstrate this, Figure Two is a network diagram describing the duration of relations between shareholders and their apprentices. Each arrow points to a shareholder under which an apprentice, both former and current, was trained. The thickness of each arrow indicates the duration of the apprenticeship, while the size of each node corresponds to the total annual turnover of each farmer. *Ɔsilibu*, who first established You Must Grumble in the late 1980s, trained four apprentices who have

since become shareholders (American, Mohammed, Michael, and BIG). These original apprenticeships lasted three years on average, whereas *Ɔsilibu* now trains at least 12 apprentices, albeit for only one year, often without being granted land to rent and the status of a journeyman. By contrast, the other less competitive shareholders typically trained fewer apprentices for longer, with a higher proportion being offered land on the farm to rent as a journeyman.

This resulted in an overall smaller proportion of journeymen, on average aged 31, who had typically continued working for between six-to-eight years, after being granted a plot of land on a shareholder's farm to rent. Only one journeyman went on to establish a farm independent of his shareholder. As is the case in other apprenticeships (see Monks et al 2008), this was due to prohibitively high capital requirements, but also because of delays in being granted a plot to cultivate in the peninsula's bush or not being afforded a shareholder's commitment to preventing police interference, as examined in Chapter Seven.

Apprenticeships were not regulated by written contracts or adjudicated by a higher authority. They were based instead on 'informal conventions' (Meagher 2011: 67). As noted by apprentices elsewhere in West Africa, this lack of formalisation opens opportunities for hierarchy and exploitation (Hanson 2005: 168), such as by terminating an apprenticeship before training is completed (Meagher 2011: 65). And yet, in spite of this uncertainty, the expectations of apprentices remained stable. Apprentices remained committed to their labour despite the uncertainties of not knowing when their skills would be recognised as having been mastered, whether they would achieve land ownership, or whether they would be afforded independent decision-making in marketing networks. Just as McCarthy's parish system stressed the virtues of ameliorating slave labour, the shareholders were not overtly coercive. Neither, as argued, did apprenticeship delay challenges by prospective rivals, for small-scale cash crop agriculture in West Africa generally does not benefit from economies of scale (Austin 2009: 33). Furthermore, apprenticeship was, in any case, reasonably motivated because youth had limited economic capital and therefore required shareholders to access the land, fertilisers, agricultural skills, and buyers necessary to increase returns and lower costs.

As argued, exploitation did arise from shareholders maintaining a high turnover of apprentices. And who, in turn, were left with little more than token payments in kind,

usually a "scale" [kilogram] of cannabis herb or 150,000 Leones (USD27), at the end of a five-to-six month season.[107] As I explain later, exploitation arguably also arose from the obligation of journeymen to pool production with shareholders, who determined the resulting distribution of profits, in exchange for permission to continue renting plots of land that were otherwise of unstable legal status. Although, unlike apprentices, journeymen were considered more knowledgeable cultivators, this arrangement with the shareholders mimicked the apprentice provisioning system of the early 1800s. Journeymen sold primarily through low-margin marketing networks, synonymous with Jamaica's *higglers*, and were unable to access higher-value cross-border exchange partners without being signaled by their respective shareholder. Such exploitation remained compatible with youth's expectations for economy autonomy, and in doing so, facilitated the reproduction of a production hierarchy in each shareholder's cluster of farms. Consequently, apprenticeship was responsible for reproducing structural advantages owing to pre-existing inequalities in claims to land ownership, and social capital and status, that institutionally-speaking were otherwise unstable

The inter-dependence between apprenticeship and small-scale agriculture resulted in the clustering of cannabis farms in Hastings and Waterloo on land ostensibly owned by a shareholder, whereby each apprentice was allocated a plot on which he undertook all tasks under the watchful eye of his boss. Or, alternatively, the farm was organised into one large plot on which apprentices periodically rotated to undertake specialised tasks, such as planting, watering and guarding the crop from thieves. Apprentices were paid after completing a season, usually with one kilogram of cannabis herb compressed into a cement bag or the equivalent sum in cash, usually Le150,000.

Shareholders also utilised journeymen who were judged to be fully trained, and who apprentices recognised to have mastered the necessary skills to grow cannabis of a high quality. Journeymen did not have the autonomy found in establishing their own cannabis farms. Instead, each paid a small rental fee in cash or cannabis herb to their respective shareholder and was required to supply cannabis for large bulk orders, usually to cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia. These contributions were exchanged for a fee determined by the shareholder. Unlike journeymen's role as the employees of master craftsmen in medieval craft guilds, they were in the majority of

[107] Meagher (2011: 65) notes that, due to economic pressures on Igbo masters, similar attempts were made to maximise the use of cheap apprentice labour in Nigerian informal production clusters. Monks et al (2008: 32) notes, however, that it is common for apprentices in Ghana to be paid either no wages or lower-than-market rates during their training.

cases permitted to sell surplus cannabis to youth bases in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown, and in doing so established recurring exchange relations. However, they were denied direct access to the more exclusive higher value markets, which continued to be controlled by the shareholders. Separately, it was uncommon for a journeyman to work as a caretaker for several shareholders at a time. This usually occurred when former journeymen who had invested their capital in pursuing other livelihoods, such as purchasing a motorcycle taxi, periodically returned to cannabis farming due to financial difficulties or the theft of their assets. For apprentices, all capital and returns were controlled by the shareholder much like in a simple tree structure for which 'any node has only one subordinate' (Martin 2009: 177, fn. 34). Unlike journeymen, then, apprentices were not competitors in the domestic market, as all investments and returns accrued to the shareholder.

Aware that my position within these fields of activity might alter my view of the power relations between different cultivators, I worked reflexively by moving between a more detached, 'objective' view of the field as elicited through surveys and network analysis and a more ethnographic examination of those from particular positions in the economic field of cultivation. As discussed in Chapter Three, a degree of detachment was necessary as part of a purposive sampling strategy that involved coordinating points of view from those at the bottom and top of these production hierarchies, in accordance with their situated lines of action, interpretation and reasoning.

For instance, one cultivator, who was 28 years old, became a journeymen having "learned the work" from his shareholder in Waterloo from 2008 until 2011. His shareholder, who had grown cannabis since the late 1990s, provided him with a small plot within a cluster of farms known as "Wanpala", a Krio term for wide, open area. After his boss passed away in 2012, the apprentice farmer gained an opportunity to "link" with a land owning associate of his boss in neighbouring Loko Fakay. Here, he rented a small plot of land comprising 150 cannabis *sativa* plants and gained the autonomy to produce and sell his own cannabis, for a small rental fee of one kilogram of cannabis each season.[108]

When the apprenticeship system is translated into the conceptual framework of Big Man networks (Utas 2012), the 'small-scale and semi-sovereign organizations' that characterised each production hierarchy are held to coordinate the market. This is

[108] Interview with Abdul-Rahman Sesay, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/09/2013.

argued to occur not on the basis of coercive 'control', but instead through mutual interests, usually the imperative to survive advanced within a shared moral framework. Although reference is made to structural power and power as something that can be 'invested' and 'possessed', how power actually plays out for those assumed to have mutual interests is not readily specified according to this conceptual approach. Furthermore, by following the network concept as used in organised crime studies, the coordination of illicit economic activity is usually explained according to the dualism of organised violence or inter-personal trust (Meagher 2009; Danielsson 2014).

In the institutional context of apprenticeship, then, a 'boss' is an arguably more useful concept for examining shareholders relations with apprentices and journeymen. In what follows, boss is used interchangeably with the emic term "shareholder" because it posits a useful baseline of what is necessary for a shareholder to command an apprentice. That is, aside from acting as a gatekeeper in access to land, higher-value exchange partners, and in possessing the authority to adjudicate an apprentice's level of skill. This clarification is necessary because relations were not based on overt coercion or violence. In contrast to the master-slave origins of apprenticeship in the West Indies that necessitated intimidation and force on the plantation, cultivators emphasised the need to "*no advantage am*" [do not take advantage] by refraining from physical force in their business dealings or against apprentices. Rather, it was necessary to "sensitise" a dependent to their wrongdoing through reasoned discussion. In the minimal definition, then, bosses are actors that exercise power *as if* they were a patron, without legitimate authority (in Weber's sense), but with recourse to various kinds of sanction, which included the termination of an apprenticeship without payment.

Big men differ because they rely on redistribution by gift-giving to retain their followers. Both conceptual figures do, however, rely on a slight of hand when maintaining access to resources, be these economic or symbolic. Big Men, for instance, must convince followers that gifts are the product of their own wealth, rather than obtained from Big Men elsewhere or by other illegitimate means. That is, if the shared moral framework with followers is to remain stable. Meanwhile, in the case of the shareholders, claims to land ownership must be defendable in the absence of legal authority or, for example, that they convey expert authority to adjudicate the mastery of agricultural skills. Given there is always the potential for these sleights of hand to be challenged, the term boss is preferred here because it accommodates recourse to sanctioning dependents in order to affirm an unstable claim and specifies control over access to capital. For shareholders,

this typically involved refusing to pay wages, delaying an apprentice's recognition as a journeyman, or forcing the apprentice to leave prematurely. This conception of boss-apprentice relations is in line with Martin (2009: 219), who argues that 'the 'boss' is an upstart who creates the inequality of relationships in a 'self-oriented' manner that, unlike a Big Man, assures they cannot have multiple followers in different networks at the same time'. Boss-apprentice relations therefore provide a conceptually accurate foundation for a qualitative examination of the hierarchies of cannabis production outlined above. This is mainly because they are more stable and less conditional (on redistribution) than those that characterise the Big Man networks of urban-based informal economies that are motivated more by consumption (see Utas 2012). Hence, using 'boss' acknowledges that shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo exercised power as if they were patrons; albeit based on social constructions of recognition and respect that, being unstable, required recourse to more material forms of sanction that asserted their control over access to economic and symbolic capital.

For instance, one perceptive apprentice commented that the uncertainty of final payment represented a form of social sanction: "because I am under a boss I don't know what he is going to pay me […] I think one million Leones for one season".[109] Likewise, the anxieties encountered when confronted with an increasing proliferation of rival self-declared shareholders were ironically summed by one shareholder who, in response to my forthcoming interview with a supposed associate, questioned rhetorically: "Who is this chairman? There are so many chairmen these days!"[110] These dynamics indicated that greater nuance exists in the conceptual overlap between patronage structures and what Utas (2012) refers to as 'Big Man networks'. This is especially given that shareholder's claims had to be accepted as legitimate by those whose secondary claims (the journeymen) depended on them for their continued veracity (Guyer 2007: 190; Martin 2009: 220-4).

Following Bourdieu (2005: 76), the analysis now builds on institutional and network approaches by departing from the strictly interactionist vision. This is because the interactionist vision brackets power relations within the momentary encounters between partners to an exchange who observe each other and react to attempts to alter each other's interest by means of establishing inter-personal trust or levying credible threats of sanction. Instead, a Bourdieuean approach utilises a 'structural vision'. A

[109] Interview with 'George I Will', Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/08/2013.
[110] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 20/11/2013.

structural vision accounts for how uneven distributions of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital have *structural effects* on interacting participants. Capitals are unequally accumulated by agents and work to foreshadow the interactions between them. The structural vision examines how the positions of each agent within a field of organised activity, each being endowed with varying levels and types of capital, are rendered congruent with their expectations in social action and interpretation. This alignment of objective position with subjective expectation occurs outside of but informs social interaction; the congruence being rooted in an agent's habitus. This approach to relational sociology, as the relations between objective positions and subjective expectations, provides an approach to understanding how apprentices, in the absence of enforced contracts, gain a degree of stability from the on-going reproduction of their practices. This requires beginning with the individual rather than the institution; with apprentice rather than apprenticeship. By shifting to Bourdieu's concept of economic field, it is possible to demonstrate how what the interactionist vision takes to be the creation of market structures necessary to limit market efficiencies such as asymmetric information (see Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 15-7) are more precisely practices through which a particular hierarchy is reproduced that is compatible with what participant's reason to be in their 'best' interest. The chapter now turns to the economic field as the beginning of an analysis regarding how the dominant position of shareholder's was reproduced through the system of apprenticeship.

4.7. Structural advantages in the economic field

At the conceptual level, the economic field is highly unequal with dominant players securing structural advantages according to the:

> 'Volume and structure of the capital the agent possesses in its different species [such that] the worse placed they are within this distribution, the more [the economic field] restricts the space of possibles open to them and their ability to challenge incumbents' (Bourdieu 2005: 75-6).

The economic field is relational in the sense that the action of one cultivator depends on the relative position occupied by another and the relations of force between them. Market dynamics do not result solely from recurrent acts of exchange: 'you have to add the impact of the structure of the field' (Swedberg 2011: 74). Relations within the economic field of cannabis cultivation are divided into two axes: i) the relations within

each farming cluster between shareholders, journeymen and apprentices (the primary field) and ii) the relations between journeymen and shareholders within competing clusters (the secondary field) that excludes apprentices who are directly subordinate to a shareholder and do not compete.

Struggles across the second axis play out according to non-price competition based on structural advantages in unequal access to non-economic capital. This includes the social capital accruing to relationships with cannabis dealers and middlemen; cultural capital in understanding how to cultivate and economically value cannabis; and juridical capital in access to protection from law-enforcement. The economic field is socially constructed and competition in the accumulation of these different species of capital entails indirect conflict, which is not 'oriented solely by conscious, explicit reference to direct competitors' (Bourdieu 2005: 82). Instead, as I examine in Chapter Six, certain ways of acting, reasoning, valuing and strategising formed structured sets of 'practices' that were tied to more and less dominant players. What cultivators recognised as rational behaviour was instead the product of 'specific social and economic conditions' and the relations with their shareholder when undertaking apprenticeship (*ibid*: 84).

The concepts of economic field and habitus are closely inter-related and enable an examination of the degree of congruence between the position occupied across the field and the expectations an agent perceives as being congruent with this position. Apprenticeships, what Bourdieu (2005: 87) refers to as a form of 'collective control', motivate reasonable rather than rational expectations. The concept of economic field therefore relates the analysis of production and marketing networks here, with the more ethnographic analysis in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. There I examine how the dispositions and practices of farmers are shaped by their particular history (primary habitus) and on-going relations with shareholders (secondary habitus), such that economic behaviour is the, 'product of previous experiences of similar situations' (*ibid*: 84). As one young apprentice explained:

> "They sensitised me [i.e. taught me] about all of the business, like how to differentiate the male and female buds […] If your boss cheats you, then you cannot complain too much, because you probably haven't done the hard work […] you must have the *intention* to do it".[111]

[111] Immanuel Lamey, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/08/2013.

It is important to recognise that, according to the economic field, what is practiced and recognised as rational strategy need not be rational from the 'objective' point of view of the researcher. It is necessary to account for how:

> 'The most consciously elaborated strategies can be implemented only within the limits and in the directions assigned to them by the structural constraints and by the practical or explicit knowledge-always unequally distributed-of those constraints.' (*ibid*: 76)

It is therefore the case that 'the dominant is the one that occupies a position in the structure such that the structure acts on its behalf' (*ibid*: 78; also see Swedberg 2011: 74-5). A relational concept of economic field breaks, furthermore, with the neoclassical privileging of methodological individualism. This treats price as the aggregate outcome of individual preferences, and economic action as a response to price. In terms of an economic field, oligopolistic competition arises not solely from the discriminatory price-setting practices of more established cultivators. Instead, as I flesh out in ethnographic detail in Chapter Six, the economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange operates according to the one-sided accumulation, convertibility and utilisation of different species of capital by dominant cultivators, rather than according to direct intervention in the market. The organised crime literature, by contrast, separated out what it deemed were problems of inefficient competition, such as asymmetric information, from social mechanisms that, as I go on to argue, have emerged precisely to protect and reproduce production hierarchies in small-scale agriculture. Strategies involving pretension and bluffing were unlikely to be successful for those at a structural disadvantage, as BIG in Sugar Loaf discovered, because the wider structure of the field had a limiting effect, both objectively and subjectively, on the possibility for the success of any individually articulated 'strategy'. For the dominant, however, strategies that appeared to be 'pure bluff', as I demonstrated in terms of their sleight of hand in access to land and their apprentices' refrains from cheating, represented forms of deference and deterrent against potential challengers (*ibid*: 80).

4.8. Conclusion: From economic field to apprentice habitus

In this chapter I argued that cannabis farming in Western Area was shaped by an institution of apprentice provisioning in the late-1700s to 1800s. This "civilising mission" conformed to the desire of abolitionists to transform recaptive slaves into industrious subjects, whose labour would undermine the slave trade through the legitimate commerce of small-scale agriculture. Apprenticeship was also instituted in the West Indies following the 1833 Abolition Act. This was based on the British master-slave contract and more punitive forms of force and intimidation, in contrast to Sierra Leone's earlier adoption of amelioration and the greater legal flexibility of indenture documents that put greater emphasis on mediation through inter-personal relations between master and apprentice. The basic institutional character of apprentice provisioning persisted into the 1900s, where it was closely inter-related with the maintenance of low-margin marketing networks during periods of economic depression. The traders in these markets were referred to as "higglers" in post-colonial Jamaica, and were consonant with the "chain work" being undertaken by cannabis cultivators in Sierra Leone who were responding to a period of painful economic structural adjustment.

A tier of cannabis farmers now referred to as "shareholders" capitalised on these small-scale agricultural production and marketing networks in the 1980s. These original farmers gained comparative advantages in first-rights to land ownership and exclusive access to high-value cross-border buyers. They also inherited a uniquely-valued seed variety (cannabis *sativa*) and cultivation techniques from newly-arrived Jamaican farmers that had fled the War on Drugs to settle in Hastings and Waterloo. Apprenticeship, I argued, was compatible with the spread of Rastafari ideas and values through Sierra Leone's emerging youth culture. This was because cannabis farming afforded the reasonable opportunity, unlike the "slave work" of upcountry rice farming, to independently accumulate capital, obtain security in land access and later ownership, and be treated with the respect of a skilled agriculturalist.

However, the basic institutional character of apprenticeship and the shareholders' first-mover advantages resulted in two modes of exploitation. First, the majority of apprentices were utilised as cheap labour, whereby apprenticeship terminated early or else the promised skills training did not translate into other opportunities or greater earnings. This was necessary because the low wages paid to apprentices would

otherwise have resulted in lower productivity and reduced firm-level profits. Second, the minority who became journeymen continued to rent small plots of land from the shareholders' farms, pool resources for large orders, and were confined to the lower-margin domestic market so as protecting shareholders from competition. I argued, therefore, that the shareholders authority, at first glance, resembled the conceptual figure of a 'boss'. This was because shareholders could resort to various forms of sanction, without escalating to the use of overt coercion or violence. Apprenticeships were, however, also informal and so not bound by written contracts or adjudicated by an impartial authority. This suggested that apprenticeship, much like on the West Indie's sugar plantations, was inherently unstable. It was therefore judged necessary to glean the motivations and commitments of the youth who participated in apprenticeship so as to examine why this institution continued to be reproduced.

The chapter suggested that a conceptual shift to a relational sociology was necessary for examining the reproduction of hierarchy without the direct intervention of a higher authority or reduction to ostensibly "mutual" interests or "shared" moral commitments (see Turner 1994). To this end, I turned away from an 'interactionist vision' towards the 'structural vision' provided by Bourdieu's concept of 'economic field'. This requires beginning with the agents participating in and reproducing institutions through their on-going activities, rather than with an institution's structure or static content. The economic field is socially constructed and involves the accumulation, convertibility and use of different types of economic and non-economic capitals through on-going sets of practices linked to an agent's more or less dominant position. Fields are stable when the objective position of an agent conforms to their subjective expectations. As I established in Chapter Two, habitus is not a straight-jacket, instead allowing a degree of provisional agency as it structures on-going action and interpretation. The field is analogous to a game, where the habitus is an intermediary between position and disposition.

I now proceed with an ethnographic examination of apprenticeship from the point of view of those participating in it. This is necessary because apprenticeship enabled the shareholders to exploit apprentices and journeymen, without compromising its basic institutional structure. In what follows, I link the economic field examined in this chapter with an ethnographic examination of apprenticeship as a site of social learning, and the resulting habitus that was generative of particular actions and dispositions motivating participation in, commitment to, and coordination of, this field of activity in the everyday life of apprentices and journeymen. This requires engaging with historical

and subjectivist modes of analysis to establish 'the conditions that shape the space of possible strategies' (Bourdieu 2005: 83). I argue that apprentice cultivators recognised particular forms of acting, reasoning and valuing as necessary for being recognised, as the shareholders put it, of "having the mind to do it" and to not be playing a "simple game". Apprenticeship represented a stable but informal institution; one in which the 'rules of the game' were being reproduced in favour of the shareholders.

Chapter Five: The Game

5.1. Introducing Apprentice Habitus: Neo-Evangelism, Rastafari and "the game"

Rather than "sitting idle" in Waterloo, Musa claimed that during the late 1990s he migrated back to his place of birth in Kambia District and honed the skills necessary to cultivate cannabis:

> "I went to observe the movement [...] I just left the house and abandoned everything without telling my parents; to find a way out, and live for myself as a man."[112]

Having acquired cannabis *sativa* seeds, Musa developed a small farm and after three years "started seeing the gain". Musa highlighted that agricultural opportunities under the ruling APC party were limited and pointed to the site of a collective farm owned by former President Siaka Stevens as evidence for growing inequalities in access to land and falling real incomes. Despite his gratitude for being trained as a communications engineer, he lamented the limited opportunities available following an end to civil conflict in the early 2000s:

> "This is what made me go back inside the game. So I could fight to stand on my own."

By the late 2000s, these shareholders had claimed first rights to land ownership and hired young men frequenting *panbɔdi* [tin hut] youth bases in Hastings and Waterloo. This process was selective and Musa claimed a prospective apprentice required the "intention" or the "mind to do it".

This chapter takes a phenomenological approach to economic action (Guillory 1997: 384; Martin 2011: 332-6, 344) in order to link the economic field to the apprentice habitus. It does so by examining the dispositions through which the shareholders sought to manage youths' expectations and inculcate the sense of requiredness described by Musa above. If the social structure of the cannabis economy worked to reproduce structural advantages enjoyed by a minority of so-called shareholders, then how were these structures being internalised and reproduced by those apprentices who were, as they put it, "going inside the game"? There is, as Martin (2011: 292) claims, something 'vaguely repellent' about using game metaphors to explain social action; children and

[112] Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/10/2013.

foolish adults play games, they have no 'real' stakes. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Four, apprentices were exploited through earning low or no wages, by the early termination of apprenticeship, inadequate skills training; and for journeymen, their exclusion in a low-margin domestic market and delayed rights to land ownership. In times of misfortune, apprentices and journeymen responded to the rhetorical phrase "*Aw fɔ du?*" [What can I do about?] with the refrain "*Yu mɔs bia am*" [You must bear it].[113] This chapter argues that an apparent contradiction between the uncertainty of apprenticeship in its potential for exploitation and the perception that it was a means of "finding your *own* lane in life" was what the apprentice habitus worked to resolve (cf. Christiansen et al 2006: 13).

Although youth in Sierra Leone typically treat patience as 'an ass' (Utas 2004), what apprentices referred to in agentic terms as "the game" was decidedly double-edged. I argue that there was a conflict between the patience and labour intensity required of apprentices and the expectancy of immediate gains resulting from a consumption-mediated youth culture. It was, therefore, necessary for the polymorphous ambitions of youth, as one established cultivator suggested, to be "pulled down" and aligned with representations the shareholders had of their social world. In *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu (2000: 202-5; also see 1977: 172, 176) refers to this subjective mediation of objectively exploitative labour relations as the 'twofold truth of labour'. Following this, I argue that the game is analogous to what Bourdieu calls an *illusio* (Chapter Two, 2.2.8; also see Utas 2014). According to this concept, economic action fails to account for how an actor's objective chances are rendered congruent with their subjective expectations in relation to a future, like that in the absence of apprentice contracting arrangements, which is unknown and yet-to-be realised (Bourdieu 2000: 213; see also Schackle 1990: 5-6; Guyer 2007b). It is, therefore, left to explain why youth expended time and energy working for shareholders, despite their uncertain prospects and vulnerability to exploitation.

To do this, I argue that cannabis farming was motivated by the *illusio* of what I term "righteous labour". The chapter examines how apprentices and journeymen expressed deference towards their shareholders, committed to the corporeal "strain" of labour, and remained patient in the expectation of delayed gains. Sierra Leonean youth are, as Blesdoe (1990) remarks, taught from an early age that there is 'no success without

[113] This phrase is analogous to the English colloquialism, 'you must deal with it'.

struggle'. This ethic is transposable to a range of contexts and situations, as Jackson (2008: 70) suggests of newly-migrated Sierra Leonean youth trying to make a living in Peckham, London:

> 'In Sierra Leone, suffering is seen as an unavoidable part of life. Though one imagines a better life, a fairer lot, one is taught to stoically accept the inevitability of hardship. What matters most is how one endures it.'

I argue that this particular ethic of economic conduct, what cultivators referred to as the "*sabi*" or "savvy" of their work, originates in a primary habitus that was maintained through a secondary habitus. In terms of the primary habitus, I identify 'broad cultural trait[s]' arising from a history of Protestant revivalist movments brought to Sierra Leone through missionary work. The core ethic of this movement continued to inform the contemporary beliefs and practices of my interlocutors, which I argue as being conducive to the institutional context of small-scale agriculture (Meagher 2009: 404).

Since the late 1700s, US-based Evangelical Protestantism and English evangelical groups that broke away from the Anglican Church have sought to combat society's ills through missionary work in sub-Saharan Africa.[114] For instance, following the Abolition of Slavery Act, the Millerites established the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, which advocated the use of educational training, religious instruction and development of small-agriculture agriculture through using apprenticeship in East and West Africa (Höschele 2007: 58-9, 61-4, 80-2). These missionaries preached the virtues of religious conversion and social advancement as achievable through 'education, skills and legitimate rather than illicit access to the power and resources of the state' (Meagher 2009: 400; Land 2015: 128-9).

In the contemporary context, a US-based charismatic movement originating in the 1960s and 1970s – often referred to as Neo-Pentecostalism – has spread to sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia, becoming the fastest growing denomination in Sierra

[114] 'Evangelist' signals the shared history of Protestant revivalist movements in England and America, with respect to the slave trade and abolition, and ethics of economic conduct that now underpin moral communities dedicated to accumulation through a range of activities, such as commercial farming (see. Robbins 2004: 119; Meagher 2009: 403-4). This is necessary given the institutional roots of apprenticeship in England's breakaway Anglican Evangelist movements, which are separate from, but also shaped by, the emergence of US-based Millerite/Adventist (since the mid-1800s) and Mormon/Christian Primitivist movements that spread through later missionary work in Sierra Leone, and were respectively formalised as the 'Seventh Day Adventists' and 'Latter Day Saints' movements.

Leone in the last four decades (Thompson 2013: 71).[115] Paul Glifford (2004) argues, for instance, that during the post-colonial period, this movement spurred the most significant ideological reformation in sub-Saharan Africa. A number of churches affiliated with Neo-Pentecostalism have been established in Sierra Leone, including, for example, the Flaming Bible Church and Assemblies of God. Separately, another significant contemporary influence on Sierra Leonean religiosity is the Seventh Day Adventist denomination, which originates from the Millenialist Protestant movement. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church differs in form, for example, by observing Saturday as the Sabbath and emphasising the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.

Despite these formal differences, the beliefs and practices of these two movements overlap in Sierra Leone because church members frequently change their religious identity and membership for a range of economic, moral and social reasons (Thompson 2013). To clarify, As Thompson (2013: 165-8, also see Land 2015: 128) explains using life histories of church members, common to Neo-Pentecostals and Adventists is that they have continued to provide youth with agricultural and educational scholarships after the war, resulting in a 'fluid overlapping of religious identities' (*ibid*: 3) with members sharing similar ethics of economic and social conduct. Particularly for youth, this has also resulted in a relaxation of many socially conservative standards typically commonly associated with Seventh-Day Adventism in the United States, including in relation to diet, entertainment and fashion.

To accommodate these overlaps while recognising their origin in nineteenth century Protestant revivalist movements, I use the term 'Neo-Evangelism' (see Woodberry and

[115] 'Pentecostalism' and 'Neo-Pentecostalism' are arguably stretched by some authors and should not encompass Protestant evangelical and revivalist movements that emerged in the late 1700s and early 1800s (e.g. see Austin-Broos 1987). To clarify, Pentecostalism refers to the Classical Pentecostalism that originated during the "Great Awakening" in largely American Methodist churches during the early 1900s. This doctrine emphasised voluntary conversion, sanctification, faith healing and Millerianism. The movement formalised around Spirit baptism, which included speaking in tongues, and has been imported elsewhere while maintaining the Full Gospel's 'basic shape': i) Jesus offers salvation, ii) Jesus heals, iii) Jesus baptises the Holy Spirit, iv) Jesus is born again (e.g. see Robbins 2004: 119-123 on the history and precision of terms). The Neo-Pentecostal movement (also referred to as the "Charismatic movement" e.g. see Thompson 2013: 71) subsequently emerged in the 1970s, albeit moderating strict moral asceticism, emphasising adherence to the Prosperity Gospel, relinquishing certain requirements such as speaking in tongues, and emphasising a personal rather than family commitment to Jesus – as implied by the term "born again". As Shaw (2007) suggests, Neo-Pentecostalism was not indigenous to Sierra Leone, but was imported, the most popular being a sub-branch known as 'spiritual warfare', which arrived during the ECOMOG military intervention in the 1990s. Unlike fundamentalists who emphasise doctrine, Pentecostals amphasise experience (Woodbury and Smith 1998: 29). In Sierra Leone, this movement places emphasis on spiritual warfare and healing against a demonic underworld (Robbins 2004: 121).

Smith 1998: 26-7).[116] 'Evangelism' points to the method of spreading Protestant gospel through education and preaching in a range of indigenous churches attended by my interlocutors since the 1980s in Sierra Leone. The prefix 'Neo-' highlights the everyday overlaps in belief and practice that now exist between contemporary Neo-Pentecostalism and Adventism in Sierra Leone.

This overlap of identity and relaxation of conservative values is important because, since the 1980s, Rastafari has also served, more specifically, as an ideological corrective for dislocated and unemployed youth seeking to make a living away from the paternalism of customary authorities (Savishinsky 1994). Despite usually being treated as unrelated phenomenon, Rastafari originated in Jamaica's Revival Zion movement that had 'grafted' West African religiosity, such as the Mayal, onto the principles of Christian Evangelism that were espoused by their masters in the transition from slavery to freedom through, for instance, the imposition of apprenticeship on the West Indies plantations (Austin-Broos 1987; Johnson-Hill 1996: 12; Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010). This resulting folk cosmology helped ameliorate oppression on the sugar plantations and organise resistance against colonial authorities (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 122-126).[117] I demonstrate that Rastafari also shaped youth culture in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown, during the 1980s, whereby the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), for instance, denounced the hypocrisy of the previous ruling elite through and called for a new more equitable society. This was because Rastafari strongly opposed state authorities, which they referred to as "Babylon". [118]

As discussed in Chapter Four (4.2), the Rastafari working in Jamaica's communes during the mid-to-late 1900s adopted small-scale provisioning and internal marketing systems utilised under the post-1833 imposition of apprenticeship (Mintz and Hall 1970). This was conducive to Rastafari principles, such as self-reliant enterprise in the pursuit of the

[116] Use of the term 'evangelist' signals the shared history of Protestant revivalist movements in England and America, with respect to the slave trade and abolition, and ethics of economic conduct that now underpin moral communities dedicated to personal accumulation through a range of activities, such as commercial farming (see. Robbins 2004: 119; Meagher 2009: 403-4). This is necessary given the institutional roots of apprenticeship in England's breakaway Anglican Evangelist movements, which are separate from, but also shaped by, the emergence of US-based Millerite/Adventist (since the mid-1800s) and Mormon/Christian Primitivist movements that spread through later missionary work in Sierra Leone, and were respectively formalised as the 'Seventh Day Adventists' and 'Latter Day Saints' movements.

[117] Rastafari suggest the movement was officially formalised following the coronation of Haile Salassie in November 1930, and his pronouncement as the rebirth of the Holy Spirit as reflected in the title 'Prince Ras Tafari' – meaning power over the Holy Trinity.

[118] This term probably originates from the missionary Adventist's suspicion of politics and organsied systems of control (Land 2015: 15).

ethic of "livity" [a lifestyle of living positively] (Johnson-Hill 1996: 14-17; Collins 2003: 69, fn. 54); the personal sovereignty underscoring the redemptive ethic of "I-in-I", and an emphasis on communal living implied in the value of "dread" (Johnson-Hill 1996: 12-15; Collins 2003: 51). These ethics of economic conduct were also conducive to organising cannabis production through apprenticing by shareholders in Western Area. For instance:

> 'A variety of self-reliant enterprises, including agriculture, fishing, wood-working, knitting, painting, printing, transport services [...] the growing marketing of ganja provides a critical source of income for many. The range and scope of these activities appear to reinforce the essential independence of amorphous small group yards and camps.' (Johnson-Hill 1996: 16-7)

Cannabis farming and consumption were, furthermore, deemed "ital" (meaning 'vital', 'natural') as part of an integrated lifestyle in harmony with the natural environment. Often citing Biblical scripture, such as Psalm 104:14,[119] the use of cannabis was justified as a basis for religious enlightenment, while farming and consumption were ritually practiced in an austere manner, 'sometimes bordering on [the] asceticism' of a Protestant industriousness (Land 2015: 189; Johnson-Hill 1996: 15). Therefore, these values organised cannabis production against a "slave mentality" that otherwise trapped workers in "Babylonian captivity".

Hence, I argue that Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism, while diverse in terms of their affiliated folk beliefs and practices, morally-accommodated cannabis farming, shaped youth culture, and maintained the ethics of personal accumulation, self-sufficiency and industriousness, in opposition to the greed, materialism and nepotism that were perceived to characterise "the system". Crucially, then, apprenticeship was consonant with a patient and stoic sensibility that was thought necessary to claim the status of a "righteous somebody". I argue that this ethic of righteousness was a leading factor in youth committing to apprenticeship as a legitimate means of securing masculine authority in a context otherwise characterised by scarcity.

I conclude the chapter by arguing this ethic was also unstable. To do so, I focus on an emerging secondary habitus, which was marked by the social figure of the "Five Star General". Referred to as a "*bluff bluff*" [deception], this was a strategy of deception that

[119] "He causeth the grass for the cattle, and herb for the service of man".

shareholders used to manage the conflicting expectations of their apprentices and journeymen. I demonstrate that, in spite of uncertainty and exploitation, the resulting secondary habitus remained congruent with an apprentice's position by imaginatively accommodating the expectation of "finding their *own* lane" in life (Weiss 2002; Newell 2012).

The chapter now proceeds by embedding cannabis farming in the political context of the Rastafari movement, as it emerged in Sierra Leone during the 1980s.

5.2. "Playing the game against the system": Rastafari and the incomplete NPRC revolution

Prospective apprentices awaited employment opportunities in one of the many *panbɔdi* [tin hut] youth bases in Hastings. Youth claimed that "Ganja HQ" comprised a group of houses and *panbɔdis* owned by a cadre of shareholders resident in an area known as 'Back Street'. At the centre of Back Street stood the Islex Entertainment Centre, recently built and funded with proceeds from cannabis cultivators that owned farms in areas colloquially referred to as "You Must Grumble" and "*Obɔnoki*". A young man regularly painted murals on the walls of Islex that were commissioned by these shareholders and dedicated to Reggae musicians such as Bob Marley, Burning Spear and Peter Tosh. Youth also proposed the inclusion of newer artists, such as "LAJ" and "Kao Denero", the symbolic figureheads for "*kliks*" [street gangs] known as the "Red Flag Movement" (or simply "RFM") and "Black Leo" respectively. The juxtaposition of these figures on the walls of Islex demonstrated a tension that had emerged over the last decade between two competing expectations of what it meant to be a cannabis cultivator. The patience, skill and righteous labour of the shareholder stood in contrast to youth's prospect of obtaining "fast money" to satisfy consumption-driven lifestyles.

The Rastafari culture invested in by the shareholders finds its origins in the 1970s, when Freetown was already well-integrated into flows of cultural goods from Jamaica, such as the reggae music of Bob Marley, Bunny Wailer, Burning Spear and Peter Tosh (Savishinsky 1994: 22; King 1999; Stasik 2012: 50, 55-6; Nuxoll 2015: 5, 10-11). For instance, the Rastafari Twelve Tribes of Sierra Leone, founded by Vernon Carrington's Twelve Tribes of Israel based in Kingston, Jamaica, was established in the late 1970s and comprised members, such as former Transport Minister Hindulo Trye. This young

vanguard was arguably responsible for establishing the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) coup of 1992 (Zylbersztayn 1995).

The message of the NPRC movement was rooted in Rastafari ideals and symbolised youths' struggle against "the system" of the ruling APC. This struggle was expressed through street art and youth culture in Freetown during the early 1990s. Opala (1994: 204-5, 209-10) argues, for instance, that Rastafari principles meaningfully shaped the message conveyed by proponents of the youthful NPRC revolution. Rural-to-urban migration also increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, ensuring many youth were no longer subject to indentured forms of labour and inequalities in access to land upheld by the patrimonial chieftaincy in their villages of birth. The militancy of the NPRC student movement grew following the student revolts in 1977 that were violently oppressed by the APC's Internal Security Unit. Although the organisation of the movement and motivations for the subsequent NPRC coup are contested, according to the dominant narrative, a disgruntled 'militariat' exploited growing youth unemployment, such that discussions between educated and unemployed youth who smoked cannabis together in Freetown's pôtes turned from 'muted discussions' to 'open talk about revolution' (Rashid 1999: 48, 69-72; see Richards 1996: 9; Abdullah 2005; Gberie 2005: 68). Bolten (2009: 359-61) provides evidence suggesting that rather than being led by a disgruntled militarily-led lumpen proletariat, the NPRC 'revolution' was 'planned well in advance' by former students who had already participated in the late 1970s revolts. In this vein, Rastafari ideology was being actively politicised in Hastings and Waterloo.

Following a *coup d'état* led by members of the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) against incumbent President Joseph Momoh in 1992, the shareholders of cannabis cultivation in Hastings' Back Street were temporarily drawn into the NPRC led by Captain Valentine Strasser. American, a former officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) prior to a second *coup d'état* led by Johnny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) – among other military officers – supported this claim, and highlighted that falling wages reinforced the close relationship between the NPRC, custom officials, police and the nascent trade in cannabis export that had been fostered since Momoh's crackdown on smuggling in 1987; and especially since a resurgence in RUF activity during 1994 (Keen 2005: 33, 116-7, 123-4, 129-130). As one former cultivator

concluded: "Much of the legacy in the game today is left by the NPRC boys [they represent] a lot of what is left now."[120]

Although the RUF in Sierra Leone's Eastern province also articulated an anti-government 'ideology', this was primarily expressed through the consumption of Western media, including figures such as Rambo and Tupac Shakur (Richards 1996; Utas and Jörgel 2008; Prestholdt 2008). The shareholders rejected this. They perceived the inclinations for obtaining "fast money" by deception, force and theft were a threat to the hard work, patience, and skill required to farm cannabis. For instance, one shareholder, nicknamed "BIG", explained that his nickname represented the opposition between East and West Coast hip-hop, the music of Tupac being synonymous with that of a young pretender against the "genuine" art of Notorious BIG.[121] The urban-based NPRC and their youthful supporters therefore espoused, at least prior to attempts to render military conscription more attractive (Keen 2005: 92-3), a moral rhetoric of anti-corruption and anti-nepotism in direct opposition to the system of Momoh's ruling APC. These same grievances were now being espoused against the perceived failings of President Ernest Bai Koroma's government (Shepler 2010: 629; Utas 2014).

For youth arriving in Waterloo and Hastings during the early 1980s, cannabis farming figured as a means of gaining economic autonomy and security in a context where structural adjustment was exacerbating inequalities in rural incomes and land ownership. The shareholders reasoned, for instance, that the system of apprenticing satiated grievances stemming from inequalities in access to land and resources that fuelled rebellion against customary authorities (Keen 2005: 9; Richards et al 2011; Peters and Richards 2011). Cannabis cultivation found an elective affinity with Rastafari ideology, such as the principle of "livity", which committed youth to "live positive" and productively in the pursuit of self-sufficiency and equality against corruption, greed and materialism (Zylbersztayn 1995: 19, 29; Meeks 2002: 166). By contrast, cannabis cultivation associated with the RUF was considered the work of "cow boys" ungoverned by any productive work ethic. As one shareholder suggested: "the rebels just sat around and did nothing" (also see Bolten 2009: 363).[122]

[120] Interview with Hindowa, former cannabis cultivator, Freetown, 09/12/13.
[121] Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 16/09/2013.
[122] Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013.

A former apprentice-turned-journeyman in Hastings demonstrated the emerging moral accommodation of cannabis farming when retelling the story of his escaping work as a look-out for a cartel nicknamed "After Twelve" in 1995. The cartel, based in Freetown's Lumley Street, sold "brown-brown" [the carbonised waste product of cocaine] and heroin:

> "Every day and night we were taking tablets to stay awake, because if you slept in Lumley Street then somebody [i.e. the police] would come and capture you. So I took tablets to stay awake, to look left and right, if you sleep the raiding squad will come, you must watch carefully."[123]

He concluded this work was "good for nothing" and referred to the ghettos in pejorative terms as having been established by "rebels":

> "Lumley Street is the centre of all drugs […] during the time when the rebels came out of the bush, when rebels came to Freetown, they founded it. The rebels founded it […] Ex-RUF run things here now, it was they used to smoke, to get speed, all of them go to Lumley Street […] but the shareholders they are not rebels, they are rich men, chairmen, and they are chairmen of the youth in Hastings."[124]

Moving from Freetown's illicit activities to cannabis farming in the peninsula hills was also understood as character-defining. One cultivator explained:

> "When I was at school I would smoke, so *raray* girl [rootless; sex worker] business. So I moved from school to not live a bad life anymore [...] The *tranga es* [young sufferer] that I am now, well I tell God thank you. I decided to set up my own business. Although I left school, I had learned a trade, and having started my business I was able to forget about many things [i.e. worries] in life [...] so the days of scum life are no more."[125]

Rastafari values heeded youth's aspirations and positioned cannabis farming as a more dignified and emancipatory means of making a living. A revolutionary vision to depart from the gerontocracy of chieftaincy and one-party statism was, therefore, not reducible to the terror of the RUF. Rather, anti-violent alternatives were expressed through a "One Love" Rastafari ideology that youth in Freetown increasingly conveyed through street

[123] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Freetown, 27/08/2013.
[124] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[125] Interview with Immanuel Vincent (alias, Balani), Cannabis Cultivator and Dealer, Freetown, 04/12/2013.

art, reggae music and cannabis smoking as pitching "the game" against "the system" (Opala 1994; Zylbersztayn 1995: 17-8; also see Johnson-Hill 1996: 18).

Frustrated with the RUF's success in capturing the strategic mining town of Koidu, a perceived failure to improve the conditions of frontline soldiers and manipulation of the military by ousted APC officials (Keen 2005: 107-8, 110), fractures began to grow within the NPRC. This resulted in the overthrow of Strasser by his deputy Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio in March 1996, and the transfer of executive power to elected President Tejan Kabbah and the SLPP. The invasion of Freetown by the RUF and blurred allegiances that characterized ex-SLA 'sobels' [soldiers-turned-rebels] comprising Johnny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that precipitated a further coup d'état in May 1997 ensured the rapid collapse of the cannabis economy. In the period after a successful operation by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces that returned Kabbah to power in March 1998, Ras Oray Simeon's Twelve Tribes of Israel stood accused of supporting the AFRC. Until signing of the Lomé peace agreement with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in July 1999 and disarmament of the RUF from December 1999 to 2001, the shareholders involvement in cannabis cultivation ceased. The advancing RUF and break-up of the NPRC forced the original shareholders to "scatter". Instead the RUF, *kamajors* and ECOMOG dominated cannabis production, with farmers forced to work under new "Big Men" during the mid-to-late 1990s. Two shareholders claimed that although the trade was publicly suppressed under Kabbah's government in 1998, it became more clandestine with smuggling routes monopolised by a small elite, namely Kabbah's son, who allegedly arranged cannabis smuggling to neighbouring Guinea for between Le600,000 to Le700,000 per scale [kilogram]. A combined AFRC/RUF junta regained control again in January 1999 but were subsequently forced out again by ECOMOG. Instead, the ECOMOG intervention resulted in the splintering of the Rastafari movement, as it launched revenge evictions and looted cannabis crops due to the perceived association of cannabis cultivators and Rastafari with the failed NPRC (Fofana 1998). As a current shareholder diffidently explained; in the aftermath: "everything [had] turned to dust".

Wartime production networks cannot, therefore, be conflated with the norms and practices that organised a productive pre-war trade in cannabis through indigenous production and marketing networks now referred to as "chain work". Despite its temporary demise, this history of Rastafari participation in cannabis farming and marketing provided a set of moral principles that has constituted the primary habitus of

the shareholders during the last decade. “The system” represented structural violence in exclusion from a waged, formal economy that was accessible only by ties of political patronage that served the interests of economic and political elites. “Playing the game”, by contrast, offered the self-enterprise, economic security and amicable working arrangements implied by the Rastafari values of “I-and-I”, “Ital” and “Livity”. The primary habitus of the shareholders cannot be collapsed into the category of ‘lumpen youth’ who are ‘prone to criminal behaviour, petty thefts, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline' (Abdullah 2004: 45). Rather, Rastafari influences on youth culture in the *panbɔdis* of Hastings, Waterloo, and Freetown underpinned the expectation that cannabis farming offered a reasonable prospect of achieving economic and social autonomy.

5.3. “Winning the race” in Back Street

Like most days I am sat with a group of young men inside one of three *panbɔdis* in Back Street, Hastings. This particular *panbɔdi* was known as Long Bench on account of the patience necessary while waiting for new opportunities to sell “*diamba*” [cannabis herb] after harvest and the large number of pushers who came to buy from the area. Usually wearing backpacks or shoulder satchels, the young men would circulate with each other, before removing small black plastic bags that roughly amounted to a “*quant*” [quarter kilogram] of cannabis and offering a sample to potential buyers. In hushed voices these youth discussed the “*grade*” [quality], arranged payment – either by bulk or instalment – and planned onward travel to markets in Freetown or, alternatively, if their shareholder offered the appropriate “link”, to cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia. After collecting money for “*haju*” [a ‘little something’ for the police] and transport from their respective boss, each would set off in turn on the back of *okadas* [motorcycle taxis] that pulled up periodically. One young man tries to reason with his old school friend visiting from Lumley, Freetown that Kao Denero, and his *klik* [group] of fans known as Black Leo are more ‘genuine’ than LAJ and his Red Flag Movement (alias, RFM). He suggests the RFM have only been successful because of their alleged financing by the ruling All People’s Congress party. Kao Denero was making “fake money” and the RFM represented another manifestation of the system: fast cars bought by illegitimate means and promiscuous sexual relationships.

I took the opportunity to ask what, exactly, youth meant when they referred to “the game”. For some it referred literally to cannabis herb, for others to matters of risk and

reward when avoiding law enforcement. Typically the term was synonymous with the risks and gambles of work undertaken in Lumley Street's cocaine and heroin cartels: "*yu no go sabi wetin yu gɛt pa(n) yu an*" [You never know if you will be paid]. "The game" was illegal and "the system" legal. The precariousness of earning a living in the game reinforced the perceived financial obligations that characterised relationships with women: "true love takes a long time, to have security […] to not have a bad heart" because "women bring bitter pain". Common, however, was articulation of "the game" in direct opposition to "the system". The latter denoted members of the ruling APC, businessmen in air conditioned offices, and Big Men responsible for organising commission-based work in the informal economies of "Swazi" and "Belgium" in Freetown. As the Chairman of the ruling APC suggested when responding to allegations of corruption during a radio interview: "I am a child of God, not a beast in the bush". In a different valance, the system denoted restricted social mobility. It had connotations with "tight" and "fixed" social practices that afforded "no movement" given the "road blocks" presented by bureaucracy, paper qualifications and need for influential referrals. An imagined geography contrasted the everyday life of Babylon "*oba yanda*" [over there] with that of Zion "*na ya*" [right here]. *Oba yanda* youth imagined they would face police harassment and their movement would be obstructed by "too many protocols" because "the system is too stiff" (also see Jackson 2008: 60). These young men claimed that "going inside the game" meant they were recognised and socially valued as "righteous sufferers". The deception, nepotism and trickery of the system, both at home and abroad, represented the antithesis of this pursuit. For youth cultivating cannabis in Hastings and Waterloo, the strain of hard labour was a sure way to escape the social moratorium ensured by their elders who deemed young men, as the chief of Hastings put it, to be "*alakie*": "those who don't have a better future". The labour of cannabis cultivation therefore offered the reasonable opportunity for these youth to "expose and go next level in life".

When we sat together on his porch, Harold would frequently tell Turkish that cannabis cultivation was for:

> "Righteous people [who] can stand on their own, when you are righteous you stand on your own […] You have two feet and two hands, so you must work for yourself, you cannot sit down and do nothing. [A] truthful man is a righteous man."

Harold was a mentor to Turkish, having taught him how to cultivate cannabis (and avoid the police) since 1999. Turkish claimed that:

> "My boss [Harold] knew me from school; he rehabilitated me inside the work. He showed me the dealers, how the money is coming, how to do the expenditure; how to pull money inside the business […] until, finally, we know how to do the business."[126]

Turkish's relationship with his father, who was a Local Unit Commander in the Sierra Leone Police, was increasingly fraught until his passing away. His perception of being disfavoured and not offered the "link" necessary to gain employment in the police force, unlike his two eldest brothers, motivated his increasing dependence on Harold. Having provided Turkish with a plot of land to use after the war, Harold suggested that he could now, "stand on his own". Like most young men, Turkish shared a desire to "win the race" and establish a stable "reference point" by buying land, building a house, and providing for his wife and young child. Without the aspiration to gain a reference point, Harold claimed that a youth was simply a "man with no faith". Harold first began cultivating cannabis the "local way" in 1978, but was subsequently taught new methods by two Jamaican cultivators in the mid-1980s nicknamed "Burning Spear" and "Tafaray". The good fortunes brought about by this history of "suffuration", Harold claimed, were now symbolised by the "vanity" of Islex, which he founded with other cultivators, including *Ɔsilibu*, American and Izato shortly after the war ended in 2001 "when this place was still bush".

Cultivators claimed that these "shareholders of the business" worked cooperatively to sponsor young men to cultivate and fulfil contracts with cross-border, and in some cases, international buyers. For the youth of Back Street these figures represented the "overseers of the business". Indeed, their houses resided side-by-side. Having claimed first rights to land ownership and established a cluster of farms known as "You Must Grumble", *Ɔsilibu* began establishing farms in Kambia, Kerry Town and Songo, while "Pastor" from the local Seventh-Day Adventist church sponsored a farm – that allegedly uses over 1,000 bags of fertiliser each year – in the village of Bat Kanu.[127] The vanity of Islex for these senior cultivators was indicative of excess, a privilege only for those who have already "won the race" but denied to those who had not. For shareholders, vanity was tempered by the imperatives of social recognition when engaged in an activity that was officially illegal. The route to winning the race was extended through a particular

[126] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[127] Interview with American, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 13/11/2013.

moral rhetoric; one that conferred recognition from the local community. Consequently, in late 2013, *Ɔsilibu* and American funded and oversaw the building of a market in the centre of Hastings, with consent from the town chief. In doing so they emphasised to Back Street's youth the importance of needing to "*mile*": to share what your wealth with those you consider your "brothers".

I first encountered the expectation of "winning the race" when Turkish took a free ride in his friend's taxi. A tower of Roots Reggae and East Coast Hip-hop music CDs, stylish clothes and car modifications were, for him, the products of having won the race. Musa from Waterloo, who in his mid-30s had three children and lived with his mother, would in similar fashion point to *Ɔsilibu*'s passing Four-By-Four and highlight his penchant for drinking Lambrini while watching Champion's League football as indications that he had already won the race. However, until one had laboured sufficiently during their apprenticeship it was necessary, as Turkish suggested: "to cut your coat according to your size, to live according to your level". While the mixed metaphor expressing this stoic virtue of hard work is as diverse as the geography it travels with (Jackson 2008: 70), most youth who perceived they were failing to win the race reasoned their misfortune resulted from the greed of the system in contrast to the righteousness of the game. For the young men of Long Bench, Harold, like the other shareholders, fell into the latter category, for they were respected as the leading "*Akuwa*" [Yoruba slang for cannabis shop].

The *panbɔdis* where youth congregated, such as *God Raw*, *Las Palmas* and *Pablo Base* in addition to more established youth bases with political affiliations such as *Homebase*, *Reggae Boys* and *Super* were located throughout Hastings and Waterloo.[128] They served as spaces of intense social activity where young men came to drink *pɔyo* [palm wine], smoke cannabis, talk about politics, relationships and sex, make arrangements to buy and sell cannabis or second-hand goods and most importantly, to stay close to their respective shareholders. The aesthetics of these bases were suggestive of an inclusive distancing, where youthful aspirations were spatialised according to an imagined geography of the Global North and a longing to be elsewhere (Ferguson 2006). Las Palmas, for example, was so named after the Spanish football club Las Palmas FC and

[128] Some youth bases were established by ex-combatants from the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and were affiliated with the ruling All People's Congress (APC) e.g. *Super* or opposition Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP) e.g. *Homebase*. Youth claimed *Super* was established by the APC to prevent *Homebase* mobilising youth and ex-combatants for political thuggery prior to the 2007 elections (see Christiansen and Utas 2008).

was the purported destination of former shareholders responsible for "controlling" their young apprentices at the base.

Rather than the projection of some distant or hard-to-reach future, however, the *panbɔdi* provided youth with 'points of orientation' that emplaced their aspirations within the present. Their need to congregate resulted precisely from the lack of opportunities and ontological insecurity that arises within a context of scarcity (Weiss 2002: 105-6; Hoffman 2007a). This spatialised aesthetic was closely linked with consumption practices that defined the means-and-ends of masculinity when opportunities for alternative productive activities are more-or-less foreclosed (Matlon 2015: 152). Discussions were shot-through with a tension between the stoic sensibility thought necessary when labouring as a cannabis cultivator, and the more short-termist and self-interested pursuit of consumption by their peers that glorified masculinity in a context where unemployment was a threat to their status. Whereas the consumption aesthetic was more malleable and accommodated multiple expectations and possibilities, production in the cannabis economy was limited to fewer, more hierarchically organised opportunities. Within the space of the *panbɔdi* social life entailed 'a process of constructing fragmented and often contradictory selves' (Hoffman 2007a: 405), but one that was policed by shareholders such as Harold who routinely challenged the attraction of consumption-driven activities and delegitimised them as merely the pursuit of "vanity". Youth-turned-apprentices therefore reasoned it was the case that:

> "The more effort you put into your work, the more appreciation you get back out of your work. This is sufferation work. That is how we operate here [...] to 'play the game' is to show you have learnt your skill, to be getting experience to get your daily survival."[129]

Consequently, as another apprentice suggested: "You are no longer a youth according to the way you struggle".[130]

However, these apprentices also perceived their shareholders were "always watching over them". In more private times and spaces would articulate this tension by comparing shareholders in terms of the material progress; measured in wages and

[129] Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.
[130] Interview with Arthur Kemokai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 26/09/2013.

access to land and new buyers. Turkish expressed to me his frustrations with working under Harold and his desire to join American's "crew". Youth, as a malleable social construction redefined based on the perception of an agent's relations to others, acted as a refrain from directly challenging the shareholders. Indeed, as Turkish's American dream seemed increasingly unlikely, he proceeded to denigrate his status, claiming American was "not too big" for he continued (so Turkish claimed) to live with his mother. To mediate the tension between stasis in the *panbɔdi* and rising expectations resulting from an imagined modernity inscribed in the art work and posters on its walls, the relationship between youth and their shareholders was maintained by the latter's recognition and respect for the virtue of hard work, carnal "strain" and stoic sacrifice perceived of their shareholders, which secured an apprentice's deference to authority.

Despite their periodic consternation, apprentices dealt with their frustrations by sharing in the social construction of an 'Other'. These apprentices typically drew on stereotypes that contrasted the righteous labour of their bosses in Hastings and Waterloo with that of Big Men in Freetown who, they claimed "had many fans, could buy what they want, and fuck who they wanted to", but had obtained their success by illicit means including deception, force and theft. For others the "bigness" of these men was reasoned to have resulted from the deception and trickery of demonic spirits. If a righteous somebody faced misfortune by failing to achieve the same earnings from one season to the next or, for example, their crop had spoiled, then misfortune was – following the discourse of Neo-Pentecostal 'spiritual warfare' – attributed to demonic spirits including the devil (see Shaw 1997, 2007: 71; Utas 2003: 103-7). For instance, an apprentice nicknamed "Atika" who finished his first season in May 2013, claimed that the lower-than-promised pay he received (Le150,000 not Le200,000) was the fault of the "bush devil eating money".

Turkish emulated his peers and lived in a *panbɔdi* with his wife, whom he married in 2012:

> "The shareholders inside the game didn't have any support; they struggled, struggled, struggled, until they could stand [on their own]. So now I must struggle, and in the end I will stand [too]."

Youth who had moved away from their parents, obtained ostensibly secure work, and held relatively well-established links with a person of perceived influence were capable

of obtaining the intermediary social status of "youth *man*". A shareholder's designation of his apprentices as youth men was a necessary compromise when young men's expectations were incongruent with their economic and social chances. Youth man was an in-between social category. It was occupied by those who had learned skills and had the productive potential to contribute to their elders and wider community, but who, like the shareholders before them, had to continue using their labour in the service of others before gaining their own economic and social autonomy.

5.4. Righteous labour

The compound status of youth man was a compromise for apprentices who expected to be self-enterprising but were still awaiting the chance to be journeymen. This intermediary category maintained a delicate balancing act that ensured the shareholder's system of apprenticing was not perceived as exploitative and akin to the "slave work" youth associated with upcountry farming. Apprentices regularly attended Neo-Pentecostal and Seventh-Day Adventist churches in Grafton, Hastings or Waterloo, and some were provided with educational scholarships after the war. One apprentice nicknamed Turkish, followed in his father's footsteps and joined the Seventh-Day Adventists in the early 2000s where he received a scholarship to attend secondary school.[131] The moral accommodation of cannabis provided by Rastafari folk religion was demonstrated by his satchel, which concealed wraps of compressed cannabis, yet also ensured he carried a copy of the Bible.

When probing discussions of what it meant to be a "youth" with cultivators, an Evangelist symbolism ran through their explanations.

> *So how does somebody 'come up' inside the business?*
> "You have to convince yourself inside the business every day. We have to do work until God sees us as the survivor, because God will bless us. He says, 'let me bless someone today!' He says it could be you, it could be me, or it could be someone else. You know, when God blesses you, you continue to pursue your mission. I continue to conjugate the

[131] Adventist missionaries arrived in Sierra Leone during the early 1900s and had established its headquarters in West Africa by 1914, and funded construction of Peninsula Secondary School, which the majority of educated cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo had attended, by the mid-1960s. Following the mission's departure as the RUF attacked Waterloo in December 1998, the Adventist church and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) returned and built a new church and hospital that are still in service.

fire, flaming, the fire flaming up, until the effort I have pursued has allowed the business to grow."

What do you mean when you say 'fire burning'?
"It is the fire burning in your heart. You have to become clean. You have to become clean and work uprightly."[132]

Another cultivator who had farmed cannabis since 1999 and since become a journeyman having learned from his shareholder three years prior to the onset of war in the late 1980s, frequently attended the Seventh-Day Adventist church after receiving a scholarship for agricultural skills training in 2001.[133] Given the 'black roots' of Neo-Evangelist churches in efforts to transcend racial division and claim solidarity in the face of colonial and economic oppression (Hollenweger 2004: 127-8), one theologist has observed its syncretisation with Rastafari, especially during the 1970s and 1980s in Jamaica when branches of Christian revivalism, such as Neo-Pentecostalism, was practiced as the predominant category of Christian denominations (Austin-Broos 1987: 2-4). The resulting folk religion was popular among the black, working classes of Jamaica, who were seeking to carve out an alternative collective consciousness during the 1970s against more middle class Christian revivalist movements. Having already spread from the United States, these branches of Neo-Evangelism were adopted throughout Jamaica, albeit now organised by 'small independent groups with no American affiliation at all' (*ibid*: 3).

Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari can, therefore, prove to be complementary in providing a respected theology and cultural flexibility, at least as they served to challenge the earlier Jamaican Revivalist movement. This folk religion articulated an ideology in opposition to colonialism, white dominance and the middle classes: they were 'complimentary opposites: complimentary but opposite ways to address some perennials of working class life' (*ibid*). Having adopted elements of Garveyism and Rastafari, this emerging working class cosmology did not racially discriminate and was readily identified with the poor and rootless in Jamaica, which includes cultivators migrating to Sierra Leone, such as Carrie B and Burning Spear. Mirroring the greed and corruption symbolised by Babylon, Neo-Evangelists are enjoined through a 'spirit of poverty' doctrine that Marshall-Fratani (1998: 282) refers to as 'morally-controlled materialism'. Labour was rendered spiritually fulfilling and meaningful.

[132] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[133] Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.

The folk religion that has resulted from the convergence between Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari in the daily lives of youth worked to ameliorate their dependency and paternalism, as Shilliam (2012: 341) notes:

> 'Many Rasta are skilled artisans and technicians, and the ethic of hard work is generally applauded. But not of the Protestant kind; waged work for unjust bosses, especially exploitative temporary contracts, is likened to slavery.'

This convergence resulted in an ethic of righteous labour. It opposed exploitative labour relations, such as tributary modes of production and pawning during slavery, and those of customary governance in rural provinces. The value of proselytization and ascetic moral guidance underpinning Neo-Evangelist religious practices, especially Neo-Pentecostal forms of spiritual warfare, attracted converts from displaced and dislocated backgrounds. This was especially the case for those who fled the RUF to resettle in Hastings and Waterloo during the late 1990s that were typically young, unemployed, had experienced traumatic violence, and who converts suggested lacked a sense of place and direction in life. In a study of Zimbabwe's Assembly of God Church, Maxwell (1998: 351-3; also see Meagher 2009: 402) has argued, for instance, that Neo-Pentecostalism represented a way of dealing with 'modernity's dominant values and institutions' such that 'this resocialisation makes the born-again believer more industrious and socially mobile than many of their unsaved neighbours'. Many apprentices claimed they were 'rehabilitated' through their work. As one apprentice who had migrated to Hastings from a rural province a year prior stated:

> "When I had found that boss [*ɔsilibu*], he made me righteous."[134]

Neo-Evangelism resonated with Rastafari principles that spurred the ecstatic NPRC student revolutions, albeit reduced to a more modest post-war vision of 'ecstatic escape' and ethics of productive activity (Robbins 2004: 124). For those newly proselytised Adventist and Pentecostals in Sierra Leone, economic success resulted from 'divine blessing' whereas those of outsiders, such as Freetown's Big Men, was attributed to demonic forces. Unlike the tendency in academic discourse to reduce the ethical basis of illegal activities to the anti-Weberian ethic of occult economies (Meagher 2009: 401), youth emphasised the righteousness of their work, which they recognised as illegal *vis-*

[134] Interview with Lamine Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 29/09/2013.

à-vis the state, yet socially-valuable and permissible within the wider community. This moral rhetoric allowed them to eschew the charge of their elders that they were resigned to a 'lumpen ideology' and lacked the 'discipline necessary to rebuild the economy' (Austin-Broos 1987: 16). Instead, apprenticeship fostered solidarity around a socially-valued and productive activity.

A number of folk idioms provided further evidence for this. Cultivators frequently referred to the bush in Hastings and Waterloo as Lion Mountain, due to the apparent resemblance of the peninsula upon the arrival of the first Portuguese colonial settlers. The most established cultivator in a cluster of farms known as "*Wanpala*" [wide, flat area] who had farmed cannabis for 25 years recounted the fable of "the king of the forest" – often retold to those working on neighbouring farms. Derived from a combination of Jamaican folklore and Rastafari animism, the Tiger (or, "Brer Lion" in this folk version) represented the antithesis of Anansi the Spider, a common totemic character in West African (principally Ghanaian) folklore:

> 'When Tiger whispers the trees listen, when Tiger is angry and cries out the trees tremble. But when Anansi whispers no-one listens, when he shouts everyone laughs.' (see Forsyth 1980: 67-8)

Whereas Anansi schemed and hustled, the Lion was honest and strived; emblematic of a righteous somebody. Medal, who used to cultivate cannabis until he left his shareholder and "gone next level" by becoming the "Youth Chairman" of Race Course Community in Freetown had a Lion tattooed on his bicep and a Lion on his belt buckle. American was often referred to in Hastings as "Lion's Raw" or alternatively as the "Hungry Lion" when harvests disappointed.

During the rule of the more conservative JLP in the 1980s the term "*bobo*" in Jamaica referred to someone who lacked mental alertness or cunning – somebody who was not productive (Forsyth 1980: 67). In Sierra Leone, *bobo* refers literally to a "small boy", somebody who is an unproductive that lacks the capital, self-enterprise or, as shareholders suggested, the "mission" necessary to contribute to society. Those who were unemployed or lacked skills and education were considered to be "idle" and therefore capable of criminal or other destructive behaviours. It was to this transition from *bobo* to the intermediary social category of "youth man" that shareholders qualified their apprentices' ethics of economic and social conduct. Whereas state

discrimination against the Rastafari tended to reduce participants in Jamaica's cannabis economy to a lumpen sub-culture, the Neo-Evangelist work ethic utilised in Sierra Leone under the Parish system of apprenticing provided the opportunity to be garnered respect and 'reshape[d] their aspirations no matter the predicament' (Shaw 2007: 70). This ethic was prevalent under apprenticeship in Sierra Leone during the 1970s, where Chuta and Liedholm (1976: 49, 51-3) in a survey of informal enterprises suggest that 90% of masters had previously been apprenticed but 71% had received no formal education. For instance, apprentices greeted each other as "*stɔna*" [hard working somebody] and bumped their fist into an upturned palm – a haptic clue of the social value that was qualified by apprenticeship in the absence of formal qualifications or significant economic capital.

In the absence of this productive ethic, apprentices reasoned they would be subject to a more degenerate social status:

> "The sufferation. There is sufferation presently because there is no finance, no money, and no school. Our families and ourselves have no money, so we [i.e. the youth] go in search of the money, to try and make our survival. So that is the problem. Money was not there for over nine years [during the civil war], there was no common food, no good clothes; there was no way of living. That is why we prefer to grow [cannabis], inside the business. We look at it as […] if we don't grow inside the business our families shall suffer […] a lot of youth are idle, there is a lot of struggle. There are many problems, so many problems. So [by cultivating cannabis] they have to heal. Those nails that are there, we have to heal them. When you grow inside the business, you have become clean."[135]

The emphasis placed here on the healing provided by apprenticeship stemmed from the Neo-Pentecostal spiritual warfare practice of 'forgetting' violence during the civil war. In the contemporary context, however, it mapped onto a folk cosmology that marked the potential of transitioning from a hopeless present to a productive future (Maxwell 1998; Robbins 2004: 126; Shaw 2007). As one journeyman similarly invoked in his need to become "clean":

[135] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

> "Some people always want to keep you behind. They'll say: 'Eh, where is Yusif? Ah, he isn't working, he isn't doing this, he isn't doing that. He is not clean; he always stays in the ghetto. Those are the people who don't want to let you grow."[136]

Rastafari principles were compatible with this transition from idleness to social value in productivity. For instance, although Zion represented the land of redeemed souls in contrast to the exploitation of labour bondage in Babylon, Rastafari emphasised the principle of '*livity*' [living positively]. According to the providence of H.I.M. as the personification of God, *livity* afforded 'profane endeavours' in Babylon towards 'sublime ends' in Zion (Shilliam 2012: 340). In doing so, Rastafari proffered a sense of agency that transcended the individual ego – of 'I-and-I' – and thereby 'incorporate[d] a collective personhood cultivated through the lived experience of suffering and a deepening relationship with the sublime'. This Rastafari exception meant for shareholders that some exploitation in apprenticing – the profane means – was justified, because this secured their apprentices better life chances and prevented them being subject to customary authorities; thereby allowing for sublime ends. Such pursuits had historically been articulated in opposition to the Colonial church under West Indies plantation slavery. External authorities, such as the colonial administration, could not grant these sublime ends, rather, they were to be realised through self-enterprise and toil. Hence, there is an affinity between "exposing" [i.e. expecting] oneself to a Western modernity yet-to-come and these Rasta principles. The ends, what shareholders conveyed as "vanity", were compatible with the profane means of apprenticeship, because their apprentices reached them by undertaking righteous labour. Hence, it was necessary to "*livicate*" [dedicate] oneself in achieving the task at hand (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 188). As Harold made clear to his apprentices, the trappings of vanity had to be earned, only after securing the stable "reference points" of a family, land and a house. These goals represented the durable "roots" of their righteous labour. Apprentices therefore perceived that by virtue of their righteous labour, it was permissible to reach Babylon. Babylon spatialised the expectations of an imagined life inside Western Europe or North America, quite literally in the posters, photographs and murals of the *panbɔdi*.

Turkish recounted his life history while sat inside *Pablo Base* as the August rains fell. Taking his time to smoke one sling and beginning to "meditate", he claimed that in the late 1990s he was able to "expose" by gaining a job as a warehouse worker for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Having obtained a "link" with "one Indian man",

[136] Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 17/10/2013.

Turkish worked at a Lumley Street cartel during the night but relieved the "pressure" – that "load in my head" – by providing cocaine and cannabis to the "white men". According to Rastafari the 'ritual ingestion of cannabis assists in the journey to discover the true self or I-n-I consciousness', providing an imaginative space in which to challenge hardship and oppression (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 188). Although it was not possible to corroborate the exact details, Turkish's retelling suggested fantasy professed a degree of realism that guided social practice in the here-and-now (Weiss 2002: 94-100), indicative of how youth deferred their pursuit of masculine authority while undertaking apprenticeship.

The relationship between these folk beliefs and the social status of youth is also apparent when interpreted according to a Neo-Evangelical aesthetic. In this view, loyalty to a "shareholder" is counter-balanced by the 'psychological payoff of promised benefits' to gain access to education, a legitimate job, and respect in the local community (McCauley 2013: 15). Given the uncertainties of contracting and potential for exploitation during apprenticeship, however, the credibility of these payoffs was delicate. For instance, during disagreements over payment, apprentices argued that their conditions were akin to "slave work". To take one example, when Musa supplied David with Medo to work as a "caretaker", Medo complained that David acted too much like a "Big Man" by allowing others to give him orders on his behalf: "it is slave work".

The apprentice habitus, being based on a folk cosmology of Rastafari and Neo-Evangelist ethics was not entirely stable. It was argued in Chapter Four that the conceptual figure of "boss" is useful here, given it accommodates recourse to various forms of sanction. However, this does not explain why youth invested in and committed to apprenticeship. Given that the lack of enforceable contracting arrangement rendered apprenticeship an uncertain endeavour, it remains to be addressed how apprentices' expectation of achieving the "vanity" of a consumption-oriented lifestyle were made congruent with their position in hierarchical labour relations that their shareholders permitted as necessarily 'profane' (Shilliam 2012: 336, 341-2). Moving forward, I begin to reconcile the primary habitus with a secondary habitus that emerged, not from a shared history of economic, political and religious experience, but rather, in the immediate relations between shareholders and their apprentices and journeymen. In the absence of enforceable contracting arrangements clarifying life chances, how did youth's expectation of self-enterprise and economic security square with the uncertainty of deferred gains and vulnerability to exploitation?

To answer this, I follow Weiss (2002: 98) who suggests in his study of young men and barbershops in Arusha, Tanzania that 'habitus requires imaginative activity if it is to be more than mindless repetition'. This was especially the case because youth hoped for a wide range of possible lives related to the globalisation of business, fashion, music, sport and so forth that were unlikely to be immediately reachable. In what follows, fantasy is treated as 'essential to the very definition of reality as it is perceived and encountered by youth' (Weiss 2002: 97). The chapter now turns to consider the ways in which the shareholders readjusted their young cultivators' expectations with reference to the social figure of the "Five Star General".

5.5. The Five Star General's "*bluff bluff*"

Having worked as an apprentice for three years and journeyman for two years in You Must Grumble, Mohammed – nicknamed "Moshie" – was now in his late twenties and responsible for several *'bobo dɛn'* [small boys] under his "control": "it's like a youth employment scheme", he suggested. Moshie emphasised when we first met that, because he was a Five Star General for youth in Waterloo, he had "left the game now". "Five Star Gen!" or "Five-O Gen!" was typical of how Moshie was greeted. He was respected as a "strong man" that "stood on his own". Moshie was also the recipient of an educational scholarship and agricultural skills training from the local Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Waterloo after the war in 2001. His investment of proceeds from cultivating cannabis into a kiosk selling electronics imported from Guinea; including smart phones, DVD players, and tablet PCs, meant that "they recognise you live for yourself now". Moshie's life was appealing to youth who respected his ability to move around, bind with others and make money. Sitting down with several other young men, Moshie resumed his favourite film, Third World Cop, and provided me with his usual running commentary:

> *Moshie leads me away from his electronics stall to a concealed space at the back of Malogie's second-hand clothes stall.* 'This is the formula we use to conceal this thing', *he tells me. Smoking one sling of diamba, he hits play on his portable DVD player and resumes 'Third World Cop'. The DVD case is emblazoned with the strapline: 'We Run Tings, Tings Nuh We Run', a slogan taken from Red Dragon's record of the same name during the heyday of live DJ'ing in dancehalls throughout Kingston in the 1980s. Set in Kingston, the film follows the lives of a police officer (Capone) returning to undercover duty, and his brother (nicknamed Ratty) who Moshie describes as a* 'criminal, thief and bad man' *that*

has been the member of a criminal gang run by Oney; a man dressed in a red suit and hat who Moshie refers to as a 'big man'*. Malogie, a younger cultivator, interrupts and jokingly shouts,* 'You're under arrest!' *before greeting Moshie as* 'Five-O Gen' *and joining us. Moshie says the* 'thieves' *are concealing drugs in local churches in preparation for a major drug deal*. *He points to Oley smoking a cigar and suggests,* 'he is a Big Man, he can eat, he can fuck, he can wear fine clothes'*; but warns me that if you have these characteristics you are a,* 'thief man' *and a* 'raray boy'[137] […] it is street life; smoke, move around, steal'*. As Capone confronts Oney at Kingston Harbour, Malogie suggests that Freetown's Water Quay is much the same and that, like Kingston, life is similar here:* 'Na fiba' [It is familiar/similar]*. Oney allays Capone's concerns and in the next scene orders a group of young men to transport the drugs to a waiting truck. Malogie nods as Moshie comments,* 'You always know who your boss is'*. The scene ends as Oney and his associates meet in a darkened room. He tears a page from the bible and uses it to wrap a joint of cannabis. Mohammed says he has torn the page of Psalm 23, and that he will,* 'have no fear now'.[138]

Moshie's commentary presented a contradictory moral rhetoric. While the young men who worked for him regularly perceived the police were Babylonians, Capone, the undercover detective, was revered for his fight against corruption and theft attributed to "Big Men" such as Oley who displayed their vanity: cigar smoking, sexual promiscuity and a "light finger" with money. And although youth their need to stoically commit to apprenticeship, they clung to the expectation that a life like Capone's was in reach. Indeed, many wanted to join the police. When questioning Moshie how the youth under his control "saw him", he suggested that:

> "Five Star is my cover near all the men in the streets. I take them as youth men and can sit down and talk to them. All of them, they understand it is not about anything bad, because they also don't wish to lead a bad life [so] they take me as the big one for them. I am able [to] control them. It makes them call me 'Five Star!"[139]

Moshie's emphasis on "cover", meaning to conceal or disguise, served two purposes. First, it was demonstrative of his need to deal with a tension between the vice of conspicuous consumption that attracted disdain from his peers and the police, and the expectations of his followers who wanted to be like him. The shareholders recognised the threat posed by these shorter-term, consumption-oriented expectations and

[137] *Raray boy* denotes a youth who is rootless or dislocated, be it from family and/or employment. It is generally used to disparage, albeit used more pejoratively than the term *bobo*, and from my observations a *raray* was a *bobo* that did not have an aim to strive for in life.
[138] Field notes, with Mohammed (alias, "Moshie") in Waterloo, 24/09/2013.
[139] Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/09/2013.

instructed their apprentices not be "boastful" or "advertise themselves" as this would attract undue attention and trouble. And yet when travelling with Musa, a shareholder in Loko Fakay, to meet his pusher at Race Course Community in Freetown, he would frequently change into a Nike branded red sweater, blue jeans and chromatic silver trainers in order to interact with high-value dealers.

Five Star Generals performed the expectation youth had to "expose and go next level" in different ways. Medal, who used to cultivate cannabis under a shareholder in Four Mile, but had since emerged as the Youth Coordinator for Race Course's self-proclaimed youth development project, arranged for me to meet other "high level" pushers in the area following Musa's visit. "I cover all the youth men here", he suggested. In discussions with youth, Medal employed what I termed "NGO Speak": "transparency", "empowerment", "equality", and "human rights". These rhetorical flourishes were used in his efforts to "sensitise" youth about the value of working together on one of his many alternative livelihood or community policing projects that were facilitated through his relationships with local government officials and NGO personnel (cf. Bolten 2012). Frequently the first thing youth would ask was the purpose of my "project" and proceed to request help in writing a project proposal or establishing contacts with expatriates better positioned to help. Ishmail (alias, "Issue"), a Five-Star General of *Las Palmas* youth base in Fulah Town, transformed his youth base into "Las Palmas Youth Organisation". He emphasised that the organisation was registered with the government (despite no supporting documentation) and was providing youth employment opportunities.

Given youth were subject to a delegitimising discourse that characterised them as lumpen and unproductive idlers, the Five Star General's *modus operandi* appeared to be a bluffing strategy that, in a context of material scarcity, enabled youth to 'draw back a little of the chance to exert collective representation and identity' (Jones 2011: 700). Despite flushing, Issue also regularly told stories of his attempts to secure a passport and visa with which to reach his extended family in the U.S. (and sometimes Western Europe) by claiming he could "*bluff bluff*" [to pass off, imitate] a living abroad. While Moshie and Medal's admission that they "covered" their apprentices served realism to the fantasy that they could "run things" too, the *bluff bluff* recognised the limits of these fantasies. This was because the Five Star Generals usually journeyman who continued to depend on the shareholders for land access and remained trapped in a low-margin domestic market in lieu of being introduced to cross-border buyers. Yet, they realised that to succeed by controlling new apprentices of their own, it was necessary to

maintain the façade of material progress through self-enterprise. To bluff, as Newell (2012: 38, emphasis added) explains 'require[s] a symbolic mastery of culture from which [youth are] excluded' and that presents youth with 'a proof of *potential* membership'. As Moshie's opportunity for introspection during interview revealed, the *bluff bluff* was, quite literally, a double bluff. This was because journeyman recognised the deceit of their self-representation as Five Star Generals; especially given that repetition in Krio is to place emphasise on, to exaggerate a claim. Although he initially claimed to have left the game, Moshie later confided that:

> "I am thirty years old now. I don't have anything. I don't have [a] house, I rent. I don't have a fixed site [i.e. permanent place to stay]. I am still in the suffering mode. [But] I still tell god thank you, because I decide that I have found myself, so there is no other thing to do next."[140]

The *bluff* operated according to a 'process of subjectification through which [] young men deploy[ed] their own subjugation […] as a means of overcoming marginalization' (Weiss 2002: 105). Yet, when doubled, the *bluff bluff* denoted a, 'labour of social mourning, *that does not say its* name' (Wacqaunt 1999: 156). The symbolic mastery of the Five Star General lay in his ability to 'manipulate others, to inveigle and deceive them', in order to qualify of the apprentices they required in their own pursuit of economic and social autonomy (*ibid*: 142-3). The ambition to become a Five Star General proved attractive to young men migrating to Freetown and its environs from the "boredom" of the provinces who imagined they might be able to progress, in materialistic terms, under the guidance of skilled master. Journeymen comprised a growing cadre of these social figures. This betrayed being stuck in a liminal position. Journeymen were not yet capable of becoming shareholders, but they required apprentices of their own in order to reduce labour costs and garner respect. Therefore, Moshie asserted he needed:

> "To pull them down and sensitise them […] the faith, be patient. With that patience you survive. You are able to bear and maintain, and in the long run you will be a better somebody."[141]

These efforts to accommodate the impatience of apprentices responded to a tension between the ethics and guidance of shareholders based on a Rastafari-Evangelical folk

[140] Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/11/2013.
[141] Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/11/2013.

cosmology, against an urban youth culture premised on multivalent expectations and material gains.

The stakes of the economic field therefore needed to be reshaped by aspiring journeymen in the image of contemporary youth culture, if they were to succeed. This tacit complicity, as Bourdieu suggests, is necessary, because the desires of youth outstripped the available means to achieve them. Such aspirations represented a threat to their collective sense of belonging inside *the* game, as a singular organised striving for (see Martin 2011: 248-254). Youths' aspirations needed to be "sensitised" to those congruent with apprenticeship.

One apprentice's earlier invocation of the system to contrast the illegitimate success of the RFM with the genuine success of Black Leo provides further evidence of how these desires were being moderated. The "contradiction here" as one former journeyman suggested:

> "Is that they will tell you that they are Rastafarians, [that] they believe in equal rights, justice for all, that's what they're preaching that the government shouldn't steal money. They will listen to those Jamaican lyrics. That's what they preach; they go by the Jamaican's. Those are the kinds of messages they'll say. *But their life does not actually depict the message they talk*."[142]

Youth is a socially constructed generational category, but one open to being reshaped by those trying to forge a better life and 'escape' conditions of hardship and inequality (Christiansen et al 2006). Yet this category was also used as a political tool for those in more dominant positions to control certain expectations and social distinctions, and thereby ensure those beneath them acquiesced to their interests. The "fearness" of the Five Star General striving against the system reduced the social distance despite apprentices being exploited and not being granted certainty in future gains. Moshie's lesson to his "youth men" was found in its suffix "man". To play the game required validation by those already committed to righteous labour, and who therefore had the authority to assume the paradoxical status of youth-yet-man, rather than a mere *bobo*. By being apprenticed, then, youth could evade the charge of being an unproductive idler and the dependency, emasculation and paternalism they claimed to experience under alternative labour arrangements.

[142] Interview with Hindowa, former Cannabis Cultivator, Freetown, 09/12/2013.

5.6. Conclusion: The *illusio* of righteous labour

During a visit to an established cultivator's farm in Loko Fakay, one of his *bobos* nicknamed "*Ayo Pack*", after Tu Pac Skakur, had a habit of telling me how he would get into fights at school. Ayo Pack took pride in the "*tɛn"* [a street colloquialism for "*chuk*", meaning stab wound or cut] that was beginning to heal on his bicep: "it makes people think that you are a gangster". His shareholder would, however, interject, claiming that his were not *real* scars; at least not like those he and his peers bore. Ayo Pack had the scars of a "*raray boy*" [rootless, displaced], of somebody who lacked a commitment to hard work and who did not possess the mind or the intention to contribute to the wealth of his brothers. While youth imagined they had the reasonable opportunity to run things here as the narrative of Capone and Oloney in the movie *Third World Cop* suggested, a secondary habitus adjudicated their opportunities for accessing economic and social capital. These readjusted dispositions ensured the more polymorphous, consumption-oriented expectations of youth were "pulled down" and rendered congruent with the objective chances they had of progressing within hierarchically-organised labour relations. The symbolism of cannabis wrapped in Psalm 23 was indicative of the aesthetic appeal that the chance to be recognised as a youth man offered, for:

> "The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want […] He restoreth my soul: he leadeth me in the paths of *righteousness* for his name's sake."

The compound status of "youth man" suggests that habitus does not entail mindless repetition, as Bourdieu (2000: 161) also argues. Instead, this intermediary socio-generational category accommodates individual idiosyncrasies and the manifold expectations that young men undertaking cannabis farming sought to achieve. This was illustrated by apprentice's and journeymen's desire to "expose" [to reach for, claim] themselves to a modernity-in-waiting, a fantasy of what was yet-to-come. And yet Ayo Pack's attempts to assert his masculine authority through the youth culture of a younger generation were routinely denied. This mechanism of control through accommodation was analogous to the social figure of the Five Star General, who worked to discourage the broader horizons of those who had not sufficiently undertaken their apprenticeship and could therefore not yet be recognised as being "inside the game". The well-timed trivialisations and dismissive remarks of the shareholders therefore functioned as 'calls to order' that were directed at their new apprentices and ensured the 'social manipulation of [their] aspirations' (Bourdieu 2000: 217-8). Shareholders turned the

tables on what it took to reach adulthood by introducing the status of youth man, a paradoxical compound whose suffix qualified the means necessary – apprenticeship – to command masculine authority. These young men inhabited a:

> 'Signposted universe, full of injunctions, and prohibitions, signs of appropriation and exclusion, obligatory routes or impassable barriers, and, in a word, profoundly differentiated, especially according to which [the field] offers stable chances, capable of fulfilling and sustaining stable expectations.' (*ibid*: 225)

Rarely do we observe fields of activity in which subjective expectations indicating where an agent would like to be are congruent with their objective chances of fulfilling that expectation in the here-and-now (Shackle 1990: 48-9). Incongruences between expectations and chances result in what Bourdieu refers to as hysteresis (Chapter Two, 2.7.3). As the transitory status of youth man suggests, hysteresis represents a time lag in which positions and dispositions are not yet congruent, but rather, indicative of a field yet-to-come. When dispositions were at odds with the more circumscribed positons of the economic field, apprenticeship stepped in as a 'collective control' and reaffirmed the link between habitus and field (Bourdieu 2005: 87). For instance, journeymen seeking to become shareholders were shown to moderate the expectations of their prospective apprentices by inventing new social figures that were congruent with their youth culture. This was necessary to begin "sensitising" youth to a more ascetic moral code forged in the confluence of Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari that valued the productivity and righteousness of their "strain".

The term righteous proceeds from an Old English etymology, 'right wise' (way & manner) and is synonymous, as D'Angelo (2015a: 10) argues in relation to the ethics of Sierra Leone's alluvial miners, with 'rectitude': the state or quality of having a constant direction. To have direction meant to have faith (and faith implies patience), to invest in a particular kind of practical activity. For one self-proclaimed Five Star General, to be righteous meant to partake in "civilised business […] but you must have the mind to do it". Shareholders reasoned that the problem with young men was their lack of commitment and preference to pursue more polymorphous and unrealistic ambitions:

> "All men have a different mind. All men are of a different mind. That is the problem."[143]

[143] Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/10/2013.

Apprentices reasoned it was therefore necessary to:

> "Come up by working hard, by having a good plan. You have to collect all the ideas [and] focus on what you want to do […] The more effort you put into your work the more appreciation you get back."[144]

Righteousness implied judgement. It was the sense of requiredness and validation experienced by apprentice cultivators that impelled investments of 'time, money and work in a given field, it is what [made] agents get together, compete and struggle with each other' (Bourdieu 1990: 88). The apprentice habitus was well-suited to dissimulating what would otherwise be more readily recognisable as the "slave work" of blunt, economic self-interest (see Guillory 1997: 384; Bourdieu 2005: 86-7). As Bourdieu (2005: 80) argues, while the 'strategies' of dominant players 'may be pure bluff' it is the case that 'their symbolic capital renders [them] credible and hence effective'.

By following the concept of *illusio* I argued that there was an extra-economic profit to be gained (the social worth of being recognised as a youth man) and the avoidance of some threat to social being (emasculation as a mere *bobo*) that:

> 'Binds them to [labour] through the freedoms […] that are left to them, and under the effect born of the competition of differences […] that are constitutive of the occupational space functioning as a field […] Thus, what is apparently most 'subjective' and 'personal' is an integral part of the reality that analysis has to account for in each case.' (Bourdieu 2000: 203-4)

A stoic commitment to work hard under the guidance of shareholders was, therefore, necessary to avoid the "shit" that resulted from their inability to demonstrate the productivity of their labour in providing for the community and their elders. Yet the double truth, or the *bluff bluff*, was that while apprenticeship provided social worth, respect and the avoidance of stigma, those in dominant positions recognised that the expectations youth men had to claim social adulthood by securing land ownership and financial self-sufficiency needed to be deferred, if not achieved at all. It was precisely the *mis*recognition of this uncertain forthcoming which secured a 'subjective experience

[144] Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.

that induce[d] the hard work that was the foundation of their labour' (Burwaoy 2012: 188).

Unlike the concept of interest in more formalist economic theory that confines subjectivity to the immediacy of a 'field of expectation' (Schackle 1990), the *illusio* of righteous labour was a captivating forth-coming. It marked out the reasonable prospect of owning land, building a house, and providing for children and elders; an essential characteristic in the process of becoming adult. These expectations, if not explicitly articulated and clung to, were nevertheless 'already present in the immediate present and not constituted as future', for it is the work of habitus that it 'combines in a single aim' – finding your *own lane* – 'a past and a forth-coming, neither of which is posited as such' (Bourdieu 2000: 210). Despite the absence of contracting arrangements and potential for exploitation suggesting a more unpredictable future, the apprentice habitus ensured a degree of congruence between subjective expectations and objective chances. Apprenticeship "opened a lane" to self-sufficiency in the mind of the apprentice, but this was indicative of a habitus that had emerged precisely to reduce the uncertainty of deferred gains, possible termination, and potential exploitation in receiving low or wages, or remaining subject to the low margins of the domestic exchange market. In short, apprenticeship ensured youth men were able to 'work for the uncertain' (*ibid*: 216).

Chapter Six: Apprenticeship

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter argued that apprenticeships were undertaken in the expectation of being respected as a "youth man". Since being utilised by the Evangelical Parish System in the late 1700s, the basic institutional structure of apprenticeship remained intact and organised labour relations in cannabis farming. These apprenticeships provided young men with social worth as skilled agriculturalists and presented the reasonable opportunity for self-enterprise necessary to reach social adulthood.

This chapter now turns to examine how apprenticeship facilitated collective learning by doing. This resulted in apprentices acquiring and reproducing practices that guided their adjudication of "links" with exchange partners, of how to value cannabis, and the forms of interaction that were permissible while working under their shareholders. Cannabis farmers reasoned that apprenticeship endowed them with 'knowledge, skills [and] competence', and a practical sense of how others operated and how they too should operate (Guillory 1997: 381-2; see also Bourdieu 1998a: 25; Wacquant 2014a, 2014b: 126). By undertaking apprenticeships it was possible to acquire "skills" and "ideas" that qualified their status as youth men, rather than underproductive idlers (cf. Wacquant 2004: 60; Bourdieu 2006: 176-7). Apprenticeship marked inclusion within a socially respected and valued group. By consequence, apprentice cultivators emphasised that they needed to learn cultivation in order to acquire the skills necessary to succeed when "going inside the game".

The chapter examines how farmers and dealers enacted and interpreted two specific emic practices – "*sababu*" and "*grade*" – that were perceived as being required and were validated by others. The chapter argues that *sababu* represented an imperative in a context of scarcity for establishing relationships with a person in a position of influence who provided access to opportunities otherwise foreclosed. Journeymen, for instance, reasoned that these relationships were compulsory for gaining access to economic capital. I argue, however, that this practice also minimised a sense of dependency – and even betrayal – by offering them the reasonable expectation of reciprocation and progress, even if this was unlikely to be borne out in practice.

Furthermore, I argue that when negotiating the *grade* [quality] of cannabis, apprentices and journeymen conformed with rigid categories of valuation closely related to their disadvantaged positions. This is contrary to price responsiveness that treats exchange as equal and resting on the negotiation of a 'fair' price. By drawing on the economic anthropology literature (Graeber 2001; Guyer 2004, 2012; Berry 2007), I treat value as a social construction and as a process of valuation adjudicated from unequal positions. This approach compliments Bourdieu's concepts of objectified and embodied cultural capital in terms of how objects (cannabis herb) and relationships (with exchange partners) are perceived and valued in an economic field. Dominant players adjudicated *sababu*; it was not as opportunistic or spontaneous as they claimed. It therefore represented a useful moral rhetoric that had functional importance in terms of regulating access to high-value buyers and land. The chapter concludes that, by virtue of securing youths' misrecognition, these practices governed their ability to accumulate economic capital and prevented journeymen gaining a competitive advantage over shareholders.

6.2. Learning the game

I walked with Musa along the winding copper-orange tracks to his cannabis farm in Loko Fakay, an area of bush he cleared and named after an old Krio village. We passed a checkpoint manned by three RSLAF soldiers protecting land owned by the military training school from being encroached by rapid urbanisation. "They are here to stop trouble and confusion […] they are inside the game, don't worry about that", he claimed. Musa tells me he controls two young men nicknamed Ayo Pack and Lamine (alias, Lamtɛk) who are apprenticed in order to "*sabi* the game". "Be honest to yourself" was carved into a rock marking the boundary with another farming plot. The work is physical. Musa helps the young men lift large yellow jerry cans of water from a nearby river and dispenses them daily across 200 dug out holes. He itemises the cultivation process in meticulous detail, from the timing between planting "*nɔsri*" [nursery garden]; to the quantities of fertiliser, chicken dung, and fish *kanda* [peel/skin] required for cultivating a "*fayn*" [high quality] crop; to the planning of seasonal crop rotations. Ayo Pack and *Lamtɛk* remained on the farm for at least six months until the December harvest, during which they slept in small, make-shift wooden huts to keep watch over the farm at night. When Musa pointed to his eye and asked if I could "see the work now", he was referring both to his perceived unique skills, while also searching for an indication that I appreciated the strain and patience his labour required. Their labouring

practices were indicative of an ascetic commitment; one resulting in the acquisition of superior skills that qualified their status as youth men.

Ayo Pack and *Lamtɛk* claimed they were fortunate to have been "drawn" into cannabis cultivation. The opportunity to be apprenticed marked inclusion in a social group that valued each other's expertise and was set apart from unproductive and lazy youth synonymous with the common idiom that "an idle mind is the devil's workshop". For those who congregated inside the *panbɔdis* of Hastings and Waterloo, the process of being apprenticed was selective. Shareholders claimed they would sit with youth at bases such as *Las Palmas* and *God Raw* to talk with them and see if, as one cultivator suggested, they had the "sense" or "the mind to do it". One journeyman qualified what it meant to be a youth man by asserting that "we only share our work with those who *sabi* it".[145] The Krio term "*sabi*" shares a linguistic affinity with the English term 'savvy' denoting the shrewdness and practical knowledge of domesticated slaves turned graduated apprentices during the early 1800s. The term was likely transferred by Portugese traders, likely originating from the Portugese word 'saber' meaning 'to know'. It also shares the same Latin root, "sapere", meaning to be wise or knowing (Ndemanu 2015: 25). In Krio street vernacular, this referenced noun and verb interchangeably, as something to be learned and as a knowledge that was possessed (i.e. being recognised as savvy). It therefore pointed to a concept, fact or value; the content of which had already been agreed upon and that agriculturalists felt obligated to pass on. Youth also commented, for instance, that you must "*Gɛt di idea*" [Have the idea] otherwise you experience "idea loss". A former apprentice-turned-journeyman explained that:

> "When you labour for them [i.e. your shareholder] you get a small change in your head […] when he teaches you, you are happy, so you won't go and make a *palava* [a public disagreement], you avoid it."[146]

One shareholder who was granted land by a former boss in an area colloquially referred to as You Must Grumble, explained that he now apprenticed three young men:

> "I am the leader. I am the force for work. When I work they see the example, and I say that by seeing this example now it is your turn to take the work. So when they go and work I am watching them. Any one mistake, I will correct it and tell them it is not the

[145] Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.
[146] Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 17/10/2013.

way to work – I direct it. It is to let them *understand* […] Of the workmen I had before [last season] they all *understand* the game now."[147]

Apprenticeship was not limited to acquiring technical skills: how to groom, when to water, what inputs to use and how to assess the quality of the *diamba* [cannabis herb]. Life histories demonstrated that by gaining an "idea" or "mission" to earn an income it was possible to reclaim masculine authority in a pre- and post-war context of chronic unemployment and limited opportunities for production.

As argued, the ethics of cannabis cultivation are rooted in the confluence of Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari since the 1980s. When I questioned a shareholder about this period he claimed that "the skill over that was passed down to us from those Jamaican guys, in a book". As new clusters of production, such as Sugar Loaf, Wanpala and Loko Fakay began to emerge in Hastings and Waterloo, unemployed youth were drawn into apprenticeships and the "skills training" thought necessary to ensure a degree of stability following the upheaval of civil conflict. Having been an IDP and acquired first-rights to land-ownership in 2001, shareholder claimed that since 2000 he had worked for three years under his "bra" known as "Sorie Root":

"I have been inside this thing for over ten years now, since 2000, just after the war. I was working for my *bra* [boss]. I was working for somebody. Through that way I trained, that *bra* there he taught me."

So he taught you how to grow it?
"Yes, he gave me the book. Those Jamaicans, they wrote the book in Jamaica and brought it here. You know the *sɛnsi* [i.e. sensimilla] book that told us how to plant. It is that book we were reading, it told us how to do the work, how to do the *practical*. When our *bra* came they gave us the book, and taught us how to do the *practical*, because at that time we were not fortunate enough to go to school. So I read it to understand […] If they come back they can do more teachings, make us understand better."

[…] *And how did you know Carrie B?*
"Carrie B came to the country as a musician; they came and played a lot of sets. Our elder brothers [*Ohsilibu* and American] understood and were used to them, so they wanted to use him as a friend. So it was with him that they linked. Then Carrie B married that man's sister. So that's what gave them the idea to grow this thing […] Then

[147] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.

> Carrie B taught 'Sorie Root' [nickname for a Rasta in Waterloo] and so he taught me back how to grow it […] It was my bra who taught me because he had the book. So the Jamaican's came with the book and we read it. You see all the specimens and techniques in the book. So you understand we had to go and do it according to the *practical*."
>
> *What do you mean by 'practical'?*
> "When you go and do something following an example. They gave us the book and showed us from that how to plant the shoots [*nɔs am*], how to water. It shows you what to do when you reach one week, two weeks, what to feed it. It shows you everything. So I went and learned from my *bra* [for three years] and then made for myself my own garden."[148]

Following the war it was also not possible to re-enter formal education since:

> "They [the RUF] burned everything, even my O Level paper [certificate] they blaze[d] everything […] So it was through that rehabilitation that made the country redevelop back […] After the war we have got the idea inside our brain now."[149]

For these nascent cultivators, the value they attributed to their skills while engaging in an activity recognised by the community as productive following two decades of economic crisis, depressed rural incomes, and growing inequalities in access to land, represented an important means of reclaiming masculine authority in a context of scarcity. A folk cosmology of the righteous poor underpinning cannabis farming (Chapter Five) emphasised the need for providing a lasting contribution to the community. This is what shareholders referred to as a "fixed reference point", such as a house, fertile land or church donation, and informed a moral economy that stood in contrast to the "vanity" of youth.

For instance, the messages presented in both Seventh-Day Adventist and Neo-Pentecostal church services suggested salvation through hard work and personal accumulation independent from communal and kin obligations. These virtues were based on a morally-mediated materialism that scorned vanity and treated debt, violence, tobacco and alcohol as akin to bodily sin (Maxwell 1998: 253-4). However, this was a folk belief that, given the Rastafari values of older farmers, accommodated the production and consumption of cannabis. Church services encompassed notions of

[148] Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.
[149] Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.

"keeping the eye on the prize" and "finishing the race strong", which had affinities with desires to "win the race". Failings of the past, symbolised in devastating form by Sierra Leone civil war, needed to be rectified through their righteous toil. Apprenticeship represented a process of re-socialisation that emphasised 'literacy, moral probity and industriousness, [which] reintegrat[ed] the volatile category of urban youth into productive forms of social engagement' (Meagher 2009c: 402). As Comaroff (2012: 47) agrees, participation in activities recognised as social productive is indicative of a 'widespread quest for ontological security'. This folk cosmology meant that, far from an illegal activity reducible to private self-interest, cannabis farming conformed to a productive and redistributive work ethic. Cannabis cultivation therefore carved a place within a licit category that cultivators referred to as "our illegal sweat". This distinction underscored the attractiveness of apprenticeships that confirmed farmers' status as youth men:

> *So what does it mean to be a youth man?*
> "When you have begun to live for yourself, when you have begun to stand as a man for yourself. When you are a *strong man* for yourself. When you are able to fight for yourself and get your own. Then you are independent, you are an independent man now. If you don't then you are a youth."
>
> *And how do you see yourself?*
> "Well now, I am a youth man, because I have small people with me. I am able to control three men now, yes. You see? So that makes me a youth man now."

To be a youth man was to possess a respected and valued skill. It obligated that these skills be passed on to other unemployed youth. As another shareholder claimed:

> "I tell them that we have suffered, we have toted, but now we have a skill."[150]

Apprenticeship was therefore synonymous with social worth and utility at a time when the distinctions between productive and unproductive work, as a principle discourse moderating what counted as licit and illicit work, came under increasing scrutiny from both the local community and agents of the state. Youth were required to learn agricultural skills in order that their status as youth men was validated by others, but this imperative also mediated the relationship between shareholders and their

[150] Interview with Mohammed (alias "Moshie"), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 09/11/2013.

respective apprentices for, as Bourdieu (2000: 172) notes, 'acts of submission, [and therefore] of obedience' are also 'acts of knowledge and recognition'.

After *Lamtɛk* finished his first season, Musa discussed with neighbouring cultivator Sorie whether he had the understanding necessary to sell a scale of *diamba* on their behalf. Citing his attention to "grooming" [removing seeds], lack of "grumbling" [complaining], obedience, and above all, patience, Musa asserted "that *bobo* [small, dependent boy] is maturing now, he talks mature, I think he gets the game".

6.3. Finding your own lane?

It was common for apprentices and journeymen to reason that they were trying to "find their own lane in life". A lane or sometimes simply "a road to pass" denoted potential access to higher value exchange partners but also signified an imagined path of action that was relatively congruent with expectations for gaining economic autonomy.[151] One journeyman spread his arms and explained how finding your own lane was analogous to "opening the game".[152] Another journeyman explained how he had spent one season learning how to cultivate under a boss nicknamed "Mr Mɛd" before he decided to find his own lane:

> "Why did I leave him? I have understood for myself now. So now I can utilise the idea. Up until now I am utilising it […] The first farm he was sponsoring us on was a big farm, nearly more than one thousand holes. I didn't work for myself, there were plenty of others. We were working with them small boys. Plenty of them were working. After a season has finished you make a lot of money […] We see it. We say: 'Eh *bobo* this is from *diamba*. We have the idea now.' So from there now we decided to avoid him [our shareholder]. Yes. We all went to find our own lane. We are trying for ourselves now."[153]
>
> *What does it mean to find a new lane?*
> "To find your own passion. To go and start a new life on your own. When you go and start a new life on your own. Without nobody again. I am not under Mr Y, I am not under Mr B. Yes. I am doing it on *my own* now. On my own, single. Everything on my own."

[151] A phrase of Yoruba origin denoting an 'open road' that would alleviate the load being toted i.e. financial worries.
[152] Interview with Alie Kamara, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 11/11/2013.
[153] Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 21/10/2013.

However, those apprenticed by more dominant shareholders such as *Ɔsilibu* and American complained that despite the expectation of economic and social autonomy, they had been held back. As a former apprentice turned journeyman who had stopped working under *Ɔsilibu* claimed:

> "[Through] all that time, all the *bobo* there didn't understand the game […] we didn't understand the game, where to buy and sell it. So we made losses."[154]

The dismayed cultivator, nicknamed Musa, bemoaned how "we saw ourselves as brothers". After a year working for *Ɔsilibu*, Musa was promoted to what he described as "head *bobo*" and was given responsibility to manage five apprentices: deciding when to transfer new shoots and when to water and rotate crop cycles. It was his duty to monitor them and make sure they did not steal. Musa claimed, however, that his shareholder "began to treat me in a way that wouldn't let me succeed; [he] wouldn't let me work for myself".

Although the acquisition of technical skills indicated new cultivators were, objectively-speaking, competent enough to cultivate on their own after one or two seasons, whether they really understood how to play the game was not for them to judge. Instead, what was validated as being competent corresponded to a form of classification within a hierarchy. Whether an apprentice cultivator could become a journeyman; by being granted a small plot to rent, or an offering in-kind of fertiliser or a meeting with a higher value exchange partner, depended on how the shareholders manipulated the rules in their own favour. For instance, the dominant shareholders were shown to terminate apprenticeships early in order to extract cheap labour. Journeymen were granted autonomy in deciding how to grow and sell their cannabis, but continued to rent land on their shareholder's farm and remained confined to a low-margin domestic market in lieu of promised contacts with cross-border buyers.

Musa was an exception because he recognised this exploitation but also that the shareholders presided over a one-sided adjudication of his labouring practices. He therefore reasoned that being apprenticed foreclosed his pursuit of self-enterprise. Running the risk of cultivating a small plot for himself away from the prying eyes of *Ɔsilibu* and his associates, Musa began to accumulate the economic capital necessary to lease land from other elders and purchase the necessary inputs. He came to reason that

[154] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.

the authority exercised by the shareholders was in part economic, but was also based on a sleight of hand that he too could practice. This was indicated by his cynicism when helping me to find another "chairman" to interview:

> "Chairman? Which one? There are so many chairmen these days! [Laughs]"

Musa produced some of the largest yields and obtained one of the highest average returns per kilogram, despite being one of the youngest cultivators to own their own farm. Musa claimed he was now his own youth man, free from the dependencies of his shareholder, and would continue to cultivate cannabis "until God makes me succeed and [I] go next level".

Musa reasoned that by "standing on his own":

> "I am a youth *man* […] according to this project I am doing. I am a popular man, I know how to talk to people […] So if I do that *raray* [rootless] boy way there, no! You won't solve any problems. I have to put my heart down, I find money […] I am getting what God has marked for *me* […] they say you have matured, [that] you have begun to take on responsibility."[155]

Yet the social category of youth man also accommodated those who remained dependent on their shareholders and had not accumulated the expected economic capital through their perceived self-enterprise as journeymen. Despite another journeyman still renting land from and providing cannabis for his shareholder to sell, he claimed that:

> "The community all so admire us. Yes, because they know we understand how to make money inside the business. They say we are able; we are so able. God has given us the strength."[156]

The desire to continue working for the shareholders was motivated for good psychological reasons (cf. Burawoy 2012: 192-3). Apprentices and journeyman alike reasoned that working for them garnered respect and social value from the wider community, congruent with the folk cosmology underpinning cannabis farming. Yet, unlike Musa they simultaneously misrecognised that the worth and value attributed to

[155] Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.
[156] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

this system of apprenticing meant their chances to succeed, economically-speaking, were foreclosed. The elective affinity found between Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism in the folk beliefs of cannabis farmers acted as a 'kind of white heat that reset time and re-establishe[d] truth' (Comaroff 2012: 57).

For those who remained under shareholders, the aspiration to find their own lane in life was congruent with how they perceived their respective shareholders, as those who – like them – had stoically struggled too. The relations between shareholders and their dependents was therefore a symbolic struggle over what character, comportment, struggle and toil were legitimate. The misrecognition of those at the bottom of the hierarchy resulted from their reasoning that success required emulation, which could be achieved by conforming to the dictates of their shareholders. In doing so, youth clung to a stoic virtue of demonstrating their commitment to working hard and expending time and energy in the here-and-now, albeit in the reasonable expectation that they would (eventually) succeed over a longer time horizon and fulfil their aspirations to own land, build a house, and be respected as a productive and righteous somebody that could "stand on their own". One cultivator explained this complex process of acculturation through a mixture of Krio colloquialisms and Evangelist and old English metaphors:

> *What do you mean when you say you 'must grow like the tree'?*
> "This is how we should do things. When you want to, erm, do a mission, you should always accomplish it. They say that when the tree grows, nobody can cut it off. So if you don't accomplish the mission, then the tree has been cut down, and nobody can rescue you. This is the problem. So whenever you are on a mission, you should try to accomplish it. If you accomplish that mission then, finally, you are a winner […] If you don't accomplish the mission you are a *loser*, you feel it deep down in your heart."
>
> *So who cuts the tree?*
> "Balogun, it is just a proverb. Just a story. You have seen? The Book of Proverbs."
>
> *So what does this proverb mean?*
> "It means you should stand tall, not stay short […] That is, you should cut your coat according to your *size*. You should live according to your level."[157]

This present toil confirmed their *being* youth men. It was signposted by their patrons who respected the "strain" of their physical labour and, as suggested by the tree in

[157] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cutlivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

Turkish's metaphorical interpretation, the use of their able-bodies as contributing to the community. Yet, youth man was also an accommodation, for it suspended a process of *becoming* adult, which was tied to those economic and social resources the shareholders needed to protect. This positioning within broader socio-generational categories played out in accordance with a folk cosmology that dictated the success of the righteous poor needed to be earned. Given judgement on their status was ultimately served by the shareholder, apprentices and journeyman were subject to an 'experience of time' that had 'engendered in the relationship between habitus and [the] social world' the 'practical expectations which [were] constitutive of an *illusio* as investment in a social game [… and] the probabilities of fulfilment that they offer to these expectations' (Bourdieu 2000: 208).

Bourdieu was aware of the role imagination played in restructuring the temporalities experienced by young, unemployed Algerians during the 1960s and youth passing time on French housing estates during the 1990s. Those youth found themselves trapped in a choice 'between flight into the imaginary and fatalistic surrender' (*ibid*: 221-3). The remedy for an uncertain future, Bourdieu claims, is found precisely in a higher authority that realigns expectations, such that:

> 'The whole set of goals posited in advance, independently of any conscious project, in the forms of demand and commitments […] and the whole forth-coming already given in the immediate present [means] this objective universe of incitements and indications […] orientate[s] and stimulate[s] action.' (*ibid*: 222)

Cannabis farmers conformed to their intermediate social status because it offered refuge from the ontological insecurity of otherwise being 'excluded from the game, dispossessed of the vital illusion [*illusio*] of having a function or a mission' (*ibid*). By committing to a folk cosmology of righteous labour forged in response to economic deprivation and civil war, these youth from the objective position of the researcher-as-observer were somewhat:

> 'Detached from reality and sometimes a little crazy, as if, when nothing was possible, everything became possible, as if all discourses about the future – prophecies, divinations, millenarian announcements – had no other purpose than to fill what is no doubt one of the most painful wants: the lack of a future.' (*ibid*: 226)

The ability of habitus to motivate and coordinate social practice cannot be reduced to mindless repetition. Whereas activities geared towards consumption, such as those bemoaned of Freetown's Big Men, appeared to extend the time horizon of aspirants, productive activity in the cannabis economy restructured temporalities and tied them to an ascetic commitment in the present. Youths' commitment to apprenticeship was therefore rooted in common understandings of what it meant to be a youth man. Apprenticeship was motivated by wanting to attain a particular quality of self, but one that did not undermine the structural advantages of more dominant agents. As Jeffrey (2012: 250) remarks in a review of youths' agency in recent anthropological studies, youth can appear resourceful while at the same time reproducing structures of domination. This is not to say that youth are 'brainwashed' or blind conformists to a 'disciplinary regime' that dictates what they should do, but rather, domination is embedded in 'local notions of shrewdness and enterprise'.

These local notions suggested that if "you don't have any job where you are learning something then you will turn into a criminal".[158] To not be recognised as a youth man, in turn, was to risk being dismissed by peers as an unproductive idler. Youth were therefore subject to the social pressures of what two new apprentices in Loko Fakay referred to as "linger loss". The longer you sat down in the *panbɔdi* the less chance you had of acquiring the skills necessary to "go in search of the paper [money]".

The misrecognition motivating on-going practices can be explained as:

> 'The capacity to impose and inculcate means of understanding and structuring the world, or symbolic systems, that contribute to the reproduction of the social order by representing social and political power in disguised forms that endow them with legitimacy and/or taken-for-grantedness – the best warrant for social longevity any social order might hope for'. (Wacquant 1987: 66)

The guidance of their shareholders was rendered legitimate, for youth and their peers treated cannabis cultivation as a captivating, legitimate and organised 'striving for' (Martin 2011: 248-54). And yet by virtue of this misrecognition, apprenticeship reproduced the structural advantages that shareholders had first acquired when cultivating in the mid-1980s and late-1990s.

[158] Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 17/10/2013.

The concept of structural advantage therefore has two inter-related dimensions. First, apprenticeship enabled dominant players to maintain exclusive access to land and extract cheap labour. Second, structural advantage was inter-subjective, for youth adhered to particular practices and social categories that resulted in deference to authority and reshaped conventions of time relative to expected material gains in favour of the shareholders. Hence, structural advantages were secured by more covert power relations that were not solely reducible to organised violence or social sanction. I therefore follow Bourdieu (2000: 184) and claim that youth men were subject to a degree of 'learned ignorance' in their commitment to on-going practices that qualified their social status in hard work, honesty and sacrifice.

The chapter now turns to examine journeymen in the domestic exchange market and considers how structural advantages were secured through the unequal accumulation of social and cultural capital. I suggest that the ability to accumulate economic and social depended on a 'conversion rate' that was not entirely explicit to youth, but was tied to the unequal positions they assumed within the economic field (Bourdieu 1984).

6.4. *Sababu*: cooperation in the exchange market

Early into field work a taxi driver pointed to a newly constructed three-story building off from Siaka Stevens street and declared "*I gɛt sababu*" [He had *sababu*]. *Sababu* was the imperative in a context of scarcity for establishing relationships, from the fleeting to the more durable, with a stranger in a position of influence who claimed to be capable of providing the recipient with obligation-free opportunities, be it for credit, exchange, access to land, wage labour or NGO funding: "*sababu* is a high up person who will talk for you in a higher place".[159] For unemployed youth, these influential persons were typically found unexpectedly; usually from God, and were to be grasped at any opportunity.

Enria (2015: 643-4) argues, for instance, that the emphasis youth placed on needing to obtain *sababu* results from their desire to be included in redistributive relations. However, I argue here that these relationships were neither strictly reciprocal nor synonymous with the inclusion of youth within a moral economy comprising 'shared' norms and 'mutual' interests. Instead, the emic concept indicated dissimulated economic dependency based on the veneer of a moral rhetoric that claimed *sababu* was

[159] Interview with Immanuel Taywaley, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 19/11/2013.

necessary to "play the game against the system" of nepotism in formal waged labour and politics. Moreover, these relations had to be earned and used or else it diminished. It depended on "the way you hold it, if you hold it fine you won't lose it".[160] Those in dominant positions adjudicated prospective relations according to character and reputation. One shareholder who had owned a cannabis farm for more than a decade explained that:

> "With *sababu* you can get up and stand strong [otherwise] you will face a lot of harassment [...] *Sababu* shows you a road to pass, without *sababu* nobody is looking at you clearly [i.e. they are judging you]."[161]

An apprentice also reasoned that *sababu* was related to character and reputation:

> "A good attitude can help you get *sababu* [...] If you can get a good friend then they can help you at any moment, but you need a good attitude, because you know that you are not stealing, and that you are working hard to find your survival [...] So you know that you are someone who will *mile* [share with everyone from the same pot], you don't steal, you are working hard to have your own."[162]

Following Bourdieu's (1986) concept of social capital, to earn *sababu* required an intense degree of sociability until youth possessed a 'more or less durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition'. New social relations were obtained "through [recognition of] your own character, through the way you are".[163] This reasoning began from a position of equality, which suggested that "we are all mortal men here". The mortal man represented commonality and was stripped of any marks of differentiation. The mortal man stood as a social figure for co-presence, familiarity and the expectation of reciprocity during unfamiliar social encounters that would otherwise have faced the problem of 'strangeness' (Torche and Valenzuela 2011).

It was indicative of a shared morality by virtue of which youth perceived they were not judged or discriminated against. This was despite decisions to afford new relationships being couched in stereotypical personal judgments that regulated access to high-value buyers. Despite this, youth reasoned that successful networking was based on the

[160] Interview with Alie Kamara, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 11/11/2013.
[161] Interview with Mr Shɛka, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.
[162] Interview with Usman Sesay, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.
[163] Interview with Arthur Kemokai, Cannabis Cultivator, 26/09/2013.

recognition that: "We have the common understanding; it is someone you can trust".[164] The operation of *sababu* was, therefore, precisely to minimise youths' potential feelings of betrayal and sense of dependency by offering them a hopeful future, even if this was unlikely to be achieved. The equality of the game suggested by the trustworthiness of those who appealed to being mortal men was merely a façade. Dominant players dictated the terms of *sababu*; it was not as opportunistic or spontaneous as claimed.

This arrangement had functional significance in terms of regulating recurrent exchange in favour of shareholders, whereas their journeymen were confined to the low-margin "open shop" of Freetown's ghettos. By contrast, the shareholders in You Must Grumble had established relationships with cross-border buyers in Guinea. For those outside of these networks who sold primarily to the domestic market, some price variation resulted from whether transactions were facilitated through a pre-established relationship or sold on the open market. These dynamics can be accounted for by comparing transaction prices at point of sale with the advertised price cultivators provided when they circulated a "sample" of their most recent harvest in the *panbɔdis* of Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. The advertised price was generally immutable – except for sellers from You Must Grumble – when journeymen searched for buyers in the open market. Mean prices were structured according to an ordinal scale based on fixed weights of cannabis herb. During the dry season, the mean value of a *scale* (roughly 1 kg) was Le150,000 and Le30,000 for one *quant* (roughly ¼ kg), unlike the more common relationship of decreasing price with increasing volume. While prices seasonally fluctuated about this mid-point, more established sellers maintained these categories more rigidly. Newer sellers, by contrast, resorted to the more flexible sales strategy of "auctioning" cannabis herb for a lower price.

Consequently, there existed a lower average for and greater variation between transaction prices among journeymen, even if the advertised price was more ambitious. Their ability to establish recurrent exchange relationships depended on character and social standing. Exchange decisions were not reducible to self-interest encapsulated in shared social norms because personal judgments to trust were not couched in the same risk and payoff structures. Instead they were generative of the shareholders' historic accumulation of symbolic capital and varied according to the one-sided dispositions and ways of accumulating, converting and valuing social capital that journeymen acquired through their apprenticeship and brought into social encounters. The choice of sales

[164] Interview with Bishie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 11/10/2013.

practice depended on a journeyman's position and how, as a potential buyer's *sababu*, they were perceived and valued. It was, for example, common that youth would over-trust and attempt to sell by installments, only for their exchange partner to abandon the deal having stolen the payments. It is therefore necessary to examine the function of social capital among strangers in terms of their subjective experience. In this case, youths' dispositions to trust made sense in the relational context of an economic field, whereby *sababu* indexed more to less dominant positions based on 'the learned capacity that develops through life experiences' (Torche and Valenzuela 2011: 191-2).

The shareholders were explicit in their refutation of *sababu* as non-reciprocal, self-interested and tactical: for them relationships were a means to an end. Journeymen, however, reasoned according to a moral rhetoric that suggested the right comportment and commitment to hard work were necessary for it to be earned, regardless of economic positon. Access to new buyers was, therefore, unequal such that the implied reciprocity was articulated more as a subjective expectation than it was borne out in practice. *Sababu* was envisioned as an avenue of opportunity in a context of scarcity. Claims to it were experienced as an act of generosity on the part of those more dominant. For shareholders, however, this represented a moral discourse that was useful to secure the compliance of youth and their expectation that good things would result if they worked in the right way.

Youth men reasoned that economic capital flowed from social capital in a one-way relationship. Judgements regarding whether their *sababu* was "genuine" or "fake" were crucial when journeymen sought to rent a plot of land through extant shareholders (primary rights users) and, to a lesser extent, through other original land owners:

> "Anybody who wants to work on this ground has to meet the shareholder of that particular place. If you do not then you should not work there […] then he will authorise you and give you the permit to do the work. To work there quietly […] If you do not, he will not agree with you, because it is a law, in the ground of Hastings. That is the law, so everybody obeys it and abides by that law. If not then everybody will blame you, they will say you should abide by the law […] You should give him a little money, it is not too much [and] he will give you the line, [show you] how you should work […] So they [the shareholders] will never obstruct you, because you have shown the effort."[165]

[165] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

The convertibility of social capital into economic capital depended on how they were perceived and valued, which was generative of an underlying distribution of symbolic capital. Trust was based on a potential exchange partner's character. Such judgements were the purview of shareholders that acted as gatekeepers. Having obtained funding from remittances, a journeyman nicknamed "Adebayor" had not undergone apprenticeship. Despite observing his behaviour to the contrary and having maintained a high degree of co-presence by farming cannabis close to cultivators in Loko Fakay, he was, however, dismissed as an alcoholic and criminal that "moved" with a *klik* [gang] in Waterloo known as the "Reggae Boys". Adebayor tried to rationalise this stigma by explaining that *sababu* had to be earned:

> "Through my own preference [...] through the way I live my life. That is how you get *sababu*. If you live your life good and not bad, if you don't do [anything] bad to other people, otherwise you don't feel free."[166]

Youth were therefore wary, as one journeyman put it, of avoiding the "blaze" of rumour that would ensue if they did not have the trust and reputability of a shareholder backing them. While negotiating whether to sell to a new dealer who had arrived in Waterloo from the provinces, a cultivator from Loko Fakay reasoned that "pushing back" by paying the dealer installments, it was possible to "let the game open" and observe whether they would be "stubborn" and not adhere to timely repayments. Another cultivator cautioned, however, that for him the game was closed and he would have to "study" and "clear" the dealer first: "She doesn't understand that the Freetown game is very fast, it is not like that upcountry game". While credit-based deals are an important adjudicator when gauging the trust of those who are unfamiliar (von Lampe and Johansen 2004), both cultivators eventually abandoned this strategy given the dealer's uncertain character and lack of a credible *sababu*: "I don't like using credit; you shouldn't trust somebody with that. Debt, it is trouble, there is no trust". If the dealer "grumbled too much" about this arrangement, both cultivators agreed that "all lanes will *blaze*, your *sababu* will spoil". As Berry (2007: 61) similarly argues, transactional histories in West Africa have a 'significant bearing on the terms of exchange [...] would-be transactors may spend substantial effort and resources in trying to obtain or conceal information about them'.

[166] Interview with Bayo Manseray (alias, Adebayor), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 19/11/2013.

Decisions to trust were therefore not reducible to 'encapsulated self-interest' (Hardin 2001), because personal judgments were not couched in the same risk and pay off structures for all agents, but instead corresponded with unequal social positions. These positions were often signaled by the nicknames of pushers that, in turn, depended on their respect and social standing. One of the most well-connected dealers in Hastings was referred to as "High Network" and another as "Busy Signal". Both examples are indicative of how *ex ante* signaling facilitated the expansion of exchange in a context where inter-personal trust through weak ties was more difficult. As one of Loko Fakay's journeymen explained:

> "If you don't have *sababu* you won't sell. You will sell it cheap-cheap [very cheaply]. You won't get fine money. But if you have *sababu* you are able to get fine [a lot of] money […] If you have *sababu* then when you talk to someone you will have no fearness."[167]

By claiming to have no "fearness" youth reinterpreted the hierarchical organisation of the cannabis economy as a level playing field on the basis of misrecognising that their righteous labour would garner them greater influence. When faced with a future that was otherwise more uncertain, youths' heightened social reflexivity ensured they reflected on the toughness of their lives such that *sababu* offered some sense that they could regain balance and control over their destiny (Jackson 1996: 19; Vigh 2008: 18-20). Journeyman's attempts to forge these more durable relationships did, however, depend on the more-or-less exclusive and private judgment of shareholders and their middlemen. Although they claimed *sababu* was obtained "through your own character", their reputation as converged with their unequal positions under apprenticeship that, in turn, limited the possibilities that "*sababu*" would "give you the lane and [that] money will come from that lane".[168] For journeymen it was enough to cling to the expectation of reciprocity by conforming to the moral rhetoric of righteous labour. This expectation, in turn, rendered the more cynical and self-interested views privately held by shareholders less explicit. With shareholders the gatekeepers for access to economic and social capital, *sababu* acted as a principle of convertibility that secured their structural advantages.

[167] Interview with Samuel Joseph, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 26/09/13.
[168] Interview with *Mɔnga*, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/10/13.

6.5. Navigating social distance

The degree to which *sababu* marked out social distance can be demonstrated by contrasting how a shareholder (Musa) and journeyman (Turkish) navigated Eastern Freetown's ghettos to "link" with prospective buyers. Musa regularly met his dealer, Dawda, in Eastern Freetown's Race Course Community and could vouch for me when meeting these "high level" dealers. Upon arrival at Race Course, Medal, the elected youth representative, explained the various links that connected these senior dealers with cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo. Musa remarked that this "was the work of *sababu*". Dawda also gave a common explanation: "a contact, someone with influence who [can] call you to meet others […] somebody who can help you".[169] Yet his was qualified with the insistence that this status was reserved for those who were already well known or, in my case, those that had been given "the signal" by a middleman.

Contrary to this more judicious negotiation of new exchange relationships, Turkish moved around frequently, from Race Course to Firestone, to Lumley Street, following a trail of nicknames gleaned second-hand on the off-chance one might grant him higher-value opportunities to sell. In many accounts of street culture, movement is synonymous with the ability to bridge social distance and difference, indicative of a practical mastery (Wacquant 1999; Bourgois 2003: 3; Simone 2005: 517; Sandberg 2008; Venkatesh 2009; Langevang and Gough 2009). Such movement was, however, frequently ridiculed by youth in Eastern Freetown who insisted Turkish needed to stay and "bind" [hang out, talk] with them. Youth at Race Course claimed Turkish "didn't know the ground here" and his inquiries were consequently ignored or greeted with the disrespect of a middle finger. In street vernacular movement was denoted by the greeting "*aw di tɔnin*?" [how is it turning?] when rotating between various informal and illicit work opportunities.[170] Guided by the haptic clue of turning fingers, youth explained this greeting referred, quite literally, to their perceived ability to turn into different roles, be it a mechanic, taxi driver or street vendor, as well as indicative of a means by which they could "turn" over a profit. Journeymen perceived movement was necessary to avoid being left with "stagnant" customers unlikely to buy in bulk. As one journeyman explained:

[169] Interview with Dawda, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 04/12/2013.
[170] For older cultivators, the term "*drɛg*", which Hoffman (2007a) defines as 'hustle', also denoted movement, albeit confined to those engaged in productive activity, such as agricultural labour. During British colonial rule Krio fishermen in the protectorate used the term *drɛg* to describe the action of casting out a large fishing net into the sea, which may or may not have returned a successful catch.

> "The price falls if a lane [new exchange partner] is not there, by which I mean a stagnant person. If you find a person with a lane you can sell to others for three coin [Le300,000]."[171]

It was necessary to reside within the same ghetto and cultivate the necessary *sababu* in order to be granted the signal to sell larger quantities. As Back Street's youth claimed "*Wi de na di grawnd*" [We are *in* the ground]. Turkish provided a similar explanation regarding his attempts to negotiate new exchange relationships in Eastern Freetown:

> "The way I am finding buyers is through my *kɔmpin* [non-biological 'brothers']. The message comes through my *kɔmpin*. *Turkish makes a give-and-take motion with his hands moving backwards and forwards*. They will say: 'Eh, that shareholder who comes and buys 150 kilo, who is that?' I will try to know that line and link with that man. So from that man, he will channel me in the business. Then finally I will have made money for myself."

The nuanced social practices involved in dealing cannabis; the unravelling of a black bandana, bodily routines for how to bind one another and the street vernaculars required for various greetings with local *kliks*, indicated journeymen possessed a practical mastery of how to play the game. Turkish had, however, incurred debts, a situation referred to as "mismanagement inside the game". Having exhausted his own funds, Turkish relied heavily on credit from his two most durable *sababu*: his shareholder Harold and Harold's middleman nicknamed "King David". To obtain credit, Turkish was obliged to sell *pɛkus* [quarter of a kilogram] of cannabis on their behalf by commission. Given Harold and King David could afford to save cannabis to sell during periods of greater demand in the rainy season, they would provide three or four *pɛku*, which Turkish promised to sell for Le50,000 in Freetown, gaining a commission of Le20,000 upon return to Hastings. Sitting on the porch of King David's auto repair kiosk awaiting customers during the evening, Turkish was left to exploit what economic sociologists refer to as information asymmetries.

Turkish was aware of the risks posed when relying on "auctioning". This sales practice was associated with those who did not understand how to play the game:

> "If I say that I am only selling it by *pɛku-pɛku* [just under ¼ kilogram], just half-half, then man will only destroy."

[171] Interview with Sallieu Conteh, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 26/09/2013.

This strategy had failed demonstrably and Turkish frequently returned to Hastings seeking finance from Harold to resolve debts he had incurred to King David. "Mojo", a former lookout who used to work with Turkish in Lumley Street's cartels before cultivating cannabis in Hastings, was a crucial link in this chain of credit. Having failed to sell three *pɛku* for Le50,000, Mojo suggested "*I dɔn pwɛl di sababu*" [He has spoiled the *sababu*]. Turkish was no longer considered "righteous inside the business".[172] Their relationship deteriorated into occasional violent threats and withholding of personal property, until Harold provided more credit to pay off Mojo's advances. The episode tarnished Turkish's reputation. His ability to secure *sababu* depended on the repayment of debts that, while left unpaid, cascaded his financial obligations back to the lender of origin: his shareholder. The restricted economic mobility denoted by the apparent paradox of increasing geographic movement signalled to others that he did not understand how to play the game, and was therefore unlikely, as Dawda put it, to be given the signal for access to higher value exchange partners.

Musa also reasoned that he relied on the "*bluff bluff*" of his street smarts and would change into a Nike-branded red sweater, blue jeans and chromatic orange and silver trainers when visiting Eastern Freetown. This bluff was, however, supported by his ability to demonstrate reciprocity with Dawda given his more secure financial position allowed for bulk sales. As discussed in Chapter Five, the bluff was unlikely to be successful for those who more limited economic capital. When asking Turkish about the differences between how he played the game in Hastings as opposed to Eastern Freetown, he compared himself to "*Kɛkunda*", an alleged drug trafficker during the NPRC government:

> "He was a bluff man. He knew the formula and he would come with the game [i.e. with the cannabis]. He didn't get any problems with it."

Turkish, like other disadvantaged journeymen, reasoned their failings resulted from a lack of social skill having not learned how to play the game correctly. More successful dealers had better street smarts and were skilled at innovating the "*formula*" [method of concealment] required to enhance their "movement". Since the death of his father who was a former Local Unit Commander in the police force, Turkish had, however, also lost a vital partner to help him change the formula:

[172] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

> "*Sababu* is like when [I] had my father, who is a proud man inside the police. For example, I want to have a job inside the police, but I can't, then my father has a debt. Then I will work through my father's relationship [...] I meet them and explain things, they will understand."[173]

By imagining himself "turning into" this new role, Turkish expected this "new lane" would help resolve his financial worries. His need for a middleman was crucial for navigating the shifting social environment of Eastern Freetown, as one cultivator-cum-dealer whose shareholder had recently passed away noted:

> "*Sababu* is a thing that will defend you in the long run. It's where they defend you. If I have *sababu* now in this place, in Waterloo, they would know that my papa [father] is my eldest, and so people that know me they fear me. But now, if I don't have any *sababu*, I will go to jail. But when I have that *sababu* they are able to say: 'Eh bra, I am begging for this man, make them understand' [...] As I said, *sababu* defends people to let you go and make a living."[174]

Despite Turkish's perceived knowledge of the street he could not – unlike Musa – reciprocate or successfully *bluff bluff* a relationship with more prominent buyers. As the movement of his hands suggested, he could only take from, but could not give back to his *kɔmpin*. Without a middleman to defend him; to give him the "fearness" required to reduce the social distance perceived between him and others in the economic field, his reputation was open to challenge and ridicule. Be it from a middle finger, or Harold's sarcastic laughs or a prospective buyer retorting "Turkish, I swear to God".

Sababu was perceived to be linked with street smarts in terms of their ability to *bluff* by continually innovating the *formula*. However, this association acted as a mechanism informally regulating journeymen's ability to accumulate economic capital. What mattered was the degree to which the *bluff* was recognised by others in the field as legitimate, which in turn rested on the symbolic capital the bluffer had already accumulated. The acquisition of *sababu* cannot be explained solely by appealing to the social skills of how life on the street was experienced and mastered (i.e. in terms of cultural capital). Hustlers, as Wacquant (1999) claims, lead 'double-edged' lives. The symbolic power of social capital operated precisely to engender youths' movement on

[173] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[174] Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/11/13.

the street and its logic of social practice as somewhat matter-of-fact, unquestionable and even banal. Given the one-sided interpretation of what was necessary to negotiate with middlemen, journeyman found that the most untenable lines of questioning were those that challenged the one-way relationship from *sababu* to economic capital. They had invested in the reasoning that social capital was necessary to make money and access land; rarely was this calculation the other way around.

The expectation of being able to "grow the right way inside the business" converged with a particular set of dispositions and practices recognised by others as competent (for their labour was valued as righteous) and that in doing so reproduced structural advantages. *Sababu* as economic exchange dissimulated through symbolic exchange resulted in a reasonably well structured economic field that underpinned what appears in more ideographic readings of youths' experience as more dynamic, fluid and uncertain (see Wacquant 2004: 391-2; Newell 2006: 182-3). Despite their subjective expectations to the contrary, the objective chances youth had to obtain durable and reciprocal social relationships with a person of influence, were limited and circumscribed by their disadvantage positions relative to shareholders. *Sababu* was not, therefore, synonymous with the weak ties of expanding social capital (Granovetter 1985), nor with treating 'people as infrastructure' prone to forging ever-increasing social circles across difference (Simone 2004). Rather, it worked to foreground youths' expectations during their social encounters with those in unequal positions. It indexed a particular view from a particular position within an unequal economic field that secured the oligopolistic hold of dominant players.

6.6. "*Na di grade*": economic valuation as social process

During daily taxi rides across Freetown, the price for a fare was rarely up for negotiation. Fees were determined according to an interval level, such as the number of "ways" that could be travelled during a taxi journey. This represented a shared scheme of valuation. Although the precise destinations and distances that comprised a "one way", "two way" or even "three way" journey were open to subtle reinterpretation based on the play of social positions between drivers and their back seat passengers, and inflation linked to fuel prices, the starting point for any potential negotiation of price remained fixed to interval-level categories. For instance, while travelling from St John Street to the commotion of Sani Abacha's street vendors, a driver uncharacteristically suggested to me that "the game is open to you now". According to

him, in a "locked game" the price was fixed such that one way equated to Le1,000. When the game was open, however, a passenger was free to negotiate the price of a single way or add more ways to the price of one. Trying my luck to negotiate with the driver, he responded "Eh Sam, you don't understand the game". "Sam", meaning a novice, implied that whether the game was open or locked depended on social position. For foreign expatriates associated with the system, the game was open only to a better price for the driver, in order to demonstrate the greater earning power attributed to this advantaged social position.

The social processes involved in economic valuation had important implications for price formation. One 'puzzle', to use Guyer's (2004) term, that illustrated the role *sababu* played as a principle of differentiation during economic valuation was how a "*lagati*" [bundle] of newly-harvested cannabis herb came to obtain a transaction price at market.[175] Once groomed, compressed down and transferred to *LeoCem* cement bags, a *lagati* was converted into a unit referred to as a "*scale*" that cultivators claimed was roughly equivalent to a metric unit of one kilogram. Once converted, the advertised and expected prices for a *scale* remained relatively fixed. During the dry season, the mean value of a *scale* was Le150,000 and Le30,000 for one *quant* [¼ kg], unlike the more common relationship of decreasing price with increasing volume. While prices seasonally fluctuated about this mid-point, more established sellers maintained these categories more rigidly. Newer sellers, by contrast, resorted to the more flexible sales strategy of auctioning for a lower price.

Consequently, there was a lower average for and greater variation between transaction prices among journeymen, even if the advertised price was more ambitious. The preference to adopt weight as the initial criterion for valuation, as opposed to volume or amount, was also common in comparisons of currency. The Pound sterling was "*ɛvi ɛvi*" [very heavy, of high value], whereas the Leone was "light". During more frequent visits to farms, cultivators rarely weighed what they claimed to be a *scale*, despite considerable variation in plant sizes and the resulting volume of cannabis herb that was

[175] This puzzle resembles Jane Guyer's (2004: 57, 2013: 299-300) analysis of the South Cameroonian *ntet*. The *ntet* refers to a piece of basketwork comprising a bundle of iron axe heads. *Ntet* was later formalised as the Beti number for 100, although the number of arrowheads within a bundle varied widely. *Ntet* referred to the bundle before it referred to the number, 'a bundle simply happened to contain about a hundred in the currency system of the region when missionaries first defined the meaning of Beti words in translation' (Guyer 2004: 57). From a longer historical point of view, *Ntet* was indicative of a transactional repertoire being drawn on to deal with volatile inflation (cf. Chinese late-Qing Dynasty 'string coins').

packed and selotaped into a paper *LeoCem* bag. Some farmers also mixed different varieties of cannabis (*sativa*, *indica*, *sensimilla*) without any differentiation in quality discerned by the buyer and no resulting variation in price. When cultivators did weigh a *scale*, as demonstrated when visiting a farm known as *Wanpala* [open, flat area], it did not strictly correspond to a metric scale. Rather, cultivators referred to an ordinal scale corresponding to load markings scratched on to the pivot of a metal rod about a make-shift balance metre. Each marking represented one *scale*. "It is a reference point", one cultivator claimed as he explained how one *scale* was translated into the ratio scale of cash money: "One *skel* is Le150,000, the price is fixed".

Scales of equivalence have been 'haphazardly' institutionalised to regulate monetary transactions in West Africa, such that there exists a wide-ranging repertoire of possible measurement scales that are drawn into 'performances' indicative of more determinate, 'underlying' power relations (Guyer 2004: 49). The implementation of weights and measures controls by authorities during the colonial period; Momoh's campaign against smuggling in the 1990s and more recent government regulations, are indicative of state officials' continued despair with the unruliness of price.[176] Western Area's bush, markets and wharves have featured as sites for contesting state-mandated 'economic discourse [and therefore] had implications not only for political power but also had deep social and cultural meanings, even when focused on the most mundane places' (Howard 2003: 263). By returning to the 'wild' space of the bush, cultivators have long been argued to successfully evade attempts by the colonial and post-colonial state to enforce fiscal and legal regulations upon the conduct of economic activity (Jackson 1989; Roitman 2005; Hoffman 2007b: 106-8).

Despite this apparent triumph of fiscal disobedience, transactional repertoires utilised by cultivators shifted when observing the valuation of cannabis undertaken by shareholders, such as *Ɔsilibu* and American. *Scales* and *pɛkus* were bypassed in favour of a stricter, monetary base scale. A "*tɛnt*" [tent] equated to Le1 million and a "*kɔyn*" [coin] to Le100,000.[177] When buying from *Ɔsilibu*, dealers claimed that one *scale* was always worth three *kɔyn* [Le300,000] – double that of the median price (Le150,000). When questioning another cultivator as to why the use of these monetary scales appeared to be deployed only during encounters with shareholders, he explained:

[176] The Weights and Measures Act 2010 attempted to enforce the use of a metric scale, as opposed the use of 'bags' and 'cups' as interval-level units in the market place.
[177] This monetary scale likely originates from Yoruba concepts of 'bags' and 'pounds', especially given influence Yoruba has had on the development of Krio vernaculars along the peninsula.

"It [the price] changes by category, yes, by step, by level, according to how you work to sell the business."

What do you mean by a 'category'?
"Well, like, how you are here now, it is just a difference."

I'm not sure I follow…
"Well it is according to [laughs] it is according to the way you come and meet me."

If, as market theory suggests, prices are determined *through the process* of exchange rather than the instantaneous *outcome* of a calibration between supply and demand, then in these social encounters value was somewhat more ambiguous. As the cultivator claimed, prices were the outcome of a social process – "the way you come and meet me" – rather than the more mechanical outcome of price responsiveness indicative of reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply and demand, 'other things being equal' (Berry 2007: 61-7). Journeymen, by contrast, were unable to sell all of their cannabis to pre-established buyers. This resulted in advertising their product by circulating a "sample". In the *panbɔdis* of Hastings, Waterloo and Eastern Freetown, buyers would meticulously judge the quality of these samples. When dealers explained to me how the price changed during these encounters, they referred first to seasonal fluctuations in supply and then claimed, in a matter-of-fact and somewhat exasperated tone: "*Na di gred!*" [It is the quality].

Appraisals were meticulous. A black plastic bag would be opened, the cannabis rubbed between the fingers to inspect condition of the Trichomes before being smelt between the palms. While this careful adjudication suggested quality was, objectively-speaking, a major determinant of price, by following cannabis that left the same farms but with journeymen associated with shareholders in structurally different positions, as was the case when comparing the experience of Musa and Turkish earlier (section 6.4); the monetary valuation of their respective samples was markedly different. While dealers reasoned that the failure to secure a buyer resulted from poor quality, my observations indicated that it was the *sababu* of seller and buyer, as an index of social position and repository of credit history, which acted as the means for more dominant and established players to adjudicate who could access higher-value buyers (cf. Berry 2007:

61). As the owner of Macdonald's largest farm claimed: "*sababu* is a person who can show you the road to pass".[178]

The most established shareholder in Waterloo who had grown cannabis for at least 25 years explained that the sale of cannabis worked according to how you "*frem*" [frame] somebody: "It is a *frem* business […] it is when you know you can use someday – [it is] usage". To frame a social encounter was to organise the positions between partners to an exchange, in terms of who was more or less dominant, as an initial move to decide whether, and under what tacitly accepted terms, a transaction should proceed. As my experience hailing taxis suggested, how the transaction was framed depended on whether somebody was in a position of equivalence and could be granted an open game or whether they were resigned to a locked game. This was despite journeymen claiming that "when you have *fayn* [high quality] *tay* [cannabis] then you can get *fayn* customers – that is the game".[179]

The reproduction of structural advantages can therefore also be explained in terms of how value was objectified in the exchange process. Value shifted according to the performance of different scales, and following Bourdieu's concept of objectified cultural capital, how cannabis was subjectively appreciated in terms of what I termed social aesthetics. Valuation of the "sense" and "taste" of cannabis was tied to qualitative experience from unequal positions. In turn, the onus placed on skills and street smarts acquired through apprenticeship, and resulting need to appreciate the product of their labour as akin to a craft that validated their undertaking, worked to suppress economic interest. This dissimulated how prices were being determined according to the unequal positons that were occupied. As Bourdieu (2005) has argued, it is not prices that determine everything but everything that determines prices.

A phenomenological analysis of exchange relationships has therefore suggested it is the *expectation* of quality, tied to unequal social positions, which is instrumental in determining the variation of price at the macro level of the economic field. The social processes involved in determining the quality of cannabis were, quite literally, about "grading": of assigning a level of proficiency and of classifying the skill of their exchange partner according to their ties with shareholders and corresponding ability to know how to "play the game".

[178] Interview with Mr Shɛkah, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.
[179] Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.

6.7. Conclusion: apprenticeship as the site for misrecognition

The emphasis apprentice cultivators placed on their need to learn cannabis farming and dealing was, conceptually-speaking, indicative of an unequal accumulation of symbolic capital. This impressed a particular vision of what was required to be a successful cultivator and concealed the interest of their respective shareholders in "pulling down" challengers (Bourdieu 1977: 180). Journeymen perceived that the practices they learned during apprenticeship were less a matter of technical proficiency – innovations that would have otherwise destabilised structural advantages (Bourdieu 2005: 75-6) – and instead akin to the ritualistic practice of a craft. Their craft involved the adjudication of 'countless minor tasks' including the correct schedules for mixing in fertiliser and chicken dung, in addition to particular ways of "grooming", "chopping" and compressing cannabis. I have argued that these mundane tasks were indicative of a pedagogy shared by apprentice cultivators that *re*-presented competence and success as resulting from a practical understanding of what was necessary to move beyond their playing merely a "simple game" (Bourdieu 2006: 176-180).

This chapter argued that the urgency of youth to commit to apprenticeship was analogous with what Bourdieu refers to as the accumulation of cultural capital; of social action being funnelled through durable dispositions that corresponded with a mastery of how to act and interact with others recognised as socially competent and valuable. The cultural capital that had been acquired by journeymen through their apprenticeships was, however, differentially valued by middlemen. The degree to which shareholder's protégés were perceived to understand how to play the game acted as a principle of differentiation. It motivated their position-*takings* within the economic field, and regulated the conversion of cultural capital – their practical knowledge – into other forms, namely: economic capital in access to land and labour; social capital in negotiations with new buyers; and, finally, objectified cultural capital in terms of the expectations they held when negotiating the monetary value of their cannabis with prospective dealers. Two emic practices, *sababu* and *grade*, acted as principles of convertibility that regulated the ability of journeymen to accumulate economic capital and gain autonomy from their shareholders in decision-making through marketing networks and in land ownership.

Sababu was closely related to the *grade* of cannabis such that the valuation of quality depended on the recognition of who was valuing, their respective position in the

economic field relative to others, and the expectation that those in particular positions would judge quality and assign price accordingly. Economic valuation during a variety of social encounters was – objectively-speaking – ambiguous and open to interpretation in spite of reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply. This was because exchange partners reasoned that they possessed different levels of knowledge that foreshadowed their expectations of resulting prices in any given transaction. To know the quality of cannabis meant to rank the persons engaging in a transaction, which were commensurate with the transactional repertoires of *scales* and *kwants* or *tents* and *pounds* (Guyer 2004: 68-9). As Sarah Berry (2007: 61) has argued:

> 'The questions and expectations that people bring to a potential exchange, and the performative strategies they employ as the transaction unfolds, arise out of their own past experiences and in the course of their encounters with one another and/or the things being exchanged.'

The emic practices of *sababu* and *grade* worked to maintain a high degree of social distance between journeymen and their shareholders, thereby acting as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism that secured the structural advantages necessary for oligopolistic competition to thrive. Mainstream economic theory suggests that information asymmetries represent market inefficiencies. To the contrary, this chapter demonstrated that asymmetries were rooted in the degree of convertibility between different kinds of capital that worked precisely as a principle of regulation. This enabled the coordination of market exchange through valuation, rather than primarily through an interactionist vision of organised violence or inter-personal trust.

Sababu as akin to social capital, *grade* as a social process of valuation, and *sabi* as the validation and recognition of one-sided competencies, formed a tripartite of emic practices that reproduced structural advantage. These emic practices worked as regulatory principles that organised the cannabis economy in which participants were committed to on-going practices as if these were rational; what Bourdieu refers to as the tacit collusion of competition and struggle in the economic field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Following Burawoy's (2012: 196) claim that 'the power of misrecognition is linked to the level of skill', it has been necessary to move towards a *social* aesthetics. Aesthetics here minimally refers to ongoing qualitative experience from a particular point of view within a field of organised activity. This stands in contrast to aesthetics as the interpretation of, say, an artwork or *lagati* [bundle] of

cannabis, by which the creativity or skill of the producer is assessed according to the product produced.

Instead, the cultivator of cannabis – in terms of how their skill was judged by others – and the appreciation of the product of the cultivator's labour were not qualitatively separate. It would, for example, have been difficult for a buyer to appreciate the quality of cannabis produced if they did not already value the skill of the seller's respective shareholders who had taught them how to cultivate during their apprenticeship. Otherwise, buyers would not have come to know any meaningful distinctions in expertise or skills. There is, therefore, no automatic correspondence between the imperative to acquire knowledge through apprenticeship, and the expectation that this knowledge improved a journeyman's "feel for the game". Instead, their practices corresponded with orientational qualitative experience, for agents assessed and appreciated their social environment in different ways depending on the pedagogy of their apprenticeship.

The methodological approach of social aesthetics enhances Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital. The chapter argued that the one-sided accumulation and utilisation of cultural and social capital resulted from acquired dispositions that constituted the habitus of apprentices. This habitus coordinated socially recognised and competent practices that conformed strictly to neither a grid-of-perception nor a wholly passive phenomenology. Rather, the analysis demonstrated that practices always have an audience. As Martin (2011: 203) similarly argues, every social encounter involves a 'we' as much as it does an 'it'. When youth 'get it' then they:

> ''Get' the 'we' as well, in the sense of establishing an assumption of like-mindedness with those of similar taste [i.e. there is inter-subjective agreement…] Aesthetic experience is inseparable from perceived entry into some group.'

Qualities are, as Martin (2011: 204) perceptively remarks 'cultivated'. Journeymen that had acquired particular dispositions under the pedagogic authority of their bosses held particular expectations of quality and what constituted a good buyer. While an outsider may comprehend these one-sided practices as a failure of rationality (Guillory 1997: 384-5); the social aesthetic from the point of view of my interlocutors in structurally disadvantaged positions could 'only have a meaning in reference to divisions between persons' (Martin 2011: 204). Hence, the we-ness implied by a *social* aesthetics, as

experienced from a particular position *taking* in the economic field (i.e. a claim to being *inside* the game), worked as a principle of social construction that ensured inter-subjective validity (i.e. this is what *we* mean by the *grade*). Albeit, this was based on a tacit complicity that, when more dominant "meets" less dominant, the former is judged the better *grade* or the more trustworthy *sababu*. Quality did not, therefore, fully explain variation in price across farms, all other things being equal, but was instead explained by position within the economic field and the structural advantage that more dominant position was rooted in. How the quality of cannabis was valued corresponded to the history of social relationships indexed by the actions and perceptions of their respective shareholders that, in turn, regulated conversion back into economic capital in terms of access to credit, land and cash-money. Apprenticeship afforded the acquisition of one-sided practices that regulated opportunities to accumulate economic capital, albeit in such a way that was compatible with their re-adjusted expectations. In doing so, however, apprenticeship ensured relations between apprentices, journeymen, and shareholders were not reduced to naked self-interest (Bourdieu 2006: 196).

Chapter Seven: Raiding

7.1. Introduction: you must "*dɔkiamp*"

Turkish walked through the back streets of Eastern Freetown stopping in a courtyard known as Peace Market. Cannabis had been dealt here since a *coup d'état* led by Johnny Paul Koroma's AFRC in May 1997. Turkish pulled a black bandana from his bag, a symbol of membership to the recently allied *Black Leo* and *Cens Coast Hood*; youth "*kliks*" [gangs] dominant in the area. Cannabis was still sold in Peace Market and concealed inside the car doors and engine parts of used motor vehicles for onward travel to Guinea and Liberia. As I sat with Turkish, he scanned the surroundings and claimed that the uncertainties presented by law-enforcement could be dealt with by gaining access to a precious commodity:

> "We pass information. We get information from the police and then pass it all back, inside the cartel."

The extra-legal networks through which journeymen, shareholders and their middlemen passed information concerning impending raids had come under increasing pressure since the United Nations led Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) was established in 2010. UNODC officials and civil society representatives claimed that the seizure of a Cessna aircraft transporting cocaine to Lungi International Airport was a "wake-up call" for the government of the threat to national security posed by organised criminal groups, especially those using West Africa as a transit point into Europe from Latin America.[180] TOCU had been mandated to gather intelligence and tackle organised crime and drug trafficking. However, this agency lacked the expertise and resources to target higher-value illicit drug trafficking networks that it claimed were operating through more clandestine Ghanaian and Nigerian subsidiaries with European contacts.[181] A change in strategy suited an emerging rhetoric that purported cannabis cultivation and 'trafficking' represented a threat to national security in West Africa (Csete and Sanchez 2013; WACD 2014). The re-articulation of cannabis-as-threat, in turn, legitimised the government's access to funding and training offered by the United Nations, European Commission and a host of national law enforcement agencies (UNODC 2009; Klein 2014). With cultivation, sale and possession subject to the same

[180] Interview with UNODC officials, Freetown, 06/12/2013.
[181] Interview with TOCU personnel, Freetown, 06/12/2013.

punitive enforcement measures as other illicit drugs under the National Drugs Control Act 2008, the ability to read and anticipate the changing dynamics of law enforcement, centered in Freetown, was being rendered somewhat more ambiguous and uncertain.

Three *pɛku* were concealed inside Turkish's bag. Having paid a small fee of Le10,000 to King David, we relocated to a nearby mechanics shop. Turkish claimed his fee ensured King David was his *sababu* and would protect him from the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). Turkish was approached by two undercover, plain clothes police officers. Although the officers were "known" to him in Hastings, his room for maneuver was, however, somewhat more limited. It was not until Turkish was sitting inside a local police station that he pointed to the fading white lines of chalk marking the times and dates of various law enforcement operations against so-called "grey zones". Peace Market had been targeted by TOCU during what cultivators and dealers began referring to as "raiding". While Turkish had incurred debts and King David was unwilling to reciprocate the higher price required for securing police inaction, TOCU's presence began to harden the boundaries between law-enforcers and law-breakers and challenged local social categories that previously motivated SLP officers to treat cannabis dealing as a licit and permissible activity in their everyday encounters.

When I told the story of Turkish's arrest to a shareholder, he recited a common idiom concerning the need to "*dɔkiamp*"[182] that emerged following a significant increase in the frequency of TOCU's operations since 2012[183]:

> "Men conceal secrets in their throat; you cannot allow the secret to come out of your mouth."[184]

[182] The term "*dɔkiamp*" is used phonetically in Krio. My interlocutors suggest it probably originates from an indigenous Temne name for the capital Freetown, referring to the mouth of the Rokel River estuary. The centrality of the men's Poro secret society in Temne culture indicates mouth refers literally to concealing secrets (i.e. not speaking with your mouth) when dealing cannabis in Freetown.
[183] According to TOCU's data, operations in 2010 coincided with a significant increase in the mean price of cannabis by Le125,000 from 2009 to 2010. While seizures appear low in 2010, the majority of TOCU's crop eradication operations occurred during the peak of the cultivation season at the end of December, such that seizures were typically recorded in the following year. TOCU claimed to have arrested 15 people on drug offences and seized 1920kg of cannabis herb with a purported market value of US$76,781. Since 2010 a total of 15.2 grams of heroin and cocaine were seized.
[184] Field notes, with Musa Barrie in Waterloo, 04/05/13.

To *dɔkiamp* was an instruction: to keep your mouth shut and keep a secret. Journeymen could obtain information allowing them to anticipate and evade law-enforcement operations. This information was usually made available when they or, more commonly, their shareholders provided law-enforcers with "*haju*". *Haju* meant to "give something, for something in return". It ranged from ephemeral one-off payments by journeymen in the domestic exchange market to more durable and formalised arrangements secured by shareholders protecting production. The threat posed by TOCU increased the demand for more formalised bribery arrangements and the necessity for youth to seek protection in extra-legal networks established by shareholders that were more capable of adapting to these changing law enforcement dynamics.

In this chapter I examine how cultivators learned and practiced what it meant to *dokiamp* and how by conforming to apprenticeships and attempting to obtain the *sababu* of shareholders, they could gain access to information that protected their farms and deals from raiding. By considering different social positions within extra-legal networks, the chapter introduces an objectivist vantage from which to assess the access to and efficacy of this information during everyday encounters. Rather than reducing encounters between law-enforcers and law-breakers to the 'blurring' of distinctions between state and society (Galemba 2012), as is common in the anthropological literature, I argue instead that the ability to secure protection from the police depended on their position within what Bourdieu (1987) refers to as the juridical field. The concept of juridical field aids an analysis of the extent to which journeymen and shareholders could negotiate protection from the police.

I argue that, although the emic practice of *haju* was an illicit act in exchange for police inaction, the resulting efficacy of this act – in terms of securing police inaction – depended on being recognised as in receipt of the right kind of *sababu*. This, in turn, depended on a cultivator or dealer's position within the economic field in terms of the status of their associated shareholders and middlemen. Rather than treating *haju* as purely an 'extra-legal' relation of collusion that corresponds to intimacy or privacy within a closed group of co-conspirators, I examine encounters between law-enforcers and breakers through the lens of public secrecy: that which is generally known, but cannot be articulated (Bellman 1981; Taussig 1993). Given the locations of cannabis farms, and the identities of complicit cultivators and corrupt police officers were widely known, public secrecy worked through a variety of semantic and social ambiguities that rendered information obtained through bribery as scarce and consequently as valuable.

In other words, monetary bribes alone were not enough to secure police inaction. Rather, the inaction of police depended on social position in terms of respect for and status of different cultivators.

To this end, the chapter examines unequal rights to and the efficacy of information about impending police raids. I suggest the prevalence of public secrecy meant that attempts to negotiate police protection through bribery varied in efficacy. Instead, public secrecy, in terms of knowing what not to say relative to social position, worked as a further covert principle of convertibility between *sababu* and *haju* that reproduced the structural advantages. Although the Sierra Leonean state was bureaucratically weak and allowed for corruption contrary to the public interest, the presence of TOCU meant that law enforcers could now only unofficially suspend the law only for some, but not others.

7.2. Conceptual starting points: juridical field and public secrecy

The efficacy of bribe payments depended on an ability to accumulate what Bourdieu (1987: 838) refers to as juridical capital. The field of juridical capital is endowed with symbolic relations of power specific to the dynamics of pre-existing fields of organised activity 'which give it its structure and which order the competitive struggles' between those participating in it. The juridical field is closely tied to the economic field given its proximity to the authority and resources of the state make it an important site of struggle for those, such as the original shareholders of the 1980s and 1990s, who were seeking to retain the structural advantages they enjoyed over competitors (Bourdieu 2005). The law is enforced according to a performative logic that impresses a particular vision of order and that finds its efficacy in the impersonality and neutrality of the law: its 'deceptive appearance of autonomy' (Bourdieu 1987: 808, 838). This performativity allowed law-enforcers to serve criminal and public interests simultaneously. Law-enforcers were able to step back from inter-personal relations and assume the more abstract authority of the state (as an agent of the state) in some cases, while in others they unofficially suspended the authority of the state by releasing suspects or otherwise turning a blind eye. Consequently, the juridical field is careful not to conflate the actions of agents of the state with the state itself (Anders 2008: 152), since both law-enforcers were guided by their own private as well as public interests.

I follow Bellman (1981) to argue that public secrecy; knowing a secret but not being able to articulate the facts as such, enabled only journeymen and middlemen with the

right connections to shareholders to be considered by law-enforcers as being "inside the game". Public secrecy is a more common social phenomenon than that attributable to youth transitions through secret societies: it is the 'lifeblood of social structure' (Taussig 1993: 69). It served to dissimulate the perception of social distance between those in more and less dominant positions, even while the content of the secret – names, farm locations and corrupt officers – was widely known. A conceptual bias is therefore often introduced into the study of illicit economies. Extra-legality is relegated to the roles of facilitating corruption and organising violence against challengers. In contexts where law-enforcers act in both criminal and public interests for reasons of poor wages and the interests of their personal networks, public secrecy accounts for social encounters between the police, cultivators and wider community whereby 'those in power and their agents [the police], [must establish they are] acting purportedly in the public interest' (Bellman 1981: 7). It is precisely because of the heavy involvement of the police in cannabis production in the context of increasing pressure TOCU placed on upholding a distinction between criminal and public interest, which required the more malleable targeting of cannabis farmers and dealers who could no longer be protected solely by monetary bribes. This was because the more limited blurring between what was licit and illicit during encounters between law-enforcers and breakers following the inception of TOCU *outside* of the game, was giving force to the government's attempts to delegitimise cannabis cultivation, sale and consumption, and was undermining the ability of the police to act purportedly in the local community's interest.

As distinctions between law enforcers and breakers hardened, especially in Freetown, cultivators under the guidance of their shareholders were taught to *dɔkiamp* [to not tell secrets]. Yet, paradoxically, shareholders were complicitous with the police by engaging in what they described as "leaking" information regarding those journeymen, especially those trying to farm and deal on their own, who were now deemed to be criminals. This presented a paradox according to which 'to tell a secret is to do secrecy' (Bellman's 1981: 8). Given that criminal activity was widely known, public secrecy rendered this not-so-secret information into a scarce commodity exchanged between shareholders and police who were under pressure to conform to TOCU's new policy mandate. This new character of bribery cannot be explained fully in terms of the passive transmission of information between nodes in a network. Rather, secrets were known, but cultivators told, interpreted and acted upon these secrets in ways that corresponded with the asymmetric exchange of this not-so-secret information between dominant players. The economic and juridical fields therefore overlapped and served to regulate each other.

More important than the act of concealing information, then, public secrecy foreshadowed encounters between law-breakers and enforcers, and thereby mediated the competing pressures on police to act in both self- and state-interest. From the perspective of those dependent on the shareholders, public secrecy delimited claims to and recognition regarding who could leak secrets and who could not. While TOCU's inception and the shareholders' claim to their respective apprentices that they needed to keep secrets implied a degree of conceptual duplicity with previous studies of illegal economy, to *dɔkiamp* entailed a more paradoxical social practice in which secrets were known at the same time as it was reasoned that they were not to be shared openly.

The concepts of juridical field and public secrecy are used to analyse how structural advantages were reproduced during everyday encounters in the open exchange market and the networks through which the shareholders tried to protect their farms from being raided. Bourdieu's concept of juridical field is useful for examining the selective criminalisation of certain cultivators and dealers, which was now being justified on the basis of a distinction between productive (and licit) and unproductive (and illicit) journeymen. Law-enforcers were able to arrest and harass those more peripheral to the extra-legal networks established by shareholders because they lacked the requisite *sababu*. This targeting was legitimised by virtue of an emerging public discourse that challenged the self-enterprise of journeymen, claiming instead that they were idle, lazy, unproductive and criminal. This enabled the police to continue benefitting from cannabis production while placating the demands of TOCU, because the shareholders had spent the *haju* and maintained the extra-legal relations necessary to both secure police inaction and leak information that implicated more autonomous journeymen.

7.3. Distinguishing the Il/licit in grey zones

In response to TOCU, the SLP began to designate areas frequented by those who they deemed were "criminals", "idlers" and "thieves" as grey zones. These were the same areas typically used by self-enterprising journeymen aiming to sell cannabis through their own autonomous marketing networks. The common distinction between productive youth man and unproductive *bobo* [small boy] justified the targeting of *panbɔdi* [tin hut] youth bases in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown who police officers claimed were already "known" to them for engaging in other kinds of criminal activity. Police action was often justified, for instance, by the purported membership of these

youth to *kliks* [gangs] such as Black Leo, the Red Flag Movement and the Cens Coast Hood. Alternatively, they claimed to target these youth because they allegedly consumed prescription drugs that made them "irrational" and "dirty". Hence, the police claimed they represented a danger to the public because they were liable not to "keep the peace". One shareholder confirmed by suggesting that the SLP only targeted those who were "*krez*" [crazy] and that would "stare into the abyss and collect spit at the sides of their mouths".[185] The tautological reasoning that drug addicts were "crazy" because they took drugs was rooted in the moral accommodation of cannabis farming and consumption, outlined in Chapter Five, that youth, the police and local residents within Hastings and Waterloo had long drawn between illegal-yet-licit drugs such as cannabis, and illegal-yet-illicit drugs such as cocaine and heroin. These distinctions were often emotively reinforced with reference to the use of illicit drugs by the RUF during the civil war. Since the late 2000s, however, government and media began to advance a rhetoric that treated cannabis as a threat to national security synonymous with cocaine and heroin trafficking. Meanwhile, public health officials drew crude parallels between very different kinds of narcotics, with one prominent psychiatrist claiming the effects of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin were "all the same".[186] Meanwhile, TOCU was increasing its operational tempo and its newly legislated mandate intensified cooperation with surveillance officers from the Criminal Investigations Division and Central Intelligence and Security Unit. Shareholders reasoned they were now more "exposed".

Journeymen that dealt cannabis in these newly designated grey zones were considered by shareholders as now only playing a "simple game". They suggested these former apprentices had failed to *dokiamp*. Those caught in grey zones lacked the "*formula*", a method of concealment that required continual innovation. One dealer in Eastern Freetown referred to the story of a "powerful" dealer nicknamed "VTEC" to explain the importance of having a *formula*:

> "Like, erm, one cartel owner I know in Goderich Street, VTEC, he has a spare parts shop out front. Out back they sell this substance [cannabis] there and they use the code 'Five-Five-Five'. When you call Five-Five-Five they will give you the drug. You give the money first and then they will give you the drug […] It is the formula, the code."[187]

[185] Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013.
[186] Interview with Dr Nahim, Clinical Psychiatrist, Freetown, 04/12/2013.
[187] Interview with Fanan Turay, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 09/12/2013.

A shareholder also emphasised the need to adopt a "disguise" in order to evade attention from the police:

> "Some police officers will know you but they can pretend like they don't understand what you are talking about, but we can disguise still. I can disguise, I can divert to another branch."[188]

During conversations with cultivators and dealers in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo, my attempts to ascertain specific information regarding farm locations, relationships between apprentices and shareholders, and those with the police, were responded to in hushed voices and answers framed in indirect and ambiguous terms. References to idioms and parables ran through explanations of their production hierarchies and extra-legal relations. Shareholders were addressed with reference to vague social figures such as "chairman", "head" and "shareholder", in addition to multiple and changing nicknames. These 'semantic ambiguities' (Penglase 2009: 57-8) were indicative of the importance they assigned to innovation of the *formula*.

These ambiguous forms of concealment were necessary because, as one dealer based in Grafton claimed: "All they [the police] want to do is change you and change your load". "Load" carried two valences. Literally speaking, a load is carried. Yet figuratively, a young man's load symbolised the burdens of trying to claim masculine authority. It was a "bundle inside your head": the obligation to find employment and be respected as a productive member of the community. The greater the load, the more tenuous was recognition by others as a righteous somebody. The perception that the police wanted to change the load a youth carried was indicative of pressure the government and TOCU placed on what social categories counted as criminal and which did not in their everyday social encounters.

During raids on youth bases in Hastings and Waterloo, the police frequently drew on moral distinctions between productive and unproductive youth in order to assign culpability for the crime of "frequency": "those criminals known to the police that return to certain areas regularly".[189] Given journeymen and less influential middlemen frequently sold cannabis at youth bases, frequency provided a suitably ambiguous charge with which to selectively criminalise those lacking the requisite *sababu* of a

[188] Interview with Mr Shɛkah, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.
[189] Interview with Malogie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/10/2013.

shareholder who was trying to placate the growing pressure on the police to tackle the cannabis trade. Youth's ability to deflect culpability depended on their appeals to influential witnesses who mediated recognition of their *sababu*. Although the payment of *haju* afforded more successful appeals, whether the police attributed culpability depended on whether youth were working under a shareholder and were accordingly recognised as a righteous somebody. Such recognition created a demand to engage in apprenticeships under bosses who, in turn, could vouch as their *sababu* during raiding.

Those unable to secure protection were resigned to "*flushing*": concealing something illegitimate inside something considered by those outside the game as legitimate. This counter-strategy was prevalent at a youth base in Eastern Freetown known as Race Course Community that hosted several "high level" cannabis dealers was indicative of this strategy. Having been designated a grey zone on several occasions since 2009, Race Course established itself as a proto-NGO by establishing "links" with a local APC politician, a community policing initiative and several Non-Government Organisations engaged in employment generating waste disposal projects. Medal, the elected youth representative, explained that Race Course arranged for unemployed youth to undertake apprenticeships with cannabis cultivators just outside the small town of Four Mile. Medal's deputy, nicknamed "Balani", claimed he had dealt cannabis in Race Course since 2005 and had since been elected as the "organising secretary". He explained that *flushing* was a response to the increasing criminalisation of youth by local politicians and the police. They had in his words, been "stained" by "the system" and needed to "organise things better":

> "We are fighting to make development in this area, because as you see yourself in this country we have got a system, we have made [these] long benches […] we have painted [murals and] we have put up the rules. According to the culture today men can curse, they fight in this place. We see all of that, and they [the police and politicians] have stained us, the people, that are doing business in this place. So now we tell God thank you, we have stopped it now. We have made our own rules and now nobody can curse, nobody will stand-up and fight. So, like how I am living now, I feel I am free today […] so we have put everything under control."[190]

To reinforce their claims to the public interest, Race Course members worked together with the Local Policing Partnership Board (LPPB) to conduct neighbourhood-watch

[190] Interview with Balani, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 04/12/2013.

along boundaries between rival youth bases (e.g. see Baker 2008, 2011; Albrecht 2010: 57, 2015). Like other youth bases, Race Course publicly displayed and enforced rules to penalise unruly and obscene conduct such as fighting, swearing and spitting. *Klik* [gang] membership was actively discouraged. Medal claimed theft was a problem only for a neighbouring youth base pejoratively nicknamed "*Bɔme*" [rubbish tip]. *Flushing* therefore represented the response of youth to the threat posed by the criminalisation of grey zones. As Christiansen et al (2006: 15) note, youth culture in marginalised contexts begets the question: 'to what degree can youth construct meaningful worlds of their own and pursue their own interests?' Having been more peripheral to extra-legal networks established since the late-1980s and 1990s, the emerging cultural practice of *flushing* represented a counter-strategy employed by self-enterprising illicit agents to negotiate a way out of the culpability of being deemed a criminal, idler or thief.

7.4. Commoditising police inaction

Musa, a shareholder in *Loko Fakay*, regularly frequented Waterloo's *Las Palmas* youth base in search of what he described as "*links*" with new buyers and police officers who passed through to drink *pɔyo* [palm wine], smoke cannabis and socialise when off shift. When greeting police officers, Musa bumped his index fingers side-by-side and claimed "*Wi de tugɛda*" [We are together]. This haptic clue suggested that relations with police officers were no longer as durable as the tightly bound fingers that had organised their chain work. I sat with Musa in a *panbɔdi* while he negotiated arrangements with a new sponsor, Sergeant Conteh, to whom he would provide a journeyman (Mɛdo) as the caretaker for his farm plot. Conteh repeatedly showed Musa the wear and tear of his upturned palms and vowed his commitment to "suffer for the business". During these proceedings, three undercover police officers on *okadas* [motorcycles] pulled up outside a neighbouring *panbɔdi* frequented by a number of small-time dealers who regularly frequented *Las Palmas*.

The undercover officers announced *Las Palmas* was a grey area and detained two young men nicknames "LG" [Lucky Guy] and "Mr Gadget" on charges of frequency. Alongside the young men, Musa and Sgt. Conteh surrounded the officers. National Identity cards were displayed and the names of various *sababu* exchanged, including a number of bluffs by younger dealers claiming to know distant relatives in the police force. During this play of social networks and positionings none of the dealers' claims held weight. Conteh responded by pulling the officers back inside the *panbɔdi* and displayed his

Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) identity card. With a payment of Le100,000 passed to the officers, LG and Mr Gadget were released from their handcuffs. Musa claimed that the youth in *Las Palmas* were targeted because they:

> "Are thieves in the night, they are soft touch guys [i.e. prone to theft]. They are *known* to the police. Look at his t-shirt: 'The Rules Are There Are No Rules'. The idle mind is the devil's workshop".

LG suggested by contrast that "this is laughing time now" and inverted the SLP's motto: "They are a force for bad, a force that spoils". Another dealer nicknamed "Fresh Up" claimed that "they didn't get the right people; they are only trying to fake poor people". Both conceded, however, that Conteh and Musa had provided the phone number of a local police officer who could "balance them" [negotiate with them] in case further raids targeted this newly designated grey area. Unlike these youth, Musa claimed that:

> "The police won't touch me because I am an ex-service man [*Musa shows me an out-of-date military identification card*] If you want to move around come with me. I know the LUC [Local Unit Commander] […] She knows me, I will have no problem […] They know you very well, no problem with that."

Since the departure of "Issue", the former chairman of *Las Palmas* who claimed he had "left the game" to raise his recently born son, these dealers bemoaned that they were increasingly "exposed". It was therefore necessary to make payments of *haju* (Le100,000 per month) to the local officers introduced to them by Musa and Conteh in order to prevent further harassment. These bribes afforded police inaction because, as one cultivator explained:

> "If you are not opening this door, financially, you will not grow because they [the police] will come and block you […] A mortal man, when he has *haju*, it is a person which is good. It is a person that, like me, you know individually as a human being […] *Haju* means in Krio: 'to open up'. *Haju*, is a good relation […] It is a pledge […] You don't get any *wahalla* [trouble] because you *haju* […] That's *haju*. They can love you; they can tell you this secret. They can pull you for a mission. They will never lock this game. Whenever the police officer, the intelligence [undercover police] comes to you, they will come and tell you the information, the right source […but only] if you have made money inside the business, one hundred and fifty thousand Leones, today, inside the business. You can go and pledge your policemen, fifty thousand. They see you as a friend, that you

are my friend. You say I have come to find money […] They will tell you: 'thank you'. They will turn into a good friend. Tomorrow if you have a problem they will not agree [with those arresting you] […] They will leave you and give all of the property back, all of the money, because the police are there to *watch*. They are there to watch, they have to know the *criminal* who is trying to sabotage the business."

So what makes a criminal want to sabotage the business?
"The criminal who wants to sabotage the business is the one who doesn't have any finance. They don't understand the business [...] The police that are there; they *understand* the business. They know they have the key to the business."[191]

This explanation was congruent with observations of raids against other youth bases in Hastings and Waterloo that had also been designated grey zones. While sitting at *God Raw* with a shareholder who had owned a farm in Sugar Loaf for eight years, six Operational Support Division (OSD) officers brandishing tear gas launchers suddenly entered the *panbɔdi* and arrested several loudly protesting young men. Seemingly relaxed, he claimed:

"It is raiding. They are raiding. This is the way they work; they need money when job facility is not there. If you have *haju* you will never fall, they will never catch me."

The cultivator then introduced me to a senior OSD officer wearing a red beret:

"This is my guy, he is a friend, do not worry. Corruption, intelligence and information, this is how it works."[192]

The logic of *haju* was not reducible to law enforcement turning a blind eye. Rather, the law was strategically suspended upon regular receipt of *haju*, thereby protecting self-interests in the cannabis trade while also conforming to the public interest in their daily encounters by TOCU. Raids against youth bases designated grey zones created a demand for police inaction, which was formalised through the regular payment of *haju* by shareholders that now began to "control" each youth base and the targeting of certain dealers that frequented them over those that were under their tutelage.

[191] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.
[192] Interview with *Mɔnga*, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/10/2013.

Formalised extra-legal networks first emerged following an influx of young migrants into Waterloo, Hastings and Freetown who were escaping renewed offensives by the RUF in the late 1990s. Unmet demand for cannabis in Freetown expanded the consumer market for entrants who could exploit its then greater contestability and gain access to those with the contacts and resources to reach inter-regional markets. Although many now current shareholders and journeymen described this period in terms of the growing suspicions and uncertainties following infiltration of the RUF into Waterloo and fragile political allegiances within the NPRC during the late 1990s, domestic exchange continued to be well-coordinated. This was because, until the fall of the NPRC, cannabis dealers were subject to the social regulation of urban secret societies.

Experienced cultivators and dealers noted that the *odelay* societies[193] of *Firestone* and *Paddle*, originally of Yoruba origin, in addition to the more recent *Civili Rule* and *Rainbow* urban-based societies, were important sources of belonging and sodality, and acted as gatekeepers in access to scarce resources, especially during the 1980s and 1990s (Nunley 1987: 61-102; Albrecht and King 2015). Although urban secret societies have typically been discussed in terms of the then-ruling All Peoples' Congress party's mobilisation of political thuggery (Rosen 2005: 78), *odelays* are noted to have provided Freetown's influx of unemployed youth with work in the informal and illicit economies (Abdullah 1998: 208). While tracing Turkish's movements through Eastern Freetown, he claimed the Firestone Community in Foulah Town – an area historically dominated by Protestant Krios – had been resident to many of the "highest level" cannabis dealers who were adept at navigating the dense and blurred allegiances of Eastern Freetown's manifold social networks. *Firestone* was officially founded in 1967 by upcoming members, known as the 'Young Bloods' who, unlike their older counterparts, were less reticent in their consumption and procurement of cannabis and 'quickly took to its use' having already been closely engaged with Rastafari culture (Nunley 1987: 77-9). Having established exchange relationships with cultivators in Hastings during the late 1980s to 1990s, new members of *Firestone* were provided with opportunities to cultivate cannabis along the peninsula, and in return, these societies facilitated cultivators' access to growing consumer markets in Freetown.

[193] The 'odelay' is a youth-oriented and urban-based troupe established in the 1970s that draw on the iconography of colonial-era hunting societies and involve annual public masquerades (see Nunley 1987).

Odelays were central to the extra-legal networks that regulated Eastern Freetown's exchange market for cannabis. A local civil society representative claimed that the influence of *odelays* extended to the organisation of cocaine and heroin "*katɛls*" [cartels] such as "After Eight" and "Bangkok" based in Lumley Street.[194] The youth of Race Course claimed that the Firestone had cooperated closely with local divisions of the SLP since LPPBs were established following the civil war in the early 2000s (also see Albrecht and King 2015: 187-9). Turkish likewise explained how his late father, a Local Unit Commander (LUC) in charge of law enforcement operations in Hastings and Grafton, was a participant on one such LPPB and worked closely to share information concerning criminal activity. These intermediaries were important for protecting shareholders from being targeted by the police, but these arrangements were now coming under strain from TOCU. Therefore, as one cultivator suggested, the ability of shareholders to influence the LPPB's was important because they represented the:

> "Intelligence […] they will come and tell you the information, the right source. They will not let you fall in the business."[195]

With shareholders already benefiting from the incorporation of pre-existing social institutions that they had participated in since the 1980s, under the pressure of TOCU they became patrons given their access to and ability to influence what criminals and criminal activity should be targeted and what should not.

7.5. Secrecy and the politics of raiding

The shareholders utilised established and more predictable extra-legal networks to protect their interests. By contrast, small-time dealers without the support of these shareholders utilised counter-strategies of the *formula* and *flushing* to evade the police in Eastern Freetown's exchange market. For them, criminal selection and targeting was more ambiguous due to the overt presence of the police in the cannabis trade. For instance, police officers openly mixed with dealers in youth bases and a number of shareholders claimed they either owned or sponsored farms to increase their income. Despite police awareness of high-level farmers and dealers being an open secret, the shareholders were still not targeted. For instance, during one visit to American and

[194] Interview with Hindowa, former cultivator and civil society representative, Freetown, 09/12/2013.
[195] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

Ɔsilibu's compounds, a large truck containing at least 1,000 bags of fertiliser had parked outside. Twenty young men took turns to eat and carry the bags into the bush (see Appendix Eight). While waiting for American and *Ɔsilibu* to return from their discussions with other shareholders concerning this "arrangement", I asked one journeyman whether I could enquire as to why they openly conducted such activity:

> "You must speak to someone first and they will give you the green light […Especially] those high up in the game. We are the small ones; we do not know how to talk to them […] You need to flip things upside down."[196]

Our proximity 500 meters from the National Police Training Centre confirmed that, if secrecy was primarily a method of concealment, then it was not one required by the shareholders. My focus shifted to the journeyman's admission that not all those aware of the duplicitous role played by the police had the right to interact with them by breaking an otherwise open secret. Instead, they were resigned to unequal power relations because the shareholders in complicity with local law-enforcement adjudicated what was criminal and what was not. Adherence to the implicit rule of knowing what not to say worked to sustain a network of extra-legal relations according to how youth handled and presented certain information deemed by their peers to be "secret". This, in turn, foreshadowed their encounters with law enforcers during which they perceived it was necessary to acquire or retain the support of shareholders to evade criminal charges. As one cultivator perceptively claimed:

> "Risk is when you are doing something with fearness; tricks are when you are doing something with style."[197]

His reference to "tricks", synonymous with having a *formula*, suggested that the "style" according to which illegal activities are concealed is what mattered. To have "fearness", however, was to be protected by a *sababu* who could minimise the real "risk" of being harassed by the police. "Fearness" denoted the duplicitous closure of social distance between the police and shareholders, whereas "style" was a counter-strategy of concealing illicit activities in the absence of a protector. His compound statement suggested that while most independent dealers perceived that an ability to evade the police was universally defined by the innovation of different kinds of concealment

[196] Field notes, with Turkish in Hastings, 13/11/2013.
[197] Interview with Alpha Fofana, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 31/10/13.

(style), the heavy involvement of the police meant it was actually those that secretly co-operated with them (that "fearness") that really mattered. And yet, it was precisely this logic that the more experienced journeymen who had completed his apprenticeship felt unable to divulge. This duplicity was necessary to maintain the coherence of a moral rhetoric that purported the shareholders worked against "the system" despite precluding their apprentices' life chances.In doing so, they remained "fearful" sources of public authority to their dependents. As one shareholder suggested: "we are all brothers, we know our secret, we know ourselves".[198] Bellman (1981: 1) notes that 'the practice [of public secrecy] is so pervasive that it is relevant to any type of social situation'. The shareholders therefore duplicitously suggested that the changing politics of drug control were a threat to their shared survival, which meant it was now necessary for their apprentices to *dɔkiamp*.

The need for shareholders to modify their extra-legal relations stemmed from reforms to the security and intelligence services amid post-conflict reconstruction efforts since 2001, which resulted in many senior law enforcers being sidelined from drug control agencies in Sierra Leone.[199] Despite claiming to possess a parliamentary mandate to gather intelligence on and coordinate law enforcement operations against illicit drug production and trafficking, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was reduced to what one NGO representative described as a "white elephant". Former head of the now defunct Military Intelligence Bureau and the current director of the NDLEA bemoaned his perceived usurpation by TOCU, which reduced the agency to four administrative staff (see Appendices Nine & Ten). Civil society representatives and law enforcement officials routinely criticised the lack of cooperation between the NDLEA and TOCU, with the implicit message that although the NDLEA "knew" more about the illicit drug economy than other agencies who staffed younger recruits from the diaspora deemed more reliable and impartial, for political reasons the ruling APC would not allow the NDLEA to regain an operational role, because:

> "He [the NDLEA director] is a dangerous guy [but] he has a *lot* of information […] sensitive information, be careful what you say to him […] he continues to have a lot of people working for him [to gather intelligence] presently."[200]

[198] Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.
[199] For a comprehensive overview of security sector reforms during the post-war period see: Jackson and Albrecht (2009); Albrecht (2010) and Krogstad (2012).
[200] Interview with Civil Society Representative, Freetown, 06/12/13.

Aptly nicknamed "*Awoko*" [a Yoruba term for a singing bird i.e. a gossiper] this interlocutor in the intelligence services suggested it was important "to be careful what you say [during your interviews], a lot of them are spying for the government". Despite the implementation of technocratic reforms, old elites continued to defend the networks of *haju* that were established by the original shareholders during the 1980s and 1990s.

Haju was a precious commodity. Cultivators claimed that although it was possible for anyone to secure *haju*, there was always the threat of "leakage". Leakage, in its literal sense, referred to the revealing of information to the police concerning farm locations, rainy season stores of *diamba* and plans to transport cannabis to Guinea. Given this information was presented as secret at the same time as being widely known, whether a leaked secret was acted upon depended, first, on whether the subject of the leak had the requisite *sababu* allied to these changing elite-level extra-legal networks and, second, on whether they could meet their *sababu's* increasing demands for *haju*. The paradox of secrecy this entailed was aptly explained by a shareholder who had farmed in *Loko Fakay* since the late 1990s:

> *So what do you mean by 'leakage'?*
> "When you go and report somebody about the things you don't know about. Do you understand?"[201]

By developing his studies of West African secret societies in relation to secrecy in more mundane social encounters, Bellman (1981: 8, emphasis added) has noted that 'when a secret is revealed it automatically restructures interpretation. *To tell a secret is to do secrecy*'. Shareholders were more prone to "tell" secrets than were their journeyman counterparts. The efficacy of telling a secret hinged on whether the receiver recognised the authority of the teller to reveal said information. As such the leaking of secrets was as much a normative question regarding who ought to do the telling, as it was a positive one regarding the content of the secret. Although anxieties about telling secrets were a feature of everyday discussions, the practice of leaking secrets was well-organised through competing extra-legal networks established through LPPBs during the NPRC of the 1990s, and those that emerged under TOCU during post-conflict reconstruction programmes following the late 2000s. With reference to his father who was formerly a Local Unit Commander in neighbouring Grafton, a cultivator in Hastings provided a detailed explanation of what it meant to leak a secret:

[201] Interview with Alpha Fofana, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 31/20/13.

"If they [the shareholders] find out you have the business [but you are not one of their apprentices], then they will leak it. If you don't have the money but you have the *sababu* then you will never make money, trust me. If you have *sababu*, then that *sababu* will pursue you out [i.e. back you up]. And then if you have money, then your money will come close, you will know how to make them [the police] come closer, to sensitise you, because they come here to give you that sense. If they want to raid you, to come and capture you, then they must give you that sense. They [the shareholders] have authority, because of *money*. You will go and meet them and say: 'Hey *pape*, look at this one million Leones'. And he says: 'Leave five hundred thousand' […] 'There now, look at this one million Leones – hold it'. You have closed them. Then finally they will give you a receipt for the business. They will say that anybody who holds you [i.e. tries to arrest you] should come and meet us, so call this number. *Turkish bangs his index finger on the bench*. They will never hold you; they will never come and obstruct the business. That is why money [is important]. Even for *Ɔsilibu* when they went and captured him, during the time of NPRC [National Provisional Ruling Council], before the coup, they said they would come and overthrow him […] But because he was a strongman inside the *ganjin* [cannabis economy], they released him."

[…]

So you keep some secrets and leak others out?
"No we don't let the ghetto man's [i.e. our network's] secret leak out. But if they [the police] want to come and raid in the ghetto then we would tell the men in the ghetto that they are coming to raid. We would hide everything and make a disguise. Then if the policemen want to get hold of the criminals, then we help them, because we are the intelligence. We let them apprehend criminals."

So the information comes from your father's friends?
"That makes the police know where they move. All the movement they are doing at all of the corners. *They* are trying to gain information. *We* are trying to gain information. [But] we are not working to disturb the peace. The police are working to gain information, to know about you. If you are a criminal, if you are a minister, or a teacher, that is what they want to know. […] This is the work of the police: to try and save life and property."[202]

The efficacy of leaked secrets depended on whether the social network through which the secret had been communicated was recognised by law enforcement as legitimate.

[202] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, 17/09/2013, Hastings.

Secrecy took the form of a message interpreted from different points of view within hierarchical networks resulting in a 'restriction of information about information' (Bellman 1981: 8). From the perspective of secrecy as a communicative act, the analytical focus is less on what was leaked (i.e. the content of the secret) for the police could already obtain the information through pre-existing networks of surveillance. A common theme across interviews with senior law enforcement and security officials was their tacit acknowledgement that my research should not be empirically challenging, for information regarding the specifics of the cannabis economy; including names of cultivators and dealers, locations of farms and ghettos, the organisational hierarchies, and so forth, were already well known to them. It was rather my failure to contact them and their particular network in the first instance; to acquire their *sababu* and be granted their "permission", that was perceived as incompetent. As a civil society representative who previously worked as a dealer in one of Eastern Freetown's ghettos claimed, many of the largest farms and ghettos were owned by members of the SLP:

> "I will tell you for free, the police know every ghetto in this country. They know the men who are doing all the stuff, but it is only that they are not proactive, because they have gains that can be made from the sale. So if you want to stop it then [*he pauses suddenly and changes tack*] well in most cases, actually, they won't go there, they will just tell the boys, because, in fact, this isn't an allegation, it's the truth."[203]

More emphatically, the Director of the NDLEA claimed that:

> "The police are hopeless, useless, they don't want the drug trade to end [...] I could name them all. I could bring a tsunami to Salone [Sierra Leone] Everyone knows everyone. If you want to know all of them go to CID, one thousand dollars should get you what you need."[204]

Such claims indicated that various activities and players were widely known but not acted on by law enforcement. This was because the targeting of one dominant player could precipitate the targeting of others in different networks. The act of leaking secrets can therefore be reinterpreted as a 'number of implicit instructions that accompany [the telling of a secret] and constitute its [communicative] key' (Bellman 1981: 9). Common during discussions with law enforcers was the absence of specific details regarding

[203] Interview with Hindowa, Civil Society Representative, Freetown, 09/12/13.
[204] Interview with Sim Turey, Director of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA, Freetown, 13/12/13.

information that led to an arrest, eradication of a farm or seizure of cannabis from a vehicle travelling to Guinea. It was the act of leaking itself that appeared to be at stake, rather than the content. This was because those who were told secrets needed to disregard the telling as an exposing (because the information could already be obtained by other means) and in doing so the police assumed membership "inside the game" with cultivators and pushers who shared dominant positions within their respective extra-legal networks. Consequently, disputes at the elite-level of drug enforcement were indicative of a struggle over access to the authority and resources of the state and its "official" rules. A selective deceit ensued whereby police recognised that secrets originating only from certain high-level cultivators were secret in the stricter sense of the term. Separately, apprentices and journeymen occupying structurally disadvantageous positions were not party to this tacit collusion. Instead they perceived the leaking of secrets to law enforcement as a threat to all, which in turn necessitated their closer cooperation with shareholders who could afford them a degree of protection.

When I asked Turkish why we could observe the illegal activities of the shareholders, but were unable to interview them on specifics, he claimed that: "We are the smaller ones; we do not know how to talk to them". The emphasis placed on "how" is crucial, for it suggested that only those who occupied structurally advantageous positons possessed the interpretive keys necessary – of putting two-and-two together – to leak a secret with efficacy. Such one-sided communicative acts imply a double truth, for the semantic ambiguities youth engaged in were motivated by the perceived threat law-enforcement posed should their secret leak out. This was despite such secrets only having efficacy – in terms of arrests, eradications and seizures – if the teller of the secret and the receiver (the police) occupied the 'same structural position *vis-a-vis* all others who would make different use of the concealed information' (Bellman 1981: 19).

Therefore, in most cases, the subject of a leaked secret was only targeted if they occupied a structurally *dis*advantageous position to the teller. This was because the leaking of secrets had been communicated from a position of authority. Otherwise secrecy amount to merely gossip and rumour that, in turn, provided youth with an incentive to pursue the protection of a shareholder in a social landscape they perceived as being inherently uncertain and unpredictable. As the owner of a farm in Macdonald

who was more peripheral to these extra-legal networks claimed: "if raiding comes, it is in God's hands".[205]

Those that had not undertaken apprenticeships were resigned to treat raids organised by TOCU as inevitable and matter-of-fact. The practice of leaking secrets marked out membership categories corresponding to the clustering of cultivators around shareholders that could access extra-legal networks, and which in turn, were structured and restructured according to their changing positions within the economic field. Access to information regarding impending raids against cannabis farms, and the ability to secure *haju* in the face of police harassment in the exchange market, depended on the positon of cultivators within geographically clustered hub-and-spoke networks. As a journeyman who rented a plot from a shareholder in *Loko Fakay* claimed:

> "Yeah, a secret *Balogun* [the researcher]. I can get information some days when they [the shareholders] say: 'Hey! Raiding is coming! So-so-so time. They call and give me a hint. Then I know and can be ready. Well then I know that today they are doing it."[206]

[205] Interview with Mr *Shɛka*, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.
[206] Interview with Bayo Manseray (alias, 'Adebayor'), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 19/11/2013.

Figure Three: Extra-Legal relations in cannabis production between cultivators and law-enforcement. *Source: Fieldwork data (Appendix Four).*



Based on data regarding ties observed and reported between cultivators and law enforcers, the network diagram in Figure Five depicts directed and undirected channels of communication between law-enforcers, shareholders, journeymen and apprentices. Journeymen and apprentices relied on their shareholders to pass on information. This network focuses on extra-legal relations in production and therefore does not account for the role played by middlemen in the exchange market. However, other groups in the open market, as suggested in the case of youth bases in Freetown, Hastings, and Waterloo, were marginal to the extra-legal networks inhabited by shareholder farmers. Each node is sized according to its respective betweenness centrality (see Appendix Five). This is a useful metric for understanding how the more localised extra-legal networks organised through LPPBs since the early 2000s, were being challenged by TOCU at the elite-level of drug enforcement. Betweenness centrality measures the degree to which a cultivator lies on the shortest path between two other cultivators and

law enforcers across the entire extra-legal network, including those shareholders detached from any extra-legal relation.[207] In the context of these changing extra-legal networks, betweenness helps to identify those that 'are able to funnel the flow [of information] in networks' and who in doing so, 'can assert control over the flow' (Opashl et al 2010: 3-4). Each node is sized according to the degree of betweenness centrality, such that larger nodes represent cultivators with greater access to sources of information regarding impending raids against farms by TOCU. *Ɔsilibu* obtained the highest betweenness (0.35). Mr *Shɛkah*, the landowner of Macdonald farm, obtained the lowest (0.0), given he was detached from the newly emerging network presided over by TOCU. These betweenness statistics closely approximated each cultivator's experience of raiding, with, for example, Macdonald farm having been targeted by TOCU in December 2012 and 2013, given this cluster of production lacked the *sababu* necessary to control the flow of information percolating from TOCU down the SLP hierarchy.[208]

With these extra-legal arrangements incorporated into the extant production hierarchies examined in Chapter Four, the resulting social structure is a larger hub-and-spoke network, which is suited to the maintenance of hierarchy and the efficient communication of information.[209] Those shareholders with a greater betweenness statistic, such as those clustered in Hastings, are thereby interpreted to have assumed a more dominant position and as such are better protected. Yet, as discussed in relation to public secrecy, not all information has the same efficacy for individuals within each production hierarchy of shareholders, journeymen and apprentices. This was because only information presented as secret was accepted as genuine and valuable, as opposed to gossip and rumour. As discussed in Chapter Three, it was necessary to link the subjectivist analysis of public secrecy with an objectivist analysis that was more detached and situated the flow of information in the hierarchically unequal positions assumed by cultivators. Hence, only shareholders were able to establish the extra-legal relations necessary for bribe payments to be acted on their law-enforcing counterparts. For example, a former apprentice cultivator that had quickly obtained land ownership and greater net profit on average corresponded to a high value of 0.22. This was

[207] The betweenness centrality of a node (v) is calculated according to $g(v) = \sum_{s \neq v \neq t} \frac{n_{ae}(v)}{n_{ae}}$ where n_{ae} is the total number of shortest paths from node *a* to node *e* and n_{ae} (v) is the number of those paths that pass through *v*.

[208] According to the land owner, TOCU's "Operation Green Hay" in 2012 and "Operation Green Hay 2" in 2013 eradicated 5km/sq of Macdonald farm.

[209] The spread of rumour, for example, is not the result of passive information "diffusion", but rather, motivated by deliberate demand and notification in relation to those who are proximate in social as well as geographic space (Martin 2009: 164).

indicative of the relations he strategically maintained with his former shareholder, *Ɔsilibu*, which allowed his payments of *haju* to have greater efficacy and served as prior warning for raids against cultivators. Having completed an apprenticeship, *Ɔsilibu* represented this cultivator's *sababu* [influential person] whom he could signal to for protection when dealing and for receiving *credible* information of impending raids. Consequently, the convertibility of social capital in relations between cultivators and juridical capital in terms of payments of *haju* was regulated by an underlying distribution of symbolic capital that was generative of who had the right to credibly leak secrets and who did not. Repeated interactions across hubs, while limited to only certain shareholders, resulted in the formation of these hub-and-spoke networks. Those that had established extra-legal relationships with law-enforcement acted as the mediators of information for the 'spokes' – the apprentices and journeymen – attached to them. Timely receipt of information regarding future raiding – when understood as credible and signalled by a cultivator's *sababu* – also acted as a withholding sanction against failure to pay land rent or in the event of theft.

Since the inception of TOCU, cultivators formed increasingly close-knit networks represented by the colloquial names given to neighbouring plots, such as *Loko Fakay* and *You Must Grumble*. Hub-and-spoke networks conformed to the imperative of shareholders that youth were to *dɔkiamp* and that, far from duplicity, they were all equally subject to the same uncertainties. The resulting structure was 'ideal to handle issues of dissemination of information when the source and recipient of that information are not easily specified in advance' (Martin 2009: 167). Consequently, the shareholders gained a structural advantage in the juridical field given they were provided by elites within law enforcement circles of impending raids. These elites had a vested interest to "leak" such secrets as it helped them undermine each other's effectiveness and stood to make light of their corrupt practices. When cultivators and pushers ventured away from a shareholder, *haju* lost its efficacy. Youth that moved around most frequently were treated with disdain. Law enforcement could therefore continue benefiting from bribes, without undermining the position of the established shareholders whom they sought to protect. This created an incentive for youth to undertake apprenticeships that, in doing so, contributed to the reproduction of structural advantages. As one former dealer noted: "The police, you know, they are like players in this ring".

7.6. Conclusion: misrecognition in the juridical field

Rather than extra-legality being indicative of a dereliction of duty to the "public", corruption was strategic and served localised political ends. The interests of local law-enforcers in the cannabis economy meant it was treated as an illegal-yet-licit activity, as demonstrated by acts of suspending the law during everyday social encounters. However, these episodes of police inaction were not solely reducible to the gains that stood to be made from self-interested bribery against all law-breakers. Rather, they favoured those in positions of authority who inhabited extra-legal networks in which shareholders and law-enforcers were co-present since at least the 1980s. The inception of TOCU did, however, begin to sharpen distinctions between law-enforcers and law-breakers, for cannabis production was increasingly conveyed as a threat to national security. This placed pressure on localised extra-legal networks comprising shareholders and LPPBs since the early 2000s. Notions of cannabis as illegal-yet-licit were being undermined by government discourse and centrally co-ordinated law enforcement, challenging the ability of shareholders to protect clients. This was demonstrated by Turkish's difficulty negotiating with two undercover police officers whom he already "knew" while residing in Hastings.

Competition between local networks of protection and the more independent TOCU at the level of everyday social encounters was explained according to the concept of juridical field. Here, different players vied to legitimise and delegitimise (i.e. criminalise) localised social categories regarding what counted as licit and illicit, permissible and impermissible. Police inaction in this regard was justified on the basis of common criminal categories. Small-time dealers in youth bases with no shareholder affiliation were subject to the charge of frequency and treated as idle delinquents engaged in the use of prescription drugs and theft. Apprentices and journeymen perceived that all were equally subject to the law. This notion extended from a moral rhetoric advanced by the shareholders that positioned their righteous work in opposition to "the system" that sought to foreclose their life chances. Those in disadvantaged positions did not, therefore, engage in purposive 'boundary work' by negotiating the roles of law-breaker and law-enforcer in line with their interests (Beek 2012). Rather, the efficacy of bribery on the part of journeymen and middlemen navigating the exchange market depended on social rather than economic capital. This was demonstrated by their signalling affiliation to shareholders during encounters with different local police forces in order to secure inaction. When qualified by *sababu*, the payment of *haju* was credible.

Extra-legality is often treated as synonymous with small, closed and collusive groups that provide a context in which corruption subverts the public interest. In this conceptual framework, primacy is given to the need for secrecy as a form of concealment; such that corruption must be kept private if co-conspirators are to avoid detection (Baker and Faulkner 1993). This chapter demonstrated that secrecy can be defined as qualitative experience tied to particular positions within a field of activity that cuts across a clear demarcation between 'state' and 'society'. For instance, shareholders taught their apprentices the importance of needing to *dɔkiamp*; to not tell the police their secret. As such, journeymen and independent dealers began to develop counter-strategies, such as the forms of concealment denoted by *flushing* and the *formula*. Given the presence of TOCU rendered shareholders' ability to protect their clients increasingly uncertain, youth reasoned that detection by law-enforcement stemmed from a failure to innovate new methods of concealment and a lack of discipline in keeping their secret in everyday social encounters. This was demonstrated by the increasing prevalence of semantic ambiguities and hushed voices, compounded by gossip and rumour.

Secrecy usually bares an analogical relation to intimacy and privacy. Typically secrecy matters in terms of who is privy to a secret and who is not. Privacy and secrecy do, however, represent different ways of treating knowledge during social encounters. While all manner of information can be concealed, such as gossip and rumour; only secrecy 'restructures interpretations of social reality' (Bellman 1981: 2-8; Piot 1993). This restructuring of reality occurred on the part of those apprentices and journeymen that learned to *dɔkiamp*, which ensured the coherence of a moral rhetoric that their shareholders were not complicit with agents of the state.

Wacquant (1998: 4) notes, for instance, that the hustling involved in criminal activity is defined by an 'ability to manipulate others, to inveigle and deceive them'. While shareholders deceived current and former apprentices by stressing the need to keep secrets, the reality of their hustle was somewhat more difficult to 'pin down in reality itself' (*ibid*: 5). Public secrecy, the shared norm of knowing what not to say, worked to dissimulate the complicity between protagonists that youth clung to as occupying the separate moral universes encompassed by "the game" and "the system". This duplicity stemmed from shareholders and law-enforcers needing to protect their mutual interests from the increasing encroachment of TOCU. The absence of their dependent's

misrecognition would have otherwise undermined their investment (*illusio*) in apprenticeship. As Wacquant concludes on the social figure of the hustler, the 'awareness' of duplicity results in 'a pained lucidity that makes [them] realize that to pity oneself would be in vain' (*ibid*: 5).

Following his father's death, Turkish remained a journeyman but had lost a vital guarantor to protect him from the police. With the inception of TOCU and the changing dynamics of law enforcement beginning to turn against him, Turkish reasoned he must continue to pursue his work in order to not become "*bɔmboshɔro*". To be *bɔmboshɔro*, as Turkish explained in the introductory vignette (Chapter One), was emasculating and indicative of the "shit" youth experienced when unable to assume the more accommodating identity status of youth man. The shareholders did, however, offer new forms of protection, thereby accommodating their continued status as youth men while paradoxically increasing their dependency and foreclosing opportunities for self-enterprise. It is for this reason that illicit work was experienced by youth as decidedly double-edged.

Despite their misrecognition to the contrary, the objective convertibility between *sababu* and the *haju* of police inaction, as understood by an observer, reproduced the structural advantages of dominant cultivators and dealers through youths' everyday encounters in the economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange. The negotiation and adjudication of *sababu* placed limits around their opportunities to convert social into economic capital. *Haju* responded to a demand for police inaction. Together these imperatives emphasised to youth that apprenticeship was the means by which they could ensure a degree of stability in their lives. Apprenticeship allowed young men to avoid the pitfalls and uncertainties of playing the game, and in turn worked to inculcate and reproduce emic practices as compatible with what it meant be a youth man. Hence, *sabi*, *sababu* and *haju* formed a tripartite of emic practices that ensured the on-going cultivation of hierarchy.

<u>Chapter Eight</u>: Conclusion: Reproducing Structural Advantage

8.1. Research question and avenues

During the introductory vignette I traced Turkish's life history from the late 1990s as he went "inside the game" of cannabis cultivation in Hastings, having dropped out of school and found himself socially marginalised undertaking the work of illicit drug running for a *Lumley Street* cartel. On the precipice of his life turning *bɔmboshɔro* [break, rupture, synonymous with the Krio colloquialism of a "*frakas*"], Turkish sought existential refuge in an apprenticeship with his shareholder Harold. First introduced by Jamaican cultivators displaced amid the Jamaican Labour Party's War on Drugs in the mid-1980s, I examined in Chapter Four how these shareholders benefited from new cultivation techniques and seed varieties that increased yields and provided them with a competitive advantage for the next three decades. Furthermore, these nascent cultivators – such as *Ɔsilibu* and American – established extra-legal relations that allowed them to access information regarding impending raids on farms by law enforcement.

I argued that illicit drug economies are typically conceptualised through what I termed an *objectivist-structuralist* approach. By reading non-state organisation through the assumptions of *embeddedness* and *interactionism*, organised and credible threats of inter-personal violence were privileged as the mechanisms through which small, closed and collusive groups mitigated challenges by newcomers and evaded detection and disruption by law enforcement. Given the uncertainties of product illegality, interference by law-enforcement, and resulting need for intra-group discipline and monitoring, violence was treated as the preferred organisational strategy for small and closed groups. Consequently, it was argued that the analysis of illicit drug economies in sub-Saharan Africa fell back on epistemic and conceptual assumptions relating to the objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches, with the empirical focus having been almost exclusively on cases of illicit drug economies found in North America, Europe and Latin America. Rather than careful analysis of the institutional histories, norms and actors involved in the production and exchange of illicit drugs, a paucity of empirical data has resulted in various kinds of essentialism that have emphasised the criminalisation of the state, war economies and Mafia-type organisation. In effect, the transit economy for cocaine and heroin operated by Eastern Freetown's handful of cartels that Turkish was escaping from, has been conflated with the longer

and more productive history of the cannabis economy in Hastings and Waterloo, such that it was increasingly being treated by government, law enforcement and international donors as a threat to national security.

When cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo locked their index fingers together, the explanation and practice of what they referred to as chain work was at odds with this representation of Sierra Leone's cannabis economy. Examining this production and marketing networks in Chapter Four was apparent that dominant players benefitted from structural advantages in access to land, labour and higher value exchange partners. A survey of seasonal returns concluded the presence of oligopolistic price competition. Yet, neither the presence of organised violence nor a unitary and corrupt police force secured these advantages. This seeming contradiction in the objectivist-structuralist approach motivated the underlying research question of this thesis:

> **How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to organised violence?**

During an initial phase of field research (Dec 2013 to May 2014) I identified boss-apprentice relations (i.e. apprenticeship) as the site at which structural advantages were being reproduced. A short period of desk research (June 2014) allowed me to develop the conceptual tools necessary to examine the *reproduction of structural advantages* in both the *economic field of cultivation and exchange* and the *juridical field of law enforcement*. This task required bridging an impasse between objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that had resulted from disciplinary silos. To this end, Chapter Two discussed Bourdieu's relational sociology and outlined his key open concepts of field, capital, habitus, practices, *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence. These concepts were considered in theoretical relation to each other, as a 'toolbox', rather than taking a more partial reading that selected certain concepts that have been deployed primarily to understand particular empirical contexts (e.g. of highly striated class society). The chapter further developed the concepts of misrecognition and symbolic violence that emerged from Bourdieu's study of non-state 'modes of domination' and concluded they required better empirical specification. Rather than reverting to an interactionist vision that privileged inter-personal relations, relations were argued to lie between position-takings occupied by agents within an organised

field of activity, such that on-going practices – acting, reasoning and valuing – were motivated and shaped by the dispositions (habitus) tied to that particular position.

8.2. Examining structural advantage

Structural advantages were 'structural' in two senses. First, according to the objectively unequal distribution of economic (land, labour and cash-money); cultural (who was recognised to be competent and knowledgeable), and social capital (in relationships with exchange partners). Second, structure took on an inter-subjective form, representing a symbolic system according to which cultivators classified, utilised and valued objects and relations in particular ways in their on-going activity. Structure was objective and subjective and related to the concepts of field and habitus respectively. Practices represented particular 'forms' of acting, reasoning and valuing that when reiterated produced the regularities observed at the level of the economic field and gave it a degree of stability. This allowed the field to be examined by using objectivist tools of analysis such as regression analysis and network mapping. By contrast, a probability function broke down at the level of the individual and their particular idiosyncrasies, lending to the impression in subjectivist-constructivist accounts that life is more uncertain and volatile (see Lainé 2014). By moving iteratively between theory and evidence it was possible to examine how apprentice cultivators misrecognised the subjective nature of social life as an 'objective' reality that motivated and gave meaning to their on-going practices. The result was identification of more covert forms of symbolic violence, rather than inter-personal violence or structural violence. I argued that structural advantages could be examined by coordinating the qualitative experience of more and less dominant participants that assumed particular positions within the economic and juridical fields. This alternative approach to the study of illicit economies was referred to as *social aesthetics*.

The methodological avenue necessary to flesh out a social aesthetics entailed the linking of objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. I followed Bourdieu and adopted the methodological approach of participant-objectivation. Rather than assuming that greater immersion as a participant-observer would result in greater objectivity, Chapter Three argued for a degree of detachment during field work and analysis in order to situate the experience of interlocutors according to the position they occupied within the field. This was also necessary because covert power operated extra-discursively and was more challenging to elicit through techniques such as interviewing that are

primarily inter-subjective. Consequently, I used objectivist and subjectivist techniques of data collection and analysis and examined the degree to which subjective expectations diverged from objective chances. This window onto social distance was clearest in terms of what Chapter Three referred to as public secrecy. By initially focusing attention on subjects who assumed more and less dominant positions, it was possible to examine who had the right to reveal secrets to law enforcement and who did not, thereby coordinating points of view from advantaged and disadvantaged positions within the juridical field.

8.3. Cultivating hierarchy: main arguments

Several empirical contributions were provided in ***Chapter Four: Chain Work*** towards a better understanding of drug production in sub-Saharan Africa and to the economic analysis of cannabis cultivation and exchange more broadly. A fine-grained institutional analysis demonstrated that a system of apprentice provisioning utilised by Christian Evangelists in the late 1700s spurred a legacy of institutional adaptation in small-scale agriculture whereby apprenticeship was inter-related with a low-margin, domestic marketing system. The introduction of cannabis *sativa* in the mid-1980s and new cultivation techniques also significantly improved crop yields and reduced harvesting time. In response to increasing intra-regional demand, prices rose during Sierra Leone's post-war recovery. Cannabis provided greater returns than licit agricultural goods and cultivators were able to strategise based on reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply. Returns were skewed in favour of so-called shareholders who had obtained first rights to land ownership and established clusters of cannabis production in the mid-1980s (in You Must Grumble). Rather than explaining these observations as a market inefficiency resulting from the opacity of price signals (i.e. incomplete information) or unequal access to information regarding quality and high value exchange partners, I argued that asymmetric and incomplete information were indicative of principles through which the shareholders secured their dominant positions.

This operated in two ways. First, quality and price were not closely associated such that the expectation of price was more significant than any 'objective' valuation when cultivators and dealers shared samples of their product. Second, more competitive cultivators had a longer history of providing apprenticeships to newer entrants and had historically acted as gatekeepers in access to economic capital (credit, labour and land). The chapter concluded that price formation in the cannabis economy could not be fully

explained when limited to an interactionist vision. Turning to the concept of economic field afforded a *structural vision* of illicit economies whereby particular dispositions tied to unequal positions within a field were structured through access to, and ownership of, land and labour. The economic field was socially constructed and I argued that what apprentices considered rational strategy was likely shaped by particular dispositions and expectations that informed how they negotiated exchange relationships. Rather than a market inefficiency, oligopolistic competition indicated schemes of action, reasoning and valuation (i.e. practices) that were oriented to the possibilities and constraints of particular positions as youth men and shareholders.

This system of apprenticing was demonstrated to be uncertain owing to a lack of enforceable contracting arrangements or independent referees, and the threat of interference by law-enforcement. Despite shareholders exploiting the cheap labour of apprentices and journeymen remaining confined to a low-margin domestic market, apprenticeship was rendered durable and reproduced according to an elective affinity between Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism. This folk cosmology invoked a sense of requiredness and validation by others sharing the same field of activity that motivated and co-ordinated action in cannabis farming and marketing networks. The ensuing practices were qualified by notions of hard work and the "strain" of physical labour that conformed to broader socio-generational categories of what it meant to be a respected and worthy young person. This process represented what I referred in Chapter One as 'alignment', which was necessary to align expectations with chances, or in other words, of subjective dispositions with objective positions. As demonstrated in ***Chapter Five: The Game***, what I described as the primary habitus of shareholders came into confrontation with the expectations of youth that were guided by the telos of a stylised Western modernity. To attune the expectations of their prospective apprentices to the objective chances they had of succeeding in the economic field of cannabis cultivation, they needed to be "sensitised" and "pulled down" to more reasonable goals. The *Five Star General's* "*bluff bluff*" was indicative of the double-edged nature of this habitus, on the one hand offering hope and on the other concealing that expectations were unlikely to be fulfilled.

The legacy of these early shareholders was the clustering of cannabis cultivation in the peninsula bush around Hastings and Waterloo into several distinct sites, referred to colloquially as *Loko Fakay*, *Obɔnoki*, *Sugar Loaf*, *Wanpala* and *You Must Grumble*. Each site was shown to be hierarchically organised, with what I referred to as 'bosses'

claiming ownership to ancestral and state-owned land by assuming the status of a stranger. This land was then informally rented to secondary land users who farmed on plots under the guidance of their respective shareholder who taught them how to grow, how to gain the *sababu* [influential people] of higher value exchange partners, and how to monetarily value the quality [*grade*] of cannabis when distributing a sample of their product to dealers in the *panbɔdi* [tin hut]. While apprentices and journeymen assumed the intermediary category of "youth man", this institutional accommodation ensured their investments of energy, hard work and time while apprenticed reproduced a hierarchical social structure and enabled the shareholders to extract cheap labour. Shareholders also regulated access to economic capital in land, higher value exchange partners, and as such were able to "control" the labour of their apprentices. I concluded that habitus was not synonymous with mindless repetition but was instead to be grasped phenomenologically in particular sites (i.e. apprenticeship) at which field and habitus were being linked. This was necessary to explain how the subjective expectations were aligned with objective chances, and thereby reproduced the institution of apprenticeship and its associated marketing networks under conditions of uncertainty.

It was through apprenticeship that habitus and field were linked to reproduce structural advantages. In ***Chapter Six: Apprenticeship*** I examined how apprenticeship, as a collective form of "learning by doing", provided the possibility of acquiring a valuable skill and claiming the status of a productive and righteous somebody within a context of scarcity. Youth engaged in two inter-linked emic practices – *sababu* and *grade* – that acted as covert principles regulating access to higher value exchange partners, greater returns for the product of their labour, and to police inaction amid raiding of cannabis farms and deals. When apprentice cultivators came to understand the game, they recognised what was permissible and impermissible; what kinds of acting, reasoning and valuing were perceived necessary so as not be playing a "simple game". I argued that, conceptually-speaking, the imperative of being viewed as savvy [*sabi* in phonetic Krio vernacular] was synonymous with the accumulation of cultural capital, and produced symbolic relations of power that shaped how these specific species of capital were accumulated, utilised and valued. Apprentice cultivators' claim to be "finding their own lane in life" was a subjective manoeuvre that provided them a degree of uncertainty in spite of the risk of being exploited by not receiving wages, land ownership, higher value exchange partners, or the their skills otherwise not being recognised by other shareholders as valuable . The recognition – worth and value – resulting from

participation in apprenticeship entailed misrecognition of the objective structures that kept them hemmed in. To be considered a righteous and productive somebody, as argued in relation to the *illusio* of righteous labour, had psychological payoffs motivating participation, which supported the economic incentives examined in Chapter Four. In effect, apprenticeship operated as what Wacquant (1995) terms a '*collusio*', by securing the reproduction of structural advantages through one-sided practices.

The juridical field of law enforcement overlapped with the economic field of cannabis production and exchange. In ***Chapter Seven: Raiding*** I argued the juridical field allowed agents of the state, namely the police, to assume the abstract and impersonal authority of the state and target those cultivators and dealers who assumed disadvantaged positions. When peripheral to extra-legal networks that had been organised by the shareholders since the mid-1980s, youth could not access information regarding impending raids against cannabis farms and were treated as unproductive idlers by the police when attempting to sell their product in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. With the inception of TOCU in 2009, I argued that these extra-legal networks were being placed under increasing strain. Consequently, the shareholders and more established cultivators began to emphasise the importance of needing to *dɔkiamp*: to keep your mouth shut and not leak a secret. Information regarding locations of farms, residence of cultivators and complicity of police officers was, however, widely known. By examining everyday social encounters between law breakers and enforcers the chapter focused on the role played by public secrecy: knowing something but not being able to articulate the facts as such. Rather than secrecy being analogous to privacy and social closure, it mattered more in terms of how certain information "inside the game" was presented as secret, and that in doing so foreshadowed encounters in terms of who had the right to "leak" secrets and who did not. Rather than securing protection through a corrupt and unitary police force, public secrecy created scarcity in terms of the efficacy of information and commoditised police inaction through the trade of *haju*: giving a little something for something in return. *Haju* represented a covert principle, in tandem with *sababu* and *grade*, which limited challenges by new comers and created an increasing demand for apprenticeship in order to access information regarding impending raids against farms.

8.4. Theoretical implications: dealing with uncertainty?

This thesis suggests that Bourdieu's concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence represent important tools for examining the organisation of and youths' participation in the illicit economies of the Global South. Furthermore, a relational sociology was shown to compliment an institutional approach, by demonstrating how regularities in social behaviour could be reproduced in the absence of self-enforced contracting arrangements and independent referees in a context of illegality. This was particularly important given apprenticeship has demonstrated a degree of permanence and popularity in West Africa, despite the majority of such arrangements not being formalised or predictable for apprentices (Meagher 2011: 65-6). As Martin (2003: 26) has argued in his development of field theory as an alternative approach to sociological explanation: 'it may be that his [Bourdieu's] approach is completed not contravened by a restriction of field to interinstitutional relations'. By linking habitus and field, it was possible to examine the reproduction of one informal institution, apprenticeship, in a context that, as highlighted in the introductory vignette, has been characterised as somewhat more uncertain and volatile. Uncertainty was shown as typically being dealt with by privileging dense, closed and small organisations in which violence was a regulatory compliment to internal discipline, monitoring and outwards protection in exchange relations. However, at the individual level, uncertainty has also been dealt with by maximising the agency of youth to observe, plot and navigate economic, political and social change. Following Vigh's (2006, 2008, 2009) widely utilised concept of 'social navigation', youth adjust and respond to change in the immediate environment of the here-and-now in interaction with 'goals and prospective positions' of an imagined horizon that 'they perceive as being better than their current location and the possibilities within them' (Vigh 2009: 432). Social navigation is therefore 'to plot, to actualize plotted trajectories and to relate one's plots and actions to the constant possibility of change' (*ibid*: 426). Youths' social practice is argued to entail flexible action oriented towards provisional goals that 'derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements' (Simone 2004: 411). Uncertainty equates to an unknowable future, and in response the uncertain has typically been treated as a 'permanent place of provisionality where interactions occur […] through loosely knit and constantly changing networks' (Nielson 2014: 216). It is argued that in contexts of uncertainty youth exercise a high degree of 'provisional agency':

> 'A transformative mode of 'can do' sociality, a means of opening up possibilities through improvisation and creation of something new and effective, which may allow for thriving as well as surviving.' (Jauregui 2014: 76)

Following this line of argument, it is common for economically and socially marginalised agents to assume a 'posture of openness to possibility' (Johnson-Hanks 2005: 367) and to be endowed with a 'willingness' to interact with one another across social difference and distance to harness the opportunities of ever-increasing social circles (Simone 2004: 408).

While some admit that uncertainty is experienced unequally (Vigh 2009: 431-2) and that the capacity to deal with uncertainty depends on the historically unequal positions of agents (Zeiderman et al 2015: 285, 298), the conceptual thrust guiding the literature is that, when faced with uncertainty, youth have an ability to exploit new social relations and opportunities while adhering to goals that are only ever provisional and subject to changing circumstances. How certain courses of action are invested in and come to be meaningful, as I have argued in this thesis with reference to the concept of *illusio*, represents a line of enquiry not fully explored. Yet this avenue for research is important in light of current developments in field theory that, having paid close attention to the legacy of existential phenomenology and Bourdieu's sociology, examine how agents are motivated to seek 'existential refuge in the collective' (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). As Bourdieu (1990: 48 emphasis added, also see 1998: 78) argues explicitly:

> '[The] precondition for entry to the field is recognition of the values at stake and therefore *recognition of the limits not to be exceeded on pain of being excluded from the game*.'

Following his arrest, Turkish explained the apprenticeship he undertook with his shareholder through the commonly used metaphor of the cotton tree:

> "When they cut the tree you will see shit. They [the shareholders] say that when you are under the tree you know that you are being covered. But when a time comes that they cut the tree, you know that the tree is valuable. So you should work like the tree and grow like the tree – this is the way we should grow."[210]

[210] Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.

The pain of exclusion corresponded precisely to the "shit" youth experienced on leaving their apprenticeships (Chapter Four) and, lacking access to more reliable sources of economic capital, were subject to a pernicious discourse that relegated them to the "*bobo*" [small boy] of an unproductive idler. In other words, dealing with uncertainty by recourse to flexible and provisional action requires a degree of cognitive dissonance on the part of agents who otherwise seek meaningful lives that provide a sense of worth and value. Cultivators like Turkish participated in a hierarchically organised institution in the expectation (*illusio*) that it would allow membership to a group that would be garnered social respect and value as a knowledgeable and righteous somebody.

Those arguing from the position of the productive capacity of uncertainty rely on a partial reading of Bourdieu's sociology that short-circuits the concepts of *illusio*, misrecognition and symbolic violence in favour of conceptualising fields as highly structured and habitus as somewhat mechanistic and conformist (e.g. see Vigh 2009: 426-7, 2010: 156-7; also see Guyer 2004: 68-70). Bourdieu is typically treated as a 'reproduction' theorist who reduces youth to cultural dopes despite being at pains in his work to emphasise that outside of particular empirical contexts 'fields do not have invariant properties' (Bourdieu 1990: 111).[211] As Crossley (2003) highlights, the reproduction line of critique results when conflating the theoretical sensitivity of Bourdieu's open concepts with specific empirical contexts, namely that of French class society discussed in *Distinction* (1984). In doing so this reduces Bourdieu's relational sociology to the mechanistic formula: '[(habitus) + (capital)] + field = practice' (*ibid*: 101; also see Calhoun 2006: 1403). The result is a partial reading of Bourdieu that privileges 'an underlying idea of relatively stable class-structured states' (Vigh 2009: 427). Further confusion arises when Bourdieu's economic concepts – 'interest' and 'capital' – are treated as 'explicitly formalist' (Graeber 2001: 27), despite these concepts remaining 'open' and articulated in somewhat more metaphorical terms as part of a

[211] Absent from Bourdieu's sociology, however, is the role of production. His conceptualisation of the economic field begins with an underlying, pre-existing distribution of capital, but does not directly address how an unequal accumulation of capital results from the extraction of surplus value. Bourdieu's formulation is bracketed to, 'capital is accumulated labour […] *which, when* appropriated on a private, i.e. exclusive basis', rather than '*that is*' (also see Gulliory 1997: 382). It is not clear how labour value, in terms of youth's time and effort spent toiling in apprenticeships for 3.2 years on average, is secured, and by consequence, how surplus value is appropriated by their respective bosses. Curious in Bourdieu's (2000: 202-5) later work, as Burawoy (2012) has similarly noted, is a short passage sub-titled, 'The Two Fold Truth of Labour'. Only under particular historical circumstances do agents invest solely in the objective truth of labour, 'an intrinsic profit in labour, irreducible to simple monetary income' a situation that is otherwise 'profoundly abnormal'.

more complex, subjectivist mode of analysis, indicative of Bourdieu's semantic sensibilities while he engaged in a project to articulate an economic anthropology that took the symbolic basis for experiences of economic 'reality' seriously. Lebaron (2004: 263) argues this mode of analysis and writing represented 'one of Bourdieu's most personal trade secrets'. As discussed in Chapter Two, such critique is at odds with Bourdieu's earlier studies of the Algerian *Kabyle,* masculinity in Béarn or the political and social turmoil experienced in France in 1968, where field and habitus were increasingly incongruent. These field studies and historical events prompted the conceptual elaboration of *hysteresis* (Chapter Two, 2.7.3).[212] The privileging of *Distinction* over Bourdieu's other texts has resulted in a reading of his sociology that is confined to 'more compact and abstract statements' (Wacquant 2014b: 128). Rather than mindless repetition, the examination of habitus in this thesis required paying attention to imagination and highly complex subjectivities. The development of field theory as a more robust approach to sociological explanation indicates that:

> 'You have to face the fact that the faculty of imagination is a crucial intermediary between ourselves and the world, between the senses and the intellect. We also have judgement, a second and countervailing intermediary, one able to correct the flaws of the productive imagination [...] I do not think that we have yet really grappled with what this means.' (Martin 2014: 111-2)

By utilising a subjectivist mode of analysis (to explicate habitus) in dialogue with an objectivist analysis (to explicate field) I argued it was possible to grasp how subjective expectations were brought into alignment with the objective structures of apprenticeship through a range of complex emic practices, namely *sababu*, *grade* and *haju*, which were taken as legitimate competence.

'Crisis' occurs when *illusio*, the belief of investing in the game as worthwhile, is no longer aesthetically captivating (Crossley 2003: 46). During times of crisis the habitus readjusts to bring objective chances and subjective expectations back into congruence (Bourdieu 2000: 211-6). Chapter Five argued that precisely this dissonance was emerging as field and habitus diverged, such that the shareholders responded with a "*bluff bluff*" that compressed youths' temporality into a future present attuned to more reasonable goals. Bourdieu was very much interested in the relationship between impatience and hysteresis, and called for a serious phenomenological approach to flesh out the *illusio* of

[212] Also see Bourdieu (2000: 159) on 'Mismatches, Discordance and, Misfiring'.

specific fields of organised activity, as experienced by agents, that guides and secures participation (Bourdieu 2000: 208-34). As Burawoy and von Holdt (2012: 3) have argued when applying Bourdieu's concepts in the context of Johannesburg, South Africa:

> 'Bourdieu's thinking about domination and order may alert us to the processes of ordering beneath a surface that appears unruly and fragmented.'[213]

Rather than automatically assuming the circular logic of field and habitus, the analytical task is to grasp how a degree of fit is secured between them. It is to recognise that there is a degree of positioning within positions of marginality that allows fields such as the cannabis economy to be productive in the first place.

Problematic in Bourdieu's conception of domination is that it operates extra-discursively as well as inter-subjectively. Drawing on snapshot interviews, Finn and Oldfield (2015) claim that the 'strain' experienced by Freetown's street vendors and sand miners was indicative of a high degree of provisional agency. But surely to *strain* implies limits? While the righteousness gained when participating in the cannabis economy was recognised (and discursive) apprenticeships were based on the sleight of hand of their respective shareholders that was otherwise misrecognised as the appropriate or correct way to succeed when going inside the game. This subjective manoeuvre pointed to extra-discursive processes that have otherwise been less well-specified in Bourdieu's sociology. As I argued in Chapter Three, to more convincingly grasp the double-edged expectations and hopes articulated by youth it was methodologically prudent to exercise a degree of detachment and reflect on the objective structure of a field of activity and examine how aspirations were incongruent with chances of succeeding, even if these were more congruent in youths' representation of their social reality. In other words, ethnographic studies must strike a dialogue with objectivist tools, such as network and statistical techniques, if we are to avoid the trap of idiographic and subjective closure that I critiqued in Chapter Two (2.1). Otherwise, there is always the risk of romanticising agency (Thieme 2013: 391) and, more importantly, of down-playing the political consequences of social suffering in our representations of youth in illicit drug economies (see Bourdieu 1998b).

[213] A similar conclusion is drawn by a small number of economic sociologists that have utilised Bourdieu's concepts to examine how, 'even in a period of strong economic changes, cultural and symbolic factors limit drastically the "fluidity" or "flexibility" of society' (Lebaron 2003: 56).

Although Bourdieu's theory of practices – and practice theory more broadly – has often failed to specify empirically verifiable mechanisms for the transmission and sameness of social action across agents, the learning trajectories of each apprentice cultivator examined in this thesis were not as idiosyncratic or individualised as critics suggest (e.g. see Turner 2001; Turner 2007: 356). Instead, apprentices were embedded in an organised field of activity – their respective production hierarchies – such that the acquisition of practical knowledge was reasonably well ordered and subject to explicit instruction based on a directed and consciously articulated pedagogy.[214] This argument is also apparent in Wacquant's (2004: 70-1, 99-127) formulation of the pugilistic habitus, which emphasises the explicit instruction of a trainer in the gym and tacit processes of acquirement by the trainee with other apprentice boxers in the ring. Practices are social, in the plural sense that action is directed towards and adjudicated by an audience that confers recognition and the validation of that action as competent (Chapter Two, 2.6.1). Apprenticeships operated as a pedagogic authority, through which young men established particular expectations concerning what kinds of practice were recognised as competent and valuable, and that resulted in the acceptance of apprenticeship as the legitimate means by which to "*sabi* the game" (Bourdieu and Passerson 1990; Wacquant 2011: 86).

The theoretical scaffolding here is consummate with recent work seeking to bridge the disciplinary silos of social anthropology and cognitive neuropsychology. These disciplines have argued that apprenticeship represents a plausible ethnographic site for studying knowledge acquisition that is organised, explicitly instructed, incremental and – crucially – time consuming for those implicated in them (Sterelny 2012: 32-43).[215] This conclusion is synonymous with earlier studies in a range of contexts that conclude apprenticeship works to shape social action and interaction beyond its particular master-apprentice relation:

[214] This critique of practices is usually arrived at by reducing mechanisms for transmission and sameness to the implicit/unconscious and therefore to the cognitive. Such critique is usually framed in terms of the cognitively implausible notion of 'downloading' practices from some shared social object that exists outside the mind (Turner 2007: 355-6). Debate has revolved around the 'discovery' of cognitive mechanisms that enable social learning from others without conscious reflection, including mirror neurons (Lizardo 2007, 2009) and connectionism (Bloch 2012: 195-200). Despite Lizardo's more explicit argument that mirror neurons represent the missing cognitive link in fleshing out Bourdieu's concept of habitus, it would be unwise, as Martin (2011: 290, fn. 32) cautions, to 'bet the house' at this early stage.

[215] Although Kim Sterelny's (2012) theoretical examination of human cognition and social life does not reference Pierre Bourdieu explicitly, his conceptual use of 'Cognitive Capital' is perhaps indicative of the theorist's influence.

> 'Training is never without [the] structure of specific instruction [...] relevant learning occurs not solely in the context of apprenticeship, but life-long through play, observation outside of apprenticeship, and general social constraint.' (Coy 1989: 1)

Rather than assuming the theoretical circularity between field and habitus that has opened Bourdieu's sociology to the critique of treating youth as cultural dopes, the analysis of this thesis adds validity to Wacquant's methodological proposal to begin first with the objective moment (the field) before embarking on an ethnographic analysis (of habitus and practices). The economic field examined in Chapter Four acted as the analytical starting point from which the subsequent qualitative chapters argued that apprenticeship regulated youths' access to economic capital in land, labour and credit through culturally and historically specific emic practices. Meanwhile, apprentices more-or-less conformed to the secondary habitus examined in Chapter Five. This was responsible for realigning their subjective expectations to the more limited objective chances offered after apprenticeship as journeymen. Even if individual learning trajectories were more idiosyncratic, youths' on-going practices were still tied to their specific positon within the field, indicative of what I referred to as *social aesthetics*: qualitative experience tied to unequal positions within a field of organised activity (Martin 2011: 314-5; 2014).

By utilising a long-term qualitative methodology grounded in a historical political economy and objectivist analysis of the economic and juridical fields, it was possible to examine how the institution of apprenticeship reproduced social order in a context elsewhere treated as more uncertain and volatile. The reproduction of structural advantage hinged on how the subjective aspirations of youth were made congruent with the objective structures of the production hierarchies they participated in. Youth misrecognised that the competence and worth recognised by others in their on-going practices worked to produce the structural advantages enjoyed by more dominant cultivators and dealers. Rather than cultural dopes, the primary habitus of their bosses that had been shaped by Neo-Evangelist and Rastafari values and virtues, and the more immanent promise of being recognised as a righteous and productive somebody in a context of scarcity, formed the basis for a captivating *illusio* that offered the chance for un- and under-employed young men to reclaim masculine authority. The result was symbolic violence in "the game" motivated by a moral rhetoric that sought refuge from the structural violence of "the system". Structural violence was field forming and symbolic violence was field reproducing. When recognised as competent practices,

sababu, *grade* and *haju* operated as covert principles in subjective experience that regulated access to economic capital in land, higher value exchange partners, greater returns on the product of their labour and in securing police inaction. It was therefore possible to conclude that Sierra Leone's cannabis economy was not regulated through the organised violence of closed social groups, but instead operated as a durable, high value activity in contrast to more destructive activities such as theft and cocaine trafficking, with important political implications. By taking the experience of youth in illicit economies seriously, and grounding that experience in an empirical analysis of the economic conditions and social structures that have come to shape their circumstances, it is possible to eschew geopolitical misrepresentation in favour of analytical precision. Or at least this would represent one small step towards understanding why youth: "bind around this, but not around that".

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Appendix 1: Tabulated Data from Surveys with 58 Cannabis Cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo during 2013.

ID	Name	Mean price per kg (dry season)	Mean price per kg (rainy season)	Annual Mean price per kg	Volume sold (kg, dry season)	Volume sold (kg, rainy season)	Annual total volum sold (kg)	Number of seasons cultivated	Volume of fertiliser use per season (bags)	Volume of chicken dung used per season (bags)	Annual volume of fertiliser used (bags)	Annual volume of chicken dung used (bags)	Farm location	Number of holes	Dry season turnover (Le)	Rainy season turnover (Le)	Annual turnover (Le)	Sold to open market (1 = Yes)	Duration as land owner or rights user (years)	Duration in Apprenticeship (years)
1	Musa Barrie	150000	200000	175000	18	10	28	2	2	2	5	4	10 Loko Faka\	250	2700000	2000000	4700000	0	9	1
2	Sara Conteh	150000	250000	200000	8	0	8	1	0.25	4	4	0.25	4 Loko Faka\	50	1200000	0	1200000	0	4	14
3	Sorie Kabbah	150000	150000	150000	10	7	17	2	1.5	3	3	3	6 Loko Faka\	200	1500000	1050000	2550000	0	5	4
4	Samuel A Cole	150000	150000	150000	42	8	50	2	15	10	10	30	20 Sugar Loaf	300	6300000	1200000	7500000	0	4	Unverifiable
5	Mohammed Manseray	100000	200000	150000	18	4	22	2	1	30	2	2	60 Loko Faka\	300	1800000	800000	2600000	0	3.75	0.25
6	Pa Mohammed	40000	40000	40000	8	0	8	1	0	0	0	0	0 Loko Faka\	140	320000	0	320000	1	4	0
9	Joaque Ibrahim	150000	250000	200000	10	4	14	2	1	15	2	2	30 Loko Faka\	150	1500000	1000000	2500000	1	0	1
10	Tamba Bangura	80000	150000	115000	7	0	7	0	6	8	0	0	0 Loko Faka\	1000	560000	0	560000	0	0	1
11	Ali Manseray	130000	150000	140000	27	0	27	1	0.5	5	0.5	5	5 Wanpala	215	3510000	0	3510000	0	0	1
12	Immanuel Lamey	170000	0	85000	36	0	36	1	0.5	10	0.5	10	10 Wanpala	290	6120000	0	6120000	0	2	7
13	Abu Bakar	150000	180000	165000	40	0	40	2	7	6	14	6	12 Wanpala	150	6000000	0	6000000	1	0	4
14	Lamin Kamara	100000	160000	130000	30	0	30	1	1.5	8	1.5	1.5	8 Wanpala	900	3000000	0	3000000	1	0	1
15	Phillip Kamara	150000	350000	250000	40	20	60	2	3	10	6	6	20 Wanpala	250	6000000	7000000	13000000	1	0	6
17	BIG	250000	300000	275000	40	25	65	3	5	25	15	15	75 Sugar Loaf	300	10000000	7500000	17500000	0	10	10
18	Turkish	200000	170000	185000	20	5	25	2	0.5	5	1	1	10 Obohnoki	300	4000000	850000	4850000	1	1	3
19	Atika	150000	200000	175000	15	10	25	2	0.5	5	1	1	10 Obohnoki	200	2250000	2000000	4250000	1	0	4
20	Thimu	50000	300000	175000	20	10	30	2	1	4	2	2	8 Obohnoki	150	1000000	3000000	4000000	1	1	3
21	Alie Bangura	70000	300000	185000	18	5	23	2	3	20	6	6	40 Obohnoki	350	1260000	1500000	2760000	1	12	2
22	Idrissa	80000	300000	190000	16	4	20	2	1	8	2	2	16 Obohnoki	300	1280000	1200000	2480000	0	7	5
23	Musa Kamara	60000	250000	155000	15	0	15	1	1	7	1	1	7 Obohnoki	200	900000	0	900000	0	13	0
24	Tapeia Sesay	100000	250000	175000	14	5	19	2	0.5	4	1	1	8 Obohnoki	200	1400000	1250000	2650000	0	7	2
25	Hassan Jalloh	60000	110000	85000	10	2	12	2	2	15	4	4	30 Obohnoki	175	600000	220000	820000	0	18	5
26	Santi Bangura	100000	200000	150000	20	0	20	1	2	10	2	2	10 Obohnoki	250	2000000	0	2000000	0	1	1
27	Lamine Barrie	150000	200000	175000	20	10	30	2	5	5	10	10	10 YMG	200	3000000	2000000	5000000	0	2	4
28	Abdul Rahman Sesay	150000	180000	165000	20	6	26	2	1	4	2	2	8 Loko Faka\	150	3000000	1080000	4080000	0	2	4
29	Arthur Kemokai	160000	250000	205000	50	0	50	1	2	12	2	2	12 Wanpala	500	8000000	0	8000000	1	2	4
30	Samuel Joseph	150000	0	75000	60	0	60	1	1.5	8	1.5	1	8 0	350	9000000	0	9000000	130000	0	2
31	Mehdo	150000	0	75000	20	0	20	1	1	5	1	1	5 Loko Faka\	200	3000000	0	3000000	0	10	Unverifiable
32	Sallieu Conteh	150000	200000	175000	27	7	34	2	3	15	6	6	30 YMG	300	4050000	1400000	5450000	0	4	3
36	Gbrilla Manserey	200000	0	100000	15	0	15	1	1.5	4	1.5	1.5	4 Loko Faka\	200	3000000	0	3000000	0	1	4
37	Ibrahim Turonka	170000	0	85000	23	0	23	1	1	3	1	1	3 Loko Faka\	250	3910000	0	3910000	120000	2	0
38	Moses	70000	70000	70000	10	3	13	2	2	8	4	4	16 Loko Faka\	150	700000	210000	910000	0	4	2
39	Maxwell Kamara	170000	200000	185000	5	0	5	1	0.25	4	0.25	4	4 Loko Faka\	25	850000	0	850000	1	8	3
40	Jonny Bangura	80000	150000	115000	14	0	14	1	3	6	3	3	6 Loko Faka\	100	1120000	0	1120000	1	1	1
41	Mustafa Kamara	200000	300000	250000	12	20	32	2	10	20	20	20	40 Wanpala	300	2400000	6000000	8400000	1	5.5	1
42	Alpha Fofana	170000	220000	195000	20	8	28	2	5	18	10	10	36 YMG	300	3400000	1760000	5160000	1	10	6
43	Usman Sesay	150000	200000	175000	25	6	31	2	20	35	40	40	70 Sugar Loaf	350	3750000	1200000	4950000	1	2	5
44	Abdullai	90000	110000	100000	12	2	14	2	2	10	4	4	20 Sugar Loaf	150	1080000	220000	1300000	0	3	1.5
45	Mohammed Kargbo	100000	120000	110000	14	0	14	1	2	14	2	2	14 Sugar Loaf	200	1400000	0	1400000	0	3	5
46	Musa Sesay	200000	0	100000	12	0	12	1	1	8	1	1	8 Loko Faka\	200	2400000	0	2400000	1	6	0
47	Mohammed Moshie	200000	250000	225000	65	30	95	2	35	0	70	0	0 YMG	800	13000000	7500000	20500000	1	2	13
51	Sara	100000	200000	150000	22	2	24	2	1	18	2	2	36 Wanpala	300	2200000	400000	2600000	0	7	1
52	Alieu	150000	170000	160000	20	5	25	2	0.5	5	1	1	10 Wanpala	300	3000000	850000	3850000	0	2	0
53	Lahay Corrie	50000	0	25000	5	0	5	1	0.12	1	0.12	1	1 Wanpala	100	250000	0	250000	1	1	3
54	Ibrahim Bangura	80000	0	40000	6	0	6	1	0.5	5	0.5	5	5 Wanpala	200	480000	0	480000	0	0	1
55	Bayo Manseray	150000	300000	225000	15	10	25	2	2	10	4	4	20 Loko Faka\	250	2250000	3000000	5250000	0	6	4
57	Mr Shekah	150000	200000	175000	11	6	17	2	0.5	12	1	1	24 Wanpala	150	1650000	1200000	2850000	0	2	3
58	Musa Koroma	200000	400000	300000	55	25	80	2	15	150	30	30	300 YMG	750	11000000	10000000	21000000	0	5	2

Appendix 2a: Tabulated data for nodes within network diagram of production hierarchies.[216]

Node-ID	Name	Duration of apprenticeship	Position in production hierarchy	Output (annual)	Price (dry season)	Price (rainy season)	Price * Output (dry season)	Price * Output (rainy season)	Price * Output (annual)	Output (dry season)	Output (rainy season)	Location of farm
81	David Kamanda (49)	0	3	12	50000	150000	500000	300000	800000	10	2	Wanpala
83	Gibo (63)	-6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
84	Wilfred Kamanda (62)	0	2	22	150000	250000	1800000	5000000	6800000	12	20	Wanpala
85	Mustafa Kamara (41)	-5.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
89	Augustine Kamanda (61)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
95	Manso (64)	-1.5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
98	Mr Shekah (57)	0	3	17	100000	150000	1100000	900000	2000000	11	6	Wanpala
99	Mako (65)	-1.5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
104	Alieu (52)	-2	2	25	120000	170000	2400000	850000	3250000	20	5	Wanpala
105	Lahay Corrie (53)	-1	2	5	50000	0	250000	0	250000	5	0	Wanpala
106	Abu Bakar (66)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
107	Arthur Kemokai (29)	-2	2	50	150000	240000	7500000	0	7750000	50	0	Wanpala
108	Immanuel Lamey (12)	-2	2	36	170000	0	6120000	0	6120000	36	0	Wanpala
112	George I Will (13)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
113	Lamine K (14)	-6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
114	Phillip K (25)	-10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
115	Ibrahim Bangura (54)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Wanpala
116	Sara (51)	-7	2	24	50000	150000	1100000	300000	1400000	22	2	Wanpala
117	Musa Barrie (1)	0	3	28	130000	190000	2340000	1900000	4240000	18	10	Loko Fakay
118	Bishi (35)	-2	1	14	150000	0	2100000	0	2100000	14	0	Loko Fakay
119	Mohammed (67)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
120	Unknown 1 (68)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
121	Sorie (3)	-5	2	17	120000	150000	1200000	1050000	2250000	10	7	Loko Fakay
122	Gbrilla M (36)	-1	2	15	170000	0	2550000	0	2550000	15	0	Loko Fakay
123	Ayo Pack (70)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
125	Lamine (69)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
126	Mehdo (31)	-10	2	20	110000	0	2200000	0	2200000	20	0	Loko Fakay
127	Pa Mohammed (6)	0	3	8	30000	30000	240000	0	240000	8	0	Loko Fakay
128	Joaquie Ibrahim (9)	-1	2	14	140000	230000	1400000	920000	2320000	10	4	Loko Fakay
129	Mohammed M (5)	-4	2	22	100000	150000	1800000	6000000	2400000	18	4	Loko Fakay
130	Musa Limba (71)	-4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
131	Jonny B (40)	-1	2	14	70000	100000	980000	0	980000	14	0	Loko Fakay
132	Immanuel T (56)	-1	2	10	150000	0	1500000	0	1500000	10	0	Loko Fakay
133	Musa Sesay (46)	-6	2	12	180000	0	2160000	0	2160000	12	0	Loko Fakay
134	Abdul Rahman-Sesay (28)	-2	2	26	120000	170000	2400000	1020000	3420000	20	6	Loko Fakay
135	Bayo Manseray (55)	-5	2	25	150000	250000	2250000	2500000	4750000	15	10	Loko Fakay
136	Ibrahim T (37)	-2	2	23	120000	0	2760000	0	2760000	23	0	Loko Fakay
137	Moses (38)	-4	2	13	60000	60000	600000	180000	780000	10	3	Loko Fakay
138	Izu (72)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
139	Unknown 2 (73)	-1.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
140	Sam Bayo (74)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
141	Ali Manseray (75)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
142	Tamba Bangura (10)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
143	Musa Duya (76)	-3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Loko Fakay
144	Sara Conteh (2)	-4	2	8	150000	200000	1000000	0	1000000	8	0	Loko Fakay
145	Maxwell K (39)	-8	2	5	150000	180000	750000	0	750000	5	0	Loko Fakay
146	Samuel A Cole (4)	0	3	50	80000	150000	3360000	640000	4000000	42	8	Sugar Loaf
147	Kohnehl (77)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
150	BIG (17)	0	3	65	150000	200000	6000000	5000000	1.10E+07	40	25	Sugar Loaf
151	Usman Sesey (43)	-2	2	27	100000	190000	2500000	1140000	3640000	25	6	Sugar Loaf
152	Sorie Conteh (78)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
153	Mohammed Kargbo (45)	-4	2	14	70000	90000	980000	0	980000	14	0	Sugar Loaf
154	Abdullai (44)	-3	2	14	80000	100000	960000	200000	1160000	12	2	Sugar Loaf
157	Mohnga (60)	-7	2	50	130000	200000	5200000	2000000	7200000	40	10	Sugar Loaf
158	Unknown 3 (79)	-3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
159	Unknown 4 (80)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
162	Gibril Sesay (81)	-1.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
163	Abu K (82)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
164	Alusine (83)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
167	Sila Tourey (84)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
168	Silasey (85)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
169	Unknown 5 (86)	-1.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
170	Unknown 6 (87)	-1.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
171	PM (88)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
172	Myers Bangura (50)	-1	2	10	50000	0	500000	0	500000	10	0	Sugar Loaf
173	Maze (89)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
174	Henry (90)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
175	Morlie Kamara (91)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
177	Unknown 7 (93)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
178	Unknown 8 (94)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sugar Loaf
179	Ohsilibu (95)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
180	Lamine Barrie (27)	-2	2	30	150000	200000	3000000	2000000	5000000	20	10	YMG

[216] '0' values are null values corresponding to cultivators for which one-on-one survey data was not collected. Instead position and relations were cross-checked by observations recorded in field notes and in discussions with other cultivators.

Appendix 2a (continued)

181	Alpha Fofana (42)	-10	2	28	170000	220000	3400000	1760000	4160000	20	8	YMG
182	Unknown 9 (99)	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
183	Musa Bangura (8)	-2	2	16	80000	100000	800000	600000	1400000	10	6	YMG
184	Musa Koroma (58)	0	3	80	200000	400000	1.10E+07	1.00E+07	2.10E+07	55	25	YMG
185	Unknown 12 (102)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
186	Unknown 11 (101)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
187	Unknown 10 (100)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
188	Salman (112)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
189	Salieu Conteh (32)	-4	2	34	100000	180000	2700000	1260000	3960000	27	7	YMG
190	Unknown 14 (104)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
191	Unknown 13 (103)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
192	Mohammed Moshie (47)	-2	2	95	200000	230000	1.30E+07	6900000	1.99E+07	65	30	YMG
193	Unknown 15 (105)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
194	Unknown 16 (106)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
195	Unknown 17 (107)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
196	Unknown 18 (108)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
197	Unknown 19 (109)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
198	Unknown 20 (110)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
199	Michael Dawo (113)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
200	Unknown 21 (111)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
201	Unknown 22 (112)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
202	Unknown 23 (113)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
203	Unknown 25 (117)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
204	Unknown 26 (118)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
205	Unknown 27 (119)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
206	Unknown 28 (120)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
207	Unknown 29 (121)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
208	Unknown 30 (122)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
209	Unknown 31 (123)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
210	Unknown 32 (124)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
211	Unknown 24 (116)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
212	Unknown 33 (125)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	YMG
213	Amerikan (98)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
214	Unknown 39 (131)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
215	Unknown 38 (130)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
216	Unknown 37 (129)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
217	Unknown 36 (128)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
218	Unknown 35 (127)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
219	Aroul (132)	0	3	25	150000	200000	2250000	4250000	6500000	15	10	Obohnoki
220	Ibrahim Torunka aka. Turkish (18)	-1	2	25	120000	140000	2400000	700000	3100000	20	5	Obohnoki
221	Atika (19)	-3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
222	Thimu (19)	-1	2	0	50000	200000	1000000	2000000	3000000	20	10	Obohnoki
223	Michael (134)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
224	Abdullai (133)	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
225	Santi Bangura (26)	-1	2	20	100000	200000	2000000	0	2000000	20	0	Obohnoki
226	Mohammed Bangura (?)		2									Obohnoki
227	Idrissa (22)	-7	2	20	60000	250000	960000	1000000	1960000	16	4	Obohnoki
228	Alie Bangura (21)	-12	2	23	70000	200000	1260000	1000000	2260000	18	5	Obohnoki
229	Unknown 41 (136)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
230	Unknown 42 (137)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
231	Unknown 40 (135)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
232	Unknown 41 (136)	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Obohnoki
233	Hasan Jalloh (25)	0	3	12	50000	100000	500000	200000	700000	10	2	Obohnoki
234	Tapeia Sesay (24)	0	3	19	80000	200000	1120000	1000000	2120000	14	5	Obohnoki

Appendix 2b: Tabulated data for ties within network digram of production hierarchies.[217]

Source	Target	Type	Tie-ID
81	83	Undirected	98
81	84	Undirected	99
81	85	Undirected	100
84	89	Directed	95
84	113	Directed	122
84	114	Directed	123
98	95	Undirected	108
98	99	Undirected	110
98	108	Undirected	118
98	109	Directed	119
98	115	Directed	124
98	116	Undirected	125
98	157	Undirected	161
106	104	Undirected	115
106	105	Undirected	116
106	107	Undirected	117
106	112	Directed	121
117	118	Directed	129
117	119	Directed	130
117	120	Directed	131
117	121	Undirected	133
117	122	Undirected	132
117	126	Undirected	134
121	123	Directed	128
121	125	Directed	127
127	128	Undirected	135
127	129	Undirected	136
127	130	Undirected	137
127	131	Undirected	138
127	132	Directed	139
127	133	Directed	140
127	134	Directed	141
129	138	Directed	145
130	136	Undirected	143
130	137	Undirected	144
131	140	Directed	147
132	139	Directed	146
134	135	Undirected	142
141	142	Directed	149
141	143	Undirected	150
141	144	Directed	151
141	145	Undirected	152
147	152	Undirected	156
147	153	Undirected	157
150	151	Undirected	155
150	154	Undirected	158
150	162	Directed	164
150	163	Directed	165
150	164	Directed	166
151	167	Directed	169
151	168	Directed	170
154	169	Directed	171
154	170	Directed	172
157	158	Directed	162
157	159	Directed	163
171	172	Undirected	173
171	173	Undirected	174
171	174	Undirected	175
171	175	Undirected	176
172	178	Directed	178
174	177	Directed	179
179	180	Undirected	180
179	181	Undirected	181
179	183	Undirected	183
179	189	Undirected	188
179	192	Undirected	191
179	199	Undirected	198
179	203	Directed	203
179	204	Directed	204
179	205	Directed	205
179	206	Directed	206
179	207	Directed	207
179	208	Directed	208
179	209	Directed	209
179	210	Directed	210
179	211	Directed	202
179	212	Directed	211
181	182	Directed	182
184	185	Directed	186
184	186	Directed	185
184	187	Directed	184
184	188	Undirected	187
189	190	Directed	189
189	191	Directed	190
192	193	Directed	197
192	194	Directed	196
192	195	Directed	195
192	196	Directed	194
192	197	Directed	193
192	198	Directed	192
199	200	Directed	199
199	201	Directed	200
199	202	Directed	201
213	214	Directed	216
213	215	Directed	215
213	216	Directed	214
213	217	Directed	213
213	218	Directed	212
219	220	Undirected	217
219	221	Undirected	218
219	222	Undirected	219
219	223	Undirected	220
224	225	Undirected	221
224	226	Undirected	222
224	227	Undirected	223
224	228	Undirected	224
224	231	Directed	227
224	232	Directed	228
228	229	Directed	225
228	230	Directed	226

[217] Target and source numbers correspond to the Node-ID in appendix 2a.

Appendix 3: Tabulated Data for Network Diagram of Boss-Apprentice Relations.[218]

ID Source	ID Target	Duration of apprenticeship (years)	Type		ID Source	ID Target	Duration of apprenticeship (years)	Type
1	110	2	Directed		57	111	3	Directed
2	111	14	Directed		58	1	2	Directed
3	1	4	Directed		59	124	3	Directed
4	1	2	Directed		60	124	2	Directed
5	1	0.25	Directed		53	1	2	Directed
6	70	1	Directed		54	1	2	Directed
7	112	1	Directed		55	5	2	Directed
8	111	1	Directed		56	33	1	Directed
9	46	7	Directed		61	14	1.5	Directed
10	113	4	Directed		62	14	2	Directed
11	114	1	Directed		63	14	2	Directed
12	115	6	Directed		64	125	1	Directed
13	115	10	Directed		65	125	1	Directed
14	116	3	Directed		66	36	1.5	Directed
15	106	4	Directed		67	36	1.5	Directed
16	106	2	Directed		68	14	2	Directed
17	106	2	Directed		69	14	2	Directed
18	106	5	Directed		70	116	0	Directed
19	73	2	Directed		71	70	2	Directed
20	73	2	Directed		72	116	0	Directed
21	73	5	Directed		73	70	0	Directed
22	120	1	Directed		74	35	2	Directed
23	106	4	Directed		75	47	1	Directed
24	70	4	Directed		76	47	1	Directed
25	70	4	Directed		77	47	1	Directed
26	117	2	Directed		78	27	1	Directed
27	73	4	Directed		79	27	1	Directed
28	14	2	Directed		80	38	3	Directed
29	25	3	Directed		81	38	2	Directed
30	4	1	Directed		82	38	1	Directed
31	118	1	Directed		83	38	1	Directed
32	119	6	Directed		84	38	1	Directed
33	70	5	Directed		85	38	1	Directed
34	115	1.5	Directed		86	87	1	Directed
35	70	5	Directed		87	70	0	Directed
36	126	8	Directed		88	87	1	Directed
37	127	1	Directed		89	87	1	Directed
38	70	3	Directed		90	70	1	Directed
39	112	4	Directed		91	70	1	Directed
40	70	3	Directed		92	70	1	Directed
40	121	5	Directed		93	70	1	Directed
41	1	2	Directed		94	70	1	Directed
42	1	1	Directed		95	70	1	Directed
43	71	3	Directed		96	70	1	Directed
44	122	1	Directed		97	70	1	Directed
45	70	3	Directed		98	70	1	Directed
46	116	1	Directed		99	70	1	Directed
47	123	2	Directed		100	70	1	Directed
48	115	3	Directed		101	73	1	Directed
48	124	2	Directed		102	73	1	Directed
49	115	6	Directed		103	73	1	Directed
50	46	1.5	Directed		104	73	1	Directed
50	124	2	Directed		105	73	1	Directed
51	46	1.5	Directed		106	70	2	Directed
51	70	2	Directed		107	106	1	Directed
52	125	1.5	Directed		108	106	1	Directed
					109	106	1	Directed

[218] Directed ties are pointed from source (boss) to target (apprentice) and weighted according to the duration of apprenticeship. Each tie represents one instance of apprenticeship.

Appendix 4: Betweenness Statistics for Extra-legal Relations between Cultivators and Law-enforcement.[219]

Name	Betweenness statistic
Local Police Chief) (Waterloo)	0.470082504
Ohsilibu	0.353284756
Local Police Chief	0.35160768
Musa Koroma	0.223918575
Local Unit Commander (Western Area)	0.187601203
Pa Mohammed	0.172102706
Forest Guard	0.155042794
BIG	0.145385149
Musa Barrie	0.108373814
Abdullai	0.108373814
PM	0.096615005
Mohammed Moshie	0.082234559
Amerikan	0.070437196
TOCU	0.056789267
Abu Bakar	0.055285681
Ali Manseray	0.055285681
Aroul	0.055285681
Kohnehl	0.042485928
Wilfred Kamanda	0.041637752
Michael Dawo	0.041637752
David Kamanda	0.029030766
Sorie	0.027874161
Musa Limba	0.027874161
Usman Sesey	0.027874161
Abdullai	0.027874161
Salieu Conteh	0.027874161
Alie Bangura	0.027874161
Mohammed M	0.013994911
Jonny B	0.013994911
Immanuel T	0.013994911
Abdul Rahman-Sesay	0.013994911
Myers Bangura	0.013994911
Henry	0.013994911
Alpha Fofana	0.013994911
Town Head (Hastings)	0.010062457

[219] 36 out of 132 cultivators and law enforcers returned a betweenness statistic > 0.

<u>Appendix 5</u>: Initial Interview Guide for Cannabis Cultivator Respondents (Krio).

Background (1)

- Wetin na yu nem?
- Usay yu bɔn?
- Wetin mek yu ka(m) ya?
- Yu (bin) go skul?
- Ustɛm yu tap pan buk lanin?
- Wetin mek yu lɛf?
- Wetin mek una yut? Aw sɔmbɔdi fɔ bi yut?

Employment & work (2)

- Uskayn wok yu bin de du na ya?
- Yu bin de du ɛni ɔda kayn wok?
- Ustɛm yu bigin fɔ gro am? Aw lɔng yu de insay di biznɛs/gem/diamba wok?
- Aw yu bin ebul fɛn wok na ya?
- Wetin mek yu (begin fɔ) gro diamba/ganja/am?
- Yu kin mek mɔni pas ɔda kayn wok?

Cannabis cultivation (3)

- Aw mɛni ol de de?
- Wetin una kal di grawnd na ya?
- Uskayn arenjmɛnt una gɛt fɔ gro am na ya?
- Yu de ɔnda bɔs? [If interviewee is a land owner or rights user]:
    - Yu gɛt wok man dɛn? / Aw mɛni wok man dɛn de na ya?
    - Aw una de sheb di wok (una de du)?
    - Yu de pe am/dɛn?
    - Wetin yu de du we dɛn mek wahalla/yala yala?
- Yu de rɛnt yu in land?
    - Aw mɔs?
- Aw yu/una de gro di diamba/ganja?
    - Ustɛm yu bigin fɔ gro am? Aw lɔng?
    - Insay aw mɛni sizɛn?
    - Wɛtin ɛn wɛtin yu de yus pa di diamba/ganja?
- Aw yu dɔn insay wan sizɛn?
- Aw m mɛni sizɛn yu dɔn gro am?
- Aw yu de sɛl am? Yu gɛt link?
    - Na opɛn ɔ sikrit?
- Una de/kin trɔst?
- Am mɔs yu de sɛl na di: dray sizɛn, reni sizɛn?
- Di prays kin chenj? Wetin mek am chenj?
- Wetin yu fil se mɔ impɔtant: sababu or mɔni?

Legitimacy & law enforcement (4)

- Una tink se diamba/ganja na rayt ɔ rɔng?
    - Ba nɔto ligal?
- Aw dɛn de si am?
- Aw gɔvmɛnt si am?
- Aw di ɛdman si am?
- Pipul kin tif am?
- Wetin go apin if dɛn tif am?
- Aw una balans ofisadɛn? Dɛn bin red yu?

The future (5)

- Yu wan fɛn ɔda kayn wok?
- Wetin yu tink se mek yu go lɛf am/di gem?
- Lɛ wi se gɔvmɛnt dɛn red bɔku-bɔku ɛn dɛn stɔp di gem tide-tide – wetin yu go du?

Appendix 6: Initial Interview Guide for Cannabis Cultivator Respondents (English).

Background (1)

- What is your name?
- Where were you raised?
- What made you come to Hastings/Waterloo?
- Did you undertake formal education?
- Why did you leave education?
- What makes somebody a 'youth'?

Employment & work (2)

- What kind of work have you been doing in Hastings/Waterloo?
- Have you undertaken any other kinds of work?
- When did you begin to grow cannabis?
- How long have you grown cannabis?
- How did you find work as a cannabis cultivator?
- Why did you begin to grow cannabis?
- Can you make more money growing cannabis than other kinds of work?

Cannabis cultivation (3)

- How many 'holes' are in your farm?
- What do you call this place?
- Do you have an arrangement according to which you grow cannabis?
- Do you have a boss? How do you know him? [If interviewee is a land owner or rights user]:
    - How many workers do you have?
    - How do you share the work?
    - Do you pay them? How much?
    - What do you do if there is a dispute?
- Do you rent the land/plot you are using?
    - How much must you pay to rent the land/plot?
- How do you grow your cannabis?
    - When do you begin to grow? How long is it until harvest?
    - For how many seasons do you grow cannabis each year?
    - What do you use to grow the cannabis?
    - How much do you put in the hole/what is the price (Leones)?
        - Fertiliser (bags)
        - Chicken dung (bags)
        - Fish skin (bags)
        - Anything else?

    - How much do you typically cultivate in one season (in kilograms)?
- How do you sell your cannabis? Do you have a 'link'?
    - Do you sell it openly or is it a secret?
- How can you trust them?
- For how much can you sell 1 kilogram?
    - In the dry season
    - In the rainy season
- Can the price change? What makes the price change?
- What is more important for cannabis cultivators: money or *sababu* [person of influence]?

Legitimacy & law enforcement (4)

- How do you see the way you make money? Is it right or wrong?
    - …But it is illegal?
- What do other people think about cannabis cultivators?
- What is the town chief's opinion of cannabis cultivation?
- What is the government's opinion of cannabis cultivation?
- Do other people try to steal your cannabis?
- What happens if you catch a thief?
- How do you deal with the police? Have they ever 'raided' you?

The future (5)

- Would you consider finding other kinds of work?
- What would make you leave cannabis cultivation?
- So let's say the government raid a lot, and they stop this business right now, what will you do?

Appendix 7: Plates of Interview Transcripts (English) with Analytic Notes.

47. Bayo Manseray (aka. Adebayor)

***Plate 1*: Interview transcript, Cannabis Cultivator, 'Bayo Manseray', Waterloo, 19-11-2013.**

Chris Ok, so easy question - what is your name?

Bayo My name is Bayo Manseray.

Chris Bayo Manseray // Yes // But people call you Ade- // *Adebayor*, yeah they call me Adebayor // Ah OK, and Bayo, where were you born?

Bayo Me, I was in-, let me say, I was born in Hastings Vill



Chris Hastings?

Bayo Yes, village, there I was born.

Chris OK, and you were raised there?

Bayo Huh? [t. confused].

Chris Were you raised there?

Bayo (.) If?

Chris Erm, were you raised there?

Bayo Yes, yes

Chris Yeah (.) So how long were you there?

Bayo How long was I there? // Yeah, yeah // Well I stayed in Hastings since-, because I was born in 1972. I lived in Hastings about 20 years, from there I moved and went (to) Western (Freetown). From Western now, I was there about 10 years, then I came to Waterloo where I am staying right now.

***Plate 2*: Interview Transcipt, 'Musa Koroma', Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20-11-2013.**

50. Musa Koroma



Chris Ok, so, easy question - what is your name?

Musa K My name is Mus-a Koroma.

Chris Musa Koroma, and Musa, where were you born?

Musa K I was born in Makeni.

Chris Makeni? // Ye-s // OK, so you were raised there?

Musa K Eh? [t. confused].

Chris You were *raised* there?

Musa K Yeah, yeah.

Chris Yeah, for how long?

Musa K Well, I was living there, from, let me say (..) it is seventeen years.

Chris Seventeen years inside Makeni // Ye-s // Oh, so your family are living there?

Musa K Yeah, my family are living there.

Chris Ah OK. And then when did you come here, to Waterloo?

Musa K I cam3-, I came here in 2008.

Chris ~~2000~~. **2008**

Musa K But I was living in Hasting-, 2004 I went to Hasting.

***Plate 3*: Interview Transcipt, 'Turkish', Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013.**



18. Turkish - Part Two

Chris What do you mean by 'leakage'? Leakage

Turkish If they find out, how- how many, if they find out that you have the business, the business leakage this, that, if you don't have money but you have the ganji, you will never make money, trust me. I fyou have *SABABU*, the sababu will, will, will pursue you out. But if you have money, your money will come close, you will know how to make you *clos-er*, to sensitise you, because some people come here, they come here to give you sense. If they want to raid you to come and capture you they give you sense. Those authority, because of *money*. You go and meet him: yeah pape (i.e. older/authority figure) look at this one million leones. Ohsi (i.e. Osilibu) and he says: leave five hundred thousand. There, er- erm, [inc. klak] there now look at this one million leones, now hold it. You have closed them [i.e. yu dohn klos dehm]. Then finally they will, they will give you a receipt for the business. They say anybody hold you (*bangs fingers on table top) come and meet us so-so call this numbe. They will never hold you, they will *never*, come and , erm, obstruct you inside the business. That is why money. Even Osilibu, they went and captured him, during NPRC time, before the coup, they say they will come and over-*throw* (.) The country overthrow (.) *Strasser*.. At the time they say they will form a coup // Coup? // Coup yeah, you have heard about that, eh?

Chris They captured Osilibu? #01:21:18-1#

Turkish They captured Osilibu to Pademba Prison, I am telling you. But because of, when you are a strong man inside the ganjin, they released him. They released him. Some of his [kohmpin dehn] killed them. They killed them now there were five (.) He then now be the number four they went to go and kill, they had killed the three, the other make four, it is him, as soon as they go now they say no, no not this man; that is Osilibu. Osilibu, is not this man. They have killed the two, they have left *you* now. They say well now then, go. Meet the crew, for control this, erm, government, NPRC.

Chris So Osilibu was fighting in the war?

Turkish He wasn't fighting, nothing, just [skandard] because he was with the string crew members. The, yes, the crew members, when they formed the crew, so they included them all inside.

***Plate 4*: Interview Transcipt, 'Turkish', Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013.**

Chris What do you mean by fire burning?

Turkish The fire burning in your *heart*. You have to become *clean* // Yeah // Yes. You have to become clean, and work *rightly* (.) When Balogu- look at Balogu farm, this Balogu farm, this my farm, Balogu's farm is not my own. My own is my own. So if want to succeed through by you I will come down (.) and try to su- survive through by you. I will work for you, to let me have my own survival. You give me, Turkish come and do small job here, Turkish come and assist me please, I want to do something, Turkish come and assist me. You know, then I come under you to come and survi-ve. You have seen? Well come on, to you like that, to come and make envious, jealousy. You not, it's not good, I will never survive through by my own, because I take your own to come and spend, erm, to my own, then I come, I come with bad heart to you, then you have clean heart for me. It will not end well. The business will not work [*claps hands] (.) God is seeing the business, he knows that to leave the same. You get up, I am down, we should live the same [i.e. yu geht ohp, mi de dawn, wi foh liv di sem]. We should migrate, we should make [inc.] God will list someone one-by-one, whenever God lifts you up the next day until you see Turkish and that [inc. big girl] you know that eh this boy I have helped him before (.) Then they say, eh, that man which is going over there with Balogu he is an intellectual he has helped me before. He is a promise(d) man. He has healed me, now finally, we have seen the progress has begun to rise. God is blessing.

***Plate 5*: Interview Transcipt, 'Turkish',**
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013.

HIERARCHY

CHAIRMAN

Chris So let we take, like, Osiliubu, what does he do inside the business?

Turkish Osilibu, he is our chair, our chair. We call him *chair* man (.) They are all chairmen, inside the business [i.e. dehn na ohl de in chiaman dehn, insay di biznehs]. You have seen? They are man which have presented them, they have made camp. Any year they send thousands of kilo, when they go [inc. abroad] like this December, you have signed up to them three hundred kilo. Which has gone, Ameri-*ca, England*, I have already told you it is there. You know that the time when Bob Marley day is coming, May eleven, inside the celebration of Bob Marley, how many kilo do they send *out*, this Hasting ganjin it is going to Jamaica, it is going to Jamaica, because they respect it, because the ground, is so *rich*. We have hard tension [inc.] [*coughs I have cold, I have brought my medicine]

Chris So and, Amerikan, what does he do inside the business?

'SHAREHOLDER'

Turkish Ah Amerikan, he is the shareholder, Amerikan, Osilibu alongside Amerikan. Well now they start(ed) the business, inside that town, they come with that (Mr) Iskandrie they talk about Karie B. And they get hold of the skunk seed, they they plant it in Hasting, then they go with it to Waterloo. It is them // It is them? // They are all friends together, *together*. mhm [t. affirmative].

Chris So (.) -

small boy = ↓assets

big no house

not chairman big man

Turkish Amerikan let's say is the small boy, he has not built (a) house yet. He lives with his family, to his mother and father. Now he is a *shareholder*, he has got children, inside the business (.) He has become (a) shareholder. Like me, [inc. win bak dohn de kohm], you know, you have children, who become foundation, you know that as time goes on me back a *shareholder*, so it is bit-by-bit [i.e. smohl-smohl].

Chris So how are they operating? Is Amerikan under Osilibu, or what?

'SPONSORER'

Turkish Yes, Amerikan he is under Osilibu, Osilibu (.) they are the sponsorers. They are the overseers in the business, they are there for [inc. ohfis skram-blin] the contract.

Appendix 8: Plates of Field Diary Entries with Analytic Notes.



13/11/2013 (Wednesday)

Wednesday, November 13, 2013
5:26 PM

"The Big Delivery"

I meet Turkish at Hastings Junction and we walk to meet Amerikan at his house. Outside is parked a large lorry carrying what Turkish says is between 500 to 1,000 bags of chicken dung and fertiliser bound for diamba farms in the bush - although Turkish is vague on the exact place. Young men offload bags from the truck walking with the bags on top of their shoulders, headed for the bush. In the court yard of Amerikan's house sit around 7 to 8 young men who he is supplying with large bowls of food and water. Turkish and I sit down with them. No one seems concerned with our presence, let alone that the truck is parked around 400 metres from Western Area Police Training School. Amerikan is rushing around, giving workers provisions, so has little time to talk. Turkish tells me there are nearly 1000 bags of dung and 20 workers. The bags are heading for *Kagbere* and *Makeni*. He says that the current 'arrangement' is organised by the 'coming together' of Amerikan, Pastor--aka. 'Pastor insay di biznes'--and 'another man' whose name he can't recall: 'den de wok in combination'. Turkish remarks how he aspires to 'work for Amerikan' although how this is, or isn't currently, achievable remains unclear. Another man walks into the court yard. Turkish calls to him--as he is trying to collect donations for his father's funeral--but he is ignored. Turkish says his name is "Kabral" (****) who 'works together' with Zaze. Turkish went to school with Zaze who was in an older year. Zaze started 'inside the business' doing 'buy and sell' but now is 'supplying'--'I de supply di biznes to di shareholders'--by which he means he farms or sponsors farms [i.e. 'supply' and 'business'] and so has now 'grown up inside the business'. As we leave Amerikan makes a point of telling us it is not that he doesn't want to see us; rather, he has 'money to collect' and is busy. Turkish takes me to a smaller house to the left of Amerikan's. Inside is Ɔsilibu. Despite threatening to burn Musa's house down he is hospitable with me, agreeing to exchange numbers, and that anytime he sees me in Waterloo we can 'bind' and 'talk'. However, he didn't seem to want me hanging around long. We leave walking towards Tukrish's panbodi. On route Turkish tells me Ɔsilibu has farms--as well as in Yu Mos Grumble-in: *Keri Town*, *Sɔngo* and upcountry in *Kambia* i.e. he 'sponsors' these farms. Turkish also says Ɔsilibu 'founded' Yu Mos Gruble, so 'if you want to work there you must ask him'. Pastor, he says, has a farm in *BatKanu* which uses nearly 1000 bags of dung every season. Ɔsilibu, Pastor and Amerikan's houses reside side-by-side: Ɔsilibu to the left, Pastor in the largest middle yellow house, and Amerikan to the right - the truck is parked directly outside of them. We pass one of the small pan bodis opposite Aroul's porch. Inside are four or five men. One is sitting on a rucksack trying to compress about 2 to 3 skels of diamba which he then hands to two young men--one swigging from a can of Extra Stout--who get on a bike together with the rucksack. The man left with us introduces himself as "Alfred Sesey" (088732064) and agrees to talk with me 'anytime' but is busy presently - and quite inebriated. At Turkish's house I discuss with him some of the problems I'm facing doing research in Hastings - namely that we have done no interviews here but I have done over 40 in Waterloo. Turkish says not to use the word 'interview' as it will 'make them think you want to leak the secret ... because it's no legal, the secret runs deep ... so dis na problem'. I ask about Ɔbɔnoki - who 'owns' the land. Turkish doesn't seem to know, or is avoiding an answer, simply saying that 'you must speak to someone ... and they will give you the green light'. Eventually Turkish appears to concede that we have been unable to meet informants quickly enough--especially those 'high up in the game'--because: 'we are the small ones, we don't know how to talk to them'. I ask Turkish why there appears to be a difference between Hastings and Waterloo, the latter being more open. He suggests that when trying to interview people like Amerikan and Ɔsilibu that I 'turn it upside down' as they are 'all watching ... all watching ... all watching na ya'.

EXTRA-LEGAL 'ARRANGEMENT'

'SUPPLIERS AS HIGHER UP' IN THE 'BUSINESS'

"ƆSILIBU" HIERARCHY

HIERARCHY

SURVELLENCE

('In combination' ↳ uses phrase a lot sim. to Musa's 'team work')

Field Notes (Hastings + Ftown) Page 155

***Plate 1*: Fieldnotes with 'American', Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 13-11-2013.**

29/10/2013 (Tuesday)

Monday, October 28, 2013
11:13 PM

Plate 2: Fieldnotes (pg. 1) with 'Turkish', Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 29-10-2013.

'SABABU'

In the taxi I overhear a man say 'I get sababu in dat big ples', referring to a man who is constructing a large building we have just passed. I walk through Sori Lane. As I pass near the river seperating Kossoh Town and Hastings a few young men shout at me saying Turkish is waiting, eventually I meet him at Kingston Base, or Long Bench as he sometimes refers to it. "Wowu", who self-deprecatingly refers to himself as 'Ugly Man'--which he was nicknamed when trained by British military officers--talks to me about his time in the forces, repeating again that I need to find Captain Miller of the Poachers regiment, as if hoping I can find him a place in the British Army. I meet "Mohammed Conteh" (077315897) who Turkish's 'uman's' younger brother. The young man refers to himself as a 'street solja': 'Mi na trit solja. A beliv se wan de gɔd go ɔp mi'. I also meet "Man Man" (****) who Turkish says is a baloster and that: 'I de insay di biznɛs' and that 'wi ɔl de insay di biznɛs'. We sit down and drink a cup of pɔyo each, Turkish drinks a lot faster than idea. He tells me that this season

'ESTABLISHED'

the 'business is not established... because of raiding, I no good', that he recently bought one pɛku of diamba from a 'friend' which he will 'process' into 'bɔl' and sell 'wan-wan' (one-one) i.e. 'wan-wan wrap'. After pausing for a minute or so Turkish says the friend is Pastor, 'a go sɛl fɔ ram na Ferry Junction' to King David who buys it for 50,000 leones: 'A no gɛt fɔ pay back Pastor, I appreciate me, tide mi batde (birthday)'. He says he keeps the 'bottom fat' of the diamba as a 'reserve' to 'sample' when trying to sell - the bottom fat is what Musa calls the 'best part' of the diamba. He says Pastors children go to school in Liberia, so Pastor is not around today as he has gone to visit them there today. Turkish tells me he will 'gada gada' all his 'fans' by making a 'gladi gladi' by which he means a 'bata' of pɔyo which costs about 20,000 leones. Turkish refers to Hastings as a village but then changes his mind saying 'it's not a village anymore, a town!'. We begin walking to Aroul's porch and pass the kiosk of "Yaman" (****) just across the road. Yaman is always very friendly and intrigued about my researching, saying he will talk to me about it, even that he was thinking about doing a similar research project. He sits in the kiosk with a big smile and text book in hand, telling me he is studying for a course in social studies at a local college. He frequently makes gestures as if to say I know what you want to know. At Aroul's porch a young man passes by who the young men refer to as "Ɛsjɛn" which Turkish says means 'Five O Jɛn', that he is the five-o jen of 'long bench' behind Islex. A man on an okada, with a fair complexion and blue Chinese work jacket, comes to talk to Aroul, out of ear shot from me. He sits with me on the porch and shares a cigarette. Then leaves on an okada after saying little. Turkish says his nickname is "Ali Pɛku" (****). Apparently they are arranging three boys to go buy and sell--it is not clear where--and each of them are given three pɛkus each. Another

relations of DEBT

Making deals

three diamba deals happen on the porch// The young men sit down with rucksacks and sactual. Other young men pass by and they open their bag revealing a black plasic bag with diamba inside which the potential buyers smells. They sit down and whisper in each others ears, negotiating price. Each time the buyer makes the first offer to which the seller responds. Usually if the first asking price does not meet the figure the seller has in mind the negotiation ends// Turkish says we can go and see Izato. We go inside the Islex building, rows of benches lined up facing television screens. In the middle of one bench Izato is seated with two young men and a younger girl. He is wrapping cannabis resin in small cling film wraps, whilst the others dispense tablets and what looks like cod liver oil into smaller plastic sachet bags. Turkish makes little effort to talk, making the situation awkward. We just greet each other, Izato fist bumps me, but he says little not really acknowledging I am there and then I leave shortly after sensing the situation is awkward. As we leave Turkish says he will go and calls his 'fans' although he appears to be exaggerating the number, perhaps they are more interested in the 'gladi gladi' than celebrating him and his birthday. We return to Kingston Base. Here Turkish introduces me to "Mɛdo Milla" aka. "Mohammed" (088216942) a slightly short stout man in a white shirt, and says we should exchange numbers. I ask Mɛdo what he does and he says 'wi na di tax force na ya', whilst Turkish describes him as a the 'yutmandɛm chiaman'. Turkish tells me that Ɔsilibu aka.

YOUTH CHAIRMAN

Mista used to 'supply' his brother Abu Limba with 'business' at Lumley Street during the 'time of the NPRC'. He says Abu worked with a man called "Balcony" who also received business from Mista, although Balcony was sent to Pedemba Road prison and died whilst in jail. Turkish begins distributing the bata of pɔyo I paid for the day before. All the young man are happy I have bought it

Field Notes (Hastings + Ftown) Page 150

***Plate 3**: Fieldnotes (pg. 2) with 'Turkish',*
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 29-10-2013.

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job application--I also add a reference saying he is my research assistant--for a local security contractor at Grafton Water: Avalanche Security. After I finish the application latter, using a maths textbook for Turkish's son Isaac to steady my handwriting, Turkish refers to the application as a 'formula': 'misef get formula now' and 'A go build formula'. Normally formula is used in the sense of concealing something, although in the context here the its use is more ambiguous. In terms of 'building a formula' the practice of concealing appears apparent as Turkish continues by telling me about a man called "Kɛkunda" who has a scrap iron business--referred to as 'iron team' and 'chaf chaf' at Ferry Junction. Kɛkunda taught Turkish how to drive cars and used to hide drugs in the inside of the car door, at times nearly 100 kilograms of diamba that would be compressed down. Turkish admires Kɛkunda: 'I na wonderful bluff man(I sabi di formula) I de kam wi di game, I de go wi di game ... wi get no problem wi dat'. Turkish elaborates on what he means by there being 'no problem with that' saying Kɛkinda would 'sensitise the buyer' of the drugs. Later Turkish tells me Kɛkunda has 'ten to fifteen farms' and is a 'producer' and a 'seller' of diamba. Another young man joins us who I write an application for the same job. As I write he and Turkish discuss how life is going, referring frequently to 'the system'. I pause briefly to ask what they mean. The young man says it means 'way of living', to which Turkish adds 'we are all hungry , must change ... Salone, di country system ... mɔna-o system ... not (in) two days, one day, mɔs chenj di system' (what does 'mɔna' mean?) They compare the system in Salone with that in America, Turkish says: 'American system cool running, Europe system cool running ... dɛn get ɔl di administration'. The use of 'administration' appears to mean two things which are somewhat inseparable. First, orderly, in terms of the system actually 'works', but second, it works for the benefit of 'the people' [probe further]. They contrast the European and American system with Salone's: 'dɛn si alikie na dis kɔntri ... di system mek mama no sabi pikin, pikin no sabi pikin ... system to---ugh! Everyday yu go ɛn fɛn am ... rɛs (rice) no de, layt no de ... so di tay wi de blo ... wi de gro tay ɔ---p! ... dɛn no value (it) ... ba wi de tinap (stand up) trɔng!' - Turkish holds his arms out and imitates beating his chest. We briefly discuss meeting Mista, saying we can go meet him together with Amerikan, Turkish says: 'mi na di green light fɔ draw yu ɔp ɛn put yu insay'. Turkish asks the other young man if he has a 'jingle'. He explains to me that it means 'a code' going on to give an example: 'when you want to make an area, when in jungle must always have a code - that is a jingle'. They continue talking about the system' and Turkish mentions 'the war', how he 'bɔn (born) Izaac (his son) during the war ... suffering makes you stronger ... you should always try to find ... what you don't know you must know, be patient to make success'. Turkish briefly mentions a man called "Idrissa" (****) who he describes as a 'manager' and 'ganja man' living in a 'big yellow house'. We leave for Sori Lane and on route bump into the two undercover police officers that arrested Turkish and I at Ferry Junction. Turkish seems unperturbed. I say--quite callously--'you again' and one mentions to the other what I've said and they make a sarcastic laugh then walk off to drink pɔyo at Pablo's base. We walk on and Turkish tells me that Showboy (covers) Pablo, meaning he 'helps him insay di business' and that Showboy's father is a police officer.

'FORMULA'

'SENSITISE' the buyer

'SYSTEM' t'mona' = pain / hard times
↳ notion of 'orderliness' + that has benefits for "the people"

Formula + 'bluff' i.e to fake / deceive.

'ADMINISTRATION'

'ALIKIE'

'JINGLE'

'SYSTEM' assoc w/ war + displacement

Idea of 'COVER' assoc. w/ metaphor of tree that covers up ... the tree covers, and protects, those underneath.

Appendix 9: National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Circular, 26th June 2013.





Appendix 10: 'Strategic Plan for 2014', National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).

Strategic Plan for 2014 - National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Sierra Leone

MISSION STATEMENT

To have the ability to provide leadership in and coordinate all issues relating to drug control, eradicating drug abuse and its primary causes, illicit drug supply and drug-related crimes. In essence, the Agency shall be the focal point and shall take a lead in all investigations concerning drugs, coordinating all drug-related regulatory, enforcement and prosecution functions conferred on any person or authority by any enactment.

The Agency shall also encourage and strengthen cooperation between the office of the Attorney-General, the Sierra Leone Police, National Revenue Authority, Immigration Department, Ministers of Social Welfare, Health, Transport and Aviation, and Internal Affairs, Local Councils, Prisons Department, other law enforcement agencies and Non-governmental organisations, in addressing issues of drug control, reducing drug abuse and its primary causes, and combating illicit drug supply and drug-related crimes.

In addition, the Agency shall collect, collate and disseminate information on drug and drug-related issues to public and private sector agencies and organisations and the wider community, and have responsibility for the conduct of research, analysis and education geared towards the prevention and eradication of drug abuse.

Furthermore, the Agency shall institute and take charge of the conduct of proceedings against any person in respect of any offence under the National Drugs Control Act, 2008 before any court in Sierra Leone with a view to the restraint, confiscation or forfeiture of any property being the proceeds or instrumentality of any offence under this Act, and shall in addition to any other functions conferred on it also have responsibility for improving international cooperation against drug trafficking and precursor trafficking by land, sea and air.